


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THE DISPATCHES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS  
FROM  
1799 TO 1818.

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“Monumentum ære perennius.”

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THE DISPATCHES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS  
IN  
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW  
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,  
FROM  
1799 TO 1818.

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COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

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VOLUME THE NINTH.

*A NEW EDITION.*

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LONDON:  
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET

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## MEMORANDUM.

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THE drafts of many letters of 1812, as stated in the Introduction, are missing from the Duke of Wellington's papers. Some addressed to Sir Howard Douglas are among the number, and there is one to that Officer dated 25th May, 1812, the *précis* of which, according to the Index, is as follows:—"Not to obey the Instructions of the 6th instant until he receives further orders from the Secretary of State." This letter has not been transmitted by Sir H. Douglas to the Compiler in time for insertion in this edition, but it will be hereafter published with others in an Appendix.

It appears that Sir Howard Douglas, in his interference with the Spanish authorities in Galicia, to prevent the embarkation of the Spanish troops for South America, acted under orders from the Secretary of State, of which Lord Wellington was not aware when he wrote the letter of the 6th May, 1812, at p. 115.



FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

‘Camp before Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

‘MY LORD,

‘According to the intention which I announced to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 13th instant, I broke up the cantonments of the army on the 15th and 16th instant, and invested Badajoz, on the left of the river Guadiana, on the 16th instant, with the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions of infantry, and with a brigade of Lieut. General Hamilton’s division on the right. These troops are under the command of Marshal Sir William Beresford and Lieut. General Picton.

‘We broke ground on the following day, and have established a parallel within two hundred yards of the outwork called the Picurina, which embraces the whole of the south-east angle of the fort.

‘ The work has continued ever since with great celerity notwithstanding the very bad weather which we have had since the 17th.

‘ The enemy made a sortie yesterday from the gate called La Trinidad, on the right of our attack, with about 2000 men. They were almost immediately driven in, without effecting any object, with considerable loss, by Major General Bowes, who commanded the guard in the trenches.

‘ We lost, upon this occasion, a very promising officer, Captain Cuthbert, aide de camp to Lieut. General Picton, killed; and Lieut. Colonel Fletcher was slightly wounded,

but I hope that he will soon be able to resume his duties. I have not got the returns, but I believe that our loss since the commencement of these operations amounts to 120 men killed and wounded.

‘ On the same day that Badajoz was invested, Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Guadiana with the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and General Slade’s, and General Le Marchant’s brigades of cavalry, and directed his march upon Valverde and Sta Marta, and thence towards Llerena; while Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, with the 2nd and Lieut. General Hamilton’s divisions, and Major General Long’s cavalry, marched from his cantonments near Albuquerque upon Merida, and thence upon Almendralejo.

‘ These movements induced General Drouet to retire from Villa Franca upon Hornachos, in order, I conclude, to be in communication with General Darricau’s division, which was about La Serena.

‘ I have heard from Sir Thomas Graham and from Sir Rowland Hill to the 19th instant. The former was at Los Santos and Zafra, with General Slade’s cavalry at Villa Franca, and the latter at Almendralejo. Lieut. General Hill took three officers and a few hussars prisoners in Merida.

‘ I have reports from the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo of the 17th instant, and from Salamanca of the 16th instant. The enemy had sent a small detachment to Bejar, principally with a view to plunder; but there was no appearance of any immediate movement.

‘ The 6th division had moved from Talavera through the Puerto del Pico on the 8th and 9th instant, and the 4th division from Toledo on the same days, through the Guadarrama, and the 1st division only remained on the Tagus, near Talavera. The march of these divisions was directed, as I understand, upon Valladolid; and I conclude either that the reports are founded which have been in circulation, that the Guards had been withdrawn from Spain, or that the enemy intend to endeavor to divert my attention from the attack of Badajoz, by making some movement upon Galicia, or upon the north of Portugal.

‘ The rain, however, which has annoyed us here, it may be expected, will have filled the rivers in the north; and I

made arrangements, before I left Castille, to provide for any plans of that kind which the enemy might adopt. Having lost their train, they cannot attack Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, at least till they shall have replaced it.

‘ I have not heard of any movements in the south. Marshal Soult was at the lines opposite Cadiz according to the last accounts.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,                      ‘ Camp before Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 5th March, marked “ secret and confidential,” enclosing your correspondence with Lord William Bentinck. I shall write to his Lordship, and to Sir E. Pellew, as soon as I can get a little leisure ; in the mean time I think it proper to apprize your Lordship that the attack of Tarragona or of Barcelona appears to me, of all the objects on the Eastern coast, to be the most desirable. I think it probable, however, that neither (most probably not the latter) will succeed. A siege requires time, and the French will move heaven and earth to save these places ; and they can bring troops from France as well as from Aragon and Valencia, in addition to what they have in Catalonia. Besides, 10,000 men are not quite sufficient to attack Barcelona, where there must be 5000 in garrison. Lord William may expect some assistance from General Lacy, but the foundation of his strength must be his British troops.

‘ I do not know how I can give him any assistance from Cadiz. Your Lordship will recollect that from Cadiz we now occupy Carthagen and Tarifa, and that there are included in the division at Cadiz and those places 1400 Portuguese troops, and about 2000 foreigners in the Regiment de Watteville and the battalion of foreign detachments. In fact there is no British regiment now at Cadiz to be detached, excepting the 1st regiment of foot guards, which I have not allowed to be sent into Carthagen or Tarifa.

‘ I would besides beg leave to draw your Lordship’s attention to the result of the operation I have now in hand. If it should succeed and matters turn out as I wish, we may re-

lieve the Andalusias. But if I should succeed in that object I shall bring the whole of the enemy's force upon me; and I cannot expect that, for some time at least, I shall receive any assistance from the Spaniards, or that they can make any material diversion in my favor. Will it not therefore be necessary to draw to this army the division at Cadiz?

' If I should not relieve the Andalusias, I beg to have your positive orders respecting the degree to which I shall reduce the garrison of Cadiz, and what regiments I shall send to Lord William Bentinck. I beg once more to repeat that it is entirely a matter of indifference to me, and always has been so, as far as I am personally concerned, whether the body of troops under my command is large or small. I shall perform service in proportion to the means placed at my disposal, in comparison with those of the enemy, and adverting to your Lordship's instructions.

' We are getting on here, notwithstanding that the weather is excessively bad. The constitutions of the troops have been so much shaken with Walcheren, &c. &c., that I am always apprehensive of the consequences of exposing them to the weather. However, I have them in tents now, and I hope that the rain will not last.

' Believe me, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

' SIR,

' Camp before Badajoz, 21st March, 1812.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th, enclosing a complaint from Dom Miguel Forjaz, that the *British* troops consumed *all* the green forage at Estremoz and Monte Mor ó Novo, which was the cause of the inefficiency of the post horses on the great road from Lisbon to Elvas.

' I cannot but observe in this complaint the desire which has been manifest for some time past, to complain of the British troops, at the same time that the Government are ready enough to avail themselves of their assistance to defend the country.

' I repeat what I have often said before, that no country can enjoy the advantage of a large army to defend it, without suffering some inconvenience.

‘ If I am not mistaken, the complaint of the badness of the post horses on the great road originated with yourself; and you passed up to Elvas either before there were any *British* troops at Estremoz, or, at all events, at most a day after they had arrived there. It is therefore not true that the badness of the post horses on the road is to be attributed to the consumption of *all* the green forage by the *British* troops. It is not true that there have been any *British* troops at Monte Mor ó Novo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

‘ The Secretary of State has sent me a copy of your dispatch to him, marked “ secret and confidential,” of the 25th January, and a copy of his dispatch to you, marked *secret*, of the 4th March, and has written me a letter on the 5th of March, of which I enclose a copy to your Lordship.

‘ The most essential object on which the troops under your command could be employed on the Eastern coast of Spain, would be the siege of Barcelona, or, if that could not be undertaken, the siege of Tarragona, in order to give General Lacy a point of communication with the fleet.

‘ I am not very well acquainted with the state of affairs on the Eastern coast. I believe however, that Barcelona is a place of the first order, but very insufficiently garrisoned, by only 5000 men. This force, indeed, is considered only sufficient to keep the population of the city in order.

‘ In forming a plan for attacking a strong place, it will not answer to reckon upon the exertions of the population within against the garrison, at the same time that the inclination of such a population as there is at Barcelona must not be thrown aside entirely.

‘ Upon the whole, however, I should doubt the sufficiency of your Lordship’s force, even with the assistance which General Lacy and Admiral Sir E. Pellew could give, to undertake such an operation as the siege of Barcelona. It may be depended upon that the enemy will make every effort to relieve the place; and I doubt the possibility of

your being able to effect your object with such a force as you will have against so formidable a place, even weakly garrisoned, before the enemy will have time to come to its relief.

‘ You are certainly much more equal to the attack of Tarragona, which is garrisoned, I understand, by 2000 men; and it is not, I understand, a place of great strength.

‘ In considering and deciding on this subject, I request you to observe, that if you should attempt and fail at Barcelona, you will not be able afterwards to attack Tarragona. On the other hand, if you should succeed at Tarragona, your success will end there, as you may depend upon it that the enemy will immediately collect a superior force in Catalonia.

‘ I do not recommend any operation to you in Valencia, as your success in Catalonia, and possibly even your landing upon the coast of that principality, will occasion the evacuation of Valencia. There would be no difficulty in seizing the city of Valencia at any time, even if you should fail at Barcelona or Tarragona. I do not believe that any of the fortified posts on the coast of Valencia are of a nature to make a vigorous or protracted resistance against an attack by 10,000 men, well equipped with cannon.

‘ The great object in all sieges is to gain time. The preparation and collection of materials for a siege necessarily take many days, which might be employed in carrying on the operations, if those materials were collected and prepared beforehand.

‘ Whatever may be the point which you may determine to attack, it is obvious that you must reach it by sea, and there can be no inconvenience in transporting with you all the materials which you may require.

‘ I would therefore recommend to your Lordship to send an officer of engineers, at an early period in the summer, to Minorca or Majorca, in order to prepare large quantities of fascines and gabions, sand bags, platforms, &c., which you should bring with you. Intrenching tools you will of course bring from Sicily or Malta; and I conclude that you will depend upon the fleet for ordnance and stores.

‘ In all the sieges which I have carried on in this country, I have used only the fire of guns, principally from entertaining an opinion that the fire of mortars and howitzers

has an effect upon the inhabitants of a town alone, and that a French garrison, in a Spanish or Portuguese town, would be but little likely to attend to the wishes or feelings of its inhabitants. By this measure I have diminished considerably the expense and difficulty of these operations: and, at all events, whether successful or not, I have done no injury to the Spanish or Portuguese inhabitants. If your Lordship should be inclined to try the effect of a bombardment, I imagine that it will be necessary that you should bring the ordnance and stores for it from Sicily or Malta.

‘ In regard to my own operations, I invested this place on the 16th instant, and I expect to be able to open our fire against it on to-morrow. I hope that I shall succeed in taking it, notwithstanding the badness of the weather, as I think the enemy cannot collect in time a force sufficient to oblige me to raise the siege.

‘ If I should succeed, much will depend upon the plan adopted by the enemy. Marmont appears inclined to carry on operations to the northward, and I may be obliged to remove the army again to that quarter. My wish is to oblige Soult to evacuate Andalusia, which I should effect if I could be sure of the Spaniards holding their ground in Galicia.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Lord William Bentinck.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

11 A.M.

‘ The river yesterday did us so much mischief, that we cannot commence our fire till to-morrow morning.

‘ General D’Urban arrived here in the night with your letter, and it appears to me to be very uncertain where Drouet is. It is obvious from the intercepted letters which you transmitted, that he wishes to protect the communication with Cordova; and I think it probable that if he has collected a force upon Don Benito, it is with a view to protect the junction of Foy by the bridge of Medellin. I believe that Foy intended to pass the Guadiana by the Barca at Castil-blanco, but the swelling of the river, which has been

so troublesome to us, will probably oblige him to come by Medellin; still, we cannot prevent, although we may delay the junction, which is a very great object for several reasons.

‘ We are not within 20,000 men so strong on the left of the Guadiana as we ought to be; the troops are arrived and arriving every day, but unfortunately our bridge was carried away the day before yesterday. I had directed that the planks and bearers might be taken off every night, and we have saved every thing, and in two days it will be as good as ever; but if the river should continue in its present state, and the bad weather should continue, we cannot be certain of passing by our standing bridge, and I have therefore ordered the troops to commence their march by Merida. This will take some days, and it would be desirable to gain a few days for this object only, as well as for others. If the Guadiana should fall, and I can put down the bridge, the troops will lose nothing by marching up the right of the river.

‘ On this ground, therefore, I think it desirable that an effort should be made to remove Drouet, Darricau, &c., from Zalamea, Don Benito, &c. I do not think there is any thing to be apprehended from the high road to Seville, as it is obvious that every thing coming from the South will pass by one of the roads from Cordova.

‘ Upon talking over roads and distances with General D’Urban, it appears to me that the cavalry, and your right divisions, should arrive at Zalamea and Quintana on the day that your left division, from Almendralejo, should arrive at Oliva, and General Hill at Medellin; Sir R. Hill should send a regiment of cavalry to General Clinton, to look out in his front, and enable him to communicate with his right and left. We shall thus force the enemy back from the best communication across the Guadiana, and from the communication with Soult, and we shall gain some time at all events.

‘ It must be observed, however, that we cannot long maintain the position which we shall thus have assumed, as Soult will be on the right flank certainly, and, if he chooses, on the rear of your troops.

‘ I shall either send General Hill a copy of this letter, or write to him to the same purport; and if you should not

hear of any movement of Soult's, which would render it inexpedient to undertake this operation, I request you to let General Hill know when you move, in order that he may regulate his movements accordingly.

'I am not certain whether Sir Rowland Hill could move upon Medellin by the left of the Guadiana; if he could it would give more security to the whole operation, but I should doubt his being able to make the march at this season.

'I have letters from —— of the 21st, and from Salamanca of the 20th, but there is nothing new; they talk of Marmont going to Avila on the 22nd.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. General*

'WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

'I have received a letter of the 21st from Lieut. Blanckley, from Truxillo, who states that Foy is at Castil-blanco, and that the enemy had left Don Benito.'

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

'Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

'MY DEAR HILL,

5 P.M.

'I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote this morning to General Sir Thomas Graham, on a plan for obliging the enemy to retire upon Zalamea, Don Benito, &c. I shall be much obliged to you if you will be ready to march in execution of this plan when you shall hear from Sir Thomas Graham.

'I should prefer your going to Medellin by the south of the Guadiana, if you can. If you cannot, you must go by the north of that river. As well as I recollect, we marched the distance in one march; but I believe it is six leagues.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To Don Carlos de España.*

'SIR,

'Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

'I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letters to the 21st instant.

'It appears to me to be quite impossible for the enemy to make any impression upon Ciudad Rodrigo without the

assistance of a battering train, if there should be 3000 men in the place determined to defend themselves. As the pressing inconvenience and danger now is the want of provisions, I would recommend to you to withdraw 1000 of the 4000 men you state in your letter of the 20th, to be in the place, leaving 3000 men, upon which I always calculated.

‘ If you have had as bad weather as we have had, I conceive the blockade to be now out of the question.

‘ I beg to refer you to what I had the honor of telling you in repeated conversations, and particularly in my letter of the 5th instant regarding the navigation of the Douro above St. João da Pesqueira.

‘ I beg leave to recall to your Excellency’s recollection, that I requested that the 24 pound British shot in Ciudad Rodrigo might be sent to Almeida, by the empty carriages going to St. João da Pesqueira for provisions, so that the removal of this shot ought not to have caused any delay in throwing provisions into the place.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Carlos de España.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,                      ‘ Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

‘ I enclose my last dispatch to the Secretary of State, to which I have but little to add, excepting that the rain has been almost constant, and has done us a good deal of mischief. We shall, however, open our fire to-morrow.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,    Camp before Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copies of a correspondence between Don Carlos de España and myself, regarding the want of provisions in Ciudad Rodrigo\*, which I beg you will bring under the notice of the Spanish Government.

‘ I imagine that the difference between Don Carlos’s account of provisions, delivered to the garrison by the British

\* See Letter dated Freneda, 12th February, 1812, in vol. viii.

Commissariat and mine, is occasioned principally by the difference between the Spanish and English pound. I observe, however, that some provisions have been delivered to the garrison (those at Guinaldo for instance), of which I was not aware.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General — — —.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 26th March, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd, and have one of the 23rd from Don Carlos de España, from which I learn that every thing was still quiet on the Tormes, &c.

‘ In regard to your supplies of corn, &c., I refer your letter to the Commissary General. He left money for the supply of your regiment, and there is still some corn in the magazine at St. João da Pasqueira, and your march is, I understand, provided for.

‘ You have acted your part very well, and I should think that by this time the enemy must know what is going on here. Don Carlos however tells me that he expects a convoy with provisions to arrive in Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th; and it is desirable that, if possible, you should not quit your station.

‘ We took the outwork called La Picurina last night, by storm, and we are established within 300 yards of the body of the place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General — — —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General — — —.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 27th March, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of 3 P.M., 24th instant.

‘ If the enemy move to reconnoitre Ciudad Rodrigo, you may depend upon it that they know that I am gone, and what we are doing; and there is no reason why you should stay any longer, and you might carry into execution my instructions of the 5th instant.

‘ I wish you, however, to advert to what I wrote to you yesterday; and it is very desirable that you should endea-

vor to have the provisions now on the road, and expected at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th instant, introduced into the place before you quit that part of the country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General — — —*.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool,*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 27th March, 1812.

‘ The operations of the siege of Badajoz have continued since I addressed you on the 20th instant, notwithstanding the badness of the weather, till the 25th instant. On that day we opened our fire from 28 pieces of ordnance, in 6 batteries in the first parallel, two of which were intended to fire upon the outwork called La Picurina, and the other four to enfilade or destroy the defences of the fort on the side attacked.

‘ I directed Major General Kempt, who commanded in the trenches on that afternoon, to attack La Picurina by storm, after it was dark that night, which service he effected in the most judicious and gallant manner.

‘ The attack was made by 500 men of the 3rd division, formed into three detachments, the right under the command of Major Shaw, of the 74th, the centre under Captain the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83rd, and the left under Major Rudd, of the 77th. The communication between the outwork and the body of the place was entered on its right and left by the right and left detachments, each consisting of 200 men; half of each which detachments protected the attack from sallies from the fort, while the others attacked the work in its gorge.

‘ It was first entered, however, by the centre detachment of 100 men, under the command of Captain the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83rd regiment, who escalated the work at the salient angle, at a point at which the palisades had been injured by our fire. The detachment which attacked the work by the gorge had the most serious difficulties to contend with, as it was closed by not less than three rows of palisades, defended by musketry, and a place of arms for the garrison, musket proof, and loopholed throughout. When the attack upon the salient angle, however, succeeded, the whole got into the work.

‘ The enemy’s garrison in the outwork consisted of 250 men, with 7 pieces of artillery, under the command of Colonel Gaspardier, of the Etat Major of the army of the South. But very few if any escaped: the Colonel, 3 other officers, and 86 men have been taken prisoners, and the remainder were either killed by the fire of our troops or drowned in the inundation of the river Rivillas. The enemy made a sortie from the ravelin called San Roque, either with a view to recover La Picurina, or to protect the retreat of the garrison; but they were immediately driven in by the detachment stationed in the communication to protect the attack.

‘ Major General Kempt mentions in high terms in his report the cool and persevering gallantry of the officers and troops; of which indeed the strength of the work which they carried affords the best proof. He particularly mentions Lieut. Colonel Hardinge, of the Staff of the Portuguese Army, who attended him on this occasion, Captain Burnet, his aide de camp, and Brig. Major Wilde, who was unfortunately killed by a cannon shot, after the work was in our possession. Likewise Captain Holloway, Lieuts. Gipps and Stanway, of the Royal Engineers, who conducted the several detachments to the points of attack; and Majors Shaw and Rudd, and Captain the Hon. H. Powys, who commanded the several detachments: these three officers were wounded, the latter on the parapet of the work, which he had been the first to mount by the ladders\*.

‘ I have to add to this account the high sense I entertain of the judicious manner and the gallantry with which Major General Kempt carried into execution the service which I had entrusted to him.

‘ We thus established ourselves in La Picurina on the night of the 25th, and opened the second parallel within 300 yards of the body of the place, in which batteries were commenced last night.

‘ It is impossible that I can do justice to the zeal, activity, and indefatigable labor of the officers and soldiers, with which these operations have been carried on in the most unfavorable weather. The Guadiana swelled so consider-

\* He died of his wounds.

ably that, notwithstanding all precautions, our bridge of pontoons was carried away on the 22nd instant, and the flying bridges were so much injured as almost to become useless. But still the operations have been carried on without interruption.

‘ I cannot, however, avoid taking this opportunity of calling the attention of your Lordship and of His Majesty’s Government to the neglect of the Portuguese authorities to furnish the means of transport necessary for the success of this or any other operation. My own anxiety, and the detail into which I am obliged to enter in order to find resources to overcome difficulties which occur at every moment, I put out of the question, although I believe no officer at the head of an army was ever so hampered, and it is desirable that the attention of one in that situation should be turned to other objects. But the serious inconveniences to which the troops are exposed, and the difficulties and risks which attend the execution of all services, for want of means of transport, become of such a magnitude, that no officer can venture to be responsible for them. If there was any want of means of transport in the country I should not complain, but I know there is no want; and I attribute the deficiency entirely to the defect of the Portuguese law upon the subject, and to the unwillingness of the magistrates to carry it into execution. In every country the supply of carriages for the service of the army is an obligation upon the owners of carriages; and I have repeatedly urged the Portuguese Government to frame a law upon the subject, with sufficient penalties to insure obedience to it, and that the army should have means of transport. Instead of doing that, the object of the law lately made by the Government, would appear to be to prevent the army from getting carriages, and the consequence is that every service becomes a matter of difficulty and risk; and as the carriages of the poor alone are forced into the service by the magistrates, they suffer all the hardships which result from the law.

‘ I had intended to commence the operations against Badajoz between the 6th and 8th of March, and all the arrangements were made accordingly; but because the large and rich town of Evora, which has suffered in no man-

ner by the war, would supply no carriages, I could not commence till the 17th, and thus the troops have been exposed to, and have been obliged to carry on the works of the siege during the rains of the Equinox, which I had intended to avoid. At this moment the powder for the siege, and much of the shot, and many of the engineers' stores, are not arrived at Elvas, and we are obliged to consume the stores of that garrison. I am destroying the equipments of the army in transporting the stores from Elvas to the ground of the siege, because no assistance is given by the country, or assistance that is quite inadequate to the demand and wants of the service.

‘I hope that His Majesty’s Government will exert their influence with the Prince Regent of Portugal, to order the Local Government not only to frame a law which shall have for its object the equipment of the armies in such a manner as to enable them to defend the country, but to carry that law into execution, so that the people of the country shall understand that they must comply with its provisions.

‘Since I addressed your Lordship on the 20th, General Drouet has had his troops on the line between Medellin on the Guadiana, and Zalamea de la Serena and Llerena, apparently with the view of keeping the communication open between the army of the South and the divisions of the army of Portugal stationed on the Tagus. Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham made a movement to Llerena on the 25th at night, but the enemy, consisting of three battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, which were there, having heard of his march, retired into the mountains during the night. Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill has likewise sent a detachment to La Guareña, and proposed to march himself this morning upon Medellin, in order to co-operate with Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham in obliging the enemy to remove to a greater distance, and to endeavor to destroy some of their detached corps.

‘The divisions of the army of Portugal which were in Castille, and those which have lately marched thither, have not yet moved, and the object of their movement is still doubtful. It is understood to be to attempt a *coup de main* upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or to blockade the place. But I consider the success of the former impracticable, and that

the latter is equally so at present, as the rain, which has been general, has filled all the rivers in that part of the country.

‘ I am sorry to say that the Spanish authorities have neglected to transport to Ciudad Rodrigo the provisions which I had given them from the British magazine at St. João da Pesqueira, and a part of these provisions only will arrive at that place on the 30th of this month. The place has now, therefore, in it only one month’s provisions for the garrison, which I had been able to give them from the stores of the army before I quitted Castille.

‘ I have transmitted to Mr. Wellesley, for the information of the Spanish Government, the copies of the correspondence which I have had with Don Carlos de España on this subject, in which His Majesty’s Government will see the measures which I had adopted to secure this important place, and the state in which it is at present.

‘ I have not heard from any authority that the troops have yet moved in the South, but it is reported that those at Seville had marched upon Cordova, to which point I understand that those at Granada had been brought.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose the return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the 18th instant.’

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,      ‘ Camp before Badajoz, 28th March, 1812.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday, and a paper directed to you from Madrid, which is well worth reading, and indeed ought to be sent home. It came to me open from the Spanish General at Plasencia, who informed me that the person who brought it lost his Spanish passport.

We are going on well, and shall open our fire from 35 pieces of artillery, *en brèche*, on the morning of the 31st.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘The man who brought the enclosed papers having expressed a desire to return to Madrid, I have given him 150 dollars and a receipt for them, and desired him to return.

‘Some of my friends in Castille have desired me to remonstrate against the —— ———’s appointment to be Captain General of that province. I believe he is a very bad fellow.’

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp before Badajoz, 28th March, 1812.’

‘When I received your letter of the 27th September, 1811, in which you announced to me that the committee for the management of the money raised in Great Britain and Ireland by subscription, for the relief of the suffering Portuguese, had determined to place the sum of 15,000 dollars at my disposal for the relief of the people inhabiting the country on the banks of the Coa, and Pinhel rivers, I employed the Rev. S. Briscall, the chaplain to head quarters, and the chaplains to the several divisions of the army, to make inquiries regarding the state of the people in the neighbourhood of the cantonments occupied by the troops, to which these gentlemen were attached, in order to enable me to form a judgment regarding the best mode of laying out the money with which I had been entrusted for the benefit of the people.

‘Mr. Briscall was unfortunately taken ill before he had completed his task, but not before he and the other gentlemen had made reports which, at the same time that they showed the general distress of the district, proved that no information could be obtained, according to which a distribution of the money could be made, which would satisfy my mind that I had done that which was most beneficial to the people.

‘I am sorry to say that I could not get from the curates of the villages, the fair source of information regarding the distresses of the poor, any account of the number in real distress, or a list of the names. All had suffered from the invasion, but not equally. The distinction of rich and poor still remained, and the former, although in a reduced state, possessed generally means of subsistence and to improve their situation, while the latter was really in want. Yet I am concerned to add that the rich in every village insisted

upon their names being inserted in the list of distressed persons, in order to participate equally with the poor in the distribution of money or food ; and the curates of the villages were apprehensive of the consequences of resisting these unreasonable pretensions ; and the list of the persons in absolute want furnished by the curates, were lists of the inhabitants of the villages.

‘ It would have been impossible for me to attempt to distribute the money excepting through the medium of the curates, and it was quite clear that the sum distributed to the whole population in equal proportions, would have relieved the distresses of none.

‘ Under these circumstances I had at one time determined to return the money to the committee, to which determination I was further induced, from observing that the people were likely to overcome the distress of the winter by attending the troops in their cantonments with various articles for sale, by which they gained a subsistence, much more beneficial to them than any which charity might give them.

‘ Nearly about this time (in the end of October) I had an interview with the Bishop of Pinhel, and having mentioned to him the difficulties which I met with in distributing the money in question, and an idea which I had of returning it to the committee, or of purchasing cattle with it, to be afterwards distributed to the people, he entirely concurred with me regarding the impossibility of distributing the money in a satisfactory manner, so as to be of use to any body ; and he observed that it was not then wanted, as the people gained much from the troops, and he earnestly recommended that I should adopt the measure which I had in contemplation, and that I should buy cattle to be distributed to the people in March.

‘ I determined accordingly to carry that plan into execution, and I enclose the account of the purchase of 276 bullocks, and the receipts for that number by the vicar-general of Pinhel. I likewise enclose the distribution of 200 dollars which I gave to General Pack, to be divided among the inhabitants of Freixo and the neighbouring villages, when the troops commanded by him had quitted the villages, and the people had no longer the means of gaining a livelihood by supplying the troops with what they wanted.

‘ I likewise enclose a copy of the paper given to the Bishop of Pinhel, containing the plan according to which the bullocks are to be distributed to the villages of the district. In adopting this plan I also acted in communication with the Bishop.

‘ I was informed that the temptation of a large price had induced many to whom the bullocks had been given to sell them, and the Bishop concurred with me in opinion that the plan which I proposed, and which is detailed in the enclosed paper would be more likely to promote the renewal of industry and agriculture throughout the district than any other; at the same time that if those entitled to the use of the bullocks should not be in possession of seed corn, or should not be inclined to make use of them, they would acquire a profit by selling their right to the use of the bullocks to the more wealthy proprietors.

‘ I beg you to lay this letter and the enclosed papers before the committee.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 29th March, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

9 A.M.

‘ I enclose some letters which I have just received from my brother, from which you will see that Soult broke up from before Cadiz on the 23rd and 24th, and commenced collecting his troops upon Seville. It is probable that the corps from thence will march upon Guadalcanal, in order to communicate with, or join Drouet.

‘ It is very desirable that you should come back to Villa Franca, Zafra, &c., keeping your cavalry out in front; and that Sir R. Hill should come to Merida. I write to him immediately to request him to fall back.

‘ The troops will commence crossing the river to-morrow morning.

‘ I have received your letter of 6 P.M. of the 27th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I do not send the enclosures of these letters as I have not yet read them.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 29th March, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

9 A.M.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 28th, 10 A.M.

‘ I have this morning received letters from Cadiz to the 24th, at night. Soult broke up before that place on the 23rd and 24th, and commenced collecting his force at Seville. He may therefore be expected shortly in Estremadura, probably by Guadalcanal.

‘ I have written this intelligence to General Graham, and have requested him to fall back upon Villa Franca and Zafra. I think you had better bring the troops which you have at Medellin and Don Benito to Guareña, and fall back thence on Merida, on the day that General Graham’s troops will fall back on Villa Franca and Zafra.

‘ I have not heard from Sir Thomas Graham since the 27th in the evening. He was then at Valencia de las Torres, and his infantry at Maguilla.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.’*

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Camp before Badajoz, 30th March, 1812.

‘ I have received your letters to the 24th, and some from General Cooke ; among others one of the 14th, detailing the proceedings of a Junta of Generals, of which General Cooke is one.

‘ I do not at all like that arrangement.

‘ First ; I do not think it proper to communicate my intentions and plans to a Junta of Spanish Generals, of whom the ——— is one. If I do not communicate my plans to them, all their deliberations must be nugatory.

‘ Secondly ; I do not think it very proper or consistent with the principles of military subordination, that General Cooke, who is under my command, should canvass, at a Junta of Generals, military operations directed by me.

‘ I do not know of what use the Junta is, excepting to

endeavor, by a side wind, to obtain the direction of the operations of this army, in which endeavor they may depend upon it they will not succeed. No power on earth shall induce me to take a step that I do not approve of; and the deliberations of the Junta must only afford fresh ground for dispute, and involve me in fresh discussions.

‘ In their deliberations of the 5th March, I see that they interfered with the Portuguese army in Braganza, besides (as all councils of this description do) throwing doubts upon the operations recommended and fixed for Ballesteros. Then they manœuvre the army of Galicia, as usual, without having the slightest knowledge of local circumstances, or of the strength of the enemy, or of their own means and resources. This they have done in their meeting, reported on by General Cooke in his letter of the 21st March, No. 59, besides in that of the 5th.

‘ General Castaños is the Commander in Chief of all the Spanish troops on this side of Spain; and it will appear by the papers which I have transmitted to you that he and I have considered every point referred to by the Junta, and have provided, as well as circumstances and the means and resources at our disposal would permit, for every event. Do the Junta propose to overturn what we have settled, or improve upon the arrangement which we have made, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances? Why then deliberate upon these points?

‘ When I required the co-operation, although distant, of General Ballesteros, I proposed the plan for it, through the King’s Ambassador, according to the instructions which I have received, and the Government agreed to the plan. Where then is the use of the deliberations of the Junta on this point? Where have they any room for deliberation?

‘ I do not wish to send General Cooke any orders not to attend the Junta, when you have desired him to attend; but I shall be obliged to you if you will let him discontinue his attendance quietly, and let matters get to their natural state.

‘ We are going on well, and shall open our breaching batteries to-morrow.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I see by the accounts from Seville that the enemy have little there but *Civicos*; and I hope that Ballesteros will take advantage of their weakness.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 15th, respecting the money in the Standard, it would certainly be very desirable to me to have some of it; but as Government disapproved of your retaining any before, I cannot desire that you should retain any now; but I shall write home on the subject, and you had better do the same.’

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 1st April, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

8 A.M.

‘ We opened our breaching batteries yesterday with great effect. The wall is a good one, however, and it will not be well breached probably till the evening of the 3rd. In the mean time I hope to be able to get the better of the inundation, which hitherto has been very detrimental to us.

‘ I have letters from —— of the 29th, and from Salamanca of the 28th. The French cavalry were at Tamames on the 29th, and —— —— intended to move that night. Marmont was at Salamanca on the 28th, but it was expected that he would move on the following day. They have collected about fifteen days’ provisions, ladders, a bridge, &c., and I am inclined to believe they will attack Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida. They have got one old 24 pounder, and some 12 pounders; and Longa, in a letter of the 4th, mentions that some troops had entered from Bayonne with 20 pieces of ordnance, of which 17 were 16 and 12 pounders, that is to say 18 and 14 pounders. We have no account of the arrival of these guns even at Valladolid; but in the letter from Salamanca of this morning, it is stated that they talk of the arrival of guns and troops from Burgos.

‘ If Soult should move forward when your troops shall be in the stations mentioned in my letter of the 29th, I should wish you to collect them in the wood in front of the position at Albuera. I mean that Hill should remain at Merida as long as possible, in case Soult should prefer to endeavor to relieve the place by the right bank of the Guadiana. He would in that case retire upon Montijo if the enemy should be too strong for him; and I will have the bridge

down between this and Talavera, in order to join him with the remainder of the army.

‘ If Soult should keep his troops collected on the left of the Guadiana, Hill would join on the left of the army by Lobon and Talavera. If he should be too late, and the enemy should be in possession of Lobon, he will always be able to pass by our bridge, which I shall move to the neighbourhood of Talavera, as soon as I find that Soult collects.

‘ I have a letter from Lima without a date, in which he says, that, on the 20th, an aide de camp of Marmont’s had come to Talavera de la Reyna, and had stated that Marmont was about to move his head quarters to Alfayates, and that Suchet was to join Soult by forced marches. Indeed he said that he expected that Marmont was already at Alfayates.

‘ I believe that the rain which annoyed us so much here will turn out to have been our best friend, as it must have delayed the execution of all Marmont’s schemes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ I shall send Hill a copy of this letter.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 1st April, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

11 A.M.

‘ Sir Thomas Graham received my letter of the 29th at 4 A.M. on the 30th, and probably commenced yesterday to carry into execution what I directed. He would of course write to you, as I sent him, with the duplicate, a copy of the letter I wrote to you on the 29th.

‘ I now enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to Sir Thomas Graham this morning, giving an account of our state here and elsewhere, and making known to him my intentions.

‘ I think it not improbable that Soult may endeavor to communicate with the place by the right of the Guadiana, when he shall find that we are so strong on the left of the river. If I should find this to be his intention, I shall rein-

force our left to the degree that may be expedient, either with a part or the whole of our troops, for which I shall use every facility by placing our bridge below Talavera.

‘ If you should find that all the enemy’s troops manœuvre upon Villa Franca, &c., you will march from Merida upon Lobon, and thence on Talavera, so as to take your place on the left of the army. It would be desirable that you should destroy the bridge at Merida, when you will leave the place, particularly if you should be certain of making your march on Lobon and Talavera.

‘ If the enemy should pass the Guadiana with the whole or part of his army at Medellin, or if Foy’s division, or any other troops should remain on the right of the Guadiana, while the others will manœuvre on the left of the river, you will remain on the right of the Guadiana, and will fall back gradually, if you should find the enemy too strong for you, upon Montijo, taking advantage of any favorable ground to delay the enemy’s advance. On leaving Merida, you will in this case also break the bridge.†

‘ If the uncertainty of the enemy’s movements towards the right bank of the Guadiana should detain you at Merida so long as that you should entertain doubts of your being able to march by Lobon and Talavera to place yourself on the left of the army, you will in that case march by the right bank to the bridge of pontoons, which you will find fixed below Talavera. You will in this case also destroy the bridge of Merida when you shall leave that place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill. K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 2nd April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th of March, and I am much concerned that you should feel any uneasiness respecting my recent report to the British Government on the want of means of transport for the army. I think it very likely that I did not trouble you upon the subject in the short time that I saw you at Elvas; but you must recollect that you were yourself detained at Elvas from the 6th, the

day on which I had fixed to arrive there, till the 11th, when I did arrive, after staying five days longer in Castille than I had intended, in order to wait the arrival of the equipments for the siege ; and when I did arrive, I could not undertake any thing till the 16th, five days afterwards, for the same reason.

‘ The delay in the arrival of the equipments for the siege was to be attributed to the want of means of transport at Evora ; and I have to add, that those equipments are not, to this moment, arrived for the same reason, and that I have been getting on in the best manner I could without them.

‘ You seem to think that you are to blame for any defect of these regulations, or deficiency in their execution. I assure you there is nothing so far from my thoughts as a notion that you are in any, the most distant manner responsible for any act of the Portuguese Government. All that you can do is to remonstrate, and point out what ought to be done. It remains for them to execute what you recommend to them.

‘ In respect to the regulation for means of transport, I beg to refer to my letters upon the subject, and the regulation itself, and it will be seen that the object of the latter is to save the people of the country from the necessity of supplying the army, and that all the penalties recommended by me are omitted.

‘ In respect to the execution of the regulation in this province, I enclose two letters which the Commissary General put into my hands this morning, informing you at the same time that if I wanted 1000 carriages instead of 100, there ought to be no difficulty in procuring them.

‘ The question is, are we to carry on the war, or are we not ? If we are, the Government must set their shoulders to the wheel.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Camp before Badajoz, 2nd April, 1812.

‘ Mr. Bissett has communicated to me a letter from the Commissary in Chief, from the perusal of which I am con-

cerned to observe that the Treasury are not satisfied with him for having lately engaged, under the authority of my sanction, to receive a sum of 400,000 dollars, to be brought from Gibraltar, at the exchange of five shillings and eight pence the dollar, the market rate at Lisbon being lower.

‘ As this was not the first contract of this kind which I have sanctioned for Mr. Bissett, as well as Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Murray, I am only concerned that the Lords of the Treasury, who have invariably been made acquainted with these contracts, did not make known their disapprobation of them at an earlier period, as, if they had, I should not have sanctioned those offered for my consideration subsequent to the notification of the disapprobation of their Lordships.

‘ I can justify the measure adopted lately, and upon the former occasions, upon no other ground than necessity. I also thought that it was the wish of the Lords of the Treasury, and of Government in general, that I should authorize the adoption of every measure that was practicable, in order to procure specie for the army; but it appears that I have been mistaken, and I hope that Government will take measures to supply the deficiency which must exist in our funds from my refusal to sanction contracts of this description in future.

‘ My brother has informed me that he expects the Standard at Cadiz from America with specie, on account of the British Government, and he has desired to know whether he is to detain any of it for the use of the army, at the same time informing me that Government had disapproved of his detaining money at Cadiz upon a former occasion.

‘ I beg to have your Lordship’s directions upon this subject, as I have told my brother that I cannot interfere with any directions given by the Government. I at the same time beg to refer your Lordship to the various financial statements sent home by Mr. Bissett and by me, and to inform you that it is quite impossible that we can go on without money.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 3rd April, 1812.

‘ We opened our fire on the 31st March from 26 pieces of cannon in the second parallel, to breach the face of the bastion at the south east angle of the fort called La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion by which the face is defended, called S<sup>ta</sup> Maria. The fire upon these has continued since with great effect.

‘ The enemy made a sortie, on the night of the 29th, upon the troops of General Hamilton’s division, which invest the place on the right of the Guadiana, but were immediately driven in with loss. We lost no men on this occasion.

‘ The movements of Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham and of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill have obliged the enemy to retire by the different roads towards Cordova, with the exception of a small body of infantry and cavalry which remained at Zalamea de la Serena, in front of Belalcazar.

‘ Marshal Soult broke up in front of Cadiz on the 23rd and 24th, and has marched upon Seville with all the troops which were there, with the exception of 4000 men. I understand that he was to march from Seville again on the 30th or 31st; and I should think that by this time he has joined the troops under Drouet, by Constantina.

‘ I have not heard from Castille since the 30th March. One division of the army of Portugal, which had been in the province of Avila, had on that day arrived at Guadapero, within two leagues of Ciudad Rodrigo, and it was supposed that Marmont was on his march with other troops from the side of Salamanca. I have not heard from thence since the 28th, on which day Marshal Marmont was there; but it was expected that he would march on the following day. The river Agueda was not fordable for troops on the 30th.

‘ The enemy will certainly reconnoitre Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida when the Agueda shall fall; and they will probably attack the former if they should be in possession of heavy cannon and other means to enable them to carry on their attack, which I doubt.

‘ I am very apprehensive, however, that I shall be obliged to return to that part of the country, in order to ensure the

safety of those places, as soon as I shall have brought to a close the operations which I have now in hand.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 3rd April, 1812.

‘ I enclose the answer which I have received from Marshal Sir William Beresford, on the reference made to him by your Lordship’s desire, respecting the value of the spherical case shot called Shrapnell’s shells.

‘ Since I wrote to your Lordship on that subject, I have heard that they have been very destructive to the enemy in Badajoz, when thrown from 24 pounder carronades ; and I have directed that some of them may be loaded with musket balls, in order to remedy what I have reason to believe is a material defect in these shells, viz., that the wounds which they inflict do not disable the person who receives them, even for the action in which they are received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 4th April, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

$\frac{1}{4}$  before 10 P.M.

‘ I hear from Sir Thomas Graham, and indeed the intelligence which I before received induced me to believe, that Soult would arrive at Llerena this day, and all accounts appear to agree that all the troops which he has are collected on that point, and that there are none moving towards Merida.

‘ Although I am prepared to send my bridge to Talavera, it would be more convenient not to move it from the place at which it is ; and as the enemy have collected, and appear to intend to act on the southern side of the Guadiana, I am desirous that you should be better prepared than you are to place yourself on our left flank.

‘ If Soult should intend to fight a battle, he will certainly advance immediately, and we may expect that he will be on the Albuera on the 7th ; and, under those circumstances,

I am anxious that, on to-morrow evening, you should move your corps to Arroyo de San Servan, Calamonte, and the woods to the south of the Guadiana, and your cavalry looking out on the roads to Almendralejo and Zafra. By this measure you will be quite ready for a start whenever you will find that Soult passes the high road from Seville to Merida, and that nothing is moving on that town.

‘ I hope to be able to attack the place to-morrow night. As for the redoubts, destroy them if you can with convenience; but the French do not seem to care much about them, nor do I.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,                    ‘ Camp before Badajoz, 4th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday.

‘ I likewise send a letter for the Secretary in the War Department from Don Carlos de España, which will inform the Government how things were at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 31st March. I have since received a letter of the 1st of April, from which I learn that a party of dragoons had crossed the ford of the Agueda above Ciudad Rodrigo on that day, and Don Carlos de España had removed to Gallegos.

‘ The convoy, which was expected on the 30th, only arrived on the 31st near Almeida. Thus, by “*mañana*,” the Spaniards will lose that place again, unless I should go with the whole army to its assistance; and they will lose a great part of the benefit which they would derive from the success of our operations here.

‘ We are getting on well; and I hope that this night, or to-morrow, we shall be ready to attempt to take the place by storm.

‘ I have received your letters of the 28th. I shall be much obliged to you if you will tell General O'Donnell that I will do every thing in my power to get his brother exchanged; but I enclose the copy of a letter, which will

show the result of an attempt which I made to get General Herrasti exchanged for General Renaud.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I find that the letter from Don Carlos de España to the Minister at War has been lost. I likewise find that I sent to Castaños the letter respecting the exchange of Herrasti; but it will be returned, or I shall get a duplicate of it, which I will send to you.’

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 4th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, conveying to me the permission of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name, and on the behalf of His Majesty, to accept the honor recently conferred upon me by the Regency and Cortes of Spain\*.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of informing the Spanish Government, that I accept the honor conferred upon me, and of again expressing my gratitude for it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 5th April, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

12 at Noon.

‘ I received your letter of 2 P.M. yesterday. If Foy remains in his position at Alia, &c., that is, if you should not receive any positive intelligence of his moving along the right of the Guadiana, before you will be required to move to Lobon, &c., in consequence of Soult’s movements, there is no occasion for your leaving any body at Merida. If Foy should be moving along the right of the Guadiana, when you shall receive intelligence of Soult’s movements, I do not think it would be necessary for you to stay with your whole corps at Merida. General Howard might stay

\* The title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, and a Grandee of Spain.

with one British, and Colonel Ashworth's brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery. Of course he would not destroy the bridge till the last moment, and if you should determine to march upon Lobon, you will not destroy the bridge till the last of your troops shall come away.

‘Tell the Alcalde, or Corregidor, that if we destroy the bridge, I shall render it passable again for them; that it is to answer a military purpose, and must be done if necessary.

‘I have not yet heard of Soult's arrival at Llerena, yesterday.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp before Badajoz, 6th April, 1812.

‘I have the honor to acquaint you, that I approve of your discharging five serjeants from the 87th regiment, according to the request of Colonel Doyle, in order that they may be appointed to commissions in the Spanish service.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Cooke.’

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Camp before Badajoz, 6th April, 1812.

‘Alava delivered to me yesterday evening your letters of the 30th March, and of April.

‘I congratulate you upon being made a Knight of the Bath. You must be introduced by a Knight of some Order to the person who is to invest you, carrying in your hand the insignia of the Order. The authority to invest you is then read; and the person who is to invest you must knight you by passing his sword over your shoulder. He then puts the riband over your right shoulder, and the star on your left breast. The ceremony here generally ends in eating and drinking, &c. &c.

‘I have no objection to the delay in sending the garrison

to Tarifa till matters shall be settled here; and it will be expedient that Ballesteros should return.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTACK OF BADAJOZ.

*(The parts in the smaller print are alterations and Explanations afterwards made by the Earl of Wellington.)*

‘ Camp, 6th April, 1812.

‘ 1. The Fort of Badajoz is to be attacked at 10 o'clock this night\*.

‘ 2. The attack must be made on three points; the castle, the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria.

‘ 3. The attack of the castle to be by escalade; that of the two bastions, by the storm of the breaches.

‘ 4. The troops for the storm of the castle, consisting of the 3rd division of infantry, should move out from the right of the first parallel at a little before 10 o'clock, but not to attack till 10 o'clock.

‘ 5. They should cross the river Rivillas below the broken bridge over that river, and attack that part of the castle which is on the right, looking from the trenches and in the rear of the great battery constructed by the enemy to fire on the bastion of La Trinidad.

‘ 6. Having arrived within the castle, and having secured the possession of it, parties must be sent to the left along the rampart, to fall on the rear of those defending the great breach, in the bastion of La Trinidad, and to communicate with the right of the attack on that bastion.

‘ It is recommended that the attack of the 3rd division should be kept clear of the bastion of San Antonio, at least till the castle which is above and commands that bastion shall be carried.’

‘ 7. The troops for this attack must have all the long

\* The hour originally named was half-past seven, being immediately after dusk, but it was subsequently changed to ten, in consequence of the arrangements being found to require that delay. The garrison took advantage of the interval between the breaching batteries ceasing to batter, and the commencement of the assault, to cover the front of the breaches with harrows and crow's-feet, and to fix a chevaux-de-frise of sword blades on their summits.

ladders in the engineers' park, and six of the lengths of the engineers' ladders. They must be attended by 12 carpenters with axes, and by six miners with crow-bars, &c.

' 8. The 4th division, with the exception of the covering party in the trenches, must make the attack on the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the Light division on the flank of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria.

' 9. These two divisions must parade in close columns of divisions at 9 o'clock. The Light division, with the left in front, the 4th division with its advanced guard, with the left in front; the remainder with the right in front. The 4th division must be on the right of the little stream, near the piquet of the 4th division, and the Light division must have the river on their right.

' This arrangement of the columns is made in order that the Light division may extend along the ramparts to the left; and that the 4th division, with the exception of the advanced guard, which is to communicate by its left with the Light division, might extend along the ramparts to the right. It may be necessary, however, for these two divisions mutually to support each other, and attention must in this case be paid to the formations.'

' 10. The Light division must throw 100 men forward into the quarries, close to the covered-way of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, who, as soon as the garrison are disturbed, must keep down by their fire the fire from the face of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, and that from the covered-way.

' 11. The advance of both divisions must consist of 500 men from each, attended by 12 ladders; and the men of the storming party should carry sacks filled with light materials, to be thrown into the ditch, to enable the troops to descend into it. Care must be taken that these bags are *not* thrown into the covered-way.

' 12. The advance of the Light division must precede that of the 4th division; and both must keep as near the inundation as they possibly can.

' 13. The advance of both divisions must be formed into firing parties and storming parties. The firing parties must be spread along the crest of the glacis, to keep down the fire of the enemy; while the men of the storming party, who carry bags, will enter the covered-way at the *place d'armes*, under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad; those attached to the 4th division on its right,

those to the Light division on its left, looking from the trenches or the camp.

‘ No. 13 will run thus :—after the words “ while the men of the storming party who carry bags will enter the covered-way,” insert, “ those of the Light division, at the *place d’armes* on the left, looking from camp, of the unfinished ravelin ; those of the 4th division, on the right of that ravelin, at the *place d’armes* under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad.” ’

‘ 14. The storming party of the advance of the Light division will then descend into the ditch, and turning to its left, storm the breach in the flank of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, while the storming party of the 4th division will likewise descend into the ditch, and storm the breach in the face of the bastion of La Trinidad.

‘ The firing parties are to follow immediately in the rear of their respective storming parties.

‘ Major General Colville will observe that a part of the advance of the 4th division must be allotted to storm the new breach in the curtain.’

‘ 15. The heads of the two divisions will follow their advanced guards, keeping nearly together, but they will not advance beyond the shelter afforded by the quarries on the left of the road, till they shall have seen the heads of the advanced guards ascend the breaches : they will then move forward to the storm in double quick time.

‘ The place here pointed out may be too distant. The heads of the columns should be brought as near as they can without being exposed to fire.’

‘ 16. If the Light division should find the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria entrenched, they will turn the right of the entrenchment, by moving along the parapet of the bastion. The 4th division will do the same by an entrenchment which appears in the left face, looking from the trenches of the bastion of La Trinidad.

‘ 17. The Light division, as soon as they are in possession of the rampart of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, are to turn to their left, and to proceed along the rampart to their left, keeping always a reserve at the breach.

‘ 18. The advanced guard of the 4th division are to turn to their left, and to keep up the communication with the Light division. The 4th division are to turn to their right, and to communicate with the 3rd division, by the bastion of San Pedro, and the demi-bastion of San Antonio, taking care to keep a reserve at the bastion of La Trinidad.

‘ 19. Each (the 4th and Light) division must leave 1000 men in reserve in the quarries.

‘ It will be necessary for the commanding officer of the Light division to attend to the ditch on his left as he makes his attack. He should post a detachment in the ditch towards the salient angle of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, so as to be covered by the angle from the fire of the next bastion on its left, looking from the trenches.’

‘ 20. The 4th division must endeavour to get open the gate of La Trinidad ; the Light division must do the same by the gate called Puerto del Pilar.

‘ 21. The soldiers must leave their knapsacks in camp.

‘ 22. In order to aid these operations, the howitzers in No. 4 are to open a fire upon the batteries constructed by the enemy to fire upon the breach, as soon as the officers shall observe that the enemy are aware of the attack, which they must continue till they see that the 3rd division are in possession of the castle.

‘ Some signal must be arranged between the commanding officer of the artillery and the officer who shall command the attack on the castle, for ceasing the fire in No. 4.’

‘ 23. The commanding officer in the trenches is to attack the ravelin of San Roque with 200 of the covering party, moving from the right of the second parallel, and round the right of the ravelin, looking from the trenches, and attacking the barriers and gates of communication between the ravelin and the bridge ; while 200 men likewise of the covering party will rush from the right of the sap into the salient angle of the covered-way of the ravelin, and keep up a fire on its faces. These last should not advance from the sap, till the party to attack the gorge of the ravelin shall have turned it. That which will move into the covered-way on the right of the ravelin looking from the trenches, ought not to proceed further down than the angle formed by the face and the flank.

‘ It would be better that this attack should move from the right of the sap. The commanding officer in the trenches must begin it as soon as he shall observe that the attack of the 3rd division on the castle is perceived by the enemy.’

‘ 24. The remainder of the covering party to be a reserve in the trenches. The working parties in the trenches are to join their regiments at half past seven o’clock.

‘ Twelve carpenters with axes, and ten miners with crow-

bars must be with each (the 4th and Light) division. A party of one officer and 20 artillerymen must be with each division.

‘ 25. The 5th division must be formed, one brigade on the ground occupied by the 48th regiment; one brigade on the Sierra del Viento; and one brigade in the low grounds extending to the Guadiana, now occupied by the piquets of the Light division.

‘ 26. The piquets of the brigades on the Sierra del Viento, and that in the low grounds towards the Guadiana, should endeavor to alarm the enemy during the attack by firing at the Pardaleras, and at the men in the covered-way of the works towards the Guadiana.

‘ A plan has been settled with Lieut. General Leith for an attempt to be made to escalate the bastion of San Vicente, or the curtain between that bastion and the bridge, if circumstances should permit. The commanding officer of the Light division will attend to this.

‘ General Power will likewise make a false attack on the tête-de-pont.’

‘ 27. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding Officers of regiments, and the Officers commanding companies, to impress upon their men the necessity of their keeping together, and formed as a military body after the storm, and during the night. Not only the success of the operation, and the honor of the army, but their own individual safety, depend upon their being in a situation to repel any attack by the enemy, and to overcome all resistance which they may be inclined to make, till the garrison are completely subdued.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

‘ My dispatch of the 3rd instant will have apprized your Lordship of the state of the operations against Badajoz to that date; which were brought to a close on the night of the 6th, by the capture of the place by storm.

‘ The fire continued during the 4th and 5th against the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of Sta Maria; and on the 4th, in the morning, we opened another battery of six guns in the second parallel

against the shoulder of the ravelin of San Roque, and the wall in its gorge.

‘ Practicable breaches were effected in the bastions above mentioned on the evening of the 5th ; but as I had observed that the enemy had entrenched the bastion of La Trinidad, and the most formidable preparations were making for the defence, as well of the breach in that bastion, as of that in the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, I determined to delay the attack for another day, and to turn all the guns in the batteries in the second parallel on the curtain of La Trinidad ; in hopes that by effecting a third breach, the troops would be enabled to turn the enemy’s works for the defence of the other two ; the attack of which would besides be connected by the troops destined to attack the breach in the curtain.

‘ This breach was effected in the evening of the 6th, and the fire of the face of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, and of the flank of the bastion of La Trinidad being overcome, I determined to attack the place that night.

‘ I had kept in reserve in the neighborhood of this camp, the 5th division under Lieut. General Leith, which had left Castille only in the middle of March, and had but lately arrived in this part of the country ; and I brought them up on that evening. The plan for the attack was, that Lieut. General Picton should attack the castle of Badajoz by esca-lade with the 3rd division ; and a detachment from the guard in the trenches furnished that evening by the 4th division, under Major Wilson of the 48th Regiment, should attack the ravelin of San Roque upon his left, while the 4th division under Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and the Light division under Lieut. Colonel Barnard, should attack the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, and in the curtain by which they are connected. The 5th division were to occupy the ground which the 4th and Light divisions had occupied during the siege ; and Lieut. General Leith was to make a false attack upon the outwork called the Pardaleras ; and another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with the left brigade of the division under Major General Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack, if circumstances should prove favorable ; and Brigadier General Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade on the right of the Guadiana, was di-

rected to make false attacks on the tête-de-pont, the Fort San Christoval, and the new redoubt called Mon Cœur.

‘ The attack was accordingly made at ten at night ; Lieut. General Picton preceding by a few minutes the attacks by the remainder of the troops. Major General Kempt led this attack, which went out from the right of the first parallel. He was unfortunately wounded in crossing the river Rivillas below the inundation ; but notwithstanding this circumstance, and the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the castle was carried by escalade ; and the 3rd division established in it at about half past eleven.

‘ While this was going on, Major Wilson of the 48th carried the ravelin of San Roque by the gorge, with a detachment of 200 men of the guard in the trenches ; and with the assistance of Major Squire, of the Engineers, established himself within that work.

‘ The 4th and Light divisions moved to the attack from the camp along the left of the river Rivillas, and of the inundation. They were not perceived by the enemy, till they reached the covered-way ; and the advanced guards of the two divisions descended without difficulty into the ditch protected by the fire of the parties stationed on the glacis for that purpose ; and they advanced to the assault of the breaches led by their gallant officers, with the utmost intrepidity. But such was the nature of the obstacles prepared by the enemy at the top and behind the breaches, and so determined their resistance, that our troops could not establish themselves within the place. Many brave officers and soldiers were killed or wounded by explosions at the top of the breaches ; others who succeeded to them were obliged to give way, having found it impossible to penetrate the obstacles which the enemy had prepared to impede their progress. These attempts were repeated till after twelve at night ; when, finding that success was not to be attained, and that Lieut. General Picton was established in the castle, I ordered that the 4th and Light divisions might retire to the ground on which they had been first assembled for the attack.

‘ In the mean time, Lieut. General Leith had pushed forward Major General Walker’s brigade on the left, supported by the 38th regiment under Lieut. Colonel Nugent, and the

15th Portuguese regiment under Colonel 'Do Rego, and he had made a false attack upon the Pardaleras with the 8th caçadores under Major Hill. Major General Walker forced the barrier on the road of Olivença, and entered the covered-way on the left of the bastion of San Vicente, close to the Guadiana. He there descended into the ditch, and scaled the face of the bastion of San Vicente. Lieut. General Leith supported this attack by the 38th regiment, and 15th Portuguese regiment; and our troops being thus established in the castle, which commands all the works of the town, and in the town; and the 4th and Light divisions being formed again for the attack of the breaches, all resistance ceased; and at daylight in the morning, the Governor, General Philippon, who had retired to Fort San Christoval, surrendered, together with General Vielande, and all the Staff, and the whole garrison. I have not got accurate returns of the strength of the garrison, or of the number of prisoners. But General Philippon has informed me that it consisted of 5000 men at the commencement of the siege, of which 1200 were killed or wounded during the operations; besides those lost in the assault of the place. There were five French battalions, besides two of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, and the artillery, engineers, &c.; and I understand there are 4000 prisoners.

‘ It is impossible that any expressions of mine can convey to your Lordship the sense which I entertain of the gallantry of the officers and troops upon this occasion. The list of killed and wounded will show that the General officers, the Staff attached to them, the Commanding, and other Officers of the regiments, put themselves at the head of the attacks which they severally directed, and set the example of gallantry which was so well followed by their men.

‘ Marshal Sir William Beresford assisted me in conducting the details of this siege; and I am much indebted to him for the cordial assistance which I received from him, as well during its progress, as in the last operation which brought it to a termination.

‘ The duties in the trenches were conducted successively by Major General the Hon. C. Colville, Major General Bowes, and Major General Kempt, under the superintendence of Lieut. General Picton. I have had occasion to men-

tion all these officers during the course of the operations; and they all distinguished themselves, and were all wounded in the assault. I am particularly obliged to Lieut. General Picton for the manner in which he arranged the attack of the castle; for that in which he supported the attack, and established his troops in that important post.

‘ Lieut. General Leith’s arrangements for the false attack upon the Pardaleras, and that under Major General Walker, were likewise most judicious; and he availed himself of the circumstances of the moment, to push forward and support the attack under Major General Walker, in a manner highly creditable to him. The gallantry and conduct of Major General Walker, who was also wounded, and that of the officers and troops under his command, were conspicuous.

‘ The arrangements made by Major General the Hon. C. Colville for the attack by the 4th division, were very judicious; and he led them to the attack in the most gallant manner.

‘ In consequence of the absence on account of sickness, of Major General Vandeleur, and of Colonel Beckwith, Lieut. Colonel Barnard commanded the Light division in the assault, and distinguished himself not less by the manner in which he made the arrangements for that operation, than by his personal gallantry in its execution.

‘ I have also to mention Brig. General Harvey of the Portuguese service, commanding a brigade in the 4th division, and Brig. General Champelmond, commanding the Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division, as highly distinguished. Brig. General Harvey was wounded in the storm.

‘ Your Lordship will see in the list of killed and wounded a list of the Commanding Officers of regiments. In Lieut. Colonel Macleod of the 43rd regiment, who was killed in the breach, His Majesty has sustained the loss of an officer who was an ornament to his profession, and was capable of rendering the most important services to the country. I must likewise mention Lieut. Colonel Gibbs of the 52nd, who was wounded, and Major O’Hare of the 95th, unfortunately killed in the breach; Lieut. Colonel Elder of the 3rd, and Major Algeo of the 1st Caçadores. Lieut. Colonel Harcourt of the 40th, likewise wounded, was highly distinguished; and Lieut. Colonels Blakeney of the Royal Fusi-

liers, Knight of the 27th, Erskine of the 48th, and Captain Leaky, who commanded the 23rd Fusiliers, Lieut. Colonel Ellis having been wounded during the previous operation of the siege.

‘ In the 5th division I must mention Major Hill of the 8th Caçadores, who directed the false attack upon the fort Pardaleras. It was impossible for any men to behave better than these did.

‘ I must likewise mention Lieut. Colonel Brooke of the 4th regiment, and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. G. Carleton of the 44th, and Lieut. Colonel Gray of the 30th, who was unfortunately killed. The 2nd batt. 38th regiment under Lieut. Colonel Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regiment under Colonel Luiz do Rego, likewise performed their part in a very exemplary manner.

‘ The officers and troops in the 3rd division have distinguished themselves as usual in these operations. Lieut. General Picton has reported to me particularly the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Williams of the 60th, Lieut. Colonel Ridge of the 5th, who was unfortunately killed in the assault of the castle; Lieut. Colonel Forbes of the 45th, Lieut. Colonel Fitzgerald of the 60th, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Le P. Trench, and Lieut. Colonel Manners of the 74th; Major Carr of the 83rd, and Major the Hon. H. Pakenham, Assistant Adjutant General to the 3rd division. He has likewise particularly reported the good conduct of Colonel Campbell of the 94th, commanding Major General the Hon. Charles Colville’s brigade, during his absence in command of the 4th division, whose conduct I have so repeatedly had occasion to report to your Lordship.

‘ The officers and men of the corps of engineers and artillery were equally distinguished during the operations of the siege and in its close.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Fletcher continued to direct the works, (notwithstanding that he was wounded in the sortie made by the enemy on the 19th of March,) which were carried on by Major Squire and Major Burgoyne, under his directions. The former established the detachments under Major Wilson, in the ravelin of San Roque, on the night of the storm; the latter attended the attack of the 3rd division on the castle. I have likewise to report the good conduct of Major Jones,

Captain Nicholas, and Captain Williams, of the Royal Engineers.

‘ Major Dickson conducted the details of the artillery service during the siege, as well as upon former occasions, under the general superintendence of Colonel Framingham, who, since the absence of Major General Borthwick, has commanded the artillery with the army.

‘ I cannot sufficiently applaud the officers and soldiers of the Royal and Portuguese Artillery during the siege; particularly that of Lieut. Colonel Robe, who opened the breaching batteries; Major May, Captain Gardiner, Major Holcombe, and Lieut. Bouchier of the Royal Artillery; Captain de Retberg of the German, and Major Tulloh of the Portuguese Artillery.

‘ Adverting to the extent of the details of the ordnance department during this siege, to the difficulties of the weather, &c., with which Major Dickson had to contend, I must mention him most particularly to your Lordship.

‘ The officers of the Adjutant and Quarter Master Generals’ departments rendered me every assistance on this occasion, as well as those of my personal Staff; and I have to add that I have received reports from the General officers commanding divisions, of the assistance they received from the officers of those departments attached to them, the greatest number of whom, and of their personal Staff, are wounded.

‘ In a former dispatch I reported to your Lordship the difficulties with which I had to contend, in consequence of the failure of the civil authorities of the province of Alentejo to perform their duty and supply the army with means of transport. These difficulties have continued to exist; but I must do Major General Victoria, the Governor of Elvas, the justice to report that he, and the troops under his command, have made every exertion, and have done every thing in their power to contribute to our success.

‘ Marshal Soult left Seville on the 1st instant, with all the troops which he could collect in Andalusia; and he was in communication with the troops which had retired from Estremadura, under General Drouet, on the 3rd, and he arrived at Llerena on the 4th. I had intended to collect the army on the Albuera rivulet, in proportion as Marshal Soult should advance; and I had requested Lieut. General Sir Thomas

Graham to retire gradually upon Albuera, while Lieut. General Sir R. Hill should do the same on Talavera, from Don Benito and the upper parts of the Guadiana.

‘ I do not think it certain that Marshal Soult has made any decided movement from Llerena since the 4th, although he has patrolled forward with small detachments of cavalry, and the advanced guard of his infantry have been at Usagre.

‘ None of the army of Portugal have moved to join him.

‘ According to the last reports which I have received of the 4th instant, from the frontier of Castille, it appears that Marshal Marmont had established a body of troops between the Agueda and the Coa, and he had reconnaitred Almeida on the 3rd. Brig. General Trant’s division of militia had arrived upon the Coa, and Brig. General Wilson’s division was following with the cavalry, and Lieut. General the Conde de Amarante was on his march, with a part of the corps under his command, towards the Douro.

‘ It would be very desirable that I should have it in my power to strike a blow against Marshal Soult before he could be reinforced: but the Spanish authorities having omitted to take the necessary steps to provision Ciudad Rodrigo, it is absolutely necessary that I should return to the frontiers of Castille within a short period of time. It is not very probable that Marshal Soult will risk an action in the province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for him to avoid, and it is very necessary that he should return to Andalusia, as General Ballesteros was in movement upon Seville on the 29th of last month, and the Conde de Penne Villemur moving on the same place from the Lower Guadiana.

‘ It will be quite impossible for me to go into Andalusia till I shall have secured Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore propose to remain in the positions now occupied by the troops for some days; indeed a little time is required to take care of our wounded; and if Marshal Soult should remain in Estremadura I shall attack him; if he should retire into Andalusia, I must return to Castille.

‘ I have the honor to enclose returns of the killed and wounded from the 31st March, and in the assault of Badajoz, and a return of the ordnance, small arms, and ammu-

dition found in the place. I shall send the returns of provisions in the place by the next dispatch. This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by my aide de camp Captain Canning, whom I beg leave to recommend to your protection.

‘He has likewise the colors of the garrison, and the colors of the Hesse Darmstadt’s regiment, to be laid at the feet of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. The French battalions in the garrison had no eagles.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., at the Siege and Capture of Badajoz, from the 18th March to 7th April, 1812, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	72	51	912	—	1035
Wounded . .	306	216	3265	—	3787
Missing . . .	—	1	62	—	63

The Portuguese loss is included in the above numbers.

*To His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose to your Royal Highness extracts of dispatches to the Secretary of State, containing accounts of the siege and capture of Badajoz by the troops under my command.

‘In order to give your Royal Highness a clearer idea and a more detailed account of the last operations, I enclose a memorandum, with the plan of attack, which I gave to the General Officers named in it, on the 4th, in order that they might thoroughly understand it, and examine the ground on which they were to act; and copies of the alterations and explanations which I made of the different articles up to the evening of the 6th.

‘ I likewise enclose copies of the reports which I have received from the several General Officers commanding divisions, from the Chief Engineer, and from the Commanding Officer of the Artillery, from which your Royal Highness will see in what manner the service was executed, and the names of the officers who distinguished themselves.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness  
the Commander in Chief.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,                      ‘ Camp at Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

‘ I send by this occasion the accounts of our success before Badajoz ; and I have sent to His Royal Highness copies of my instructions for the attack, and the reports of the several officers commanding divisions, &c., on the execution.

‘ These name officers, and His Royal Highness will judge whether it is fit that they should be promoted or noticed. I am particularly anxious about General Picton’s aide de camp, Captain Stovin \*, and his Assistant Adjutant General, Major Pakenham †, whom he has particularly mentioned to me ; likewise Captain Stuart, of the 95th, the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General of the Light division ; and Major Rowan, the Assistant Adjutant General with the same ; and Major Broke ‡, the Assistant Quarter Master General with the 4th division.

‘ Our loss has been very great ; but I send you a letter to Lord Liverpool which accounts for it ||. The truth is, that, equipped as we are, the British army are not capable of carrying on a regular siege.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

\* Colonel Sir Frederick Stovin, K.C.B.

† Major General the Hon. H. Pakenham, C.B.

‡ Major General Sir C. Broke Vere, K.C.B.

|| A search, hitherto unsuccessful, is being made for this letter. From the *précis* of it in the Index of 1812, as well as from documents in the Ordnance Office, it appears that this letter recommended the formation of a corps of Sappers and Miners ; the want of such an establishment with the army being the chief cause of the great loss in the sieges.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

‘ I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship to have sent to the Tagus 4000 barrels of gunpowder. There is but little of that article remaining in Badajoz; and the siege has expended a large proportion of what was in Elvas, which must be replaced from the stores at Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

‘ It gives me great pleasure to inform your Lordship that our numerous wounded officers and soldiers are doing well.

‘ I have had great reason to be satisfied with the attention paid to them by Dr. M<sup>c</sup>Grigor, the Inspector General of Hospitals, and the medical gentlemen under his direction, and I trust that the loss to the service, upon this occasion, will not eventually be great.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose the copy of a dispatch to the Secretary of State, giving an account of the capture of Badajoz by assault.

‘ I beg that you will communicate to the Spanish Government such parts of this dispatch as you may think proper. And I send it by Colonel Don Josef O’Lalor, who has for some time been employed with this army, very much to my satisfaction, and has been present at all the operations; and can give the Government any farther details which they may wish to have.

‘ I have requested Lieut. General the Marques de Monsalud to come over here; and I propose to give him possession of the place, and all that it contains.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS, ‘Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

‘ I send my dispatch on the fall of Badajoz by Captain Canning, my aide de camp. I had thought of sending it by Lord FitzRoy Somerset, for whom I am very anxious to obtain the rank of Lieut. Colonel; but it would really be so inconvenient to me, and to the public service, to be without him, that I prefer to trespass upon His Royal Highness’s kindness, and to ask him as a favor to promote him.

‘ I have more than one claim for promotion for my aides de camp, as I have not availed myself of all the opportunities of which I might have availed myself to send them to England with accounts of important events. I hope, therefore, that if His Royal Highness should be favorably disposed to grant me this request you will make it.

‘ I likewise wish again to draw the notice of His Royal Highness to Major Dickson. I am certain that there is not an officer in this army who will not admit that he deserves any favor which can be conferred upon him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marquis Wellesley, K.G.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY, ‘Camp at Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

‘ I have the pleasure to tell you that we took Badajoz by storm on the night of the 6th. Our loss was severe, but it is impossible to perform services of this kind without heavy loss. I am in great hopes that Ballesteros will likewise get into Seville, and if that should be the case, and he destroys everything as he ought, the French will be done for in Andalusia.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley, K.G.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Captain Canning was to have taken this, but he is gone without it, and I send it by the post.’

*To Colonel Austin.*

‘ SIR, ‘Camp at Badajoz, 9th April, 1812.

‘ I write to the Conde de Penne Villemur to suggest to him the expediency of returning to Estremadura, and that he should pass by the left of the Guadiana.

‘ In case, however, that he should prefer to pass through the kingdom of Portugal, I beg that you will give him provisions to support his troops to Beja, from whence the Commissary General of this army will provide for him.

‘ I enclose the route for the Conde de Penne Villemur, and I beg you to fill up the dates and send me a copy of it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Austin.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Badajoz, 9th April, 1812.

‘ In answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz’s note of the 4th instant, enclosed in your letter of the 6th, I beg that you will inform that gentleman that I refer him to my letters on the subject of the regulation for means of transport, and to the regulation alone, in which he will see that every measure which I proposed is frittered away to nothing; that the form and words only remain, and the spirit of the measure is taken away.

‘ I must observe, that this is the mode in which the local Government of Portugal have acted by me for the last two years. They are apprehensive of the displeasure of their Prince and of the country, if they openly object to what is proposed; but they carry it into execution in such a manner as to deprive it of all chance of success.

‘ I purpose not to give myself any further trouble about this or any other arrangement; and the local Government will act as they may think proper.

‘ I give them notice, however, first, that they will lose the fortress of Elvas, if they do not take measures to carry up to that place the stores which I had provided for the siege of Badajoz, which are now at Alcaçer do Sal; as, for want of those stores, I have been obliged to use the stores in Elvas. Secondly; that they will lose Badajoz, if they do not take measures to provide me with the means of transport to supply that place with stores for its defence.

‘ I beg that this warning may be recollected, and that it may be understood, that from this time forward, I consider myself in no manner responsible for the safety of either place.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp at Badajoz, 9th April, 1812.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 11th February, in regard to the relief of 2nd battalions of this army.

‘As soon as the 2nd batt. 4th regiment shall arrive, I shall send away two of the 2nd battalions ordered by His Royal Highness. The 2nd batt. 52nd is already gone, under His Royal Highness’s former orders; and the 2nd battalions of the 5th, 38th, and 42nd regiments shall go as soon as the 1st battalions of those regiments shall arrive.

‘There will then remain three 2nd battalions in this country, which His Royal Highness is desirous should quit it, and they shall go as soon as I shall receive orders to send them; and I beg your Lordship will state to what part of the world the several battalions are to be sent, when they shall quit this country.

‘Your Lordship and His Royal Highness are the best judges of what description of troops it is expedient that this army should be composed. I beg leave, however, to submit, that some of the best and most experienced soldiers in this army, the most healthy and capable of bearing fatigue, are in the 2nd battalions. The 2nd batts. 53rd, 31st, and 66th, for instance, are much more efficient, and have always more men for duty in proportion to their gross numbers, and fewer sick, than any of the 1st battalions recently arrived which had been in Walcheren; and it is certain that this army will not be so strong by the exchange of new for old soldiers.

‘I have thought it proper to submit this matter to your Lordship, assuring you at the same time that it is entirely indifferent to me; and that whatever orders I shall receive upon the subject will be immediately obeyed.

‘I ordered General Cooke to occupy Tarifa as soon as I received your Lordship’s directions; but, as the Spanish Government had reinforced General Ballesteros at my request, and had reduced for that purpose the Spanish force at Cadiz, referring, at the same time, to the state of the British force at that station, they objected to send a detachment to Tarifa at present.

‘As, however, the object for which General Ballesteros was reinforced is accomplished, I conclude that the Spanish troops will be recalled to Cadiz ; and I have desired General Cooke to obey your Lordship’s orders.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Major General — —.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Badajoz, 10th April, 1812.

‘I beg to refer you to my instructions of the 5th ultimo from Freneda, in which you will see that, in case the enemy followed your march from Ciudad Rodrigo, you were to move gradually, and you were not directed to proceed farther than Castello Branco without further orders.

‘I cannot consider movements to be gradual which brought you from Val de Lobos to Castello Branco in two days.

‘You have now crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha without orders, and you propose to destroy the bridge at that place.

‘It does not appear from your letters whether you had or not received the orders of the Quarter Master General of the 8th instant, to halt at Castello Branco, or to return thither if you had left that place ; and I cannot tell whether you will obey that order or not.

‘If, upon the receipt of this letter, you have no positive intelligence that the enemy are actually in Castello Branco, you will march there, and act according to the orders contained in the letter from the Quarter Master General of the 8th instant.

‘You are not to interfere in any manner with the bridge at Villa Velha. I send an officer there to take up the bridge if it should be necessary, and to remove the boats to a station below Villa Velha on this side of the Tagus, from which they can afterwards be moved up again, and formed into a bridge for the service of the army.

‘The troops will move in the morning.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major General — —.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,                      ‘ Camp at Badajoz, 10th April, 1812.

‘ In my last letters I omitted to recommend to His Royal Highness’s favor Captain Nicholas of the Engineers, because he is so desperately wounded that I thought it impossible he could live, but I understand that he is likely to do well\*; and it is but justice to him to make known his merits to His Royal Highness.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Fletcher has likewise requested me to recommend Captain Ellicombe of the Engineers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. It would be very desirable to get back to their duty in this country all the officers absent in England for various causes. I have really more to do than I can manage.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,                      ‘ Camp before Badajoz, 11th April, 1812.

‘ I heard yesterday evening that some of Marmont’s troops had crossed the Coa, and had appeared on this side of Sabugal on the 8th; it is even said that they were that night at Penamacor. It is therefore necessary that I should return to that side of the Tagus, and I have put some of the troops in motion this day.

‘ It is desirable that General Long’s brigade should move forward to Villa Franca and Zafra, having posts of observation at Llera, Usagre, and Bienvenida, in order to relieve General Anson’s brigade, which are following and observing the enemy. Major General Long must take care not to engage himself in any affair of consequence, but must fall back upon you in case of necessity.

‘ You will judge of the best place to put your corps in to fulfil the following objects, for the present. My own opinion is, that your infantry should be in Almendralejo, Azaual, &c., and your light cavalry as above pointed out, and your Portuguese cavalry on the north side of the Guadiana; I propose, besides, to attach a brigade of heavy cavalry to

\* He died of his wounds.

Sir William Erskine's division, which should be in the best situation for forage, &c.

‘ My wish is to put Badajoz in a state of defence again as soon as possible, and Lieut. Colonel Fletcher is setting to work upon it, and that you should cover the place with your corps while the work will be going on. Either General Spry's or General Power's brigade, and the 22nd Portuguese regiment, will be in the place as a garrison, and to work upon it, till Penne Villemur and Morillo shall return from the Condado, and two companies of Portuguese and one of British artillery to set the ordnance, &c., to rights.

‘ Of course, if the enemy should attempt to play tricks with small corps, you will fall upon them: if they should advance in force, I recommend to you to occupy the place with the three regiments above mentioned, and with your corps to occupy the position of S<sup>ta</sup> Engracia, having your right protected by the redoubt Mon Cœur, or the French redoubt, which we re-established during the siege. You might have the ground looked at to see where you could place your left with advantage, and where it would be expedient to throw up works to enable you to defend the ground more easily; you might also have the ground opened to see how it would work, in order to determine whether it would be necessary to construct such works beforehand; and if it should not be necessary, it would always be an advantage to delay them to the last moment.

‘ As it appears that it would be impossible for the enemy to assemble so large a corps in this country as to distress you in that position, without my having previous knowledge of their intention; and considering that you would be surrounded by strong places, and would have the choice of the use of either side of the river for your communications, I should wish that that position should be considered as one to be maintained, unless the enemy should be in such strength as to render the maintaining it very uncertain.

‘ When Morillo and Penne Villemur shall arrive, the Spaniards will give the garrison of the fort; and General Spry's brigade, and 22nd regiment, might remove to Elvas, if not wanted for work, or encamp near the fort, if required for work by Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.

‘ I think also, that when you are in your position at

Almendralejo, &c., it might be expedient to encamp one British brigade at Badajoz, on the dry ground near the breach, in order to assist in the work.

‘I leave in Badajoz camp equipage for 14,000 men, of which you will make such use as you please.

‘Let me have as soon as you can, returns of the number of masons, bricklayers, carpenters, sawyers, wheelwrights, miners, and smiths in each of the regiments, British and Portuguese, in the 2nd and General Hamilton’s divisions.

‘I am going into Badajoz this day, and I shall set out for Portalegre, either the day after to-morrow, or the next day, according to the intelligence which I shall receive from Castello Branco.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 11th April, 1812.

‘On the morning that Badajoz fell, I desired General Alava to write to the Conde de Penne Villemur, to acquaint him with that event and to desire him to communicate it to General Ballesteros. I likewise desired that the Conde de Penne Villemur might be prepared to march again into this province; a measure which I have since suggested to him in a letter which I wrote to him on the 8th instant; and I requested that the Conde de Penne Villemur would apprise General Ballesteros of my opinion, that it was probable that the enemy would return into Andalusia immediately; and of the fact that, owing to the state of affairs on the frontiers of Castille, it was out of my power to follow them into that kingdom.

‘The enemy have since acted as I supposed. They had collected about 30,000 men at, and in the neighborhood of Villa Franca, on the 8th instant; and they retired on the 9th, as soon as they heard of the fall of Badajoz.

‘You have been informed of the causes which render necessary my return to the frontiers of Castille. The enemy have not only blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo, but they have moved some troops into Lower Beira. A small force could get the better of the latter; but I shall not be able to relieve

Ciudad Rodrigo without taking with me such a proportion of the army as would leave too small a force for the expedition into Andalusia; to which I have to add, that I must collect a body of troops near this place to protect it till the breaches in its works shall be repaired, and to aid in the repair of the breaches.

‘I do not think it probable that I shall have another opportunity of relieving the Andalusias from the enemy, by the most certain mode, the movement of a superior body of troops into that kingdom. But I am convinced that the Regency will see the impossibility of attempting it at the present moment, and the causes which have led to that impossibility.

‘If Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned as I had a right to expect, there was nothing to prevent me from marching to Seville at the head of 40,000 men, the moment the siege of Badajoz was concluded.

‘If I were to march there under existing circumstances, the formidable position which I have acquired with so many sacrifices would undoubtedly be lost, and, with that position, all the objects of the expedition into Andalusia. It remains then to be seen what is to be done under existing circumstances.

‘First; I request you to inform the Regency, that it is absolutely necessary that a garrison should be provided for Badajoz without loss of time. I understand that the regiments of Zamora, El Rey, Navarra, and the battalion del General (now called of Cadiz), belonging to the 5th army, taken to Cadiz last year by the Captain General Blake, are still at that place, and it is desirable that they, and a body of 300 artillerymen, should be sent round to Setuval without loss of time, to become the foundation of the garrison, which should consist of 5000 men.

‘It is quite impossible for me to furnish any part of the garrison; and the place must be destroyed if the Spanish Government will not garrison it.

‘Secondly; it is desirable that General Ballesteros should keep himself in safety, under Gibraltar, &c.; but should be prepared to advance upon Seville, in case the enemy should move into this province in strength in order to attack Badajoz.

‘Thirdly; it is absolutely necessary that the Conde de

Penne Villemur and General Morillo should return into Estremadura, as well as the garrison for Badajoz; as otherwise, you will observe that there are no troops in this province to re-establish the authority of the Government.

‘ But these measures will not be sufficient; as it may be depended upon, that, notwithstanding all that I shall do to weaken the enemy as much as may be in my power, they will collect their forces when the harvest will be on the ground, and they will be certain of subsistence for their army, in order to remove the inconveniences which they will feel from our early successes; and it must be expected that they will be too strong for me.

‘ Under these circumstances, it is most desirable that some diversion should, if possible, be made in my favor on the eastern coast.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have lately received from the Secretary of State, enclosing one from Lord William Bentinck, of the 25th of January; and the answer of the Earl of Liverpool, and my opinion on the proposed plan of operations on the eastern coast of Spain, in a letter to Lord William Bentinck, of the 24th of March.

‘ Since I wrote that letter, Lord Frederick Bentinck has arrived here with other letters from Lord William Bentinck and Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, of which I enclose copies.

‘ I propose to urge Lord William Bentinck in the strongest manner to undertake the expedition to the coast of Catalonia.

‘ I am about to send my battering train of artillery to Gibraltar, to be put in order for him; and early in the month of June I will likewise send there British and Portuguese artillerymen, engineer officers, and such other assistance of every description as I can afford him.

‘ But I still fear that he will be too weak to undertake even the smaller object of the two recommended to his attention, and I have not the means of reinforcing him. I beg leave, therefore, to suggest to you the expediency of proposing to the Regency:

‘ Fourthly; that 3000 men of General Roche’s division at Alicante, and 3000 men of General Whittingham’s division at Majorca, should be prepared to be embarked early in June, in order to join and co-operate on the Eastern coast

with the troops under Lord William Bentinck, which will come from Sicily.

‘ If the Spanish Government will consent to this proposal, I will take care that transports shall be at Alicante and in Majorca early in June, to take these troops to their destination.

‘ Lord Frederick Bentinck will return to Sicily in a few days, and I will desire him to go to Cadiz to receive from you the decision of the Government on this proposition, in order that he may carry to Lord William Bentinck the fullest information regarding the assistance to his operations which he may expect in the Peninsula.

‘ If Lord William Bentinck should be made sufficiently strong, it is probable that we shall succeed in opening a communication between the fleet and the patriots in Catalonia, and the war will revive in that principality and there is a chance of recovering Valencia. At all events, a diversion of the enemy’s force must be created for my operations ; without which, I shall have upon me the armies of Portugal, the South, and Centre, and that of Suchet.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Victoria.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 13th April, 1812.’

‘ It is desirable that you should take measures to have brought into the fort, and lodged in the stores at Elvas, the shot, and other military stores, now at the flying bridge.

‘ Major Dickson will communicate with you upon this subject. I shall likewise be much obliged to you, if you will take measures to have taken out of the water, placed upon their carriages, and drawn into Elvas, the five boats now formed into the two flying bridges, with all the materials belonging to them.

‘ There are in Badajoz fifteen pontoons, which the Government has given to me ; and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will make arrangements to have them drawn into Elvas ; each pontoon will require six bullocks to draw it, but it will not be necessary to draw the whole at once.

Colonel Fletcher will communicate with you on these two last subjects.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Victoria.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 15th April, 1812.

‘ This letter will be delivered to you by Prince Reus, an Austrian officer, who is desirous of entering the Spanish service; and as his character is well known to Sir Thomas Graham, who speaks of him in the highest terms, I beg leave to recommend him to your notice, and I trust that you will be good enough to forward his views as much as may be in your power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Niza, 15th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter and its enclosures from the Secretary of State, which I beg you to peruse and return to me, and to let me have your opinion on the plan proposed.

‘ I think we shall get some money, or, at all events, pay some debts, by this scheme.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Bissett, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General — —.*

SIR,

‘ Niza, 15th April, 1812.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 13th, and this day that of the 14th.

‘ I will hereafter reply to that part of the first which refers to your justification of your own conduct, confining myself now to telling you that it is by no means satisfactory; and that you have disobeyed my instructions in three instances, in all of which they were clear. I have also to observe, that if you had obeyed them, the enemy would, probably, never have passed the Coa.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General — —.*

WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Niza, 15th April, 1812.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 18th March, enclosing the Order in Council of the 4th March, relative to the residence of the partners of British commercial houses in parts of Spain occupied by the enemy.

‘ I am much afraid that the effect of this Order in Council, if the British troops should ever enter into the heart of Spain, will be to afford the protection of the British Government to Spanish and British subjects who have exerted themselves to support the usurpation of the enemy, and have done more to establish the enemy’s government in Spain than any other description of persons. I know some who come under this character.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Niza, 15th April, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter from the Prince Regent of Portugal, by which I learn that His Royal Highness has been pleased to create me Marquez de Torres Vedras.

‘ I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will lay this letter before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and request His Royal Highness’s permission for me to accept the honor conferred upon me by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Niza, 15th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from General H. Clinton (in which he proposes a levy of men of inferior size and strength, to perform certain duties, for which men are now necessarily taken from the ranks), because I think it proper that every plan of this description should come under the view of the Commander in Chief, particularly when it proceeds from a respectable officer ; but I acknowledge that I do not think the plan would have the effect expected from it.

‘ First ; I do not think that the men to be formed into these battalions would be very trustworthy. If they should not be so, the medical gentlemen will not like to use them as orderlies in the hospitals, nor the captains of companies, nor others entitled to bātmen, be induced to trust them in that capacity. It will not be easy to prevent soldiers in the regular regiments from being so employed.

‘ Secondly ; I am afraid that, with all our care, we have at this moment, in every regiment, men of the description mentioned by General Clinton. Sometimes they are employed as bātmen and orderlies, but generally they are too weak even for these duties. Surely, if we have men of that description in all the regiments, there is no use in raising entire battalions of them.

‘ Thirdly ; we have no escorts with convalescents, nor with commissariat stores, and very rarely with sick going to hospitals. The convalescents coming up to the army are the guards for the treasure sent at the same time. Here, therefore, there would be no saving of men. The cattle guards require at times the strongest and most active men in the regiments. These men are frequently out at night, and their marches are always more fatiguing than those of the other soldiers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Niza, 16th April, 1812.

‘ It is really necessary to attend to the orders from England which I have transmitted to you, for the relief of the garrison of Tarifa.

‘ I conclude that the Spanish Government will now bring back to Cadiz part of General Ballesteros’s corps ; but, whether they do or not, you must send the troops to Tarifa according to my direction ; and I beg to have, as soon as possible, an account of the state of the works there, and of the position which you propose should be taken up and defended.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Niza, 16th April, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have received your letter of the 6th instant.

‘ The Commanding Officer at Tarifa is to continue to receive ten shillings per diem.

‘ I beg that you will apply to Lieut. General Campbell, to leave Captain Vavasour, of the Engineers, at Tarifa.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Niza, 16th April, 1812. Half past 1 P.M.

‘ I enclose intelligence received from the north and from Brito. It appears that Marmont came to Sabugal, and I conclude that the river and our advance will induce the whole to retire again. I have not heard from General — this day.

‘ If Marmont retires, and I can get the convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo, I am still inclined to try my original plan, and in this case I shall halt the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Niza, 16th April, 1812.

‘ I received on the 7th your letter of the 23rd February, which you had sent by your brother; and I refer you to one which I wrote to you on the 24th March, for my opinion on the plan proposed by your Lordship to the Secretary of State in your letter of the 25th January, and agreed to by the Secretary of State in his dispatch to you of the 4th of March.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 24th March, I have had further reason to believe that a diversion on the eastern coast will be highly useful during the present campaign, and I hope that you will have it in your power to carry your proposition into execution.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to my

brother \*, in which you will see the state of affairs here, and the measures which I have recommended should be adopted in order to add to the strength of your corps.

‘ I besides propose sending to Gibraltar, to join you eventually, some British and Portuguese artillerymen, some officers of engineers, and artificers, who may be of use to you. I shall likewise send there a battering train on travelling carriages, which has lately come from England for my use, consisting of twelve 24 pounders; six 18 pounders; and twenty 12 pounders; and thirty travelling carriages for 24 pounders, for which I shall request General Campbell to have guns, &c., fitted. You will find these carriages much more manageable in trenches and batteries than those which would be furnished from the ships. I hope also to send some mortars and howitzers.

‘ In respect to time, the period in which your operations would be of most use there, would be in the months of June, July, and August; say from the third week in June to the second week in September: this is the period during which the harvest is on the ground, and we may be certain that the French will collect their armies in one body. All the preparations, therefore, which depend upon me shall be made, and every thing at its place early in June.

‘ I have recommended to Lord Frederick to return to you, and to take from Cadiz accounts of what you may expect.

‘ In consequence of my letter to my brother of the 11th you will of course have to send to Gibraltar, Alicante, and Majorca, to collect the troops and equipments destined to co-operate with you, and for your use.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Niza, 16th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose Sir Thomas Graham’s opinion on the spherical case shot. Since I wrote to you last upon the subject, I have had opportunities of hearing accounts of the effects of this description of shot on the garrison during the siege of Ba-

\* See page 53.

dajoz. Several wounded in the hospital have declared that they were wounded by these shots; and I learn from a person who was in the town during the siege, and had opportunities of hearing the French officers talk, that this description of shot had great effect, and that it was quite impossible to keep the men at their guns or at work when they were fired.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Niza, 16th April, 1812.

‘ Marshal Soult collected his army at Villa Franca in Estremadura on the 8th instant, and, having there heard of the fall of Badajoz, he retired before daylight on the 9th towards the frontiers of Andalusia. Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham directed Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton to follow their rear with the cavalry, and he attacked and defeated the French cavalry at Villa Garcia, with Major General Le Marchant’s and Major General Anson’s brigades, the latter under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby, on the morning of the 11th instant.

‘ I have the honor to enclose Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham’s letter, enclosing Sir Stapleton Cotton’s report \*,

\* *To General the Earl of Wellington, K.B.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Santa Marta, 12th April, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the enclosed report of Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, giving the detail of a very brilliant and successful attack against the enemy’s rear guard. It must be unnecessary for me to call your Lordship’s attention to the distinguished ability with which the Lieut. General planned and conducted this enterprise, so admirably seconded by the gallantry and judgment of Major General Le Marchant and Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby, as well as by the great exertion of the officers and men of the two brigades employed on this service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General  
the Earl of Wellington, K.B.*’

‘ THOMAS GRAHAM.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Gracia, 11th April, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to report to you that, having received information last night of the cavalry of General Drouet’s corps (amounting to 2500) being encamped between Usagre and this place, I ordered Major General Anson’s (commanded by Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby) and Major General Le Marchant’s brigades to move in the course of the night from Villa Franca and Los Santos,

and the return of killed and wounded on this occasion ; and I have only to add my commendation of the conduct of Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Major General Le Marchant, and the officers and troops under their command.

‘ The enemy retired on that day from Llerena, and since entire from the province of Estremadura.

‘ I have not yet heard whether General Ballesteros had entered Seville. The Conde de Penne Villemur, with a detachment of the army which had been sent from Estremadura into the Condado de Niebla, had approached that

so as to arrive before day-break, the former at Usagre, the latter at Bienvenida, determining to attack the enemy with General Anson’s brigade in front, whilst Major General Le Marchant’s, by a flank movement from Bienvenida, should cut off his retreat upon Llerena. The advanced guard of Major General Anson’s brigade drove in the enemy’s piquets from near Usagre two hours sooner than I had intended, and General Le Marchant’s brigade had not time to get into the rear of the enemy, who fell back, upon the alarm being given, a sufficient distance to secure his retreat upon Llerena.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby followed the enemy soon after day-break through Villa Garcia, and was skirmishing with him when General Le Marchant’s brigade arrived on the other side of the heights between the Llerena road and Bienvenida : I desired Colonel Ponsonby would show only three squadrons, and endeavor to amuse the enemy in front, until Major General Le Marchant’s brigade (which I had sent Colonel Elley to conduct under cover of the heights) was prepared to attack the enemy in flank : this succeeded admirably ; and the enemy, being vigorously attacked, at the same moment, in front and flank, retired in the greatest confusion and disorder. I pursued him with Major General Anson’s brigade, and one regiment of Major General Le Marchant’s (the 5th dragoon guards), supported by the 3rd and 4th dragoons, to near Llerena, a distance of four miles, during which the enemy’s loss in killed was very considerable, and about 150 prisoners, including a Lieutenant Colonel, two Captains and one Lieutenant, with about 130 horses, were brought off the field.

‘ The enemy’s cavalry formed on the right, and in rear of seven guns, and between 8000 and 10,000 infantry, which had taken up a position on the left of and close to the town. The whole soon afterwards retired upon Berlanga and Asuaga, to the former of which places my patrols followed them.

‘ I cannot say too much in praise of the gallantry and regularity of the four regiments which attacked and pursued the enemy, nor could any thing have exceeded the steadiness and good discipline displayed by the 3rd and 4th dragoons (commanded by Major Clowes and Colonel Lord Edward Somerset), who supported them.

‘ I have to recommend strongly to your notice Major General Le Marchant and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby, who commanded the two brigades with so much gallantry and judgment ; and I have great pleasure in assuring you of the good conduct of Lieut. Colonel Hervey, commanding 14th light dragoons ; Major Prescott, commanding 5th dragoon guards ; Captain Dickens, commanding 12th light dragoons ; Captain Murray, commanding 16th light dragoons ; and Major the Hon. C. Cocks, commanding detachments of the 12th and 14th light dragoons.

town by the right of the Guadalquivir, and was engaged with the enemy's garrison of Seville, and of the fortified convent on that side of the river, on the 5th, and had obliged them to retire within their works. The Conde de Penne Villemur retired on the 10th, according to a suggestion made to him by me, in consequence of the fall of Badajoz, and the certainty that I had that Marshal Soult would return immediately into Andalusia, without risking an action, which it was not in my power to bring him to; and I trust that the Conde de Penne Villemur will have communicated to General Ballesteros the intelligence and suggestions which I desired might be conveyed to him, and that all is secure in that quarter.

‘ I have since urged the Conde de Penne Villemur to return into Estremadura.

‘ Since I wrote to your Lordship on the 7th instant, I have received reports of transactions in the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo only to the 9th. The enemy still kept the

‘ To Lieut. Colonel Elley, my Assistant Adjutant General, I am much indebted for the very great assistance which I derived from him, particularly in conducting my right column to the point of attack. I beg also to recommend to your notice Captain White, my Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and Captain Baron Decken.

‘ Herewith I send a list of the killed and wounded, which I am happy to find is not great, considering the very superior force of the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ STAPLETON COTTON,

‘ *Lieut. General*

Lt. Gen. Commanding the Cavalry.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the First Cavalry Division of the army under the command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., in an affair with the Enemy's rear guard, near Llerena, on the 11th of April, 1812.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	—	1	13	18	14
Wounded . .	2	4	35	9	41
Missing . . .	—	—	2	1	2

place blockaded, but had made no attack upon it, nor had they repeated their visit to Almeida, having suffered some loss in the reconnaissance of that place on the 3rd instant.

‘ It appears that on the 3rd instant the greatest number of the troops in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo broke up and marched towards Sabugal, where I believe that Marshal Marmont came himself. Major General — —, whom I had kept in front of Ciudad Rodrigo with the 1st hussars till the end of March, in order to mask the movement of the army into Estremadura, I hope misunderstood, as he disobeyed my instructions in every point. He was followed, although at a distance, through Lower Beira, by Marshal Marmont’s advanced guard; and, having quitted Castello Branco, contrary to orders, on the 8th instant, the enemy being then at Meimoa, twelve leagues distant from him, they moved on, and the advanced guard, consisting of 2500 men, of which six squadrons of cavalry, entered Castello Branco on the evening of the 12th; Brig. General Le Cor, with his brigade of militia, having been obliged to retire upon Sarnadas, when he saw the enemy advance. In the mean time, having heard that — — had crossed the Tagus, I ordered him to cross that river again, which he did on the 12th, and the enemy retired from Castello Branco before daylight on the morning of the 14th, and Brig. General Le Cor and Major General — — entered the place.

‘ The enemy have, as usual, in this expedition robbed and murdered the inhabitants of the country. But the injury which they have done, as far as I can learn, has been confined to these acts of atrocity, all the stores in our magazine at Castello Branco, and our hospital there, having been removed to this side of the Tagus.

‘ I cannot sufficiently applaud the firmness and good conduct of Brig. General Le Cor. He remained in Castello Branco till he saw a superior enemy advancing upon him, and he then retired in good order no farther than was necessary. If my orders had been obeyed by others as well as by Brig. General Le Cor, it is probable that the enemy would never have passed the Coa, and certainly would never have ventured so far as Castello Branco.

‘ As soon as I heard of Soult’s retreat from Villa Franca, I put the army in motion towards Castille. The advanced

guard has arrived at Castello Branco this day, and I shall go there myself to-morrow.

‘ Lieut. General Sir R. Hill remains with the 2nd division of infantry, and Lieut. General Hamilton’s Portuguese division of infantry, and Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine’s division of cavalry, consisting of two brigades of British and one of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura; and I have placed the regiments of Portuguese infantry which were in Elvas and Abrantes for the present in Badajoz, in order to repair the works and to garrison the place for a short time, till the Spanish Government can provide a garrison for it.

‘ I have heard of no movement in the north.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brig. General Sir N. Trant.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 17th April, 1812.

‘ I arrived here about two hours ago. Marshal Beresford received your letter of the 13th upon the road; and I received that of the 12th from General Bacellar this morning.

‘ We shall move on as soon as the troops come up. It would appear that the French are collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care of yourselves on Guarda, if they should collect two divisions at or in the neighbourhood of Sabugal. Guarda is the most treacherous position in the country, although very necessary to hold.

‘ I should prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the Mondego behind.

‘ Have you used my magazine at Celorico? I enclose a letter for the Commissary there, and one for Don Carlos de España. Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to Celorico.

‘ Show this letter to General Bacellar; I do not write to him, as I have no Portuguese with me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General  
Sir N. Trant.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General ———.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 18th April, 1812.

‘ In consequence of your letter of the 13th instant, I think it proper to explain to you in what way you disobeyed my orders.

‘ The orders of the 5th March provided for two possible events, when the enemy should discover that the allied army had marched from the frontiers of Castille.

‘ 1st, that of the enemy moving to the southward; 2ndly, that of the enemy passing the Agueda.

‘ In case the enemy should make the movement first mentioned, you were to march with the 1st hussars, by easy marches, through Lower Beira; to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and to proceed to Elvas.

‘ In case the enemy should cross the Agueda, you were to fall back *gradually* through Lower Beira to Castello Branco.

‘ The instructions of the 5th March, besides, contain an injunction to you not to allow yourself to be diverted from what they contained by the operations of General Bacellar, or of Don Carlos de España, but you were desired “not to be in a hurry, and to give them your countenance as far as might be in your power; and to tell them that you were left in the front for a particular object, and that you had positive instructions for your conduct in the event of the occurrence of the enemy’s movement to the Agueda.”

‘ I afterwards wrote to you on the 26th and 27th March, to acquaint you that Don Carlos de España had informed me that he expected to be able to introduce a convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, and to request you “to endeavor to have those provisions introduced into the place;” and you were afterwards to carry into execution my instructions of the 5th of March.

‘ I now request you to advert to your conduct under these instructions.

‘ On the 29th you reported that the enemy were arrived in Tamames, and that it was your intention to fall back that evening to Ciudad Rodrigo, leaving piquets near Tenebron.

‘ On the 30th you wrote from Ituero; in which letter you acknowledged the receipt of one from me, I conclude that of

the 26th or 27th, as I had not written to you before since the 19th. The enemy had that day arrived at Guadapero.

‘ On the 1st April you wrote from Nave, at 9 p.m., that the enemy had on the 31st a piquet of 40 cavalry at the ford of the Agueda, between Pastores and Zamarra; and that a regiment of infantry had marched to Martiago. You left Ituero that morning, the 1st of April, and marched to Nave; and the enemy on the same morning crossed the ford with two squadrons and took possession of Pastores.

‘ The convoy for Ciudad Rodrigo was expected on the 1st April, from Aldea del Obispo.

‘ I beg leave to observe, that if you had assembled the 1st hussars at Pastores on the 30th of March and 1st April, the Agueda being then scarcely fordable for cavalry, and that ford being always the first that is practicable, sending your baggage, &c., away to Sabugal, you would have kept open the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and the convoy would, probably, have got into the latter place. At all events, my instructions of the 26th and 27th March would have been obeyed.

‘ On the 2nd of April you wrote from Sabugal that the 1st hussars had arrived there, and that it was reported the enemy had recrossed the Agueda; and on the 3rd you marched to Val de Lobos, where you halted the 4th; on the 5th you marched to Pedrogaõ, and on the 6th to Castello Branco.

‘ Putting the instructions of the 26th and 27th March out of the question, it is obvious that the case had occurred adverted to in my instructions of the 5th March, viz., the enemy had crossed the Agueda; in which case “you were to fall back gradually, taking care not to commit yourself, upon Sabugal; and from Sabugal in the same manner by Penamacor on Castello Branco;” and I would wish you to consider whether you did fall back gradually; whether there was any necessity of any description for your quitting Nave on the 2nd, or Sabugal on the 3rd; or whether to march twelve leagues in two days through Lower Beira can be deemed, in any sense of the word, “falling back gradually.”

‘ In fact, when you wrote on the 7th from Castello Branco, you knew nothing about the enemy; and, instead of receiving from you, as I had expected under my instructions of

the 5th March, a regular daily account of their operations, you knew nothing ; and, from the manner in which you made your march, all those were driven off the road who might have given me intelligence, and were destined to keep up the communication between me and Don Carlos de España.

‘ But this is not all; you were positively ordered by your instructions to go to Castello Branco, and no farther. The reason for this instruction is obvious. First, the militia of Lower Beira would have been there in the case supposed, and they were there. Secondly, as soon as I should be informed of the enemy’s approach to the Coa, it would have been absolutely necessary for me to assemble a force at Castello Branco, of which the foundation would have been the 1st hussars. Yet, notwithstanding these orders and the reason for them, you marched from Castello Branco on the 8th, and crossed the Tagus on the 9th.

‘ Till I received your letter of the 7th April, I did not conceive it possible that you would have so far disregarded your instructions, otherwise I should certainly have prevented it ; and the consequence of your conduct was, that I did not know that the enemy had crossed the Coa till the 10th instant.

‘ I am willing to believe, nay, I am certain, that the omission to obey my instructions was not intentional, and that it is to be attributed to that description of inattention which is too much the practice of the Service. If the instructions of the 5th March had been read with attention, and pains had been taken to understand them, and a plan had been considered for the mode of executing them, in case of the occurrence of the event for which they provided, it is impossible that the mistakes of which I complain could have occurred.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

— — —.

[ *To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 18th April, 1812. 10 A.M.

‘ I enclose the last letters from General Bacellar and Don Carlos de España.

‘ The enemy were still at Pedrogaõ yesterday ; but our patrol took a courier, who says they intended to retire last night.

‘ I had at first intended to bring the divisions across the Tagus two at a time. But the weather is so bad that it is impossible to bivouac the troops, and the cantonments on this side the Tagus will scarcely hold one division. I have, therefore, given the troops a second halt, in order to allow the 4th division to follow the 5th across the Tagus.

‘ I am much afraid that Major Grant is taken. He was at Idanha à Nova, and the man taken yesterday says that an officer was taken there by one of the enemy’s patrols. I have not heard from him since the 15th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Castello Branco, 19th April, 1812.

‘ It is necessary that some attention should be paid to the mowing of hay this year, otherwise I think there is great reason to fear that the cavalry will be but ill provided with forage during the winter. I believe the best places in Alentejo are Portalegre, Alpalhaõ, Gafete, Niza, Castello de Vide, Villa Viçosa, Estremoz, Crato, and all the villages along the Sor river. Mr. Routh should take early measures on this subject; some might be mowed on the left of the Guadiana, near where our bridges were, and between Badajoz and Talavera Real; the former stored at Elvas, the latter at Badajoz.

‘ The mode in which I propose to settle this matter in this part of the country is to make arrangements with the magistrates of the villages to mow and stack the hay, for which they should be paid from 40 to 50 reas a truss of from 12 to 15 pounds. The magistrates should then be held responsible to produce all the hay for cutting and storing which they should have been paid.

‘ The best season for cutting is the month of May, so that you see Mr. Routh has no time to lose. I recommend this arrangement in case of accidents, as I hope and believe we shall spend the winter out of Portugal yet.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,                      ‘ Castello Branco, 20th April, 1812. 8 A.M.

‘ The enemy have continued to withdraw from this part of the country; and our piquets were yesterday in Penamacor; and from the Alpedrinha side, in Val de Lobos; and I conclude that this day the whole will be across the Coa.

‘ The Light division and hussars are this day at St. Miguel and Pedrogaõ; the 3rd division and 11th at Alpedrinha, &c. The 4th and 5th divisions will move to-morrow from hence; and I shall keep the front in movement gradually towards the Coa till the rear shall come up.

‘ We had an unpleasant report yesterday morning from Coimbra, of the 17th, that Trant had been defeated on Guarda, and his militia dispersed. The report was brought to Coimbra by an *alferes* of militia, and some non-commissioned officers; the day of the defeat not mentioned.

‘ We had heard from Trant on the 13th, at night; and there was a possibility that the affair had happened on the 14th. Guarda being 29 leagues from Coimbra, it appeared barely possible that it might have happened on the evening of the 15th, as the letter from Coimbra was dated at nine in the morning of the 17th.

‘ There are letters in this town from Celorico of the 15th, which do not notice this affair; and, therefore, it certainly did not happen on the 14th, and probably not on the morning of the 15th; and yet, if it was not then, it is scarcely possible that the *alferes* and non-commissioned officers could have gone the distance in the time.

‘ We have heard from Covilhaõ to the 17th, and have no accounts of this action; and the ordenanza are in all parts of the country, and there is no report of it among them; nor any among the prisoners and deserters from the enemy, some taken even yesterday.

‘ I sent an officer from hence on the 16th with letters to Guarda; and he would certainly have returned if he had heard of this action; unless, indeed, he has been taken, which is not very probable. A non-commissioned officer went likewise with letters on the night of the 17th from Alpedrinha; and we have no accounts from him.

‘ Upon the whole, I believe that the *alferes* and non-commissioned officers have taken fright, and run away; and have spread this report at Coimbra as a justification of their own conduct.

‘ I am going to Escalhos de Cima this day, to be nearer the advanced posts. It is only two leagues from hence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ I have no accounts from Ciudad Rodrigo since the 11th.

‘ *Escalhos*, 4 P.M.—I enclose a letter from Colonel Wilson, from which you will see that there was some affair at Guarda on the 14th, though not what the *alferes* reported. It is strange that the person who wrote from Celorico on the 15th knew nothing about it. The dragoon who brought this letter says that two companies of militia were taken prisoners on the Mondego.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 20th April, 1812.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 16th.

‘ All the pontoons, and all the boats which are in Badajoz, with their baulks, anchors, &c., for which there are carriages, must be sent to Elvas. I beg you to speak to the Marques de Monsalud on this subject, and to communicate upon it with General Victoria, in order that he may find the means of moving these boats.

‘ Any boats for which there are not carriages should be floated down the river to Jurumenha.

‘ I beg that you will tell General Campbell, that if he wants bill hooks, he must apply for them to the Portuguese head quarters. No article of any description, excepting the pontoons and boats, and what belongs to them, must be taken out of the stores at Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Sir N. Trant.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pedrogaõ, 21st April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your

division and that of General Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened; and that I wished you to withdraw from that position.

‘ In fact troops ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned, if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree with me, that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal.

‘ I can only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which you made for the retreat from it.

‘ As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt to put it in execution, and it is useless to say any thing about it. I would observe, however, upon one of your principles, viz., that the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war, particularly in our situation, and with such troops as we, and you in particular, command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You could not have succeeded in that attempt; and you would have lost your division and that of General Wilson.

‘ I give you my opinion very freely upon your plans and operations, as you have written to me upon them; begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that both you and General Wilson did every thing that officers could do under such circumstances; and that I attribute to you the safety of the two divisions.

‘ I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day; and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each other.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*  
*Sir N. Trant,*

‘ WELLINGTON.

, *To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pedrogaõ, 21st April, 1812. 3 P.M.

‘ I enclose letters from Generals Bacellar and Trant, which will show what passed at Guarda on the 14th; and

letters from Don Carlos de España to the 18th, which will show how matters stand at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ You will see that the enemy have lost their bridge on the Agueda. They have retired from Sabugal, and I believe are passing the bridge of El Villar.

‘ The Light division and hussars are this day at Penamacor and Meimoa; the 3rd division and 11th dragoons at Capinha and Bemquerencia. Our patrols have been, I believe, in Aldea da Ponte.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Dickson, R.A.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Penamacor, 22nd April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th. Let me know as soon as possible what ordnance and stores there are for the heavy train in the transports at Setuval, including those recently arrived from Oporto.

‘ Let the 927 barrels of powder be sent to General Rosa at Lisbon; and I will settle with Marshal Beresford to have 1000 barrels of powder sent from thence to Oporto, for the service of the northern garrisons.

‘ Let the 7726 24 pounder shot be likewise sent to Lisbon, and be given over to General Rosa.

‘ I shall hear from you, of course, when the gun carriages arrive at Alcacer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Dickson, R.A.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir A. Campbell, Kt.*

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Penamacor, 22nd April, 1812.

‘ I received by the last post your letter of the 24th March. I do not exactly recollect what passed between Sir Harry Burrard and me on the occasion of the reference made to us by you and Colonel Darling, on a difference respecting an exchange. I believe we declined to decide upon the subject, and we gave no opinion. Not recollecting what passed, I certainly cannot recollect what opinion I formed upon reading the papers.

‘ I believe the chief command at the Isle of France is a better situation for your health than the staff in the East Indies, but I should doubt its being better for your pocket.

‘ You will see that we have been in a *bustle*, as Sir David says, here. I believe that my patrols will communicate with Ciudad Rodrigo this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir A. Campbell, Kt.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Penamacor, 22nd April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, regarding Lieut. — of the —th regiment.

‘ There are with the —th six subalterns less than I have endeavored to keep with every battalion in the army; and Lieut. — is now the third lieutenant in the second battalion. He has omitted to inform you, however, that there are three subalterns belonging to the first battalion, now doing duty in the second battalion; and, under the King’s order, I must detain them till they shall be relieved. I should in like manner be obliged to detain him, even after he should become effective in the first battalion; and of course cannot allow him to go to that battalion before his seniors, and before he shall belong to it.

‘ I always feel much concern in being obliged to refuse officers who wish to quit the army; indeed it is the most painful duty I have to perform. But it must be performed; otherwise, between those absent on account of wounds and sickness, and those absent on account of business or pleasure, I should have no officers left.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Penamacor, 22nd April, 1812. 5 P.M.

‘ Our patrols were yesterday in Alfayates, which town the enemy left at nine in the morning, taking the road of

Casillas. The patrols were to go this day, if possible, to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I shall go to-morrow to Sabugal; and if I should find the enemy decidedly gone, I shall send orders for every body to halt.

‘ I enclose letters received from Don Carlos, Ruman, and the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Ruman is come here himself. He passed by the right of the Coa yesterday, after twelve o’clock, as far as Mealhada Sorda.

‘ The Light division are this day in Sabugal; the hussars at Quadrascis and Soito.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I hear that the 42nd are arrived, and I shall order them to join the 1st division.’

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Penamacor, 22nd April, 1812. ’

‘ I have delayed to answer your letter of the 16th instant, containing one from the house of Messrs. Alcock, Bulkeley, and Co., till I shall have an opportunity of looking among my papers for the copy of a proclamation issued by me in the year 1809, when I settled that the Commissaries should draw bills on the Commissary General for supplies furnished by the country; but, unfortunately, I have not been able to find it.

‘ When the British army first came to the Peninsula, nothing could be more irregular than the mode in which supplies were taken from the country by Commissaries, corps, and even individuals, for which they were in the habit of giving irregular vouchers.

‘ One of the consequences attending this evil was, that it was impossible to settle the accounts of the Commissariat, or to pay for those supplies, without reference to the authority of the Commander in Chief; and I was obliged to examine and consider every irregular voucher left at any distance of time by any individual, and to inquire into all the circumstances attending it, before I could give authority

that payment should be made for the supplies furnished. It frequently happened that, owing to the lapse of time, the justice of the demand could not be satisfactorily proved, and I was obliged to refuse sanction to the payment of it.

‘ In order to put an end to these evils, I ordered the officers of the Commissariat to *settle accounts* for the supplies which they should receive from the country before they should quit the town in which they should have received them; and I issued a proclamation, requiring all those who furnished supplies to the army to demand payment for them within one month after the period at which the supplies had been furnished, and I promised that they should be paid, if possible, in ready money, or, if not possible, that the Commissary who had received the supplies should be directed to give a bill for their amount on the Commissary General.

‘ This is the origin of the Commissariat bills to which the letter from Messrs. Alcock and Bulkeley refers. It was never intended to promise in this proclamation that which was impossible, viz., to pay within one month for all supplies which this army might receive. That which was intended was to settle accounts with those who furnished supplies, and to give those persons a document to prove the existence of a debt, without the trouble of coming to head quarters, and of being parties to a long investigation to prove the justice of their demand.

‘ A bill was preferred to every other description of acknowledgment of the debt, as being the best known to the people of the country, and as pointing out the person to whom they were to look for payment. But these bills have never specified periods of payment.

‘ Accordingly, the practice has been, from the year 1809 to this moment, to postpone the payment of the Commissariat bills. At times, those drawn in payment of one description of supplies are preferred to others; at other times, those drawn for smaller sums are preferred to those drawn for larger; and generally, the bills have been numbered at the Commissary General’s office when presented for payment, and have been paid in rotation in the register of the numbers.

‘ But there is one rule which has been invariably followed, both in the payment of these bills, and in the payment of

demands for supplies furnished before those bills were in use, and that is, to pay those last who should have appeared to have purchased the bills, or the right to demand the payment, at a depreciated rate.

‘ These arrangements, and the practice of the Commissariat under them, have been no secret. They are known to the world.

‘ If I am not mistaken, Messrs. Alcock and Bulkeley were apprized, when Mr. Kennedy paid similar demands by bills on the Treasury in the month of September last, that it would be the last time he should consent to such an arrangement; and I know it is notorious throughout the country, and must be well known at Lisbon, that I had, so long ago as the year 1809, ordered that those who should purchase up the debts of the British army should be paid the last.

‘ It is not necessary that I should here enter into a justification of this order. Unfortunately, the difficulty of procuring specie renders it impossible to pay in ready money for all the supplies required by the army; but, whether I have it or not, I have assumed an authority to decide which of the creditors of the army shall be paid last.

‘ I do not think I have exercised that authority unjustly in determining that those shall be paid last who do not, themselves, furnish any supplies or assistance to aid our exertions, and to forward the just cause in which we are engaged; but who, on the contrary, do us and their country all the mischief of which they are capable, by endeavoring to make money of the public difficulties, and to destroy our credit by purchasing our securities from the holders of them at a depreciated price.

‘ It is impossible that this rule can be attended by half the injurious effects that must be the consequences of encouraging the purchase of these securities; the least of which must be to raise the price of all commodities throughout the country to more than the amount of the profit which these purchasers would choose to make by this traffic.

‘ I request you to communicate this letter to the Consul General for the information of Messrs. Alcock and Bulkeley, and that of the British merchants at Lisbon in general.

‘ At the same time, I beg that these gentlemen may be informed that, as it appears that a considerable time has

now elapsed since these demands have been due to them, I have desired the Commissary General to take an early opportunity of paying them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Sabugal, 23rd April, 1812.

‘ Lieut. General the Marques de Monsalud, who commands in Estremadura, in the absence of Captain General Castaños, has requested me to apply to Government for 8000 suits of clothing, including shoes, shirts, caps, and gaiters, for the Spanish troops destined to be the garrison of Badajoz, of the same description with that recently sent to Oporto for Don Carlos de España, with the exception of the caps, which are to be of black felt; and 400 suits of the same description for artillerymen, and 200 suits of grey for pioneers.

‘ I request that if your Lordship should grant this clothing it may be sent to the Tagus at an early period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alfayates, 24th April, 1812.

‘ I did not write to you last night, as I was by no means certain of the enemy’s movement. It appears, however, by the report which I have just received, that they have all crossed the Agueda, and are in full retreat towards the Tormes.

‘ I have therefore ordered every thing to halt to-morrow; and I shall send orders regarding the disposition to be adopted, while I shall bring up supplies for Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

‘ I am in great hopes, however, to be able to carry into execution our southern scheme yet.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Alfayates, 24th April, 1812.

‘ Marmont has retired, and I shall immediately get provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo. I propose, while this operation shall be going on, to send some of the troops back across the Tagus, and to distribute the whole in such a manner as that they can be easily subsisted.

‘ I think that you might avail yourself of this opportunity to strike your blow at Almaraz. I think that one of your British brigades, and two Portuguese brigades, or one and a half British, and one strong Portuguese brigade, would do your business as to the French in that neighbourhood.

‘ All the iron howitzers are now in Elvas, and you might employ, to draw six of them, the mules attached to one of General Hamilton’s brigades of Portuguese artillery. If Dickson has not got the ammunition carriages prepared for the brigade of howitzers, which I proposed should be in the reserve of the artillery, you might then get mule carts, to carry the quantity of shot, and of howitzers and spherical shells, which you might think it expedient to take. See Dickson in regard to this equipment, and settle the whole with him. You had better take him on the expedition with you. The equipment might be prepared at Elvas, and might join you at Truxillo or Jaraicejo by Caceres. Besides the gun equipment, you should take with you six of our small pontoons, to enable you to make a flying bridge if you should require it. The pontoons and bullocks are at S. Vicente, near Elvas; Lieut. Piper, of the Engineers, is in charge of them, and will do whatever you order him; each of them should march with a double proportion of bullocks.

‘ Make all your preparations in secret for this expedition. I shall watch from hence the course of the enemy’s retreat, and will let you know if it should appear to me that you have anything to fear from any of the divisions of the army of Portugal going near Almaraz. Of course you will not march till you shall hear further from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You should take a regiment of British and one of Portuguese cavalry on this service.’

*To Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Alfayates, 24th April, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th April, enclosing one from the Conde de Linhares, in regard to the reward of Major Das Neves, as having first formed the plan of the positions which are fortified in front of Lisbon, and first conceived the idea of the system of defence which was adopted.

‘ It has never been my practice to refrain from giving applause to those officers under my command to whom applause is due, or to omit to recommend them to the notice and generosity of their superiors and their sovereign; but I solemnly protest against its being understood that Major Das Neves, or Colonel Caula, either formed the plan, or conceived the idea of the system which was carried into execution for the safety of Lisbon under my direction. I never saw Major Das Neves in my life, nor Colonel Caula, till I saw him at Almeida. Your Excellency gave me in 1809 a plan of the country in question, and a memoir by Major Das Neves; I am now obliged to declare, that when I came to examine the ground, I found both so inaccurate, that I could place no reliance upon them; and it is a fact that having trusted in one instance to the plan and memoir, without reconnoitring the ground, I was obliged to make a second journey to Lisbon, in February, 1810, and to destroy the works which had been commenced.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Alfayates, 24th April, 1812. ’

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th March, regarding the importation of articles duty free for the British Commissariat.

‘ It appears to me that there can be no difficulty in the business, by applying to these articles the first article, as proposed in my letter to you of the 4th November, 1810.

‘ The Commissary General will apply to me that these articles may be imported duty free, giving me a list of them, which I will sign, and send the application to you. These

articles will then be admitted duty free, and carried to the Commissariat stores, under the responsibility of the officers of the Commissariat.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alfayates, 24th April, 1812.

‘ My brother-in-law has sent me a carriage from England in one of the transports, of which the wheels must be put on, and the carriage hung upon springs in Lisbon. If you have an English coachman I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow him to put the carriage together for me; if not, I shall be obliged to you if you will employ to do it the most intelligent coachmaker in Lisbon.

‘ I have here one of the Prince’s carriages, which I propose to send down as soon as my own shall come up; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will ask Joaquim da Costa to lend me a pair of the Prince’s mules and a careful driver, to bring the carriage up. I shall send the mules and driver back by the Prince’s carriage. One of the police dragoons might as well come up with the carriage. Excuse this trouble.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Marmont has retired, I hope to be able yet to undertake an expedition to the south.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alfayates, 24th April, 1812.

‘ The army continued its march towards this quarter since I last addressed you, and the enemy retired before them. The last of the enemy crossed the Agueda yesterday morning, and they are in full retreat towards the Tormes. The rains which had fallen between the 13th and 19th instant, had carried away the bridge which they had constructed on the Agueda, immediately above Ciudad Rodrigo, but they have repaired it within these last three days, and the leading

divisions of the army crossed by the Puente del Villar, and the fords of the Upper Agueda; the rear only by the bridge near Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ When Marshal Marmont marched his troops upon Sabugal, Lieut. General Bacellar ordered that the Portuguese militia under Brig. Generals Trant and Wilson should be concentrated upon Guarda, with a view to protect our magazines at Celorico, and to prevent the enemy’s incursions into the Serra d’Estrella.

‘ Marshal Marmont moved upon this militia on the 14th instant, with a considerable force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery; and Brig. General Trant, who commanded, conceiving the enemy to be too strong for him, determined to retire across the Mondego. I am by no means satisfied with the conduct of the militia upon this occasion. They had made great progress in their retreat which, if they had been steady, would have been effected without loss. But a battalion which was covering the retreat having been ordered to fire upon the enemy’s cavalry, and the rain having prevented their pieces from going off, broke, and threw the retreating troops into disorder, and the enemy took about 150 prisoners.

‘ The troops were formed again, however, on the left of the Mondego, and retired upon Celorico, General Bacellar keeping the advanced posts, under Brig. General Wilson, at Lagiosa. On the following morning, the 15th, the enemy advanced again in considerable force, and drove in Brig. General Wilson’s outposts at Lagiosa, which induced General Wilson to give directions that our magazines at Celorico might be destroyed, according to directions which I had left in case the magazines were likely to fall into the hands of the enemy. But the enemy having halted at Lagiosa, Brig. General Wilson countermanded the order for the destruction of the magazines, and nearly the whole have been saved.

‘ The enemy retired from Lagiosa in the course of the night of the 15th, and from Guarda on the 16th, which town was occupied on the 17th by the troops under the command of Brig. General Wilson.

‘ I enclose a letter from General Bacellar of the 15th, containing Brig. General Trant’s report of the affair of the 14th, and your Lordship will be happy to learn that the officers

of the militia behaved remarkably well. It appears to me that Brig. General Trant and Brig. General Wilson, being at Guarda, did every thing they ought to have done. But when Marshal Marmont was in strength at Sabugal, they ought to have kept only an advanced guard at Guarda; and as soon as I heard that they were collected at Guarda, I apprized them of my opinion; but it was too late.

‘ The partial success over the Portuguese militia on their retreat from Guarda, and the murder and plunder of the inhabitants of a few villages in Lower Beira, already suffering from the enemy’s former depredations, are the only fruits of Marshal Marmont’s expedition within the Portuguese frontier, to divert our attention from the siege of Badajoz.

‘ While the troops belonging to the army of Portugal have been collected for this service, I learn from Captain General Castaños that General Abadia had ordered the Spanish troops in the Asturias to move into Leon, where Brigadier Moreno had had some partial success against a French detachment at Otero de las Dueñas.

‘ Don Julian Sanchez, likewise, who has continued with his cavalry in Castille, has been very successful on the enemy’s communications, and against their convoys.

‘ By accounts from the south I learn that neither the Conde de Penne Villemur nor General Ballesteros entered Seville, while Marshal Soult was in Estremadura in the commencement of this month. The Conde de Penne Villemur is now on his return into Estremadura with the troops of the 5th army, in consequence of a suggestion which I conveyed to him on the 8th instant.

‘ General Drouet is at Fuente Ovejuna, in Cordova, with the troops under his command, and Marshal Soult at Seville, according to the last accounts of the 21st instant, which I have received from Lieut. General Sir R. Hill.

‘ I have ordered the militia to return to their stations, and I propose at present to canton the army in the stations most convenient for subsistence till Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida be filled with provisions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alfayates, 24th April, 1812.

‘ Having reported in my dispatch of the 16th instant, that Major General ——— had disobeyed the orders which I had given him, I think it proper to enclose to your Lordship copies of the instructions which he received, and copies of the correspondence which I have had with him upon the subject, in which you will see how the matter really stands.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 25th April, 1812.

‘ De Lancy will send you the proposed distribution of the troops, and I say nothing about it.

‘ I send you the last reports from Madrid and Salamanca. You see that they differ a little in respect to the person to command the French armies. They would derive great advantage from this supposed arrangement.

‘ I see in a paper of the 10th, that the Russians have declared war on the 19th of March.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 25th April, 1812.

Half-past 11 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I have just now received your letter of half-past twelve at noon this day, and I am much concerned to find that you did not receive last night the letter I wrote to you yesterday, at a little after twelve, and one by the Quarter Master General, for the 1st division to halt this day.

‘ It was likewise intended that the 1st division should halt at Pedrogaõ to-morrow and next day, and should afterwards proceed under orders sent this day, by Castello Branco across the Tagus.

‘ The first thing to do is to get the men under cover ; and

Penamacor, and Joaõ de Pirez, and Aldea del Obispo are vacant, and you had better occupy those places in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Conde de Amarante.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 12th instant. I beg to observe to your Excellency, that the object in placing the troops under your command in Tras os Montes, is principally to defend that province, to observe the enemy’s movements in that part of the country, and eventually to aid by movements of your troops, without risking their retreat into Portugal, those movements which General Abadia may make from Galicia. I recommend to you not to make the movement which you propose on Tabara and Carvajales, as being entirely inconsistent with all the objects in view, in placing you in Tras os Montes, and risking your troops without any object.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Conde de Amarante.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

‘ I have a letter of the 14th from the Bath King at Arms, in which he tells me that there is to be an installation of Knights of the Bath in the next month ; and he desires me to have a proxy and three esquires for the occasion. There will be no difficulty about the latter ; but the former must be knighted, which is not very agreeable to many. I am going to write to Culling Smith by the mail, either to be himself my proxy\*, or to get one for me, and to point out esquires for the occasion ; and I shall desire him to get a proxy and esquires for you.

\* Lieut. General Sir Alexander Campbell was the proxy for the Earl of Wellington, as Knight of the Bath, at the Installation in Westminster Abbey ; and Mr. Culling Smith, Lieut. Colonel G. Napier, and Captain Gurwood, were the three Esquires.

‘ I shall desire him to apply to Lord George Seymour to be your proxy, who need not care about being knighted.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

‘ The same mail which brought me a letter from Lord Liverpool of the 10th instant, will have brought you the decision of the Treasury of the 8th, that all the specie in the Standard is to be applicable to the service of this country. Pray let me know how much there is, in order that I may make the appropriation according to the directions of the Treasury, and in the mean time, send me 500,000 or 600,000 dollars ; as we are, as usual, much distressed for money.

‘ Let me know also what the Spanish expenditure paid by Great Britain is. I did not know that Whittingham received any thing.

‘ You will see that Marmont made but a poor effort after all. However, we should have lost Ciudad Rodrigo if I had not returned here. I am making every effort to provision that place, and I do not yet despair between ourselves, of being able to undertake the expedition into Andalusia this year.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ In hopes of being able to go into Andalusia, and of freeing that province, I requested Government some time ago to have prepared 20,000 suits of clothing, &c., for a Spanish army of that number.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose the copy of my last dispatch to the Secretary of State.

‘ I beg that you will inform the Spanish Government that I have been in Ciudad Rodrigo, and that I conceive that the firmness and conduct of Brig. General Vives, and of the

garrison under his command, during the late blockade by the enemy, are highly praiseworthy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To the Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st instant, enclosing one of the 10th from the Secretary of State, in regard to the removal of Principal Souza from the Local Government of Portugal.

‘ It is not necessary that I should enter upon the natural defects of Principal Souza’s mind and character. My objections to him as a member of the Government, and my recommendation, in 1810, to the Prince Regent of Portugal, that he should be removed from this situation, were founded upon his being the original cause and promoter of the opposition by the Portuguese Local Government to the measures which I proposed should be adopted by the Civil Government in aid of and co-operation with the operations of the army, which opposition was founded upon erroneous military notions entertained by this gentleman, and by his influence introduced and supported in the councils of this Government.

‘ The Prince Regent of Portugal refused, however, to dismiss Principal Souza from his situation at my recommendation ; and although the determination was not communicated to me in very gracious terms, I determined not to press again the removal of this gentleman, as at the time I received it, the circumstances which had occurred must have proved to the most prejudiced and obstinate that I had not been mistaken in my views of the military operations to be carried on in the year 1810, and that those who impeded or failed to forward my views were not the best friends of their country, or of the alliance. It likewise appeared to me that neither Principal Souza, nor the Portuguese Government, acting under his influence, were likely again to interfere in military operations.

‘ I subsequently, in October, 1811, received a letter from

the Prince Regent of Portugal, which appeared to me to offer a favorable opportunity of being reconciled to the Local Government; and I offered and requested that every thing that had passed might be buried in oblivion.

‘ In the mean time His Majesty’s Government having been made acquainted with all that had passed, and having interfered with their influence that my recommendation should be attended to, and that Principal Souza should be removed, His Royal Highness has been pleased to consent to his removal, by his letter of the 29th of October, 1811; and the question is, whether we shall avail ourselves of that letter to remove Principal Souza from the Government.

‘ It is obvious from all that has passed and from the letter itself, that the consent of the Prince has been extorted from him, not by conviction of the unfitness of Principal Souza for his office, or of the injury he has done to his service and to the cause of his allies, but by a desire to conform to the wishes of His Majesty, and of the Prince Regent, and of His Majesty’s servants.

‘ Under these circumstances, although Principal Souza should be removed from the Regency, he would retain the influence which he possesses over its members and their councils, and ministers, and all the civil branches, at least, of the administration. Nothing would be gained, then, by his removal in the manner proposed, and he would be considered by the country at large as a martyr to English influence, and it is natural to suppose that his popularity would proportionably increase.

‘ I object to Principal Souza, generally, as a member of the Portuguese Regency, and to the Regency itself, and their measures in general, because, in my opinion, they have endeavored to deceive the country, if they have not themselves taken an erroneous view of their situation.

‘ The real nature of the war has never been fairly brought before the people by the Government, and instead of being informed that it was a war on their part for every thing that was valuable in life, if not for life itself; and instead of being called upon and encouraged to make corresponding sacrifices to carry it on, the people have been flattered and cajoled, and the resources of the country, which consist essentially in the sacrifices of the people, have never been

fairly called forth to provide for any of the emergencies of the war.

‘ On this same principle of deceiving the people, the sole reliance of the Local Government of Portugal, on every occasion, is on the resources and aid of Great Britain. With these views, when reforms of abuses in the customs, or any other branch of the revenue, or the abolition of useless establishments and the saving of their expenses are recommended, with a view to enable the Portuguese Government to carry on the war, they are objected to, or not carried into execution, and fresh demands of loans or subsidies are made upon Great Britain. And in the same view of deceiving the people as to the real nature of the war, all the measures recommended with the hope to enable the army to avail themselves of the resources of the country have been frustrated. They would have been objected to and refused, if under the late orders of the Prince Regent, that had been possible; but they have been adopted in such a manner as to render all their enactments nugatory. Then, on the same principle, the magistrates have carried these measures into execution according to the spirit in which they have been adopted by the Government.

‘ It is possible that Principal Souza does not believe and has no confidence in the representations which have been repeatedly made to the Government of the evil consequences likely to result from this conduct. He has experience of the army having overcome difficulties which have been repeatedly represented to him as fatal; and he thinks it better to rely upon their exertions and upon the resources of Great Britain, than to call upon his own country to exert themselves to facilitate our operations, and to contribute all in their power for their own salvation and for the benefit of the cause.

‘ But I cannot admit that, to whatever cause his conduct may be attributed, it is otherwise than desirable that he should be removed from the Government.

‘ The question still remains, however, whether advantage shall be taken of the letter of the Prince Regent to remove him.

‘ On the same principle that, on the last occasion, I would not urge the Prince Regent to remove him, I do not recom-

mend that advantage should be now taken of His Royal Highness's letter. The Principal will still enjoy His Royal Highness's favor, if report is to be believed that he is to be raised to a higher station, and his influence over the Regency will continue; and if it should be lost, and the Regency should alter its measures, all the unpopularity which will follow them will attach to the English, and the improvements will still be insufficient for the purposes for which they were recommended.

‘I am therefore not desirous that you should send to the Brazils the letter which Lord Castlereagh has written to Lord Strangford.

‘I recommend to you at the same time to impress upon the King's Government the necessity of urging the Prince Regent of Portugal to order his Local Government to reform all abuses in the collection and management of his revenue, particularly the customs, and to discontinue all unnecessary expenses, including the naval establishments.

‘He should be informed of the real nature of the war, in relation to his own interests and those of his country; of the necessity of farther exertion on the part of Portugal, particularly in finance; of the ease with which such exertion could be made, and of the hopeless impossibility that Great Britain could afford him further pecuniary aid.

‘His attention should be seriously called to the complaints recently sent from this country, of the deficiencies in all descriptions of supplies and assistance which the country ought to afford; and he should be reminded that these supplies and assistance are afforded by no people voluntarily; that laws, with due penalties, and execution of them in an efficient manner, could alone compel the people of any country to make the exertions required from the people of Portugal to insure their salvation, and to enable us and themselves to assist the common cause.

‘If representations of this description are duly, constantly, earnestly, and sincerely urged by His Majesty's Ministers at the Brazils, it is to be hoped that at last the Prince's eyes will be opened to the real state of his affairs in Portugal; and that if he should make a change in his Local Government, those who may be removed will be so far disgraced as that those who remain, and their successors,

and the ministers and their subordinates in office, will be convinced of the necessity of acting in the manner which has been so often, but hitherto so fruitlessly recommended to them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Dickson, R.A.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812.

‘ I received your letter of the 22nd. Captain Rettberg must give charge of the ordnance and stores in Badajoz to the Spanish Lieut. Colonel of the artillery, sending me a list of what he gives over. When this shall be done you will move the British and Portuguese artillerymen now in Badajoz to Elvas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Dickson, R.A.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd respecting the establishment of a Bank. I am quite certain that the plan, however good in ordinary times, will not answer at present, and it is a useless waste of time to give it any consideration.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812. 5 P.M.

‘ I have received your note of five P.M. yesterday, and I conceive that there will be no inconvenience, and you will have plenty of time to make the tour you propose to Zarza, &c. I am afraid that the inhabitants of that place are very disaffected to the cause. They are, in general, smugglers.

‘ I have nothing new from the front. I have not yet heard that Marmont had arrived at Salamanca.

‘ I was yesterday at Ciudad Rodrigo, and I am sorry to say that the works are but little more forward than they

were when I saw them last on the 5th of March; yet the Spaniards had till the 1st of April to work without any enemy being near them.

‘ It is difficult to know what to do with these people. I have this day tried to excite them to work by feelings of national vanity and honor, but I fear I shall not succeed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON . .

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th marked “ Private,” and I am very much obliged to you for communicating to me the papers you enclosed. It is my opinion that your mediation will produce no effect; and indeed the Spaniards have not accepted it as if they intended it should. I am certain that the only mode of dealing with them is to make them request as a favor every thing in which it is wished that we should interfere.

‘ I enclose to you a letter which I wrote last summer to my brother upon this subject\*. From a perusal of this letter you will see that there are two essential points for mediation to which you have not adverted in your instructions. One is the form of Government in the colonies; the other, the disposal of the colonial revenue, or rather, the division of that revenue between the colony and the mother country. This is a very important point for Spain, as well as for the colonies.

‘ I am glad to find that you propose to give a million to Spain this year. I was not aware that my brother had till this time supplied the Spaniards with any money, excepting as advances, which had been repaid. It is my opinion that this money should be given to those who act in co-operation with this army, by which means I should hope to be able to guide their operations in some degree. But this must of course depend upon my brother.

\* See Letter to the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, dated Quinta de St, Joaõ, 14th July, 1811, in Vol. VIII.

‘ Your brother was better when he went away, and I hope will be quite well when he shall arrive in England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Le Cor.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

‘ It is desirable that no time should be lost in making arrangements for cutting the hay in Lower Beira for the use of the army. The mode in which I propose that this service shall be performed is as follows.

‘ I request you to send orders to the magistrates of those places near which the hay grows, to make immediate arrangements to cut it, and to have it cut and stacked at the proper season; and I beg to know from you, by return of post, what sum of money it is necessary to place in your hands, in order to defray the expense of cutting and stacking.

‘ You will then pay each magistrate the sum which the hay will cost, informing me of the sum you shall have paid him, and for what quantity of hay.

‘ You will then inform the magistrate that he will be held responsible to deliver that quantity of hay to the army, whenever I shall think proper to call for it.

‘ I request you to make these arrangements throughout Lower Beira.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Le Cor.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter of the 8th instant, which I have received from Lord Liverpool, in regard to the disposal of certain arms which his Lordship has sent to you from England.

‘ I think they cannot be disposed of in a better manner than that proposed by his Lordship; and I beg you to dispose of them according to the directions contained in the enclosed letter.

‘ It may probably be as well to send here the arms in-

tended for Don Julian, and any of the guerrillas in this neighbourhood.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir H. Douglas, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose the postscript to a letter of the 13th from Sir Howard Douglas, which might as well be communicated privately to the Government. If the circumstances to which it relates should be made public in England, there will be a breeze ; yet I do not see how they can be kept secret. I shall write privately to Castaños upon the subject.

‘ It has been hinted to me that ——— has not given satisfaction in Galicia, in consequence of his pressing the general armament of the people ; but dissatisfaction on any account should not have occasioned conduct so foolish as that to which he refers.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that, notwithstanding I left money to carry on the works at Ciudad Rodrigo, I found very little done since I was there last, on the 5th of March. There were twenty six days of valuable time from the 5th to the 31st of March, which appear to have been entirely thrown away, even though it be admitted that during the blockade nothing could be done. Since the 23rd of this month also, when the enemy raised the blockade, nothing has been done.

‘ I have sent Alava over to the place to point out to the principal officers how much their indolence, and their indulgence of the indolence of their men, affected the cause ; and I have told them that I should give no assistance in English soldiers to work, unless the demand for such assistance should be founded on an acknowledgment that the Spanish officers have not authority over their men, to induce them to perform works for their own defence ! But the indolence and the apathy of their nature is terrible ; yet they boast of their activity and energy.

‘ I am convinced that we shall lose both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz before the summer is over, by the prevalence of the habits of indolence and delay in this nation. I write to Castaños upon this subject.

‘ I beg that you will represent to the Government the necessity of their attending in some degree to the garrisons of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, and to the troops in Estremadura and Castille. These are thrown entirely now upon the resources of the British army.

‘ I hope also that you will recollect, and, at all events, give a positive answer upon the claim which I have brought forward, that a proportion of the sum of money given by Great Britain to Spain should be applied to the service of those troops which are in co-operation with us. If I had the command of that sum of money really, I should have the efficient control over all their operations.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the answers of the commanding officers of the 12th, 14th, and 16th light dragoons, to the complaints which have been made of the loss in the service of these regiments, of bullocks given in charity to the villages in the neighbourhood of Coa.

‘ You will observe that these losses have been occasioned entirely by the desertion of the drivers ; an evil which I had wished to remedy by the amendment I proposed to the law relative to the means of transport, but the Government would not adopt this amendment.

‘ I have desired that an inquiry may be made from the Commissary at Celorico for the bullocks stated to have been given over to him by the 12th light dragoons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Charles Stuart.’*

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 28th instant.

‘ As soon as the communication between the magazines

on the Douro and the army was opened, I ordered that provisions might be brought up to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and I am happy to find that your Excellency yesterday sent off 184 carriages to aid in that service.

‘I propose to lodge in Ciudad Rodrigo a magazine of 26,000 rations of biscuit or flour, 100,000 lbs. of salt meat, and 40,000 lbs. of rice for the use of the British army, which magazine will be at the service of the garrison in case the place should be attacked or blockaded.

‘On the 16th of February I gave your Excellency an order upon the magazine of St. Joaõ da Pesqueira for 175,000 rations of biscuit or flour, and other provisions, besides the supplies already in the place.

‘I do not know what your Excellency has received on account of this order; but I have given directions that the storekeeper of St. Joaõ da Pesqueira should continue to issue upon it when your Excellency shall send the means of conveyance to carry the provisions away.

‘The Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel Alava has communicated to me the memorandum which your Excellency gave him for my information, in which you desire to reduce the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to 1500 men; to send one battalion into the Sierra de Gata, and one battalion into the Sierra de Francia, in order to feed on the villages; and you desire that I will supply food in Portugal for 2000 men.

‘I beg leave to observe to your Excellency, that unless the place of Ciudad Rodrigo should be put in a state of defence, the army under my command, instead of being employed in active operations against the enemy, must watch the enemy’s movements against that place.

‘I believe your Excellency will admit, that unless you employ the troops of the place to work at the fortifications, you cannot expect to complete them; and I am apprehensive that 1500 men will do but little work.

‘I would likewise beg leave to observe to your Excellency, that the quantity of 175,000 rations of provisions having been calculated to last the garrison two months, and a part of it having now arrived, and your Excellency having it in your power to draw for the remainder when you think proper, there can be no want of provisions for the full garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, more particularly as, long

before these provisions can be consumed, the magazine, which I have above stated that it is my intention to put in the place, will have arrived, and will be at the service of the garrison in case it should be attacked. Your Excellency, however, is the best judge of the disposition to be made of your troops.

‘ I shall only repeat to your Excellency, that if Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned, as I had a right to expect when I quitted Castille on the 6th of March last, I should now have been in Andalusia at the head of an army of 40,000 men; and that the prospect of my being able to carry that plan into execution in this year depends entirely upon the degree of security which I shall find given at an early period to the place of Ciudad Rodrigo, by the completion of the works ordered by the Captain General Castaños, for which I have given the money, and by the formation, in the place, of the magazine above mentioned.

‘ In regard to the desire of your Excellency that 2000 men, belonging to your Excellency’s division, should be cantoned in Portugal, in order to be fed by the British Commissariat, I beg leave to recall to your Excellency’s recollection, that since the months of August and September last, some of the troops under the command of your Excellency have been subsisted in this manner upon the resources intended for the British and Portuguese allied army.

‘ I consented to this arrangement in hopes that I should have seen corps regularly organized and disciplined, and that I should have had the benefit of the assistance of your Excellency, at the head of a well disciplined Spanish division, to co-operate with this army.

‘ The wishes of your Excellency and of myself upon this subject have been entirely disappointed; and I must therefore decline giving any further assistance of this description.

‘ It is a useless waste of money, of which, in justice to my own country, I cannot be guilty, to lay it out in feeding an undisciplined peasantry, who, although perfectly capable of being made soldiers, are, after a lapse of six months, during which the expense of feeding them has been incurred, no better disciplined, as soldiers, than they ought to have been in the first week.

‘ I must therefore request your Excellency to provide for the food of the soldiers of your division now in Portugal, in one week from this date.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General*

*Don Carlos de España.*’

‘ WELLINGTON,

DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO \*.

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letters, Nos. 12 and 13, of the 2nd and 13th instant.

‘ I concur with you in your opinion of the advantages of the Island of Arosa over the Bayona Islands, as a depôt on the coast of Galicia. I beg you therefore to obtain the consent of General Abadia, to have the necessary works erected for the security of that depôt.

‘ General Castaños and General Abadia will fix upon the position they think best in the kingdom of Galicia; but whatever may be the position, or the plan of operations, or the result, it is desirable to have a secure depôt in one of the islands on the coast of Galicia.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir H. Douglas, Bart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

‘ I have heard nothing new of any description since I wrote to you last; and I enclose the only intelligence which I have received.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April 1812.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Don Carlos de España, and the copy of my answer of this day.

\* In writing to Spanish authorities, the Spanish title was added to the signature, but it will not be repeated in this compilation.

‘ I beg to draw your attention to that part of my letter in which I have refused to give food to those troops which are not disciplined, after they have had arms in their hands, and have been fed by me, in hopes that they would be disciplined, since the months of August and September last.

‘ I recommend to you to adopt the same principle in respect to the distribution of the money and other aids of the British Government to the Spanish army.

‘ I know no other mode in which the officers can be prevailed upon to discipline their troops, or to keep them in any order.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

‘ The enemy have continued their retreat since I addressed your Lordship on the 24th instant; and I have carried into execution with this army the disposition which I announced to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 24th instant.

‘ I am concerned to have to inform your Lordship that but little progress has been made in the works of Ciudad Rodrigo since I left this part of the country on the 6th of March last, notwithstanding that I had left money to complete them.

‘ I have ordered magazines of provisions into Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which will be established in those places as soon as means of transport can be collected for the purpose.

‘ No movement has been made in the south. General Drouet was still, by the last accounts, at Fuente Ovejuna, in Cordova.

‘ The Conde de Penne Villemur has returned into Estremadura with the troops under his command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

‘ Referring to your Lordship’s dispatch, No. 4, of the 3rd of January, I beg leave to remind your Lordship that you have not yet sent me the permission of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, for Brigadier General Wilson to accept the Order of the Tower and Sword, conferred upon him by the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th April, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, containing a list of the officers whom he considers to be entitled to the medal which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased to grant, in commemoration of the battle of Albuera.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th April, 1812.

‘ Adverting to the instructions contained in my letter of the 24th, I think you might now put your boats and the heavy equipment from Elvas in movement upon Caceres, covering the movement by the Portuguese cavalry, which I suppose are towards Montanches ; and I beg you to have the other troops prepared to move on the expedition towards Almaraz, as soon as I shall write to you. I wait only to hear decidedly of the movement of the 1st division.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th April, 1812.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter, and its enclosures, which I have received from His Majesty’s Ambassador in Spain, notifying to me that the Spanish Government had been pleased to confer upon me the Grand Cross of the Order of San Fernando.

‘ I beg your Lordship will lay these letters before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and request His Royal Highness’s permission for me to accept the honor conferred upon me by the Government of Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th April, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th instant, in which you enclosed one from the Secretary of State to the Regency, to your Excellency, and to myself, informing me that the Spanish Government had been pleased to confer upon me the Grand Cross of the Order of San Fernando.

‘ I beg that you will return my thanks to the Government for this mark of their favor, and that you will inform them that I have applied to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent for permission to accept it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st May, 1812. 8 A.M.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 29th. The Conde de Penne Villemur has arrived in Estremadura, in consequence of a suggestion from me. He communicated with Ballesteros, who, as he had notice of Soult’s march into Andalusia after the siege of Badajoz, must have retired in time : but he tells me in a letter received this morning, that it is reported at Seville, that Ballesteros had beaten General Rey near Malaga. There was such a General at

the head of a small body of troops, I suppose the garrison of Malaga ; and Ballesteros, when he advanced upon Seville, detached a column to observe his movements. He probably augmented that column as he retired ; and thus he may have defeated General Rey.

‘ I send you the intelligence received last night from Salamanca, which shows the disposition of the enemy’s several divisions.

‘ You will see in the paper from Valladolid, that the enemy have some heavy artillery already, and some on the march from Bayonne.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Corregidor of the Comarca of ———.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 2nd May, 1812.

‘ I am desirous of making arrangements to have the hay cut in the Comarca under your directions, in order that the army under my command may have the advantage of it, at the same time that the people will derive profit. I beg you, therefore, to give directions to the other magistrates in your district, to make arrangements to have the hay in their districts cut and stacked at the proper season. They are to report to you the quantity which will be cut and stacked in each village, and the expense of the same ; and you will forward this report to the Commissary General at head quarters, who will send you the money to be distributed for this service among the several magistrates of the district.

‘ The magistrate who will receive the money will be responsible to produce for it a corresponding quantity of good hay for the service of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Corregidor of the  
Comarca of ———.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 2nd May, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatches, Nos. 24 and 26, of the 25th of March and 2nd of

April; and having considered with the Commissary General and other persons here, who have a knowledge of the facilities in raising money in this country, the probability of succeeding with the securities drawn and transmitted by your Lordship, it has appeared to those persons, as well as to me, that the chance of success would be greater if the certificate were altered, as proposed in the enclosed draft, in which the option is left to receive the interest at head quarters or at Lisbon, and to receive payment of the principal likewise at the same places.

‘ There would be but little inconvenience in paying the interest at head quarters as well as at Lisbon; and in regard to the principal, I would observe that the measure is calculated to provide for a momentary scarcity of specie in England, applicable to the service of the army abroad. It is not probable that in three years there will be the same difficulty in procuring specie in England to send abroad as there is at present; and if there should be, it is not improbable that the regularity of the payment of the interest, and the advantages and security enjoyed from this description of certificate, will have improved the credit of the British Government to such a degree, that there will be no difficulty in borrowing specie in the Peninsula to pay off these certificates.

‘ There remains for consideration another possible event, viz., that the British army shall have been withdrawn from the Peninsula before the expiration of the term of three years.

‘ It will be necessary in that case to appoint an agent for the holders of these certificates, to receive their interest and the principal when it shall become due, at the office of the Commissary in Chief in London, and transmit it to them in the Peninsula.

‘ In case your Lordship should consent to the proposed alterations in the certificate, I beg you will determine and let me know whether the alterations shall be made here in the certificates already transmitted, or whether your Lordship will have others made out according to the form enclosed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

'No. 123.

1000 Dollars.

Don Manuel  
Velasquez.

(his signature)

transferred on  
theto Don Diego  
Lopez.

(his signature.)

'No. 123.

'Certificate for 1000 Dollars.

'For 1000 dollars advanced to the British army, the holder of this certificate is hereby entitled to receive interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, in half-yearly payments, on the and the in each year, at the office of the Commissary General of the British army, at head quarters or at Lisbon.

'The said 1000 dollars will be repaid by the said Commissary General of the British army, at head quarters, or in Lisbon, at any period after the expiration of two years from the date hereof, within ten days of the presentation of this certificate for that purpose.

'In case the holder of this certificate should choose to receive payment of the interest or principal in England, he will, upon giving notice thereof, receive payment as above specified at the office of the Commissary in Chief in London, at the rate of 5 shillings sterling for each Spanish dollar.

(Signed) 'WELLINGTON.

(Countersigned)

\_\_\_\_\_ 'Com. Gen.

\_\_\_\_\_ 'Dep. Pay. Gen.

'MEMORANDUM.

'Every transfer of this certificate must be duly registered and certified at one of the offices where the interest is made payable, without which it will not be acknowledged.'

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

MY DEAR SIR,

'Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd May, 1812. A.M.

'I received this morning your letter of the 1st, and I now enclose a paper from Salamanca. The Curate of Coca is come over, and says that Marmont had brought back to Salamanca the troops which had marched through that place; being under some apprehension that we should move forward.

'I am sorry that you experienced difficulty in passing the road from Villa Velha to Niza. It is very bad; and I am afraid cannot be materially improved.

‘ I have sent Sturgeon and Todd to endeavour to repair the bridge of Alcantara; in which I hope they will succeed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Lobo.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd May, 1812.

‘ Mr. Stuart, His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon, has informed me, that he has taken the liberty of addressing to you a carriage which has been sent for me from England.

‘ I shall be obliged to you, if you will direct the person who is bringing the carriage to proceed by the route enclosed to head quarters.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Lobo.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd May, 11 P.M. 1812.

‘ I received in due course your letter giving me an account of the progress of the repairs, &c., at Badajoz; and I am happy to find that you are going on so well.

‘ There are two or three points, however, to which I think you ought to attend, in order in some degree to improve the state of the works.

‘ First; the sluices in the dams of the bridge over the Rivillas, and in the dam of the ditch of the ravelin of San Roque, ought to be protected in some manner or other, so as to prevent the enemy from effecting the object which we attempted in regard to the latter. Probably a good wall of stone masonry in front of, and enclosing each of the dams with a grating at the bottom of the wall to give a free passage to the water, would answer the purpose.

‘ It would likewise be desirable to have a good covered communication from the Picurina to the ravelin. Indeed, if the inundation can be depended upon, I should think that the Picurina might be rendered very difficult of attack by its gorge, approaching it by its right flank.

‘ I do not know whether you have found the plans of the French engineers for bringing water into the ditch of the

fort from the Guadiana. It is very desirable that these schemes should be examined, and their practicability and expense ascertained.

‘ I conclude that you have discovered the communication between the inundation of the Rivillas and the water in the ditch of the fort, and have ascertained whether it is, or can be retained in the latter, supposing that it is let out of the former.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd May, 1812.

‘ I am very sorry to tell you that affairs are going on very badly at Ciudad Rodrigo. I sent General Alava there yesterday, upon hearing that they had not yet commenced upon the works ; and, as far as I could understand him, the garrison were in a state of mutiny, because Don Carlos de España had not performed a promise which he had made to pay the officers of the garrison for their extra allowances of provisions, which had been stopped from them during the blockade. He gave me to understand that he should write to the Spanish Government this day to apprise them of his opinion, and that of several of the principal officers of the garrison, that it was absolutely necessary that a British officer should be appointed Governor of that garrison ; and as far as I could understand him, that allied troops, meaning British and Portuguese, should be in it.

‘ I am tolerably well acquainted with the sentiments of some of these officers, among others, of Alava himself, regarding the employment of British officers in any Spanish concern ; and I am thoroughly convinced that this proposal does not proceed from any desire to improve the Spanish military system, but that it is to be attributed solely to the desire to get out of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. They dislike the restraint which must prevail soon in a Spanish garrison ; they dislike being exposed to my view in the occasional visits which I make to the place, and to my remonstrances on their indolence, and want of discipline, which I have assumed a right to make, on the ground of the assistance which I have given them of different descriptions ;

and, above all, they dislike the prospect of, some day or other, being attacked in Ciudad Rodrigo. This last feeling is common to all Spaniards. I refer you upon this point to Roche, who says very truly, that when a Spanish officer or soldier is running away, the last place he will run to is a fortified town, although he should be certain of receiving there assistance of every description. It is very desirable that you, and the Spanish Government, should be clearly informed of my opinions and intentions on this point.

‘ First, I consider the British troops the best we have, and I will not put them in garrison. Secondly ; I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the Peninsula, and I will not put more of them in garrisons than I am under the necessity of employing in that manner. I am obliged to employ some Portuguese regular troops in Elvas, and one regiment in Abrantes, but the Portuguese forts in general are occupied by the Portuguese militia, who, like other militia, cannot regularly be marched beyond the Portuguese frontier ; and if they should be sent beyond the frontier for any length of time, they would desert.

‘ I insist upon it, that Spanish troops are the proper garrisons for Spanish forts. If the Spanish Government differ with me upon this point, and insist upon my placing garrisons in these forts which we have taken from the enemy, and I have made over to them ; or if they do not adopt measures to place, and support, in them proper garrisons, I now give notice that I will destroy both Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo. It will not answer their purpose or mine, that I should be tied by the leg to guard these two places against the evils to be apprehended from the want of proper garrisons, or sufficient supplies in them.

‘ The Spanish troops, however, will be no more fit to garrison these places, unless they should be disciplined, paid, and fed, than they are for other military services, and I see no chance of their being the first, unless they should be the two last.

‘ But the British Government having agreed to aid the Spanish Government with one million sterling this year in specie, besides aids in other modes, I see no reason why a part, at least, of this sum, should not be applied to the support of those garrisons, and troops which are to act in con-

cert with the British army, and to aid and support our operations. The distribution of this money having been referred to you, I am anxious to have your decision, whether you propose to give any, and what part of it, for the support of the garrisons of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the troops under Don Carlos de España, destined to act in Castille, and of the Conde de Penne Villemur, destined to act in Estremadura.

‘ If I am to have any thing to say to the distribution of this aid, I shall employ it in giving their pay, or a certain proportion of their pay, to a certain number of officers and soldiers, regularly organized and disciplined. Those who shall not be disciplined in two months, shall receive no more of this aid, nor any assistance whatever from the British Government. The contributions levied from the province, and any money that could be sent by the Government, should go to make up the deficiency of the pay from the British subsidy. In this manner we might contrive to discipline and maintain these Spanish garrisons, and to render them useful.

‘ In regard to the employment of British officers with the Spanish troops, I entertain the same opinion which I have always held upon this subject. British officers will be worse than useless, if they have not the support to their exertions of the authority of the Commander in Chief, who must have the cordial support of the Government, or he will have no authority. British officers, besides, require an authority of no mean description, exercised with considerable strictness to keep them in order and within due bounds. The history of our service in Portugal will afford many instances of the truth of both these opinions. British officers would have more difficulties to contend with in Spain than they had in Portugal, and more temptations and opportunities of abusing their authority.

‘ I retain likewise the same opinions regarding my having the command of the Spanish armies. I consider troops that are neither paid, fed, nor disciplined, (and they cannot be disciplined, and there can be no subordination among them, unless they are paid and fed,) to be dangerous only to their friends when assembled in large bodies: as guerrillas they might be of some use, but it would be better, probably, if

the same men were employed under the guerrilla officer, who is much better acquainted with his trade, than what is called the officer of the regular Spanish service, knows the country better, which is the seat of his operations, knows better and is better known to the inhabitants, and, above all, has no pretensions to military character.

‘ I never will voluntarily command troops who cannot, and will not obey ; and therefore I am not desirous of having any thing to say to the command of the Spanish troops till I shall see the means provided for their food and pay, and till I shall be certain that the regular issue of these has been the effect of introducing among them a regular system of subordination and discipline.

‘ Upon this subject of the introduction of British officers into the service, and of the command being given to me, I may be wrong, but I entertain opinions which I have not heard from others. It is my opinion, that the officers of the Spanish army, and the *employés* of the Government in the military, as well as the civil departments, are the principal excitors and supporters of the general sentiment which prevails among the people against the French. Excepting the *Grandeos*, and a few men of large estate, who resided in the provinces, every person in Spain of the class of a gentleman, or, more properly speaking, above the class of the cultivators of the soil, was in the civil, military, or naval service of the Government. All these consider themselves deprived of their profession by the establishment of the Government of Buonaparte, particularly the officers of the army : and it is a very remarkable circumstance, and tending strongly to support my opinion, that the officers of the navy, whose services are least likely to be required by their country, in case the Spanish nation should succeed in shaking off the Buonaparte yoke, and that the alliance with England should become the permanent system of Spain, have done least in the war, have seldom agreed cordially with us, and a larger proportion of them, than of the military, have taken the side of the usurpation.

‘ The conclusion which I draw from these observations, is, that if we mean to encourage the continued resistance of the Spanish people, we ought not to disgust the officers of the Spanish army, and so far deprive them of their profession, as

to give to British officers the effectual control over the army. Mind, I do not say that the Spanish officers are the sole cause of the continued resistance of the people; for I believe the sentiment of hostility against the French is part of the nature of a Spaniard; but it must be admitted, that the example and instigation of the superior class of officers must have some effect in continuing the resistance of the lower orders.

‘ But, although I conceive that there are many difficulties and inconveniences in introducing our officers into the Spanish service, and in giving the Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s troops the supreme command of the whole, I conceive that many of the advantages to be expected from both arrangements might be acquired in another manner. I think that I have already acquired such an influence over the officers of the Spanish army, that they would do any thing I should desire them, excepting perhaps to discipline their troops, establish subordination and order among them, and overcome their habits of indolence and procrastination. I doubt that they can effect these objects till the troops shall be regularly paid and fed; and if what I have above suggested be adopted, you will see that the remedy for these defects is provided.

‘ It has always been my opinion that much might be done by the British Government to increase the authority and influence of the Commander in Chief in this country.

‘ First; travelling military missions ought to be put an end to, or ought to be under the immediate direction of the Commander in Chief.

‘ Secondly; no aid of any description ought to be given to any Spanish troops, or commander of army, or guerrillas, excepting under the direction of the Commander in Chief.

‘ I have above stated the condition upon which alone I would issue any aid to any regular troops. The discipline of guerrillas might not be insisted upon; but it might be possible to couple with the grant of any aid, whether of arms, provisions, or money, even to guerrillas, an arrangement for their following a certain system, or line of operations, connected with those of others.

‘ All propositions for increase and extension of authority are received in England with jealousy; and I have there-

fore never made any direct proposition upon this subject. I might have hoped that the desire which I have always expressed to be allowed to confine my attention to my own army, might have satisfied the King's Government that I want no extension of authority, and that I deprecate it as throwing upon me additional responsibility and trouble.

‘ But the state of the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the discussions into which we are about to enter respecting those establishments, render it necessary to speak out ; and I have no hesitation in declaring my opinion, that the only remedy for the existing evils is for the British Government to increase to the utmost extent the power and authority of the Commander in Chief, and to leave to his discretion the distribution of all the aids to the Peninsula.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th April, to which I would not trouble you with an answer, only that I see that Dom Miguel Forjaz, of course, deceived himself by those under him, and thus deceives you.

‘ I have as yet made no complaint of means of transport in Alentejo, wanting to convey provisions and stores to Elvas and Badajoz since the siege of the latter. What I complained of, was want of means of transport to convey the stores for the siege of Badajoz, in the months of February and March, and to facilitate the operations of the siege. These wants occurred before the complaints were made.

‘ I am afraid that Dom Miguel Forjaz thinks that I am inclined to complain without reason. In order to avoid disappointment and complaint, and in order, if possible, to throw provisions into all the fortified places and magazines without pressing the country for means of transport (which, by the by, I must observe ought to be done by others, and not by me), I have done what I believe no other General at the head of an army ever before dreamt of. The allied

army are now separated, from the Douro to the Sierra Morena, close to the magazines, in order that the troops may subsist with facility, and that all the means of transport belonging to the army may be employed in filling the forts and magazines with provisions, in order that I may have to call for little transport from the country, and may have no complaints to make.

‘ I beg, however, that Dom Miguel Forjaz may not boast that the want of complaint is to be attributed to the activity of the agents of the Government, or the efficiency of the law.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about my carriage. I shall write to General Lobo about it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Peacocke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812.

‘ I beg, that as soon as convenient after the receipt of this letter, you will inspect the —th regiment under the General Orders of the 3rd May, 1812, and make me a report upon its state without loss of time, in order that I may judge of the expediency of again ordering that regiment into the field.

‘ I understand that the —th regiment have their mules, &c. in readiness to march at the shortest notice.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brig. General Le Cor.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st instant, and I have given directions to the Commissary General to have a sum of money in the hands of the Commissary at Castello Branco, for the purpose of making the advances for cutting hay, at an early period in this month.

‘ The Commissary at Castello Branco will be directed to wait upon you on this subject. I beg, however, that you will observe, that I do not propose to make advances for straw ;

I make advances for hay, under the notion that this description of forage would not be cut, under the existing circumstances of the country, if these advances were not made. Whatever may be the state of the country, the corn will be cut, and the straw will be a resource, and I am willing to take my chance of its being one, for the army on payment on delivery, rather than pay for it beforehand. It will not be necessary, therefore, to provide so large a sum to be advanced as you propose.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Le Cor.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812.

Half past 11 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I enclose papers of the 27th and 30th April, from Salamanca. The former ought to have been received before.

‘ Marmont ought certainly to place his left on the Tagus, and his right at Avila, and to hold Salamanca by a small corps. But the French are so distressed for provisions, and in every other way, that it is difficult to guess what they will do.

‘ Affairs are going on but ill at Ciudad Rodrigo ; and as far as I can understand, there has been something very like a mutiny there ; and all parties agree that the garrison must be given over to us ; that is to say, the officers do not choose to stay in it. I have given fair notice, however, that I will not take charge of the garrison, excepting on an acknowledgment under their hands, that they are incapable of holding it, or, as officers, of commanding their men ; and that sooner than garrison the place permanently, I will destroy it entirely.

‘ I have, however, begged my brother to draw the serious attention of the Government to this subject.

‘ I think this time favorable for Hill’s operation upon Almaraz, and I have desired him to march upon it with a part of his troops.

‘ I have sent large numbers of carts and animals to the magazines to bring up supplies for the places ; and that business is going on well. Before it can be so far com-

pleted as to enable me to leave this place, I must know what Marmont's dispositions are, and I shall be prepared for a movement on one side or the other of the Tagus before the harvest. In order to make this preparation, however, I have done what could not be attempted in any other war but this; having placed the right of the army upon the Sierra Morena, and the left at St. Joaõ da Pesqueira, on the Douro. But I am certain that the French will not find out how weak we are in all points.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th May, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Madrid from a person unknown to me, in regard to the two young men who will wait upon you with this letter.

‘ I beg leave to recommend them to your protection; and if it should appear that there is any person in authority at Cadiz acquainted with the character of the writer of the enclosed letter, or with that of their family, I beg you will recommend that they may be received into the academy, and eventually employed in the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th April. It does not appear to me to be necessary that you should issue the stores required by Brig. General Carroll till he shall have men to make use of them, and only in proportion as he shall have men.

‘ I beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of abstaining from making remonstrances on the detachment of troops from Galicia to America, till you shall receive orders to do so from His Majesty's Government. Your duty is to make such representations as you may be directed to make to the

General Officer commanding in Galicia in regard to his operations, and to suggest the measures which may occur to you as likely to forward the object in the view of His Majesty's Government, or of the Commander in Chief of the army.

‘ You are likewise to superintend the distribution of the stores sent to Galicia for the purposes of the war, according to the orders which you will from time to time receive.

‘ But I beg leave to suggest to you, that you have nothing to say to political measures. You have nothing to do with the detachment of troops or artillery to South America.

‘ It is obvious that General Abadia, or General Castaños, could not make such detachments without orders from their Government; and you must not endeavor to prevail upon them to disobey the orders which they may receive, although you may press the expediency of the employment of the troops and artillery in other quarters, without reference to the orders of the Government that the troops and artillery should be sent to America.

‘ If His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz should wish to have those orders recalled, he will make the request direct to the Government; and at all events your interference with the person who is to obey the orders of the Government must be hopeless, while it will lead to discussions of an unpleasant nature, which may as well be avoided.

‘ In regard to the supply of arms and equipments to troops about to be detached to America, you have received the Secretary of State's orders upon that subject, and you will of course obey them.

‘ If troops should be detached to America which you have supplied with arms and equipments, you will observe to General Abadia that the design in supplying these arms and equipments was to enable the Spanish Government to oppose the common enemy in the Peninsula, and not to attempt any thing so hopeless as the conquest of the Colonies; and you will suggest to him the expediency of using the arms and equipments for troops destined to serve against the common enemy in Europe.

‘ If any of the arms and equipments issued by you should be detached to America with the troops notwithstanding these remonstrances, you will, upon every occasion on which

you shall make an issue to the troops in Galicia in future, stipulate that neither the arms nor the equipments issued by you are to be detached with any troops to America.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’*

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 16th, 23rd, 25th, 26th and 29th of April, Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67, and 68; and I have perused with great attention the enclosures from Major General Ross.

‘ I entirely concur with General Ross in opinion, that it is expedient that he should occupy Fort Atalaya, as well as Fort Galeras, and that those places should be provisioned for the period during which it is probable that they would hold out if attacked by the enemy, or during which it might be expedient that the garrison should be kept within them without communication with the town.

‘ In regard to the heights of San Julian, I was induced, upon examining the plan of Carthagena, and upon conversing with Lieut. Wells, to be of opinion that it was expedient not to occupy that position. According to Lieut. Wells’s report, the construction of a respectable field work on that point appeared impracticable; and any thing more solid appeared to require such a length of time and a sum of money, owing to the extreme difficulty of getting materials to the spot, that it could not be expected that it would be completed within any reasonable period.

‘ It likewise appeared from an examination of the plan, that although the occupation of San Julian was essentially necessary, with a view to any more extensive system for the protection of the right of the works of the town, and for the protection of the navigation of the harbour, it was not itself sufficient for either object; and therefore upon the whole I was of opinion, that it was better not to occupy San Julian, more particularly as it appeared that there was at all times a good communication with the sea from Galeras. It is, however, impossible to form a conclusive opinion upon a

question of this description without seeing the ground. It is obvious that some of the information received from Lieut. Wells was erroneous; and Major General Ross on the spot, must be a better judge than I can be here, of the effect of his work upon San Julian; and upon the whole I certainly concur in his plan to complete the old Spanish field work on that hill, and to build within it the tower proposed by Captain Roberts.

‘Major General Ross must likewise be a better judge than I can be of the expediency of placing guns of a large calibre in Fort Atalaya, and his works on San Julian.

‘I have observed that the French have come but ill-provided with ordnance and ammunition for the attack of strong places in Spain; and, therefore, unless there should be reason for preferring heavy ordnance in outworks, light ordnance should be adopted. But if heavy ordnance should be necessary, and there should be any of the irregular calibres, it should be preferred to ordnance of the regular calibres.

‘For this same reason I recommend, that if Major General Ross should think ordnance of large calibres necessary in these outworks, he should prefer the English ordnance, as the ammunition will not answer for the French and Spanish calibres.

‘I believe, however, that the heavy English iron 12 pounders will throw a shot as far as any other gun, and if the shot is not required for destroying masonry, that calibre would answer as well as any other for all other purposes. This gun, therefore, ought to be preferred for these outworks, and it would be useless to the enemy if it should fall into their hands.

‘The same observation regarding the deficiency of ammunition generally felt by the enemy for his operations, suggests the expediency of firing as few guns as possible of the regular calibres; as I know, that upon more than one occasion, the French have carried on a siege nearly unprovided with shot excepting that fired by the besieged, which is picked up by the soldiers for a reward.

‘The next subject which requires an answer in Major General Ross’s letters, relates to Alicante. I have received no orders from His Majesty’s Government to occupy that

post with British troops, and I cannot think it expedient, in any view of the subject, to detach troops from Cadiz, or from this army, to occupy that post.

‘ In regard to the proposition from General O’Donnell, that Major General Ross should detach troops from Carthagena, I might refer Major General Ross to the instructions which have been handed over to him by Colonel Lambert.

‘ He has the copy of the instructions which were given to Major General the Hon. William Stewart when he was detached from this army to Cadiz, in 1810, to which he is directed to attend, as far as they may be found applicable to the circumstances at Carthagena ; and he will find in those instructions an article relating to quitting the Isla de Leon.

‘ I should be sorry to be bound myself, and I do not wish to bind others by positive orders, which may not be applicable to circumstances as they may arise.

‘ The Spanish nation and troops, particularly the common soldiers, entertain an opinion that our soldiers are invincible ; and that it is only necessary that they should appear, in order to insure success ; and they are so ignorant of the nature of a military operation, that they attribute our refraining from interfering upon many occasions, to disinclination to the cause, and frequently to the want of the requisite military qualities in the General Officer, who directs our operations. It may be depended upon, that where there are British troops, there will be no want of invitations for their co-operation ; but I am convinced that there is no officer who can believe that 500 or 600 men can perform any thing essential ; or that it is proper to employ the King’s troops, or to risk their safety in the execution of plans which have really no essential object in view, which are adopted without consideration, and relinquished without cause ; and for the execution of which, there do not exist, even in the opinion of those who propose them, any adequate means excepting the military virtues of the British troops.

‘ I therefore beg leave to warn Major General Ross of the inexpediency of his attending to the invitations of General O’Donnell of co-operation in expeditions in the field ; as he may depend upon it, that they will not answer any purpose. I cannot at this distance, however, take upon me to say, that a case will not occur, in which it may be proper that

Major General Ross should detach some of the troops under his command from Carthagena ; and I beg to refer him to my letter to you upon the subject of detachments from Cadiz, of the 15th November, 1811, which has been approved of by the Secretary of State.

‘ In regard to Major General Ross’s complaints of the inclination of the soldiers of Watteville’s regiment to desert, I beg to observe : first, that it affords an additional reason for not detaching from Carthagena the few British troops he has under his command ; secondly, that all General Officers, who have foreign troops under their command, have the same cause to complain. In that part of the allied army under my command, called British, there are between 6000 and 7000 of them, who desert whenever they can get an opportunity ; and I cannot increase the number, and decrease that of the really British troops, in order to send another British regiment to Major General Ross ; neither do I think that you can spare another British regiment from Cadiz in exchange for 500 foreign troops. I am responsible for the description of troops which I have sent to Carthagena ; and Major General Ross is responsible for making the proper use of them ; and if he thinks that I have not sent to Carthagena troops upon whom he can depend for the service on which he is employed, he has only to say so, and he shall be relieved.

‘ I do not think it quite clear, whether Major General Ross has or not a warrant from you to enable him to hold a General Court Martial, as he mentions in one letter that he has not a warrant, and in another that he has ordered a General Court Martial to try certain deserters. I therefore enclose a warrant to enable him to hold a General Court Martial.

‘ It is necessary that you should request the Governor of Gibraltar to supply the ordnance and stores required as well for Carthagena as for Tarifa, and inform me and the Secretary of State the nature and amount of those requisitions.

‘ I concur in your paying the Spanish soldiers a *real* a day for their work at Tarifa, but I beg leave to suggest to you, that measures may be adopted to insure their doing a day’s work for the payment, either by fixing the task which

each man is to perform, or by the active superintendence of officers, or by any other mode that may be proposed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

‘ Although I have neither the authority nor the means of applying a remedy to the various complaints which you may have occasion to make, I beg that you will understand that it is my duty to attend to them, and that it is not necessary that you should make any apology for sending them.

‘ I beg leave to observe, however, that the papers transmitted in your letter of the 2nd instant, are no answer to the complaints made by me of the civil authorities in Alentejo for omitting to supply the means of transport required in February to bring up to Elvas the stores for the siege of Badajoz. After the place was taken I threw upon the Government the responsibility of bringing up the supplies to replenish the magazines of Elvas, and to fill those of Badajoz; and I am happy to find that that measure has had the effect of calling forth an exertion which, according to Dom Miguel Forjaz’s account, has accomplished my object.

‘ When a complaint is made in Portugal, I observe that there is no want of answers. But answers written months after the cause of complaint arises will not carry on the service, and I only wish that those who write them would come forward and suggest resources to remedy or remove the inconveniences of all descriptions occasioned by the neglects and omissions which gave cause for the complaints. They will then probably think it necessary to do something more than give fallacious answers.

‘ In regard to money for the Portuguese Government, I begged Mr. Bissett to suggest to you that if you were not satisfied with the sum he was enabled to supply you, you should make your complaint on the subject to the King’s Government. I am not the Minister of Finance, nor is the Commissary General.

‘ It is the duty of the King’s Ministers to provide supplies for the service, and not to undertake a service for which

they cannot provide adequate supplies of money and every other requisite. They have thrown upon me a very unpleasant task in leaving to me to decide what proportion of the money which comes into the hands of the Commissary General shall be applied to the service of the British army, and what shall be paid to the King's Minister, in order to enable him to make good the King's engagements to the Portuguese Government; and at the same time that they have laid upon me this task, and left me to find money to carry on the war as I could, they have, by their orders, cut off some of the resources which I had.

‘ In every view of the case, therefore, it is to the King's Government that you should make your complaint. I must say, however, that there is little cause for complaint of want of supplies of money from the Portuguese Government in the months of March and April. It appears by Mr. Bissett's statement that he issued to you in those months 725,000 dollars, besides supplies to a large amount; and besides provisions for the Portuguese troops serving with our divisions, for the garrison of Almeida, and to the militia under Generals Trant, Wilson, and the Conde de Amarante, and pay and provisions to the regiment at Cadiz. I cannot be certain, but I believe the Portuguese Government are not entitled to more in money than the sum above stated. This, however, is no concern of mine; I merely suggest it for your consideration, before you bring the subject under the consideration of the King's Government.

‘ At all events, whether the sum is less or more than the King has engaged to supply to the Portuguese Government, I could not authorise the issue of more, with justice even to the Portuguese service. The British army have not been paid for nearly three months; we owe nearly a year's hire to the muleteers of the army; and we are in debt for supplies in all parts of the country; *and we are on the point of failing in our payments for some supplies essentially necessary to both armies, which cannot be procured excepting with ready money.*

‘ I admit that the payments made in March and April, although to the full amount of what the Portuguese Government are entitled, are not sufficient for their wants. But that is no concern of mine. I have frequently recommended

measures which, if they had been adopted, would by this time have rendered the Portuguese Government independent of the subsidy, and an aid instead of being a financial burthen on Great Britain. I repeat those measures:—a reform in the abuses of the customs of Lisbon and Oporto; a more equal and just collection of the income tax on the commercial property, particularly in those large and rich cities. (It is really scandalous to hear of the fortunes which have been made by the mercantile classes in those cities by the war, and to reflect that they contribute nothing to bear its burthens.) A reform of the expenses of the naval establishments of the country and those of the arsenal. If these measures were adopted, the income would be equal to the expenditure, and the Government would get on without calling upon Great Britain at every moment to find that which, in the existing state of the world, cannot be procured, viz., money.

‘ I am concerned that I cannot agree with you in the justice of the proposition that the King should pay the hire of boats detained in the service of the Portuguese Government, when the Commissariat do not issue from the stores all that is required at the moment it is required. Adverting to the extensive store houses there are at Lisbon unemployed, and belonging to the Government, it is not very friendly, nor, adverting to the scarcity of specie, very politic, to make the Commissary General hire his stores at a large rent; and I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of demanding from the Portuguese Government a proportion of the rent for store houses, equal to the proportion of the stores consumed by the Portuguese army. This demand, however, has not been made. That which has been made for rent is for stores not taken away, when the orders for their issues had been given, which, considering that when an issue is ordered, a purchase must be made of fresh quantities to supply its place; and that if the stores of which the issue has been ordered are not carried away, new store rooms must be hired and additional expense incurred, does not appear to me to be unreasonable.

‘ I must observe upon this discussion that it originates in the system of giving *answers* to complaints, instead of applying a remedy.

‘ Marshal Beresford makes a complaint of want felt by the army, and Senhor Cardoso *answers* by what I must term a falsehood, viz., that he cannot get his supplies from the British Commissariat. When this *answer* comes to be examined here, after having gone through the usual course of notes, &c., it turns out to be proved that the issues had been ordered months before ; that the stores were still lying in the British store houses ; and that they had been replaced by fresh purchases of stores, to hold which fresh store houses had been hired.

‘ Is a demand for payment for store room, under these circumstances, at all like a demand for payment of hire for boats, detained possibly by the usual course of business, but certainly, as appears by the above statement of facts, not by design ?

‘ The man who wrote the paper which you sent to England, is not employed by me. I thought he had been employed by you, but I find he is employed by my brother. I judge from the intelligence that he is the same person who sends information to Valencia de Alcantara.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter which I wrote to my brother three days ago, in regard to the temper of the officers of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo ; since which time the officers have been in open mutiny.

‘ It is not necessary that I should enter upon the details of this event ; but it is obvious to me from the pretence for it, the conduct of the body of the officers in general, and the mode in which it was put an end to, that what they want is to get out of the garrison.

‘ I cannot but admit that their situation in the garrison is very distressing ; they have no pay, and nothing but their rations to subsist upon. The inhabitants in general had quitted Ciudad Rodrigo previous to the late blockade, and they have not yet returned, and the officers enjoy none of

the conveniences which they would have by residing in the houses of the inhabitants in cantonments in the villages. They are, therefore, dissatisfied with their situation, and I am certain that unless means can be devised of paying them and the troops under their command regularly, it is useless to expect any assistance from them. If I was enabled to pay them, I would force them to learn and to perform their duty.

‘ Your Lordship will observe in the enclosed letter, that it is my opinion that all the supplies sent to this country for the Spanish Government should be at the disposal of the Commissary in Chief of the King’s troops. I have long entertained this opinion, and if I have not given utterance to it more clearly, it is because I was not desirous of creating an impression that I wished to accumulate power into my own hands. It might besides appear that I blamed the distribution of the supplies in kind, which had been made by His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz, as, till I read Lord Castlereagh’s dispatch to the Duque del Infantado, I did not know that the Spanish Government had received any but very small occasional sums of money, always upon a promise of repayment, which promise had frequently been performed.

‘ The reasons why I think the supplies ought to be exclusively in the hands of the Commander in Chief are, first, that it will give him an influence over all the operations more efficient than the command under existing circumstances, and probably as efficient as it could be under any circumstances. Secondly, it is the only mode in which the due distribution of the supplies, money in particular, can be secured for the purposes of the service.

‘ I beg to refer your Lordship to Sir Howard Douglas’s statement of the revenue and expenditure of Galicia, and to the monthly estimates of the military expenditure in Portugal, in which you will see how large a revenue can be laid out among military pensioners and civil establishments of all descriptions, and an example of how small a proportion of a sum of money can be applied to the support of the real fighting soldier. I contend for it, that if the King’s Ambassador at Cadiz disposes of this money, he must dispose of it through the hands of the Government : admitting that

the Government dispose of it conscientiously for the benefit of the army, what happens? They send a part to ———, and the first thing ——— will do will be to take the whole arrear of his own appointments, and those of his whole Staff, and probably a part of the appointments of 1500 officers living at his head quarters at ———, who have dispersed; the officers doing duty with the regiments will probably get but very little, and the soldiers positively nothing; this is a real representation of what I know to be a fact.

‘ A sum of money sent to ——— might be distributed rather more fairly, because he has with him more effective men and fewer idlers; but still I will venture to assert, that the officers of his Staff are less in arrears than those of the regiments, and the officers of the regiments infinitely less than the men.

‘ If this money is placed at my disposal: First, I shall insist that after the first two months, it shall be paid to none but disciplined troops.

‘ Secondly, that staff and regimental officers and the soldiers shall each receive their regular proportion of their pay.

‘ Thirdly, that every other sum of money, either collected upon the country by way of contribution, or sent by Government, shall be distributed among the whole on the same principle.

‘ I do not think that the King’s Ambassador, distributing the money through the Government, can effect this object: however, in whatever way the King’s servants may decide this point, I beg to lay in a claim for a part of the money for the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and for the Spanish troops in Castille and Estremadura, otherwise much of the benefit to be expected from these conquests will be lost.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinalde, 6th May, 1812.

‘ Having understood that some discussions of an unpleasant nature had taken place between Sir Howard Douglas and General Abadia in Galicia, and having observed, from

the postscript to a letter of the 13th ultimo from Sir Howard Douglas, that he was not on the terms on which he ought to be with General Abadia, I have thought it proper to send him the instructions of which I enclose a copy.

‘ His direct interference to prevent a detachment of troops from embarking from Galicia to America must be quite hopeless, if His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cadiz cannot prevail upon the Regency to refrain from that measure; and it has been the cause of the discussions to which I refer, the existence of which has tended to weaken Sir Howard’s influence in Galicia, and to diminish the benefit to be expected from his employment in that quarter.

‘ The truth is, that when the Spanish Government or nation are determined to adopt a measure, however injurious to their cause, nothing can prevent them from carrying it into execution.

‘ The measure of sending troops to America has been insisted upon by the City of Cadiz, from which alone the Government receive any pecuniary assistance, and which possesses unbounded influence over the Cortes, and it may be depended upon that no power which can be exerted will prevent its execution.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

‘ The enemy have distributed their troops generally in the cantonments which they occupied previous to their late march to this quarter, and nothing of any importance has occurred since I last addressed you.

‘ We are collecting provisions and stores for Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which I hope will arrive at an early period. No movement of importance has been made in the south.

‘ By accounts from Galicia I learn that Espoz y Mina fought a very successful action with the enemy in the end of March, and frustrated all the endeavors of General Dorsenne to destroy his corps with an infinitely superior force. He has since been very successful against one of the enemy’s

convoys on the 9th of April, and it is reported that he has taken a very large sum of money.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th May, 1812.

9 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I have desired Sir Rowland Hill to undertake the service which I have long had in contemplation for the destruction of the enemy’s establishments at Almaraz, and I hope that he will have marched about this time with about 5000 or 6000 men for that object.

‘ I am not quite certain whom Sir Rowland will leave in command of the troops in front of Badajoz.

‘ It appears by a letter which I have from Hill this morning, that some of Bonet’s troops were in motion in the beginning of the month towards Zalamea, &c.; and I hear from Clementi Pereira that the 2nd division of the army of Portugal was likewise in motion towards the Puerto del Pico; while Marmont, with a part of the army of Portugal, remains at Salamanca. I conclude, therefore, that the first measure of the King’s command has been to draw closer the two armies; and that they will be in direct communication by Talavera, but nothing offensive can be intended with troops so widely extended.

‘ As some time must elapse yet before we can attempt anything, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will move your quarters to Portalegre, and if you will have your eye upon what is passing in front of Badajoz, and will go there, if you should find that any serious movement is likely to be made by the enemy on that place during Hill’s absence.

‘ I have ordered the 6th division from Castello de Vide to Portalegre, in order to be nearer Badajoz, in case you should think more troops there to be necessary.

‘ I enclose the copy of the instructions which I gave Sir Rowland Hill when I left Estremadura, which I shall be obliged to you to return to me, as I have no other copy. Brigadier General Power’s brigade, and the 22nd regiment, still remain in Badajoz, and Penne Villemur’s cavalry and



vessels. This is a measure of importance, as all this part of the Peninsula has been living this year on American flour.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Austin.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 9th May, 1812.

‘ I have received this day your letter of the 2nd instant, informing me of the arrival at Ayamonte of the regiment of Jaen, which is to go to Badajoz.

‘ I intended that the troops destined to garrison Badajoz should be landed at Setuval, as being nearer Badajoz, and a place from which they could be more easily provisioned on their march.

‘ It will be necessary for you to adopt the arrangements for subsisting these troops on their march which I requested you to adopt for the subsistence of those under the Conde de Penne Villemur. I enclose a route for them, but I much fear that they will be distressed for provisions on their march, if they should have marched before you will have received the route, and the Commissary can have had time to order that preparations might be made for them from Beja.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Austin.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812. 10 A.M.

‘ I enclose three letters from Cadiz ; I have others from General Cooke which I will send you to-morrow. They contain details on which I must give an answer.

‘ There is nothing new here.

‘ I find that the American embargo took place on the 7th of April for 90 days, and I conclude will then be renewed, if the harvest should be so bad in Europe that their assistance will be required to feed these countries.

‘ We have more than 200 days’ provisions for the British and that part of the Portuguese army fed by our Commissa-

riat. The demands, however, for the Portuguese garrisons, and that part of the army not fed by us, will reduce the supply to four months. But I some time ago sent to the Brazils, and to the Mediterranean, and to the British settlements in North America. I think, therefore, that both army and people, and Cadiz will continue to be well supplied, even if the American embargo should be continued. If it should not, corn will be excessively cheap.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Campbell, Gibraltar.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

‘ I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send to Gibraltar the four transports named in the margin, which are laden with ordnance and stores, according to the enclosed return. These transports, as well as those respecting which I wrote to you on the 19th April, are to wait at Gibraltar the orders of Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.

‘ Your Excellency will observe in the return twenty seven 24 pounder carriages, and three 18 pounder carriages, which it is desirable should receive at Gibraltar the repairs which they will require; and it is recommended by the officers of the artillery that they should be fitted with strong iron trunnion boxes, to secure the guns from forcing their way back by constant firing.

‘ In order to complete the heavy ordnance equipment required by Lord William Bentinck, it is desirable that guns for these carriages and stores should be provided in the garrison of Gibraltar; and I have therefore to request your Excellency that twenty seven 24 pounder iron guns, Carron manufacture, of 9 feet 6 inches long, and three 18 pounder guns of the same manufacture, 8 feet 6 inches long, should be prepared for these carriages, and embarked, with 1000 rounds of ammunition for each gun; eight 24 pounder guns, with their carriages and ammunition, in the Southampton, and eight 24 pounder guns, with their carriages and ammunition, in the Mary Anne.

‘ I propose to send from Lisbon two more transports to receive the remaining fourteen guns and the ammunition,

which transports shall take to Gibraltar the three thousand six hundred and sixty four 24 pounder spherical case shot, and the seven thousand  $5\frac{1}{2}$  inch spherical case fuzes, stated in the enclosed return as forwarded in these transports.

‘ Included in the 1000 rounds for each gun, I beg that there may be 100 of grape, and 100 rounds of case shot for each.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Campbell.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

‘ I return Mr. Pipon’s letter of the 6th, and Mr. Stuart’s to me, and my answer; and I beg that the two letters may be sent back to me.

‘ I beg that orders may be given to Mr. Pipon to issue the quantities required by the Portuguese Government for the month of May, excepting the rice, of which, it appears by Mr. Dalrymple’s return, that there is none in store.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Bissett, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letters to the 28th of April.

‘ I learn from the Governor of Algarve, that one of the regiments intended for Badajoz is arrived at Ayamonte, which is unlucky, as I expected they would have come to Setuval; and no preparations have been made to supply them on the road from Ayamonte. These preparations, however, were ordered yesterday, after I heard of their arrival at Ayamonte.

‘ I concur with you in respect to the expediency of giving assistance to Whittingham’s division. It would have been desirable, however, to know the last expense; and I recommend to you to call for an estimate of it without loss of time. It would likewise be desirable to know what part of the expense would be borne by the revenues of the islands of Minorca and Majorca. I mention this, because there will be much to do with the million allowed for Spanish services.

‘I was never so much disappointed as by the Standard. I did not expect four or five millions, but I expected more than she has brought. I have no idea what we shall do for want of money. If I had a little now, I should certainly keep the campaign on its legs. But how are we to pay this Spanish million in addition to our other charges?’

‘You will have heard of the American embargo for ninety days, from the 7th of April; that is to say, to see whether their corn will be absolutely necessary for our subsistence next year. If it should not be so, they will take off the embargo. But I see that the new ministry have lowered their tone about the Orders in Council. Indeed, they have laid themselves on this subject at the mercy of France and America.

‘Since I wrote to you last, the officers of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo have been in a state of mutiny, the details of which will have been communicated to the Government by General Alava. Don Carlos de España went there and settled the matter; not, in my opinion, exactly as it should have been settled; and it is impossible to have any confidence in the troops in that garrison. As soon as I shall know whether you will give any, and what sum of money for the support of that garrison, I shall write to Castaños to have them relieved by troops from Galicia.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘Would it be possible to come to any arrangement with the Barbaresque powers to supply Cadiz, Lisbon, &c., with corn? It would be capital to turn the tables upon these cunning Americans, and not to allow them to have any intercourse with those ports. I have sent to the Brazils, and to the Mediterranean for corn, and to the British settlements in North America; to the Western Islands, &c. Mexico ought to be able to supply some.

‘I enclose the last dispatch.’

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 7th. It would, I believe, save you, and certainly me, a good deal of trouble.

if you would be so kind as to send me the requisitions for supplies by the Portuguese Government on our Commissariat. It is impossible for me to allow Mr. Pipon or any body else to grant them without my consent, and it would save a great deal of useless correspondence if they were to come in the regular form to me. This becomes the more necessary, as there is a prospect that the supply of corn, &c., will not be so plentiful as it has been lately.

‘Reckoning for that part of the Portuguese army supplied by our Commissariat, we have in magazine for our army for 200 days; the demands of the Portuguese Government upon us, supposing them to continue at the same rate at which they have been for the last four months, will reduce our stock to one for four months. I have desired that it may be increased and kept up to one for six months for both armies, so that you will see there is no difficulty in supplying the demands. But I cannot allow them to be supplied without my consent.

‘I had already ordered that all the demands for *depositos*, &c., made from January to the end of April, might be complied with. I have now desired that the demand for May might be complied with, excepting rice. We have none of that article in our stores, excepting 4443 quintals, ordered to be issued to the Portuguese Government, being their demand for April, not taken away.

‘It would be very desirable if the demands for supplies were made in the last ten days of each month for the ensuing month, specifying where it would be most convenient for the Portuguese Government to receive the amount; that is to say, at Lisbon, at Figueira, or at Oporto. I do not mean to say that we can always supply the demand at the place they wish to have it; but it would frequently be more convenient to us to supply the demand at Oporto instead of at Lisbon.

‘You are the best judge respecting the amount of these demands, and the expediency of continuing to supply them at the rate they are made. I hope to-morrow to be able to send to Dom Miguel Forjaz a statement of their amount and cost, from 1st January to 30th April, from which I am afraid it will appear that the Portuguese Government have received from the Commissariat more than the subsidy, in the four months which have elapsed since the 1st of January, to the amount of £250,000! You will judge whether you

will go on at that rate. All that I contend for is that the tone of complaint of insufficient supplies from us ought to be laid aside, and that I, at least, ought not to be the *target* on these occasions.

‘ In regard to the bills demanded for £100,000 sterling, you must be the best judge how far it is expedient to grant them in the existing state of our credit and of our finances.

‘ Believe me, &c.

*His Excellency*

*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th May, 1812.

‘ De Lancy has communicated to me your letter to him of the 8th instant, and the enclosure from General Le Marchant in regard to the portable forges.

‘ If General Le Marchant states that there are no horses in his brigade decidedly unfit for the ranks, but still capable of some service, I beg you will authorise him to have purchased, and kept upon the strength of troops, as pointed out in my letter of the 2nd, four mules for each portable forge, at the price stated in that letter.

‘ It is really necessary, however, that we should all avoid incurring an expense for the public, when it is not absolutely necessary, and I hope that Major General Le Marchant thoroughly understands the principle on which I have consented to the purchase of mules for this service.

‘ The horses which Major General Le Marchant states to be unfit for service should be sent to grass.

‘ In regard to your proposal to have a different saddle, I beg that you will give your own orders to have any saddle made that you may think proper, and it shall be supplied, if you will only state the kind of saddle that it is to be.

‘ I shall be sorry if this establishment should not answer, and I have no doubt it will answer, if pains be taken to have the men taught how to saddle the horse with a *bât* or pack-saddle. If it should not, we must only return to the old forge-carts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 12th May, 1812.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take measures to suggest to the Colonels of regiments serving in this country to have the clothing for their regiments at Lisbon before the 1st of October next. Some of the regiments have put on since Christmas last, and have now in wear, the clothing due to the men at Christmas, 1810; and the Colonels of those regiments can experience no difficulty in having their clothing out at the time above specified. Others of them have in wear the clothing due at Christmas, 1811; and although it may be more difficult for the Colonels of these regiments than it is for the others to have their clothing, due at Christmas, 1812, in Portugal by the 1st of October, 1812, I conceive it is not impossible; and it is really necessary, with a view to the arrangements to be adopted, to have the clothing brought up to the army in time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 12th May, 1813.

‘ We have received here the accounts of the American embargo for three months from the 7th of April; and, adverting to the quantity of provisions imported into the kingdom of Portugal, principally, I believe from the American States, in the last twelve months, of which I enclose a return, you will readily believe that these accounts have occasioned a good deal of anxiety. Not only Portugal, but the neighbouring provinces of Spain have subsisted upon these importations.

‘ I feel no anxiety respecting the subsistence of the army in consequence of this measure; and I had already adopted some measures with a view to supply the deficiencies which might be generally felt in the markets if the embargo were to continue, which I think might be still farther improved.

‘ When your Lordship informed me, in your letter of the 21st November, that we could not expect any supplies of grain from England, I desired that the magazines of the

army might be augmented from a stock for three months' consumption to one for six months' consumption. We had accordingly in the magazines, when we received the accounts of the embargo, more than sufficient to last our army 200 days, including that part of the Portuguese army serving in the British divisions.

‘The Portuguese demands upon us for grain instead of money as subsidy will reduce that stock in some degree; but I have directed additional purchases, in order to keep up our magazines to that quantity till the state of the next harvest in England shall be known, when, if it should be plentiful, I shall reduce them again to a supply for three months.

‘Expecting that something of the kind that has lately taken place in America would occur, I requested Mr. Stuart in the winter to take measures to get corn from the Brazils, from the North American States, and from the coast of Barbary; and I have since adopted measures to get some from the British Colonies in North America, where I believe much can be got.

‘I believe that our expectations of a supply from the Brazils will not be disappointed; and indeed I believe that a very large supply could be drawn from thence if ships were sent there. I am afraid that our demands in North America were too late.

‘It is not impossible that this measure of hostility (under the disguise of peace) of the worst description has been adopted by the American Government at an earlier period than was intended, in consequence of their receiving intelligence of the measures taken by us to purchase supplies there.

‘Our measures to procure supplies on the coast of Barbary have failed, principally, as I am informed, from the deficiencies of the persons employed by the British Government to conduct their affairs on that coast. The affairs of that coast become every day more interesting. It is very desirable that the allies should, and that the enemy should not, enjoy the benefit of their resources; and I believe that both objects could be accomplished if persons of character and talents were employed to conduct the affairs of the British Government there, instead of those who are there at present.

‘ The persons who should be sent from England on these services, if any should be sent, might call at Lisbon and at Cadiz, in order to converse with the King’s Ministers, and the persons employed at those places to superintend the supply of the markets, and of the magazines of the army.

‘ The measures which I have adopted to get corn from the British Colonies in North America have been confined to the Commissary General directing the Commissary General there to make purchases for him, and to send them to Portugal; and Mr. Stuart has desired Mr. Foster to employ some money which he had sent him to make purchases in the American States, in making purchases in the British Colonies. But if the embargo should be renewed, these measures will not be sufficient to supply the demands of this country and Cadiz, notwithstanding the prospects of the plentiful harvest.

‘ Your Lordship knows best whether the British Colonies in North America can supply any large quantity of corn; if they can, I would beg leave to suggest that some measures should be adopted by Government, probably through the Board of Trade, to secure the importation of a large quantity into the Peninsula before the winter.

‘ You will see in the enclosed paper the prices which the different kinds of grain have brought in the Lisbon market. Flour has latterly been from 15 to 17 dollars the barrel of 196 pounds. The price has increased very much since the accounts of the embargo have been received, but I think they will fall again as the harvest approaches, which promises to be remarkably plentiful. We have already had an offer from America to supply us with 60,000 barrels of flour, at an advance of 50 per cent. beyond the price before the accounts of the embargo were received, to which I have declined to agree, as there is no want at present, and we could not get this supply before the harvest even in England; and if the want should be so great as that the price will rise to the amount demanded by about 23 dollars a barrel, the embargo will prevent the Americans from bringing their corn to the Lisbon market. If the price should not rise to that sum it will be because there will be plenty of corn, and if that should be the case there is no reason why we should engage to pay this exorbitant price.

‘ However, the subject requires early attention to counteract the mischief which the American Government certainly intended by laying on the embargo at the time they did; and I am certain that by attention there will be plenty in Portugal, notwithstanding the failure of the supply from America.

‘ Your Lordship will have heard that the Standard has brought no money on account of the Spanish Government, and only 380,000 dollars on account of the British Government. This failure has disappointed me much, and I am quite at a loss to know what to do.

‘ The eventual success of the campaign depends upon my being able to move forward into Spain before the harvest, but I cannot venture upon that measure without having a sum of money in hand. Under these circumstances, the want of the 500,000 dollars which we might have got from Gibraltar but for the orders of the Treasury, may be most unfortunate. It would be very desirable on every account that the Treasury should appoint a person here in whom they would feel confidence, to conduct the financial concerns of this army. It would relieve the Commissary General and me from much business and anxiety, on a subject with which I at least ought to have nothing to do, and the business would be done to the satisfaction of the Treasury.

‘ We are now three months in arrears of pay to the troops; we owe the muleteers an immense sum; and what is worse than all, there are bills outstanding for meat to the amount of 800,000 dollars.

‘ I enclose the weekly and daily states.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Captain P. Malcolm, R.N.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

‘ I received your letter of the 22nd of March, and I am very much obliged to you for the wine which you sent me by the Latona, which I conclude is the same for which Captain Digby of the Theban ordered Mr. Dobree of Guernsey to draw upon me. I ordered Messrs. Coutts to pay the bill. There are two cases, of twelve dozen, although you mention in your letter three cases.

‘ I was very happy to hear of your appointment to be Captain of the fleet, which I conclude to be agreeable to you, although you will not have quite so much to do at an early period as some of your predecessors.

‘ Pray present my best respects to Lord Keith.

‘ I can give you no news from hence. I hoped to be able to make a great campaign of this, and I have not yet lost all hopes, although I have met with some disappointments.

‘ When do you expect your brother John ?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain P. Malcolm, R.N.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ About Pasley: I could recommend him, and would recommend him if he were under my command; but I can recommend nobody excepting by permission, and the permission would not be granted for an officer not serving here. I have a very high opinion of him, and I wish we had him; although we have made such an expenditure of engineers, that I can hardly wish for any body, lest the same fate should befall him as has befallen so many !!’

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812. 10 A.M.

‘ I enclose the only paper of intelligence which I have received since I wrote to you last, from which it would appear that Marmont’s troops have not yet moved into Estremadura. If this is the case, Hill will yet be in time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Bart\*.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

‘ I am very anxious to send some engineer officers and some of your artificers to Gibraltar, in order to be prepared for a service likely to be carried on on the Eastern coast; and I should be glad to know from you how many engineer

\* Lieut. Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher had been made a Baronet, in consequence of being the commanding engineer at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.

officers and artificers you could now spare for that purpose. All those that you can spare should march to Lisbon as soon as may be convenient: and I beg that it may not be known on what service they are going. If you cannot spare their services immediately, it does not much signify, as I shall find means of sending them in fast sailing vessels.

‘ I beg to draw your attention to the enclosed reports from Lieut. —, who is employed on the Douro; and to the reports from Captain Ross, made last year, which I likewise enclose. It appears to me, that the great obstacle which Lieut. — finds to the completion of the navigation of the Douro, is that which Captain Ross reported to have been overcome by the Portuguese Government at great expense.

‘ I doubt Lieut. — being very capable of understanding the subject on which he writes: and it is really very desirable that we should take some decided steps in order to know whether we can, or not, render the Douro navigable to Barca d’Alva.

‘ Return the enclosed papers.

‘ I am anxious to hear from you what you propose to do to defend the sluices of the Rivillas; what you have discovered respecting the means of throwing water into the ditch of the place, and retaining it there; and respecting the mines; and at what period you expect to have finished your work.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812. ’

‘ The only movements which the enemy have made since I addressed your Lordship last, have been apparently with a view to connect the army of the South with that of Portugal. General Drouet has moved his head quarters from Fuente Ovejuna to Hinojosa de Cordova, apparently with a view to communicate with the detachments of the 1st division of the army of Portugal, which from Talavera de la Reyna are in the country between the Tagus and the Guadiana.

‘ It has been for some time reported that King Joseph had been appointed Generalissimo of the French armies in Spain, with the exception, I believe, of the army of Arragon and Catalonia. I have not seen any official notification of this appointment, but I give credit to the report; and I attribute the partial movements which have lately been made of the army of the South to their right, and of the army of Portugal to their left, to the desire of the King to establish a more perfect communication between these armies than had hitherto existed.

‘ It is very obvious, however, from the general distress suffered by all the enemy’s troops for want of provisions, that they cannot undertake any operation till the harvest shall be ripe.

‘ I have directed Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to endeavor to destroy the enemy’s establishments at Almaraz, constructed with a view to give them that passage over the Tagus, which object I hope he will be able to effect. He was to break up from his cantonments at Almendralejo with part of the 2nd division of infantry, and the 13th light dragoons, in order to march upon this expedition on the 11th instant.

‘ I have requested Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham to go to Portalegre, and have ordered the 6th division of infantry to Arronches, in order to be in readiness to march into Estremadura, in case the enemy should move upon hearing of Sir Rowland Hill’s march.

‘ The measures for filling the magazines of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida are still in progress; and till those objects are accomplished, the allied army will continue cantoned, as I before reported to your Lordship.

‘ Great progress has been made by our engineers in the repairs of the damages done to Badajoz. But I am sorry to have to mention to your Lordship that the Spanish engineers have continued to neglect Ciudad Rodrigo, where but little work has been done since I left the place on the 5th of March to go into Estremadura. I have frequently remonstrated upon this neglect since my return to this part of the country, and I have mentioned it to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cadiz. I approve highly of the conduct of the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, General Vives; but I am

concerned to add, that the officers and garrison under his command are but little to be depended upon.

‘The guerrillas are very active in all parts of the country; some employed in forming and disciplining their troops, and others in enterprises against the enemy, in many of which they have lately been very successful.

‘There has been no movement in the north.

‘General Ballesteros surprised at Alora, and defeated, a column under General Rey, on the 14th of April; and it is reported that the division of General Copons, one of those composing the corps under the command of General Ballesteros, had on the 17th entered Malaga. But this report has not been confirmed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

‘Major General Cooke having informed me that he had represented to your Lordship that the corps of Royal Military Artificers at Cadiz was much reduced by a detachment which had been sent to Portugal, I beg to acquaint you, that I gave orders some time ago that these men should return forthwith, and I imagine that they must have arrived before this period at Cadiz.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 13th May, 1812.

‘I have the honor to transmit lists of officers entitled to medals for the action at El Bodon\*, and the assault and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, under the regulations contained in your Lordship’s letter of the 3rd September, 1811.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th May, 1812. 11 P.M.

‘I enclose letters from my brother and General Cooke, and some just received from Salamanca.

\* Medals were not granted for El Bodon.

‘ We have the accounts of Copons’ entering Malaga from other quarters besides in the enclosed papers, and the dates agree.

‘ I am glad to find that the fever at Portalegre is not so bad as was reported. That place is very subject to infectious fevers, if great care is not taken to keep the town clean ; but not at this season of the year. It is situated at the south side of the hills, and does not enjoy the advantage of the northerly breezes, and is intolerably hot in the months of July, August, and September, at which season the town is very unhealthy, if great attention is not paid to cleanliness ; but in general it is the most healthy town in the province of Alentejo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 14th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 3rd, and I regret that I had not received that from Major General Ross of the 20th April, marked “ confidential,” before I wrote you my last letter of the 10th instant, as I should have had before me a clearer view of Major General Ross’s intentions, and of those of General O’Donnell. However, there is no reason why that letter should not be sent to Major General Ross, with the explanation that I had not seen his of the 20th when I wrote it.

‘ I shall not fail to mention Captain Adam to Sir Edward Pellew as General Ross desires.

‘ I beg that Serjeant James Johnson may be appointed an Assistant at Carthagena to the Deputy Provost at Cadiz. His pay will be ensign’s pay and allowances, under the General Order of this army of the 3rd May, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 14th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 6th, and I shall recommend Mr. Dobson for an ensigncy.

‘ I do not know what sums of money have been sent into Estremadura ; but I have been well acquainted with the state of affairs in Castille since August last, and I can assure you most positively, that the officers and troops here have not received one shilling for any purpose whatever. The troops in Ciudad Rodrigo have subsisted solely upon what I have given them ; and Don Carlos de España’s division, some of them upon our magazines, and others by plundering the country.

‘ If you wish to know what becomes of the money which you give to the Government, and the Government send to General —, I refer you to Sir Howard Douglas’s reports of the finance of Galicia, in which you will see a sample of the manner in which civil and military pensioners, and large civil and military staff, can eat up the revenues of a kingdom, and leave nothing for the men who must fight for its defence. To which information, I shall add what I know to be fact, viz., that when —, or any other General officer, receives a sum of money, he does not, as we do, pay the soldiers first, and the staff last ; but he first takes the arrears of his own appointments, and of those of his staff officers ; he then pays the officers a part of their pay, and the men *nothing*. There are 1500 officers, and — soldiers at —’s head quarters at — —, each of whom has received more pay than those officers now doing duty with their regiments in Ciudad Rodrigo. These are the abuses which have sunk Spain ; and there is no Spanish Government equal to the task of getting the better of them ; and I will add, that if the English subsidy, instead of being one million sterling, was ten millions sterling, and was to pass through the hands of the Spanish Government, it would be spent in the same manner, and would produce no benefit whatever ; excepting it can be called a benefit to maintain such men as General — (of whom, by the bye, I have not a bad opinion), General —, and General —, and their numerous staff with enormous salaries.

‘ I admit, that it is not very easy for the King’s Ambassador to give the King’s aid in any other manner than through the Spanish Government ; though he does give clothing, arms, and equipments, by a direct communication with the Chiefs ; but the difficulty he would experience in

giving the pecuniary aid direct to those who are to enjoy the benefit of it, is the principal reason why I think that the whole ought to be at the disposal of the Commander in Chief.

‘ I accept of that part of the aid of which you have allowed me the disposal, viz., £200,000 pounds sterling in this year ; and I hope that you will continue to send me *the money* in addition to the usual supplies from Cadiz, otherwise this aid will be an intolerable burthen to us, and will probably be as fatal as the feather was to the camel’s back. As it is left to my disposal, I acknowledge that I shall not lay it out in forming a depôt of recruits. A depôt of recruits is very necessary for an army actively employed in the field ; and the mechanical discipline of soldiers is essential to the formation of an army. But, in my opinion, those take an erroneous view of what an army is, if they suppose that well drilled recruits are all that is required for it. Subordination and habits of obedience are more necessary than mechanical discipline acquired at the drill ; and these can be acquired by soldiers to any useful purpose only in proportion as they have confidence in their officers ; and they cannot have confidence in officers who have no knowledge of their profession, even of that lowest part of it acquired at the drill, who have no subordination among themselves, and never obey an order. The plans for improving such an army should have for their first object the officers, and principally those belonging to the regiments ; and it may be depended upon, that there would be no want of drill, or of that military expertness acquired at the drill, if habits of subordination and obedience, and some information, were given to the officers.

‘ I will go one step farther, and express my doubts whether, to launch a number of well drilled recruits into regiments such as I have seen in the Spanish service, can ever answer any practical good purpose. The object of all drill must be to practise and form individuals to perform that which it is thought expedient they should perform when part of a body before an enemy, under the command of their officers : and it is supposed that all of the body are equally, or nearly equally expert ; and that, at all events, the officer cannot only order what is to be performed, but know whether the body under his command performs it well or ill. Is this the case in one of a hundred instances in which recruits well

drilled might be sent from a depôt to a Spanish company or regiment? Certainly not. The consequence is, that the well drilled recruit in the day of action is no better than the rabble with whom he is mixed up; and he either very soon forgets all that he has learnt for want of practice, or despises it as useless, as he finds that the boasters among whom he comes have none of the acquirements which he has gained with so much trouble; or he despises the ignorance both of his officers and comrades, and has no confidence in either, or in himself. The money then, which I should lay out in a depôt of recruits, I should, under present circumstances, consider as thrown away.

‘What I propose to do first, is to call for an account of the monthly pay of the several ranks of officers and soldiers composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; and I shall desire to have from Don Carlos de España an account of the sums of money which he receives in contributions from the country (as there is some received in this manner) applicable to the purpose of paying the garrison. I shall then offer to pay what is deficient, provided the sum collected in contributions, and the sum which I shall give, shall be appropriated solely to the purpose of paying those who perform duty, each, whether officer or soldier, his fair proportion; and provided that, at the end of two months, the system of discipline, subordination, and obedience, ordered by the Spanish regulations, is completely established in each of the battalions composing the garrison.

‘If there should be any residue, after completely providing for the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, in which *we* are most interested, I shall assist Don Carlos de España’s division on the same system; unless I should find the garrison of Badajoz is thrown upon me, in which case I must adopt the same system for paying the troops in that garrison. I entirely concur with you in the propriety of assisting Roche and Whittingham’s divisions with part of the British subsidy. But I earnestly recommend to you to call for estimates and accounts of the expenditure; to make those officers responsible for the distribution which you shall order, and to see whether you could not get something out of the contributions of Majorca and Minorca, for the support at least of the latter.

‘ I shall send you regularly all that passes in regard to the distribution of the £200,000.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th instant.

‘ Although I have received the instructions of the Secretary of State to secure the island of Arosa, I do not think it proper to authorize the expenditure of so large a sum as more than £10,000 on that service, more particularly as there does not exist any reason to press the measure at present.

‘ I therefore wish you would take the orders of the Secretary of State on the subject.

‘ There is no officer of engineers with this army whose services can be spared to go into Galicia to superintend the performance of these works.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir H. Douglas, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

‘ I enclose the only intelligence I have received since I wrote to you last, excepting letters from Colonel Austin, mentioning that about 2500 men had gone from Seville towards Ayamonte, and that Soult had gone towards the Puertos.

‘ I conclude that the movement towards Ayamonte was occasioned by the landing at that place of the regiments destined for the garrison of Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose a small parcel, sent to me by Colonel Carroll, directed to you, containing I believe, a medallion of the Marques de la Romana.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

‘ I enclose a memorial from a gentleman, by the name of —, of this province, who was one of the members of the Junta before Ciudad Rodrigo fell into the hands of the French. He remained there afterwards by my desire, in a situation in which his life was at stake at every moment. He did not quit his post till I permitted him last autumn; and in the mean time he rendered services of the utmost importance to the cause.

‘ He is a person of very good talents, and is, I believe, the most fit to be at the head of the Hacienda in this province.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

‘ Adverting to your letter of the 27th April, in regard to the Spanish troops eventually destined to join Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck, I have to inform your Excellency that I had arranged with Admiral Berkeley to send transports (for the conveyance of 3000 men) to Alicante, and (for the conveyance of 3000 men) to Majorca; and I requested that Lord William Bentinck would send to those places respectively, and to Gibraltar, to collect the troops from the two former, and the stores from the latter, which should have been prepared to join him.

‘ It is desirable that the Spanish Government should determine as soon as possible whether they will or not allow any, and what number of the troops from Alicante to proceed on this service, and what number they will allow to proceed from Majorca.

‘ In all cases of maritime expeditions, the effort is necessarily limited by the means of maritime transport; and I have to inform you that I do not believe Admiral Berkeley will have it in his power to send more transports than those above referred to, which, for a short voyage, might be sufficient for the conveyance of 8000 men; and I had arranged that these transports should go in equal proportions to Alicante and Majorca.

‘ In this case, however, there are other points for consideration :—

‘ First ; how many men is it expedient to leave in Majorca for the defence of the island, of the 7000 of which it is supposed General Whittingham’s division will consist ?

‘ Secondly ; General Whittingham’s division of 7000 men will have been newly raised, excepting 3000 men. How many of the 7000 men would it be expedient to leave behind, as being recruits and unfit for service ?

‘ Thirdly ; these points being taken into consideration, for how many men are transports to be sent to Majorca ?

‘ Fourthly ; supposing that the Regency should think proper to order a part of General Roche’s division from Alicante on the proposed expedition, how many men belonging to the division at Alicante is it expedient to leave for the defence of that post ?

‘ Fifthly ; for how many men shall transports be sent to Alicante ?

‘ It would be desirable to have answers upon all these points ; but as that is impossible before the period at which I hope that the transports will have left the Tagus, I propose to request Admiral Berkeley that the officer in command should have orders to send into Cadiz to receive directions regarding the distribution of their numbers at the two places, Alicante and Majorca. I request you to be prepared, therefore, to give the directions to the officer in charge of the convoy when he shall send for them.

‘ It will be desirable that you should apprise Admiral Sir Edward Pellew of what will be decided by the Spanish Government, for the information of Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck, particularly whether or not it will be necessary for his Lordship to send to Alicante for the troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, Bart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th May, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th April.

‘ Your Excellency will have received before this time, that which I had the honor of addressing you on the 16th of April, in which I enclosed the copy of one of the same date, to Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck, with its enclosures.

‘ The enemy retired and raised the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, in proportion as I advanced, and we have since been employed in throwing provisions into those places, and in moving forward our magazines.

‘ Your Excellency will have seen in my letter to Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck, of the 16th of April, the measures which I proposed to adopt, and which the Spanish Government should adopt to aid in his operations. I have sent to Gibraltar the ordnance and stores, and ordnance carriages referred to in that communication, and I have requested the Governor of Gibraltar to have the equipment completed with guns, and with stores for 1000 rounds for each gun.

‘ I likewise propose to send to Gibraltar 400 British and Portuguese artillerymen, a few Engineer officers and military artificers.

‘ By a letter from Sir Henry Wellesley of the 27th April, I learn that the Spanish Government had not decided whether they would send to co-operate with Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck any of the troops stationed at Alicante, or how many of those at Majorca.

‘ But I have written to Sir Henry Wellesley this day a letter, (of which I enclose a copy,) in which I have suggested to him to bring these points to a decision, and I have requested him to inform your Excellency what should be settled upon them.

‘ It is desirable that your Excellency should apprise Lord William Bentinck of the state of the preparations, and that he should know from you, whether or not it will be necessary that he should send to Alicante to collect the troops from thence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Admiral*

*Sir Edward Pellew, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the General Officers Commanding Divisions.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 18th May, 1812.

‘The Spanish Government having been pleased to allow a limited number of the natives of Spain to serve His Majesty in the British regiments composing this army, I have to request that you will authorize the regiments named in the margin to enlist and bear on their strength 100 Spanish volunteers, on the following conditions:—

‘First; the men must not be under five feet six inches high, strongly made, and not under nineteen years of age, nor older than twenty seven.

‘Secondly; they are to be attested according to the following form by the commanding officer of the regiment to serve during the present war; but in case the regiment into which they shall enlist should be ordered from the Peninsula, the Spanish volunteers are to be discharged, and each of them is to receive one month’s full pay to carry him to his home.

*Form of the Attestation.*

‘I, A. B., do make oath that I will serve His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, in the — battalion of the — regiment of foot, during the existing war in the Peninsula, if His Majesty should so long require my services, and provided that the — battalion of the — regiment of foot shall continue in the Peninsula during that period.’

‘Thirdly; they are to be allowed to attend Divine service according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic religion, in the same manner as British soldiers, His Majesty’s subjects, are.

‘Fourthly; they are to be fed, and clothed, and paid in the same manner as the other soldiers; and they are to be posted to companies indiscriminately, as any other recruits would be.

‘Fifthly; they are to receive pay from the date of their attestation, but no bounty. The captain of the company to which any of these volunteers shall be posted, will be allowed eight dollars for each to supply him with necessaries, from which must be purchased a knapsack, two pairs of shoes, and two shirts. The officer commanding the company must be accountable to the volunteer for the residue of the sum after purchasing these articles, in the same manner as for

his pay. The shoes may be received at the usual rate from the Commissariat.

‘ In communicating this arrangement to the several regiments, I request you to point out to the commanding officers of regiments how desirable it is that these volunteers should be treated with the utmost kindness and indulgence, and brought by degrees to the system of discipline of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The General Officers*

*Commanding Divisions.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 18th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th instant, and I beg you to observe that the certificates sent of the transport of stores to Badajoz and Elvas refer to stores which left the sea coast between the 23rd April and the 3rd May. This is in answer to my complaints, which referred to the stores required for the siege of Badajoz, which ought to have commenced the 6th March, and ended the 6th April.

‘ Whatever measures Government may order in respect to means of transport, shall be obeyed by me and the authorities of the British army; but if those measures are inefficient in themselves; are adopted by an unwilling Government, and are carried into execution by the subordinate officers of the Government in a manner conformable to the spirit in which their superiors adopted them, it must be expected that the measures, even if perfect in theory, will fail in practice; and it may be depended upon, that if they do fail, I shall complain to my Government, be the cause of failure what it may.

‘ I do not know whether the Government have taken the pains of ascertaining the truth of any one of the returns of means of transport which they have received, but it appears to me that there is fraud on the face of those returns.

‘ Whatever may have happened in the northern provinces of the kingdom, at least the southern have never been invaded, and the resources of the southern provinces have seldom been called for, and that only for short periods; yet it appears, by looking at the returns of 1810 and 1812, that

the district of Evora alone contained in 1810 more bullocks, and nearly as many carts, as are now in the two provinces of Alentejo and Algarve.

‘ If the deficiency of means of transport in the country should be the cause of important failures, the British Government will have to judge and decide whether they shall continue to expose their army to the consequences of these failures.

‘ I did not answer the letter of Dom Miguel Forjaz, because it proceeds on a fallacy. I say that the alterations which I proposed to the regulation were not made in some instances, and when made, were not made in the spirit in which they were proposed ; my object having been to secure means of transport for the armies which are to defend the country, and the object of the Government having been something else for its benefit and advantage.

‘ It is very proper that the Governors of the kingdom should endeavor to do that which will be advantageous and beneficial to the kingdom, in the proper season ; but now they should attend to that which will enable them to carry on the war vigorously, and save the country from the hands of the enemy.

‘ Dom Miguel Forjaz’s note, marked G, is like every other paper from that gentleman, very able, and looks well to the eye ; but it is not sound. The Governors of the Kingdom dare not act otherwise than profess they will act as I recommend to them ; but I, who am to carry measures into execution with aids which depend upon their arrangements, can see and feel the difference between professing to perform an action and really performing it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 19th May, 1812. 10 A.M.

‘ I enclose the only intelligence I have received since I wrote to you last. I am afraid that unless I can get Grant \* away by force, I shall not get him at all.

\* Major Grant, 11th foot, employed in observation between the advanced posts of the armies. He had been taken prisoner. He was afterwards Lieut. Colonel of the 54th regiment, and died in the East Indies.

‘ In regard to force also, I find by an account from Tordesillas, that our principal correspondent there has been seized by General Boyer, in consequence of his own imprudence. I am apprehensive that some traces may have been found of my letters to the different guerrilla chiefs to urge them to intercept Grant, and to offer a reward to the party which should take him, and that Marmont will take care that he shall have a sufficient escort. This was the person through whom all the correspondence with the north was carried on.

‘ You will have seen in the last letters from my brother his account of the sum he is authorized to give the Spaniards this year. I doubt that Great Britain can realize in specie what is necessary even for that purpose, and to support this army. I am, besides, afraid that the grant of money to the Spanish Government would not answer our purpose. Their system is so overgrown by abuses, that no sum which we could give them would ensure to us an active military co-operation. I have therefore desired my brother to confine his issues to pay only to effective officers and troops, who shall not receive for more than two months unless they shall be reported to be in a state of discipline and subordination as a military body ought to be.

‘ It will be impossible, I am afraid, to effect all that I have in contemplation by this mode of giving our pecuniary aid, particularly if the aid should be given through the Government; and I have therefore proposed that the aid should be at my disposal, to give it direct to such troops as I might think fit.

‘ There will still remain the difficulties of subsistence; but as some contributions are collected in all parts of the country, I propose that they should be applied solely to the subsistence of the troops. We may do something in this manner.

‘ We are getting on with our convoys. The first arrived yesterday at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Peacocks.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 19th May, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by the Inspector General of Hospitals, and I beg that, according to the recommendation which it contains, the —th regiment may be removed to the sea side as soon as possible.

‘ I beg that you will inform the commanding and other officers of the —th regiment that they have been sent, and are detained at Lisbon, because their regiment is *unfit for service*, a circumstance not very creditable to any regiment ; and that I trust that by their attention to the discipline, as well as the health and necessary comfort of the soldiers, by their obedience to orders, and by their endeavors to establish in the regiment a system of order and subordination, they will render their regiment fit to belong to this army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocks.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 19th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 29th ultimo, allowing of our making private bargains for bills on England, if we should find it necessary ; and I have desired the Commissary General to endeavor to procure the sum, of which I had before refused to sanction the acceptance, in consequence of Mr. Herries’ notification to Mr. Bissett of the disapprobation of the Treasury of these transactions. This money will be of great use to us just now, if we can get it, as we are very badly off indeed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Peacocks.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 20th May, 1812.

‘ The 26th regiment are to be embarked, and to proceed to Gibraltar to relieve the 82nd, which regiment is to be brought round to the Tagus. I request you to let the Admiral know the strength of the 26th regiment, in order that he may order transports accordingly.

‘ When the 1st batt. 38th regiment and 91st shall arrive in the Tagus, they are to be landed, and be prepared to march to join the army.

‘ You will be pleased to give the enclosed letter for Major General Campbell to the commanding officer of the 26th, who will deliver it on his arrival at Gibraltar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 20th May, 1812.

‘ As you expressed an anxiety to have an account of our wounded officers and soldiers, I hope to be able to send an official one this day; but the materials for it have not yet come in. I can tell you generally, however, that with the exception of General Walker and Colonel Elder, and one or two other officers of inferior rank, the officers are all doing well. General Walker has been better for the last three days; but he is much weakened by repeated hemorrhage, and he is not out of danger, although the hemorrhage is stopped. He was badly wounded, and was very imprudent, both in exerting himself improperly, and in his food during the first day after he was wounded, which brought on hemorrhage. Elder was also very badly wounded, but had so far recovered as to be thought out of danger; but he has for some days past had lock jaw. He has not become worse for these last four days, and hopes are entertained of his recovery; but of course he is still in great danger.

‘ Major General Kempt’s wound proved to be worse than was at first imagined; but he and General Colville, and General Bowes, are getting well.

‘ Many of the men have already returned to their duty; others are convalescent, and nearly all are doing well.

‘ The real loss has been small, and I hope, that as the season continues favorable, we shall save many.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st May, 1812. 6 A.M.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 19th, and those from Sir William Erskine of the 18th.

‘ The enemy are evidently moving upon Hill’s rear, probably in larger force than that which has hitherto been under the command of Drouet. The last I heard of Soult was, that he had left Seville for the Puertos on the 10th and 11th; and on the same day there were about 2500 men near Ayamonte, it was said, under Gazan. It is not probable, therefore, that the whole army of the South are in motion.

‘ I apprised Hill of the probability of this movement; and it is most likely that he heard of the enemy being at Don Benito on the 17th as soon as Sir William Erskine.

‘ If this is the case, he will have arrived at Aldea del Obispo, so as to open the road to Caceres on the 19th; and he will be at Caceres this day, whether successful or otherwise in the enterprise which was the object of the expedition. If he should be a day later, I think he will still be in time, as it is probable that the troops which were at La Granja on the 18th are intended to pass the Guadiana at Medellin, which they cannot do before the 20th. I have therefore but little anxiety respecting Hill’s retreat.

‘ I was apprehensive that the enemy would make this movement in consequence of the delays which took place; and the movement of the equipment upon Merida instead of upon Caceres. However, I hope that the evil will be confined to the disappointment of my views upon Almaraz for this time.

‘ The 1st division cannot move in a better direction than towards Caceres; but if Hill’s retreat should have been effected, it would be best to get the troops back to their stations, as matters are getting very forward here.

‘ I say nothing about the measures to be adopted in case the movement of the enemy should be only upon Hill’s rear, and confined to a moderate force. If the whole army of the South should have entered Estremadura, it would be best to take the position indicated in my letter to Hill, of which I sent you the draft.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ There is nothing new here.’

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22nd May, 1812. 10 A.M.

‘ I have received as yet no intelligence from Sir William Erskine of a later date than the 18th in the evening, or from you of a later date than the 19th, at three P.M.; but the guide arrived yesterday evening, and I see from the *Roteiro* that the head quarters were still at Almendralejo on the evening of the 19th.

‘ The enclosed letters from Cadiz show that Soult was expected in that quarter about the 8th, and that troops had arrived there. I know that 2500 men were near Ayamonte on the 11th; and therefore upon the whole I feel no anxiety respecting affairs in Estremadura, although I should be glad to hear of them. I fancy that Sir William has been misinformed.

‘ It is very desirable that the 1st and 6th divisions and the cavalry should return to their stations as soon as Hill’s safety is beyond all question.

‘ We are nearly ready with our magazines here; and it is obvious that this must be our operating flank; and I intended to put the troops in march as soon as Hill should return.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ I enclose papers from Salamanca.’

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22nd May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th, and its enclosures.

‘ I am happy to find that you propose to inquire at Tarifa respecting the necessity for the staff appointments which have been made there. An interpreter may be necessary, who ought to perform all the duties of the Staff officers, if he is an officer. If he should not be so, there might be another Staff officer; but I cannot see the necessity for two Staff officers, and that one of them should be the Adjutant, the other the Quarter Master of the 87th, neither of whom can have any duty to perform in his new situation which does not belong to him in that which he has hitherto held.

‘ It is also very desirable that you should ascertain whether two assistant engineers are required, and whether the officers appointed to those situations are the most fit to fill them.

‘ In regard to the works at Tarifa, you have not sent me the plans and sections, and I cannot judge of them from description; and even if I had the plans and sections, I should not be so well able to determine on the propriety of undertaking the works as those who might see the ground.

‘ The impression on my mind is, that nothing can render Tarifa a post likely to hold out, even for a short time, against the attack which may, and probably will be made upon the place.

‘ The garrison will, after all, be obliged to retire to the island, where, it is my opinion, they can be so secured at a moderate expense, incurred gradually, as to render it probable that the enemy would not be able to carry this point.

‘ On the other hand, it is my opinion that the possession of the island, as a military post, would deprive the enemy of all the advantages which they expect to derive from the possession of the town of Tarifa, viz., the navigation of the coast to Algeziras. If instead of the town falling into their hands fortified, or in part fortified, as it certainly will if the works in contemplation should be continued, it were to fall into their hands with all the works demolished, it is probable that when they should find that they could not obtain possession of the island, they would abandon the place altogether, and leave the town, as well as the island, in the hands of the allies.

‘ If they should, under such circumstances, pretend to hold the town, they must either leave a large force in it, which would alone be a great advantage to the allies; or, if they should leave a small one, the troops composing it would be exposed to the constant attacks of the allies from the island. Whereas, if the town should be fortified, or in part fortified, and lost, as it certainly will, the enemy may with impunity leave in it in security as small a force as they please; and as long as they can remain in Andalusia, the allies will be deprived of that *débouché* into the country.

‘ I wish you to consider the works carrying on at Tarifa in this view of them. As long as the British Government

shall furnish money, there will not be wanting Spanish engineers to execute fancies of all kinds in the way of fortifications; and it is probably neither your business nor mine to interfere in the nature, or extent, or object of the assistance afforded to the Spanish Government by His Majesty's Ambassador. But, adverting to the great expense incurred in the Peninsula, to its daily and necessary increase; to the expenses now incurring for the fortifications at Cadiz, and those at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and to the absolute necessity which exists for curtailing those expenses as much as may be possible, particularly in instances in which it may appear, as it does to me in this instance, that the expense is not only not necessary, but may prove injurious, and in those in which the whole expense must be incurred in money; I recommend to you, if you should agree with me upon the view of the place in the opinions which I have formed, to urge His Majesty's Ambassador to withdraw the assistance afforded for carrying on the works for fortifying the town of Tarifa; and that our exertions should be confined to making a secure post of the island.

‘Boards and trussels may be provided for the soldiers to sleep upon at Tarifa.

‘I conclude that the Secretary of State will give directions that your requisitions for supplies for Tarifa may be complied with.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Cooke.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 23rd May, 1812. 10 A.M.

‘Major Currie arrived here yesterday with accounts of Sir Rowland's success of the 19th, and he tells me that he wrote to you of it.

‘He likewise informs me that the enemy's troops which had appeared upon the Guadiana had retired again, which report I hope that Hill will have heard before he will have received that from Sir William Erskine; as it appears from Blanckley's reports, who is on the spot, that the numbers reported to Sir William were very much exaggerated. However, whatever they were, they are gone again.

‘I received your letters of the 20th and 21st last night,

the former enclosing that of the 19th from Sir William Erskine. I have, besides, one of the 15th from Austin, who reports that the French troops have taken up cantonments in the Condado, apparently with a view to subsistence.

‘ The object now in Estremadura is to see Hill back in safety ; and as soon as he returns, to put the troops of the 1st and 6th divisions and the cavalry in march for this country.

‘ I believe that the infantry can pass at Alcantara and at Alconeta ; and if they can, a great object will be gained in saving them the fatigue of the circuitous march by Villa Velha, at least for the troops of the 6th division. The artillery and cavalry must go by Villa Velha.

‘ I have desired Sturgeon to report to you immediately what the means are of passing the Tagus at Alcantara, and how long a given body would be in passing ; and I send an officer down to see the *barcas* at Alconeta, and to report to you ; of which *barcas*, however, I should think that the Marques de Monsalud might be able to give you an account.

‘ If you should find that the infantry can pass with convenience at either or both these ferries, I request you to put the artillery and carriages of the 6th division at least (and of the 1st, if you should think it expedient that they likewise should cross the ferries) in march upon Villa Velha and Castello Branco by the usual stages, as soon as Hill’s return shall be quite secure ; and afterwards put the infantry in march to cross the Tagus at the ferries on the day that the artillery shall cross the bridge of Villa Velha.

‘ I shall send orders for the cavalry to move as soon as I shall hear from you that you have ordered them back to their cantonments.

‘ In regard to supplies on the march by Alcantara, &c., there is a magazine at Castello Branco, from which I shall have supplies forwarded to the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
Sir T. Graham, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ There are with Hill two flying bridges of our pontoons, of three or four boats in each flying bridge, which might go

to Alconeta to facilitate the passage there, if you should think proper, when Hill returns.

‘ I am afraid they could not go to Alcantara, though I am not certain. If they could, it would be the most convenient point for the troops.’

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 24th May, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I enclose papers from Salamanca, from which it appears that Marmont intended some movement, and that he had heard of Hill’s arrival at Lugar Nuevo.

‘ They do not know what to make of the disposition of our troops, which, without a knowledge of our circumstances, it is not easy to understand; and they are very anxious to know where head quarters are.

‘ This was the object of Marmont’s letter to me, adverted to in the enclosed, which contained only one from Grant of the 27th of April. It came by the hands of a friend, who is gone back well tutored.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from Cadiz of the 10th. Colonel Austin informs me, on the 16th, that Soult had again left the Puertos in a great hurry; I conclude upon hearing of Hill’s march; and that the Spanish troops ordered to Tarifa had been countermanded.

‘ I have a letter from the Spanish Minister at War, urging strongly a movement upon Andalusia. This would now be a false movement. At least six divisions of Marmont’s army are free, and would follow us, or would attack Ciudad Rodrigo, in which operation they would now succeed, as you will have observed they are bringing up heavy cannon by degrees.

‘ Our first object must certainly be now to get the better of Marmont’s army, of which we have a chance in the two months which will elapse between this time and the period of reaping the harvest in Castille.

‘ Matters were very different two months ago. The French could not have collected any where; and if Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned, we might have marched 40,000 men into Andalusia, throwing the remainder of the army upon Castello Branco to observe Marmont. But the harvest will be ripe in Andalusia in the beginning of June.

It was reaped last year in Estremadura in the second week in June; and we should not be well through the province before we should have Marmont after us.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received a letter from Hill of the 21st, from which I find that he was to be at Truxillo on that day, so that he will be on the Guadiana sooner than I expected when I wrote to you; and I found yesterday that Mr. Bissett was not quite so forward as I thought he was from his report.

‘ There is therefore no immediate occasion for hurry in the movement across the Tagus. I think the artillery, with the 1st and 6th divisions and the cavalry, had better be thrown back to the old cantonments at all events; and I request you to decide whether the infantry shall, upon the following considerations:

‘ First; whether the troops can cross at Alcantara without inconvenience, with the aid of Dickson’s flying bridges.

‘ Secondly; whether they can be subsisted in the positions which they now occupy, and keep up their supplies.

‘ The nearest magazine to the 6th division at Montijo is Badajoz; the nearest to the 1st division is Niza. This last had passed Castello de Vide before they received your order to halt at that place.

‘ I find that there is a boat at Alconeta capable of containing twelve horses, which might probably be brought down to Alcantara. I have desired Captain Pierrepont to report to you on that ferry; but I recollect one inconvenience attending the use of it to come to this part of the country, and that is, that the Alagon must be passed likewise by a ferry. The troops also which would march by Alconeta would have to send far for their supplies on their march.

‘ I would recommend the use of Alcantara alone therefore, if you should send any troops across the Tagus by any other road than the bridge of Villa Velha.

‘ According to what I have above stated to you in regard to Mr. Bissett’s preparations, I request you not to move the infantry, excepting towards their old cantonments, till you shall hear further from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 24th May, 1812.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 21st. I have invariably ordered that as much money as could be spared from the service of the army should be delivered to the chest of the “aids,” and I believe the subsidy has been much overpaid. But that is no concern of mine. I shall continue the same practice.

‘ I must say, however, in answer to your letter of the 21st, that I do not believe I shall be able in the month of June to order the issue of more *money* than was given in the month of May, and I cannot fix the time at which any will be given.

‘ You had much better write to Government on the subject. I can do no more than I am doing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You may depend upon it that the subsidy has been infinitely overpaid since the 1st January.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812. 8 A.M.

‘ I have received your letters of the 20th and 21st instant, not yet that containing your report of your transactions on the Tagus.

‘ I wish you would take measures to know exactly what passes at Mirabete, if you have not got that garrison as prisoners. It is my opinion that they will abandon the place as soon as they can; and I shall be glad to hear from you when they shall abandon it.

‘ I do not believe that Soult intended to attack Tarifa; but if he did, you will have seen that your movement upon Almaraz has deranged all his projects, as well as those of Marmont. Soult’s troops are again marching towards Seville; and Marmont moved from Salamanca on the 23rd towards Avila and Talavera. He was to move himself, I believe, yesterday.

‘ In consequence of Sir William Erskine’s reports, Sir Thomas Graham moved into Estremadura the 1st and 6th divisions of infantry, and part of the 1st division of cavalry. These troops will either withdraw into Alentejo again, or will wait in Estremadura till I shall order them across the Tagus at Alcantara, and will be considered applicable to other services as soon as you shall return to the Guadiana, where you will resume your old position, and revert for the present to my instructions of the 11th April.

‘ You will observe that your success has given great security to your left, as, whatever may be said, I know that the roads from the Tagus to the Guadiana, leading from the bridge of Arzobispo and Talavera, cannot be called military communications for large bodies of troops. You might therefore adventure a little against Drouet, and keep him out of the province of Estremadura if you can, keeping me apprized of your designs.

‘ In the formation of all these plans, keep in view the support which Drouet will have from Soult, whose head quarters, I suspect, are about to be moved to Andujar. Endeavor to gain accurate information respecting Belalcazar and any other fortified posts which the enemy may have towards Cordova.

‘ It will be necessary that the flying bridge which you have should be moved towards Alcantara, and placed at the disposal of Sir Thomas Graham if he wants it; and that Lieut. Colonel Dickson’s reserve of howitzers should be placed in a situation to be in readiness to cross the Tagus at the same place, with that part of their equipment, consisting of 5½ inch shells, spherical case, and powder.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,                      ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812. 8 A.M.

‘ I enclose some letters from my brother, and a letter and its enclosure from Salamanca.

‘ You will see from the latter that Hill’s operation has induced Marmont to move. I do not know yet whether he

has got the garrison of the tower of Mirabete. I should think he would, if he had not been alarmed by Sir William's reports.

' Hill's operation has deranged Soult's, as well as Marmont's plans, as I learn from Austin, on the 18th, that the troops had been withdrawn from the Condado; and you see that they have been withdrawn from Cadiz.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General*

' WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.*

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812. 8 A.M.

' I received last night your letter of the 22nd, in regard to the cut from the Picurina to the inundation.

' First; is what you propose now better than what you proposed before, viz., a communication from the Picurina to the ravelin?

' You will observe that an enemy could not attack the redoubt by its gorge without obtaining possession of the communication, the approaches to which would be better flanked and defended by the fire of the fort, and from the gorge of the redoubt, than from the proposed line.

' There is another advantage in the communication likewise, which is, that it would afford an additional obstacle to an enemy attempting to turn the redoubt by its left. Unless the whole of the new proposed line, and the covered way on the left of the redoubt, should be occupied, the redoubt will always be liable to an attack in the night by surprise in its gorge. The only guard against it will be the flank fire from the right of the redoubt, and the fire from the body of the place.

' And here the second question arises, viz., is the proposed line flanked by any, and what works of the place?

' You must be the best judge, being on the spot, of the validity of this reasoning; and I beg you will decide which you will adopt, the communication as first proposed, or the line as proposed in your letter of the 22nd.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel*

' WELLINGTON.

*Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.*

‘As far as I can judge from the plan, the proposed line will be seen only from the face of the bastion of Santa Maria.

‘I have omitted to write to you respecting an engineer to be attached to Lieut. General Hill. I rather believe that you had better detain Lieut. Colonel Jones for that purpose.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 18th instant, and I had at the same time one of the 20th from the Conde de Amarante, from which I learnt that the enemy, after plundering the villages on the frontier of Galicia, had retired to Benavente.

‘There is no chance of their attacking Galicia as long as this army shall be on this frontier; and, entertaining this opinion, and feeling an anxious desire that the Portuguese Government should be saved the expense of the militia in arms when not necessary to be incurred, and that the individuals composing the militia should have the advantage of returning to their homes when their services should not be required, I desired that the militia should be disbanded as soon as I brought back the army to this quarter, with the exception of those corps necessary to observe the enemy’s movements.

‘They are, however, ready to turn out again at a moment’s notice.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’*

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812.

‘I enclose the copy of a letter, which I have received from the Secretary of State of the War Department, desiring that the troops under Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill should move into Andalusia, in co-operation with the 4th army to drive the enemy from that kingdom.

‘Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill has lately made an important movement and effected in a very brilliant manner

a very important operation on the Tagus, near Almaraz, of which I propose to transmit to you the detailed accounts for the information of the Spanish Government, in the course of a day or two.

‘ It appears that Marshal Soult abandoned whatever design he might have had immediately in view in Andalusia, as soon as he heard of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill’s movement towards the Tagus ; and I have only now to add, that I will take care that General Sir Rowland Hill shall annoy the enemy in every manner that may be in his power with the force which he has under his command.

‘ I am apprehensive, however, that the force under his command, even assisted by the 4th army, is not equal to the undertaking of forcing the enemy from Andalusia.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 26th May, 1812.

‘ When we had taken Ciudad Rodrigo in January, and I intended to carry on the siege of Badajoz in March, I expected to be able, if successful in that object, to invade Andalusia with a superior army to that which the French had in that part of Spain.

‘ These expectations were founded on the knowledge which I had, that even if Soult and Marmont had collected their armies, either to impede our operations at the siege of Badajoz or to stop our further progress, the want of subsistence at that season of the year would have obliged them to separate, which want, we, with our superior means and better arrangements should not have felt.

‘ It appeared to me also that nothing which Marmont could undertake at that season of the year could prevent me from carrying my plan into execution. He could not attack Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, because we had taken, in the former, the heavy artillery belonging to the French army, which could not be replaced in time. He could not venture at that season of the year to make a serious invasion of Portugal ; and if he had, two or three divisions of the army which could have been spared after the siege of Badajoz,

with the militia, would have stopped him effectually ; nor could he at that season invade Galicia with any prospect of success. In either of these operations he would have felt a want of provisions equal to, if not greater, than that which he would have experienced, if he and Soult had joined to impede our progress south of the Tagus.

‘ I enclose a copy of the memorandum which I gave to General Castaños before the siege of Badajoz, in which the probable plans of the enemy are discussed, and measures to defeat them are proposed.

‘ Your Lordship will see that I adverted to that which at length obliged me to return into Castille ; I mean the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo ; and I thought I had adopted the most effectual measure to frustrate it, by giving to the Spanish authorities, before I wrote the enclosed paper, the provisions in our magazines which they were to have carried to the place. But unfortunately they could not find the means of moving these provisions, only seventeen leagues, in nearly seven weeks ! Other mistakes and disobedience of orders occurred, and I was obliged to bring back to Castille an army able to beat Marmont in the field, in case he should persevere in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, and to abandon, for the moment, the execution of my plan upon the Andalusias.

‘ The measure then to be adopted, was to replenish the magazines of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as soon as possible ; and it was necessary to keep the army in a situation to be in readiness to concentrate, to protect that service, in case the enemy should attempt to interrupt it. If such an attempt had been made, and we had not been at hand to prevent its success, your Lordship will observe that both places would probably have been lost, as neither could have in it at the same time provisions for more than a few days, and could not have held out till assistance could come to their relief.

‘ I did not, however, lose all hopes of being able to relieve Andalusia by a movement into that province, although I was obliged to detain the army for some time in Castille. Those hopes depended upon the period at which Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida should be replenished with provisions, and upon the accounts which I should receive of the degree of

progress made by the enemy, in providing themselves with artillery and stores for the siege of those places.

‘ The magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida have been replenished, but I have reason to believe that the train for Marmont’s army is in considerable forwardness on its road from Bayonne. But at all events, the season is now so far advanced that the reasoning in reference to the expedition into Andalusia, which would have rendered that plan advisable in April or in the beginning of May, is not now applicable. The harvest in Andalusia will be ripe in the beginning of June, and that in Estremadura in the same state in the second week in June; and this is the state in which it is most convenient to the French to find the harvest, from which they can take what they please where they want it, without any account; and wherever they find ripe corn on the ground, they can collect any number of men they please, and can keep them collected during the time which may be necessary to perform any operation.

‘ If then I were to choose this period for my expedition into Andalusia, Marmont would follow me march for march, and on my arrival in Andalusia I should find an army much superior to mine.

‘ It may here be necessary to advert to the state of the enemy’s numbers at present. I reckoned that Soult had about 45,000 men under his command in March, of which 5000 in the garrison of Badajoz; and I calculated that he could bring 32,000 for a few days into Estremadura to raise that siege. I have reason to believe that Marmont has 45,000 men under his command, including the divisions of Souham and Bonet, received from the army of the North in January, which are about 14,000 or 15,000 of the number; and I reckoned that he would have brought 30,000 men into Estremadura to raise the siege of Badajoz, leaving those divisions to occupy Castille and Leon. I enclose, however some intercepted letters in regard to the siege of Badajoz, which show that I was mistaken respecting the numbers which the enemy could bring into Estremadura to raise the siege of Badajoz, which it appears by the enclosed letters were 80,000 men. In these numbers, however, I conclude that 5000 men belonging to what is called the Centre Army, are included.

‘ Of the two armies called of the South and of Portugal, which are opposed to us, the latter can produce the largest number of men in a distant operation. Soult must maintain the blockade of Cadiz as long as he remains in Andalusia, and in effecting that object he must keep garrisons in Seville, Granada, Malaga, and some other points; and if he is to be absent from the province for any length of time, he must leave a body of men to observe Ballesteros, who would otherwise be able to effect some operation attended by permanent injury to his objects in Andalusia.

‘ Marmont, however, has no object, nor, as he has been repeatedly told in letters from Berthier, any thing to attend to but the British army. By abandoning Castille and Leon for a short time he might lose some plunder and some contributions, but he can lose nothing which could permanently affect his situation or the operations of the war; or which he could not regain as soon as he should again be able to have a superiority, particularly of cavalry, in the open country of Castille. Marmont’s then being, what may be called of the two, the operating army, the movement which I should now make into Andalusia, which, as I have above pointed out, would enable the enemy to bring the largest body of men to act together on one point, would be a false movement, and this must by all means be avoided.

‘ There are other circumstances also which render a movement into Andalusia, at the present moment, inexpedient. First, your Lordship will have seen that the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo is not in a very satisfactory state, and it is desirable not to carry the operations of the army to a distance from that place, so as to leave it exposed under existing circumstances. Secondly, the harvest in all the countries north of the Tagus, particularly in those north of the mountains, by which Castille is separated from Estremadura, is much later than it is to the southward. We shall retain our advantages for a longer period of time in these countries than we should do to the southward; and we have time to strike some important blows, which, if successful, may have the effect of relieving the Andalusias, as effectually as a direct movement upon those provinces.

‘ I propose, therefore, as soon as ever the magazines of the army are brought forward, which work is now in pro-

gress, (the troops continuing in dispersed cantonments for that purpose,) to move forward into Castille, and to endeavor, if possible, to bring Marmont to a general action.

‘ I think I can make this movement with safety, excepting always the risk of the general action. I am of opinion also that I shall have the advantage in the action, and that this is the period of all others in which such a measure should be tried.

‘ Your Lordship will have observed that General Hill’s recent operation gives great security to our right in any forward movement into Castille. The enemy have, in truth, now no good military communication across the Tagus, excepting the bridge of Toledo. I know that the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera cannot be deemed military communications for large corps, and scarcely for any body of troops marching with cannon and carriages. There are besides other difficulties for a corps advancing along the valley of the Tagus towards the frontier of Portugal. It is not very probable, therefore, that we should be turned by our right; and if reinforcements should be drawn from the north to press upon our left, we shall always have our retreat open either upon Ciudad Rodrigo or by the valley of the Tagus.

‘ In respect to the general action, I believe there is no man in this army who entertains a doubt of its result, and that sentiment alone would do a great deal to obtain success. But we possess solid physical advantages over the enemy, besides those resulting from recent successes. Our infantry are not in bad order; our cavalry more numerous in relation to the enemy, and the horses in better condition than I have known them since I have commanded the army; and the horses of the artillery in the same good condition and complete in numbers, whereas the enemy are, I know, terribly deficient in that equipment.

‘ Strong as the enemy are at present, there is no doubt that they are weaker than they have been during the war, or than they are likely to be again, as they will certainly be in some degree reinforced after the harvest, and very largely so, after Buonaparte’s projects in the north shall have been brought to a conclusion. We have a better chance of success now, therefore, than we have ever had; and success obtained now would produce results not to be expected from

any success over any single French army in the Peninsula upon any other occasion.

‘The certainty of the loss in every action, and the risk which always attends such an operation, ought not, therefore, in my opinion, to prevent its being tried at present. I am not insensible to these losses and risks, nor am I blind to the disadvantages under which I shall undertake this operation. My friends in Castille (and I believe that no officer ever had better) assure me that we shall not want provisions, even before the harvest will be reaped; that there exist concealed granaries which will be opened to us; and that if we can pay for a part, credit will be given us for the remainder. They have long given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castille upon British securities; and it was with a view to loans from the people of the interior principally, that I applied to your Lordship for the forms of the securities.

‘In case we should be able to maintain ourselves in Castille, the general action and its result being delayed by the enemy’s manœuvres, which I think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I shall at all events have our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘But with all these prospects I cannot reflect without shuddering upon the probability that we shall be distressed, nor upon the consequence which may result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain.

‘I have thought it proper to make your Lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections, and the plan according to which I propose to proceed for the campaign, which I hope at all events will be a successful one.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Peacocke.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 27th May, 1812.

‘I gave directions some days ago to the commanding officer of artillery that two companies of the Royal Artillery might be prepared to be embarked for service; and I requested Marshal Sir William Beresford to apply to the Portuguese Government for permission to send two companies

of Portuguese artillery with them, to which the Government having consented, the Marshal has directed that those might be prepared; and I applied to the Admiral to have transports prepared to take these troops to their destination.

‘ I request you to inquire from General Rosa and Lieut. Colonel Fisher when the troops shall be ready to embark, and that you will settle with General Soares de Noronha the period of their embarkation, after having ascertained from His Excellency the Admiral that the transports are ready to receive them.

‘ These four companies are to proceed to Gibraltar; and I enclose a letter for the Governor of Gibraltar, which the commanding officer is to deliver to him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th May, 1812.

‘ Marmont had not quitted Salamanca on the 24th, but it was expected he would go on the 25th. I enclose a letter from Ruman, containing the accounts of the 24th.

‘ I have a letter from Sir William Erskine of the 24th, from which it appears that he then thought the enemy were retiring. I do not think Sir William has very good intelligence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ I do not know how Sir William makes himself out much inferior to Drouet in cavalry.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th May, 1812.

‘ The Government of Spain having signified to Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel Alava their consent that His Catholic Majesty’s subjects, to the number of 5000, might be permitted to enlist into His Majesty’s army serving in the Peninsula, I enclose the copy of a circular letter which I have written to the General Officers commanding divisions,

to permit the regiments in their several divisions to enlist His Catholic Majesty's subjects, and specifying the terms on which the enlistment is to be made.

' You will observe that this letter provides for enlisting 4100 men, which is all that I have thought it proper at present to allow of; and I have not allowed the foreign regiments in the British service to enlist any Spaniards.

' I request you to lay the enclosed before the Spanish Government.

' I likewise request that you will apply for leave for Captain Gray, of the 95th regiment, who will have the honor of delivering a duplicate of this letter, to go to Alicante and the kingdom of Valencia, with the order of the Government, directed to the Captains General of Valencia, Murcia, and Catalonia, to permit him to enlist His Catholic Majesty's subjects, natives of those kingdoms, into His Majesty's 95th regiment.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' MY DEAR HILL,                      ' Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812. 9 A.M.

' Since I wrote to you on the 25th, I find that Sir Thomas Graham will not require the flying bridges, which you had better send back, with all the appurtenances, bullocks, &c., to San Vicente; and I shall write to Fletcher respecting the disposal of the bridge of pontoons.

' Lieut. Colonel Dickson's reserve brigade of howitzers must, however, be ready to cross the bridge of Alcantara on the day Sturgeon will have it prepared; and I shall write to Sturgeon to let him know exactly on what day it will be ready.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

' MY DEAR SIR,                      ' Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

' I received last night your three letters of the 25th.

' I send Major Currie to England with Sir R. Hill's dis-

patches, which I hope will be of service to him. I received three letters from Hill with his dispatch, including the dispatch, and I believe all in their covers.

‘ I desired Colonel Framingham to attach Major Gardiner to the artillery with the 1st division, and it was necessary to move Captain Lawson’s company with him. But it is certainly desirable that some of the experienced artillerymen and drivers should remain with the 1st division, and I shall speak to Colonel Framingham on the subject.

‘ I think it probable that I shall be able to send directions for the march of the troops to-morrow morning. All will now pass by Villa Velha, in consequence of their having taken up their old cantonments, as stated in your letter of the 25th.

‘ I shall write to Sturgeon to fix his bridge where he can, and then to join the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You will have heard of Mr. Perceval having been murdered coming out of the House of Commons on the 11th.’

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘ His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cadiz having placed at my disposition a part of the aid supplied by Great Britain to the Spanish Government, I conceive that I cannot fulfil the wishes of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland, nor forward the interests of the Spanish Government more essentially, than in making use of that aid to furnish the pay of the officers and troops composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of those composing the division under the command of your Excellency.

‘ I request your Excellency, however, to understand that the expenses of the army under my command, and the other expenses incurred by His Majesty in the cause of the Peninsula, are very large, and that it is frequently impossible to procure funds to defray those of them which must be paid in money. Whatever may be my intentions or my

wishes, therefore, regarding the regularity of the payment of the troops above referred to, it must depend upon the realization of specie for the other necessary expenses of the army.

‘ I mention this in order to guard myself against future reproaches on account of the irregularity of these payments, which I now declare I cannot expect will be regular.

‘ I likewise consider it my duty, acting on the behalf of His Majesty’s Government, and doing what I conscientiously consider best for the cause of Spain, to make the following conditions :—

‘ First. The money is invariably to be applied to the purpose for which it will be issued by me ; that is to say, to give their pay, or the stated proportion of their pay, to a certain specified number of officers and soldiers.

‘ Secondly. As the object in giving this aid is to render the officers and troops efficient for the service, it is desirable that it should be understood that as long as the contributions which can be raised in Castille are allowed by the Government to be applicable to the support of the military establishments employed in the country, they should be applied to the provision of subsistence to the troops, particularly the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo ; to the completion and maintenance of the works of that fortress ; and lastly, to aid in the payment of the troops, so that the money supplied by Great Britain may be applied to another object for the service of Spain.

‘ Thirdly. I beg it may be understood clearly that I employ the aid placed at my disposition in the manner above stated only, because I consider the troops composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and those under the command of your Excellency, to be regular troops ; among whom ought to be established, and by whom ought to be observed and practised, the Rules and Regulations established by the Kings of Spain for the government of their armies ; and these troops ought to be as good as any in the Peninsula engaged on either side.

‘ If I should find that I have been mistaken, it may be depended upon that I shall correct my error ; and I shall discontinue the payment of this aid to any corps which shall not be properly disciplined, and in which the Royal Orders

and Regulations for the establishment and maintenance of discipline and subordination among officers and soldiers shall not be duly observed.

‘ When I make this last condition, however, I admit that I have no right, nor have I the intention, of criticising the conduct of others. But His Majesty’s Ambassador having confided to me the distribution of a part of His Majesty’s aid to the Spanish Government, it is my duty to satisfy myself, at least, that I shall dispose of it for the benefit of the cause of Spain and her allies; and I do not conceive that I should perform this duty if I were to throw away money to pay officers and soldiers who should have no knowledge of their duty, and among whom there should exist no subordination, no discipline, or no knowledge of or attention to the Orders and Regulations of their Sovereign.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General*  
*Don Carlos de España.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘ According to my letter No. 1 of this day’s date, I have now the honor to enclose a warrant upon the Commissary General for 12,675 dollars, 19 reals, and 32 marav., which is sufficient to pay the officers and soldiers according to the enclosed estimate for half of a month; and I beg that this money may be so applied to pay the troops in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo and under the command of your Excellency, for half of the month of June.

‘ I have made the calculations in this estimate according to those which your Excellency first gave me as the rate of pay of each individual.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General*  
*Don Carlos de España.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General George Murray.*

‘ MY DEAR MURRAY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘ I received this day your letter of the 2nd, and I cannot express to you how much concerned I am that you have relinquished your situation with this army. I acknowledge

that when I first heard of your intention to quit us, my sentiments were not confined to concern and regret; but it is impossible to expect that men will pass their lives in these countries, who have other objects to look to, and I cannot be surprised, that after such continued absence, you should be desirous of spending some time at home.

‘ In answer to your letter I can only express a hope that you relinquish your situation with as much regret as I feel upon losing your assistance; and I assure you that I shall always be happy to receive it again when you feel disposed to give it.

‘ You will have appreciated the difficulty and importance of our late operations. The siege of Badajoz was a most serious undertaking, and the weather did not favor us. The troops were up to their middles in mud in the trenches, and in the midst of our difficulties the Guadiana swelled and carried away our bridge, and rendered useless for a time our flying bridge. However, we never stopped, and a fair day or two set all to rights. The assault was a terrible business, of which I foresaw the loss when I was ordering it. But we had brought matters to that state that we could do no more, and it was necessary to storm or raise the siege. I trust, however, that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with the people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be; and that our engineers will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis, and to blow in the counterscarp, instead of placing them wherever the wall can be seen, leaving the poor officers and troops to get into and cross the ditch as they can.

‘ Hill’s late operation is likewise very important, as unless the enemy have another bridge, they can no longer pass the Tagus as an army, excepting at Toledo. As you have left us I will not *tantalize* you by entering on our plans for the remainder of the campaign; I think it will be ours at all events, and I hope it may be attended by permanent important consequences.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General  
George Murray.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,                      ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘ I received this day your letter of the 2nd, announcing General Murray’s removal from the Quarter Master General’s department of this army, and the intention of His Royal Highness to send here Colonel Gordon, to perform the duties of that office.

‘ I very much regret the loss of General Murray’s assistance, to whom I have so long been accustomed, and who has been of so much service to me. But I am very much obliged to His Royal Highness for having fixed upon Colonel Gordon to succeed him; and I assure you that, as General Murray is to go, no arrangement can be more satisfactory to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,                                      ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from Dr. M’Grigor, with a return of the officers who have died of their wounds, during and since the siege of Badajoz; and another letter, giving an account of the soldiers who have died, and of the present state of the wounded.

‘ I am sorry to say that Major General Walker is in a very dangerous state, as is Major Gillies, of the 40th. Lieut. Colonel Elder is better, and out of danger. Major General Bowes has returned to his duty; but Major General the Hon. Charles Colville and Major General Kempt are still confined by their wounds.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,                                      ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘ When I found that the enemy had retired from this frontier on the 24th of April, and that I was enabled to make a disposition of the army, to give me the command of the means of transport attached to the troops, and to enable me to throw provisions into the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo

and Almeida, and to move up the magazines of the army, with a view to the further operations of the campaign, I directed Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill to carry into execution the operations against the posts and establishments of the enemy at the passage of the Tagus, at Almaraz, which I had in contemplation before the siege of Badajoz, and which I had then delayed for reasons into which it is not now necessary to enter.

‘ Owing to the necessary preparations for this expedition, and to the unexpected delays of the repairs of the bridge over the Guadiana at Merida, which I had destroyed during the siege of Badajoz, Lieut. General Sir R. Hill could not begin his operation with part of the 2nd division till the 12th instant; and he attained the object of his expedition on the 19th instant, by taking by storm Forts Napoleon and Ragusa, and the *têtes de pont*, and other works by which the enemy’s bridge was guarded, by destroying those forts and works, and the enemy’s bridge and establishments, and by taking their magazines, and about 259 prisoners, and 18 pieces of cannon.

‘ I have the honor to enclose Sir R. Hill’s report\* of this

\* *Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B., to General the Earl of Wellington, K.B.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Truxillo, 21st May, 1812.

‘ I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that your instructions relative to the capture and destruction of the enemy’s works at Almaraz have been most fully carried into effect by a detachment of troops under my orders, which marched from Almendralejo on the 12th instant.

‘ The bridge was, as your Lordship knows, protected by strong works, thrown up by the French on both sides of the river, and farther covered on the southern side by the castle and redoubts of Mirabete, about a league off, commanding the pass of that name, through which runs the road to Madrid, being the only one passable for carriages of any description, by which the bridge can be approached.

‘ The works on the left bank of the river were a *tête de pont*, built of masonry, and strongly intrenched; and on the high ground above it, a large and well constructed fort, called Napoleon, with an interior intrenchment and loopholed tower in its centre. This fort contained nine pieces of cannon, with a garrison of between 400 and 500 men, there being also on the opposite side of the river, on a height immediately above the bridge, a very complete fort, recently constructed, which flanked and added much to its defence.

‘ On the morning of the 16th, the troops reached Jaraicejo, and the same evening marched in three columns; the left column, commanded by Lieut. General Chowne, (28th and 34th regiments, under Colonel Wilson, and the 6th Portuguese Cacadores), towards the castle of Mirabete; the right column,

brilliant exploit; and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the difficulties with which he had to contend, as

under Major General Howard, (50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments,) which I accompanied myself to a pass in the mountains, through which a most difficult and circuitous footpath leads by the village of Romangordo to the bridge; the centre column, under Major General Long, (6th and 18th Portuguese infantry, under Colonel Ashworth, and the 13th light dragoons, with the artillery,) advanced upon the high road to the pass of Mirabete.

'The two flank columns were provided with ladders, and it was intended that either of them should proceed to escalate the forts against which they were directed, had circumstances proved favorable; the difficulties, however, which each had to encounter on its march were such, that it was impossible for them to reach their respective points before daybreak; I judged it best, therefore, as there was no longer a possibility of surprise, to defer the attack until we should be better acquainted with the nature and position of the works; and the troops bivouacked on the Sierra.

'On further examination of the Mirabete works, I was satisfied that any attempt to force that pass, however successful, must be attended by so serious a loss, that I determined on endeavoring to penetrate to the bridge by the mountain path leading through the village of Romangordo, although, by that means, I should be deprived of the use of my artillery.

'On the evening of the 18th, I moved with Major General Howard's brigade and the 6th Portuguese regiment, for the operation, provided with scaling ladders, &c. Although the distance marched did not exceed five or six miles, the difficulties of the road were such, that, with the united exertions of officers and men, the column could not be formed for the attack before daylight. Confiding, however, in the valor of the troops, I ordered the immediate assault of Fort Napoleon. My confidence was fully justified by the event.

'The 1st battalion of the 50th, and one wing of the 71st regiment, regardless of the enemy's artillery and musketry, escalated the work in three places, nearly at the same time. The enemy seemed at first determined, and his fire was destructive, but the ardour of our troops was irresistible, and the garrison was driven at the point of the bayonet through the several intrenchments of the fort and *tête de pont*, across the bridge, which, having been cut by those on the opposite side of the river, many leaped into the river, and thus perished.

'The impression made upon the enemy's troops was such, that panic soon communicated itself to those on the right bank of the river, and Fort Ragusa was instantly abandoned, the garrison flying in the greatest confusion towards Navalmoral.

'I cannot sufficiently praise the conduct of the 50th and 71st regiments, to whom the assault fell. The cool and steady manner in which they formed and advanced, and the intrepidity with which they mounted the ladders and carried the place, were worthy of those distinguished corps and the officers who led them.

'Could the attack have been made before day, the 92nd regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Cameron, and the remainder of the 71st, under Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, were to have escalated the *tête de pont*, and effected the destruction of the bridge at the same time that the attack was made on Fort Napoleon. The impossibility of advancing deprived them of this opportunity of distinguishing themselves, but the share which they had in the operations, and the zeal which they displayed, entitle them to my warmest commendation; and I cannot avoid to mention the steadiness and good discipline of the 6th

well from the nature of the country as from the works which the enemy had constructed, and to the ability and charac-

Portuguese infantry, and two companies of the 60th regiment, under Colonel Ashworth, which formed the reserve to this attack.

‘ Our operations in this quarter were much favored by a diversion made by Lieut. General Chowne, with the troops under his orders, against the Castle of Mirabete, which succeeded in inducing the enemy to believe that we should not attack the forts near the bridge until we had forced the pass, and thus have made way for our artillery. The Lieut. General conducted this operation, as well as his former advance, entirely to my satisfaction. I regret much that the peculiar situation of Mirabete should have prevented my allowing the gallant corps under his orders to follow up an operation which they had commenced with much spirit, and were so anxious to complete; but the possession of these forts would not have made amends for the valuable blood which must have been shed in taking them.

‘ I cannot too strongly express how much I am satisfied with the conduct of Major General Howard through the whole of this operation, the most arduous part of which has fallen to his share; and particularly with the manner in which he led his brigade to the assault. He was ably assisted by his staff, Brigade Major Wemyss, of the 50th, and Lieut. Battersby, of the 23rd light dragoons.

‘ To Major General Long I am also indebted for his assistance, although his column was not immediately engaged.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Stewart, and Major Harrison, of the 50th, and Major Cother, of the 71st, commanded the three attacks, and led them in a most gallant and spirited manner.

‘ I have received the greatest assistance from Lieut. Colonel Dickson, of the Royal Artillery, whom, with a brigade of 24 pounders, a company of British, and one of Portuguese artillery, your Lordship was pleased to put under my orders. Circumstances did not permit his guns to be brought into play, but his exertions, and those of his officers and men during the attack and destruction of the place, were unwearied. In the latter service, Lieut. Thiele, of the Royal German Artillery, was blown up; and we have to regret in him a most gallant officer. He had particularly distinguished himself in the assault. Lieut. Wright, of the Royal Engineers, has also rendered me very essential service. He is a most intelligent, gallant, and meritorious officer; and I must not omit also to mention Lieut. Hillier, of the 29th regiment, whose knowledge of this part of the country (in which he has been for some time in observation) proved of great assistance.

‘ Your Lordship will observe from the return of ordnance and stores which I have the honor to enclose, that Almaraz has been considered by the enemy in the light of a most important station; and I am happy to state that its destruction has been most complete. The towers of masonry which were in forts Napoleon and Ragusa have been entirely levelled, the ramparts of both in great measure destroyed, and the whole apparatus of the bridge, together with the workshops, magazines, and every piece of timber which could be found, entirely destroyed.

‘ A color belonging to the 4th battalion of the *Corps Étranger* was taken by the 71st regiment; and I shall have the honor of forwarding it to your Lordship.

‘ Our loss has not been severe, considering the circumstances under which the attack was made. I enclose a list of the killed and wounded. Captain Candler, of the 50th regiment, (the only officer killed in the assault,) has, I am

teristic qualities displayed by Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, in persevering in the line, and confining himself to the

sorry to say, left a large family to deplore his loss. He was one of the first to mount the ladder, and fell upon the parapet after giving a distinguished example to his men.

‘ I have had frequent occasions to mention to your Lordship, in terms of the highest praise, the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General. During the whole period I have had a separate command in this country, that officer has been with me, and rendered most essential service to my corps ; on the present expedition he has eminently distinguished himself, and I beg leave particularly to notice his conduct. Your Lordship is also aware of the merits of Lieut. Colonel Offeney, my Assistant Quarter Master General, of whose valuable aid I have been deprived during the latter part of this expedition. Though labouring under severe illness, he accompanied me, to the serious detriment of his health, and until it was totally impracticable for him to proceed. Captain Thorn, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, succeeded to his duties, and I am indebted to him for his assistance, and also to Major Hill and my personal Staff.

‘ The Marques de Almeida, Member of the Junta of Estremadura, has done me the honor to accompany me since I have been in the province ; I have received from him, as well as from the people, the most ready and effectual assistance which it was in their power to bestow.

‘ Major Currie, my aide de camp, will deliver to your Lordship this dispatch, and the color taken from the enemy, and will be able to give you any further particulars. I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ General the Earl of Wellington, K.B.

‘ R. HILL, Lieut. General.

‘ I enclose a Return of prisoners, in number 259, including the Governor, one Lieut. Colonel, and 15 officers. I also transmit a Return of provisions in the forts near the bridge, taken from one signed by the Chief of the French Commissariat, on the 13th of May.

‘ *Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of His Excellency General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., under the immediate orders of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B., at the storm and capture of Fort Napoleon, and the Enemy's other works in the neighbourhood of Almaraz, on the morning of the 19th May, 1812.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	2	1	30	—	33
Wounded . .	13	10	121	—	144
Missing . . .	—	—	—	—	—

objects chalked out by his instructions, notwithstanding the various obstacles opposed to his progress.

‘ I have nothing to add to Lieut. General Sir R. Hill’s report of the conduct of the officers and troops under his command, excepting to express my concurrence in all he says in their praise. Too much cannot be said of the brave officers and troops who took by storm, without the assistance of cannon, such works as the enemy’s forts on both banks of the Tagus, fully garrisoned, and in good order, and defended by 18 pieces of artillery.

‘ Your Lordship is aware that the road of Almaraz affords the only good military communication across the Tagus, and from the Tagus to the Guadiana below Toledo. All the permanent bridges below the bridge of Arzobispo have been destroyed during the war by one or other of the belligerents, and the enemy have found it impossible to repair them. Their bridge, which Lieut. General Sir R. Hill has destroyed, was one of boats; and I doubt their having the means of replacing it, or that they will again form such an establishment at that point, however important it is to their objects, as that of which he has deprived them.

‘ The communications from the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera to the Guadiana are very difficult, and cannot be deemed military communications for a large army. The result then of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill’s expedition has been to cut off the shortest and best communication between the armies of the South and of Portugal, which, under existing circumstances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to re-establish.

‘ Nearly about the same time that the enemy’s troops, reported in my last dispatch to have moved into the Condado de Niebla, marched from Seville, it is reported that another considerable detachment, under Marshal Soult, went towards the blockade of Cadiz; and it was expected that another attack was to be made on Tarifa, from which it appears that the enemy intended to divert the attention of the allies by a renewal of the bombardment of Cadiz, which was actually carried into execution on the 16th instant.

‘ It appears, however, that the enemy received early intelligence of Sir R. Hill’s march. The troops under the command of General Drouet made a movement to their left;

and arrived upon the Guadiana at Medellin on the 17th; and on the 18th a detachment of the cavalry, under the command of the same General, drove in as far as Ribera the piquets of Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine's division of cavalry, which had remained in Lower Estremadura with a part of the 2nd division of infantry, and Lieut. General Hamilton's division of infantry. Marshal Soult likewise moved from the blockade of Cadiz towards Cordova, and the troops which had marched from Seville into the Condado de Niebla, returned to Seville nearly about the same time.

‘ As soon as Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham was apprized of the movements of the enemy in Estremadura, he marched the 1st and 6th divisions, and part of Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton's division of cavalry, into that province; but Lieut. General Sir R. Hill had attained his object on the 19th, and had retired to Truxillo, and was beyond all risk of being attacked by a superior force on the 21st, and he has since arrived on the Guadiana at Merida.

‘ The enemy's troops have retired into Cordova, and it is stated that Marshal Soult's head quarters have been moved to El Carpio, between Cordova and Andujar, and Lieut. General Sir T. Graham's troops have returned to their cantonments.

‘ Since the accounts have been received of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill's expedition, the enemy's troops have likewise been put in motion in Old and New Castille. The 1st division, under General Foy, and a division of the army of the Centre, under General Darmagnac, crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo on the 21st, and have moved by the road of Deleytosa, to relieve or withdraw the post which still remained in the tower of Mirabete.

‘ The whole of the army of Portugal have likewise made a movement to their left, the 2nd division being on the Tagus; and Marshal Marmont's head quarters have been removed from Salamanca to Fontiveros.

‘ By a letter from Sir Howard Douglas of the 24th, I learn that the troops under General Bonet, after having made two plundering excursions towards the frontiers of Galicia, had again entered the Asturias, and were on the 17th in possession of Oviedo, Gijon, and Grado. In the mean time the troops under General Mendizabal are in pos-

session of the town of Burgos, the enemy still keeping the castle; and in all parts of the country the boldness and activity of the chiefs of guerrillas are increasing, and their operations against the enemy are becoming daily more important.

‘The measures for moving up the magazines of the army are still in progress.

‘I forward this dispatch by Major Currie \*, aide de camp to Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship’s notice and protection.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose to your Royal Highness the copy of my dispatch of this day’s date, and of its enclosures to the Secretary of State; and the copy of a letter from Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, in which he desires me to recommend to your Royal Highness’s notice the officers who have distinguished themselves on the expedition to which his dispatch relates. I likewise enclose a sketch of the ground near the Tagus at Almaraz.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Royal Highness*

‘WELLINGTON.

*the Commander in Chief.*’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

‘You will be as well pleased as I am with General Hill’s success, which certainly would have been still more satisfactory if he had taken the garrison of Mirabete, which he would have done if General Chowne had got on a little better in the night of the 16th, and if Sir W. Erskine had not alarmed him, by informing him that Soult’s whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura. Sir Rowland, therefore, according to his instructions came back on the 21st, whereas, if he had stayed a day or two he would have brought his heavy howitzers to bear on the castle, and he

\* Afterwards killed at Waterloo.

could either have stormed it under their fire, or the garrison would have surrendered.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that I have marked some paragraphs in Hill’s report not to be published. My opinion is that the enemy must evacuate the tower of Mirabete; and indeed it is useless to keep that post, unless they have another bridge, which I doubt. But if they see that we entertain a formidable opinion of the strength of Mirabete, they will keep their garrison there, which might be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to establish there our own bridge.

‘ I enclose a Madrid Gazette, in which you will see a curious description of the state of King Joseph’s authority, and his affairs in general, from the most authentic sources.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose the last morning state.’

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th, and with every desire to oblige Don E. Bardaxi, I am very sorry that I cannot comply with his request.

‘ The magazines of the army in Elvas and Badajoz are required to enable the army not only to carry on their operations, but to remain in Estremadura at all. If these magazines were given over to the garrison of Badajoz, the place would fall for want of the necessary support.

‘ There is but one remedy for the inconvenience felt, and that is, for the Marques de Monsalud to oblige the towns in Estremadura to send their means of transport to Alcacer do Sal, to remove to Badajoz the provisions which Don E. Bardaxi is desirous of sending to that place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I enclose two newspapers received yesterday from Sir Howard Douglas, containing accounts of Mr. Perceval’s

death, and of proceedings in Parliament on that event. I beg you to send them on to my brother, when you shall have read them. If you send them to Señor Barcenas, at Badajoz, he will forward them by the Spanish post to Cadiz. There is nothing new here.

‘ I enclose a paper from Salamanca.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.’*

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812.

‘ I have perused Major General Hulse’s confidential reports of the state of the regiments of his brigade; and I observe in the reports of the Courts Martial of the 61st regiment, it is stated that there are five men, John Poole, John Henry, Edward Ross, Denis Farrell, and Charles Bouton, whose punishment is “remitted, to depend upon their future behaviour.” This appears to me to be irregular.

‘ It is impossible that these soldiers can be put on duty in the situation of convicted criminals; and I conclude that the Commanding Officer does not propose to make their punishment depend upon their behaviour while in confinement.

‘ These men should have been either punished or pardoned; but as I should imagine they have been on duty since they were convicted of the crimes with which they were severally charged, they ought now to be pardoned; and this irregular practice must be avoided in future.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th, enclosing one of the 4th from Lord Castlereagh, regarding the Portuguese account.

‘ I concur with you in thinking that the Portuguese Government ought to have credit for the money for which Mr. Villiers refused to give them credit in 1809. They un-

doubtedly maintained many more than the stipulated number of troops, whether Da Costa can furnish the regular vouchers or not.

‘ Mr. Bissett has the accounts of issues prepared, I believe, to the end of the year, with every thing excepting prices, which I have desired him to calculate and add to the document, and I hope you will have it in a few days.

‘ I know nothing of the receipts of the Portuguese Government of articles of military equipment from England, or their prices. There will be to be added, a demand from Mr. Murray for supplies delivered before 1810, when Mr. Kennedy took charge, which came to me, but without prices, and I sent it back to have the prices included.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812.

‘ In transmitting to your Lordship a duplicate of my dispatch (No. 14) of the 11th of February, I beg leave to request that you will be pleased to give directions that the scythes for which I then made application should be sent to Lisbon without loss of time, as otherwise they will arrive too late for the object for which they were intended.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Dickson, R.A.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 31st May, 1812. 10 A.M.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 28th. We *must* have in this part of the country immediately the 6 howitzers, and as many spherical case (principally) as you can carry; and after the spherical case as many common shells. I shall have 24 pounder shot and powder ready here, and means to move both, which will answer our purpose.

‘ I want this equipment here now for a particular purpose, and when that purpose is accomplished, we must dispose of it somewhere till it can be got properly in order to follow the army. You know best how many waggons you want, and you will give such directions as you may think necessary

to have them prepared and properly fitted for this equipment; the nearer to the army the better.

‘In respect to the draft for your waggons, Sir W. Beresford says that if you will write to General Rosa, and point out to him where your waggons will be found fitted and prepared, he will send the mules to bring them up to you. Let General Rosa know the number of mules you will require.

‘The company of British artillery is to remain with you. It is absolutely necessary that you should cross the Tagus at Alcantara, as soon as the bridge there is ready.

‘I shall give orders that you may find provisions on this side of the Tagus.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Dickson, R.A.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

‘My attention has been called in a very particular manner to the expenses at Cadiz, to the extravagant amount of which it is absolutely necessary to fix some bounds.

‘The troops at Cadiz are a part of this army, and the departments at Cadiz are branches of the same departments here. They should correspond constantly with the heads of departments here, and keep the latter acquainted with the state of the demands upon them, and of their expenses; but instead of that, I was concerned to learn from Mr. Bissett this day, that Mr. O’Meara had not obeyed an order which Mr. Bissett had recently transmitted to him, to send to the army three officers belonging to the Commissariat Department at Cadiz. I beg that you will see that he obeys this order forthwith; and in future, he is to lay before you every order which he shall receive from the Commissary General, and I request you to see that he obeys them, unless you should have good reason to believe that obedience would be inconvenient to the service.

‘I beg to have for the month of July, estimates of the expenses at Cadiz, Tarifa, and Carthagea, severally, under the following heads:

Ordinaries.

Extraordinaries.

‘ Under the latter head, I request to have distinguished the amount of the following expenses :

Commissariat Salaries.

Staff paid by the Commissariat.

Bât and Forage.

Provisions.

Forage.

Means of Transport.

Hospitals.

Works by the Engineers.

Supplies purchased for the Engineers.

Supplies purchased for the Troops.

Expenses not classed under the foregoing heads, of which a general enumeration must be returned, including the sum furnished monthly to the ordnance.

‘ I request to have likewise an estimate of the quantity of provisions and forage which can be purchased by bills upon England at each place ; or can be procured by contracts entered into in Great Britain and Ireland.

‘ I beg that these estimates may be accompanied by returns of the quantities of provisions, forage, and military equipments in the Commissariat stores at each place, on the 20th of June ; and by returns of the number of persons receiving rations of provisions and forage at each place.

‘ I request that in future, similar returns, and similar estimates, may be made up between the 20th and 30th of each month, for the following month ; and that it should be stated opposite each head of expense, whether it has exceeded, during the current month, the amount estimated for the same in the preceding month.

‘ I beg also to know, to what period the troops and staff are paid.

‘ I earnestly entreat your attention to keep down the expenses at Cadiz, Tarifa, and Carthage, as far as may be in your power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st of May, upon the state of the works at Tarifa ; and as you appear, upon a view of the place, to be of opinion that the possession of the town is important to the possession of the island, I have no objection to measures, reasonable in amount of expense, being adopted to improve the works of the town.

‘ At the same time, it is necessary that the Spanish Government should employ a sufficient and a proper garrison to secure the place, in addition to the troops which may be employed by His Majesty.

‘ In regard to the payment of the expenses for these works, as I before stated, it is no business of yours or mine, and you must refer it to His Majesty’s Minister.

‘ If you are of opinion that the money is laid out on objects not deserving the expense, or that it is not laid out at all for the objects for which it is given, you must represent your opinion to His Majesty’s Ambassador.

‘ Not only the British Government, but the Spanish Government and nation, are most materially interested in curtailing every expenditure of money in that part of the Peninsula ; as every shilling spent there is taken from the military chest of this army, and diminishes so much the means it would have of rendering service to the cause.

‘ It is my opinion, from the knowledge I have of the mode in which works are generally performed by Spanish officers and soldiers, that no money ought to be paid through the former to the latter ; that an English officer should be charged with the disbursement of the money, even when given to the Spanish Government as loans for the purpose of constructing certain works ; and that the English officer should be directed to see that adequate work was performed, before he gave their day’s payment to any soldier or party of soldiers. This is the way in which the soldiers of this army are worked ; and the Spanish officers and soldiers could not complain of an arrangement founded on a clear principle of natural justice ; viz., that no man should be paid, excepting he should perform adequate work.

‘ If the Spanish engineers should propose to perform works of which you do not approve, and should require British assistance for the performance of those works, you should likewise make your representation to His Majesty’s Ambassador on that subject; who will, of course, decline to give such assistance.

‘ I beg to recommend that the works of the town of Tarifa may be mined in different places, in order to be effectually destroyed in case it should be necessary for the garrison to retire to the island.

‘ In regard to the works carrying on upon the island, the only thing to which I object, is the expensive mode of executing them. Although I am decidedly of opinion, that when works are to be executed, the largest view should be taken of their object; and that every day’s work should be carried on on a systematic plan, having some great object in view; it does not appear to me to be necessary that all works should be constructed in an equally permanent and expensive manner.

‘ I acknowledge that I do not see the use of the casemates and the works revetted in masonry on the island of Tarifa.

‘ First; the expense of works in earth, although probably in the end the largest, is at first infinitely the smallest; and works in earth are equally good, if not better for defence, than those revetted in masonry. They have, besides, the advantage of being finished at an earlier period; and I have to observe in respect to the works on the island of Tarifa, that it is to be hoped that the occasion for them will cease long before the expense of constructing them in earth will be felt by the British Government.

‘ Secondly; adverting to the means which the enemy possess, and the probability which exists that they will make a formidable attack by bombardment on the island of Tarifa, I doubt the necessity of constructing casemates for the troops.

‘ Troops are well protected from the effects even of the heaviest fire of shells, by what are called *blindages*; the expense of which is trifling in comparison with that of casemates, and these buildings have the advantage of being easily moved from one place to another.

‘ I beg you to turn your attention to these suggestions;

and to do every thing in your power to curtail the expenses at Tarifa, as far as may be consistent with the necessary defence of the place.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812. 9 P.M.

‘ I enclose the description of a spy, to which it may be well to pay some attention.

‘ Thinking it probable from your letter of the 28th, that Foy would move off again immediately, I did not send you any answer to it, nor to the others on the same subject. The dispatches are gone, and I hope that Currie got down to Lisbon in good health, and that he will have taken with him the colors.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812. 10 P.M.

‘ I enclose a letter from Ruman, containing the last account from Salamanca; from which you will see that Marmont has returned there. I learn from a muleteer, that he did so suddenly, after receiving a courier from Joseph.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from my brother, and some enclosures. You will see that ——— was terribly misinformed respecting Soult.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812. ’

‘ I enclose my last dispatch; and I see from the information in your letter of the 23rd, that I had been misinformed respecting the movements of Soult. Indeed, I must say that ———’s intelligence during the whole period of Hill’s absence upon the expedition to the Tagus did us a great deal of mischief.

‘ I intend to attack Marmont, and expect to be able to march next week. It is possible that the whole army of the South may be thrown upon Hill while I shall be so employed, and Ballesteros should be prepared to execute the old project upon Seville; and the army of Murcia to move upon Andujar and Cordova, if not occupied by Suchet.

‘ If Soult should attack Tarifa, Hill shall move upon Cordova, &c., and do every thing in his power to create a diversion in favor of General Ballesteros, unless it should be necessary that he should cover my flank, which does not appear probable; and the army of Murcia should in that case likewise get on upon the Guadalquivir.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

‘ I have long had in contemplation the means of obtaining intelligence from distant and various parts of the Peninsula, and I had settled a plan with that view with our principal correspondent at Salamanca, who is certainly the best of the whole class.

‘ In searching for correspondents at Madrid, he has fallen in with the persons with whom you correspond in that city, and I enclose an extract of his letter regarding them. I rather believe it would be the best mode, as it certainly would be the cheapest, to confine their correspondence to one channel; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether I shall tell them so through my Salamanca friend, and direct them to send their letters through him in future. I beg of you also, to enable me to give an answer respecting the missing messenger adverted to, and the letter.

‘ If you should determine that this correspondence shall come in future by Salamanca, there is no occasion to say any thing on the subject to —, who was only a receiver of the letters.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

‘ I received your letter of the 28th. I have no objection to Mr. Burford’s making a panorama of Badajoz, and I enclose a letter to Lieut. Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, who is there repairing the works, to request him to give him every information and assistance. He had better go there as soon as he can.

‘ I have ordered the Commissary General to give the Portuguese Government 150,000 dollars in June, notwithstanding our own distresses, and the urgency of demands for money; but I hope they will pay this money to the troops with the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Fill up the blank in my letter to Sir R. Fletcher, with the name of the gentleman; as in your letter you call him *Burford*, and in Mr. Hamilton’s he is called *Barker*.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from the Consul General, Mr. Duff, at Cadiz, to which I request to call your Lordship’s attention, in which you will see described the difficulties in our way in raising money for this army, in consequence of the extravagant rate of exchange in the Mediterranean and Gibraltar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from Sir William Beresford and its enclosure, being one from the office of Military Accounts to the Paymaster of the 1st batt. — foot, directing that “ the pay of officers belonging to the British army, permitted to serve in the Portuguese army, is to be issued to them under

a similar restriction to that which has been prescribed in the case of officers holding more than one military appointment under the British Government ;” and as some of these officers receive their pay from the Treasurer of the “Aids,” under warrants from Marshal Sir William Beresford, I request to know whether it is the intention of Government that this regulation should be enforced, and from what period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st June, 1812.

‘ In consequence of a demand made by the Spanish Government, in the month of January last, for assistance to enable them to work the foundries on the Isla de Leon, for the supply of guns and shot for the works on the Isla and at Cadiz, I directed that certain returns should be made out, in order to enable His Majesty’s Government to judge of the expediency of defraying the expense of these foundries, or of supplying from England the articles expected to be supplied by them ; and I now enclose the returns received, in which your Lordship will see an account of the demand of ordnance and shot for Cadiz and the Isla only, and the expense to be incurred in supplying that demand from the foundries at Cadiz, and the time which will elapse before it is supplied.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that the estimate does not include the expense of iron, which must sooner or later be incurred, as the supplies of old iron in the stores cannot be inexhaustible ; and no estimate is formed of the expense which must be incurred to supply the other demands for the Spanish service, besides those for the works on the Isla and at Cadiz.

‘ Upon this paper, however, your Lordship may be able to form a judgment of the expediency of defraying the expense of keeping up the foundries, or of sending the articles provided by them from England, as a mere question of expense. In this view, however, it may not be proper to decide it by referring solely to the account of sums to be expended in supplying the articles from England, or in manufacturing

them at Cadiz, as I beg leave to remind your Lordship that every shilling spent at Cadiz deprives the military chest of this army of so much, which, if it were here, would render it more efficient. It may likewise be an object to encourage the iron manufacturers in England, by giving them the supply of this demand.

‘ On the other hand, it must be recollected that if the workmen at the Spanish foundry are not employed on the Isla, they will find their way to the French arsenals on the opposite coast, and at Seville. But as, from the mode of recruiting the French armies, they are never in want of workmen in any trade, or of any description, I do not believe we should supply them with means which they do not already possess, if all the workmen in the Spanish foundries were sent over to them.

‘ I certainly think that some measures ought to be taken to supply the Spanish Government with the quantity of ordnance, shot, and shells, stated by Lieut. Colonel Duncan; but, adverting to the nature and extent of the works at Cadiz and the Isla, and to the improbability that an army can be brought against those works, under existing circumstances, capable of carrying on an attack upon them which can at all be deemed general, I consider his calculation of the quantity of shot required for the works to be extravagant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 2nd June, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 24th, in regard to the letter to be written to the guerrilla chiefs, with the swords and pistols to be presented to them in my name.

‘ I have found that the shortest and most simple mode of expression is the most agreeable to the Spaniards, and has most effect; and it appears that, particularly since the assembly of the Cortes, they have felt that they were to look for their happiness in the independence of their country, rather than in the internal institutions. If, therefore, the letter is to be written to them in my name, I request that they may be informed that I obey with great satisfac-

tion the commands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in transmitting to them these presents, as a small mark of the estimation in which their conduct is held by His Royal Highness, and by His Majesty's subjects in general; in having, notwithstanding the reverses of all the regular armies in Spain, the misfortunes of the country, and in the face of difficulties of all descriptions, continued to maintain successfully the contest against the enemy. That I, having been employed by His Majesty in the Peninsula since the commencement of the contest for the independence of the nations inhabiting this part of the world, have been fully aware of the difficulties of their situation, and of the benefit which the cause has derived from their constant perseverance and valor; and that I trust that the applause which their conduct has gained, of which what is now sent them is a small token, the consciousness that they have done their duty, and the hopes which there are now good grounds for entertaining, that their labors and exertions will be crowned by the attainment of their object, the independence and the happiness of their country, will be their inducement for continuing, and, if possible, increasing their exertions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir H. Douglas, Bart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 2nd June, 1812.

‘ I received your letter of the 27th, respecting letting the water of the Guadiana into the ditch of Badajoz. It is obvious that we can do nothing effectual till the period at which the river will probably rise, and it may be as well to leave the work alone till other matters shall be finished.

‘ I should wish to know from you whether the Spaniards have yet placed a garrison in Badajoz, and whether the Spanish soldiers perform any work.

‘ I am anxious to have our bridge so arranged that we can make use of it if I should want it; and wishing it to consist of 36 pontoons, I have desired Mr. Bissett to have bullocks at Abrantes, to draw up the six pontoons which are there, to St. Vincente, where the others are.

‘ I should wish the whole then to be kept collected at

St. Vincente, complete in all its parts, with the bullocks attached to it, and the seamen ready to start at a short notice to wherever it may be ordered.

‘ I beg you to order up the six pontoons to St. Vincente as soon as the bullocks will be ready to draw them ; and that you will communicate with the officer in charge of the boats respecting their being complete in equipments of all descriptions, and let me know whether they will require any additional seamen.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 2nd June, 1812.

‘ In consequence of your letter informing me that you intended to allow me to dispose of £200,000 sterling of the money applicable to the service of Spain, and having taken into consideration the distressed situation of the troops in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the division under the command of Don Carlos de España, I determined to make an advance of a part of their pay to those troops, out of the sum above mentioned ; and having called for a return of their effective numbers, and of the pay of each rank, I gave Don Carlos de España a warrant upon the Commissary General for the sum of 12,675 dollars, 19 reales, and 32 maravedis.

‘ I enclose copies of two letters which I wrote to Don Carlos de España upon this occasion, containing the conditions on which I should continue to make these payments, and the copy of his answer.

‘ I propose to carry this sum of 12,675 dollars to account against the sum of 158,000 dollars which your Excellency has sent to Lisbon to be at my disposal for the service of the Spanish Government.

‘ No call has yet been made upon me for assistance for the troops in Estremadura ; and if none should be made, the sum which you have sent will last for those in this quarter for five months.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.



‘ Marshal Marmont has again moved his head quarters to Salamanca, and the troops which had marched from thence when he moved his head quarters to Fontiveros, have returned.

‘ The troops, which I reported in my letter of the 28th had moved from the bridge of Arzobispo, by the road of Deleytosa, arrived at Truxillo on the 26th, but they retired again on the 28th, by the road by which they advanced.

‘ I have not heard of their having moved from Arzobispo, nor that the 2nd division had moved from Talavera. I find that I was misinformed respecting the movements of Marshal Soult, as reported in my last dispatch. He was still at the blockade of Cadiz on the 25th.

‘ The troops in the Condado de Niebla had been moved to Seville, however, as therein stated. And I believe the officers attached to the head quarters of the army of the South, are removed from Seville to El Carpio, and part of the Marshal’s baggage.

‘ Lieut. General Sir R. Hill has taken the position south of the Guadiana, which he occupied previous to his march upon the bridge of Almaraz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd June, 1812.

‘ In the list of officers whom I considered to be entitled to the medal for the assault and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I transmitted to your Lordship on the 13th ultimo, I included Captain Mitchell of the 95th regiment, under the supposition that he had the distinct command of the detachment of the 2nd battalion of that corps; but as I have since understood that the two companies of which he had charge were attached to, and acting immediately under the orders of Major Cameron, commanding the 1st battalion, I beg to acquaint your Lordship that I do not consider Captain Mitchell to be entitled to the distinction of a medal on this occasion, and therefore recommend that his name should be erased from the list.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd June, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of officers entitled to the distinction of a medal for the siege and capture of Badajoz ; and a return of the officers of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General’s department who (with the exception of Lieut. Colonel De Lancey, the Deputy Quarter Master General) were serving as Assistants in those departments, and attached to divisions in the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro, Talavera, and Busaco.

‘ I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd June, 1812.

‘ I am very sorry to have to inform you that Dr. M’Grigor has told me that he has great reason to apprehend that Sir Thomas Graham will, in a short time, be obliged to quit the army. He has a disorder in his eyes, one of which it is most probable he will lose ; and the sight of the other, if he should retain it, will be very defective.

‘ I have not seen Sir Thomas Graham since I left Estremadura in April, when he was in very good health ; and he has not mentioned to me the disorder in his eyes. But I have heard of it from others ; and Dr. M’Grigor has his information from the medical gentleman who attends him.

‘ I mention the circumstance to your Lordship, in case you should think it proper to make provision for the event of any accident happening to prevent me from continuing to hold the command. The officer next to me after Sir Thomas Graham is Sir Stapleton Cotton, and after Sir Stapleton, Sir Rowland Hill, and next to him, Sir William Beresford.

‘ As far as I am concerned, I certainly should prefer that no officer should be sent out. There are few officers who understand the situation of the officer second in command of these armies. Unless he should be posted to command a division of cavalry or infantry, and perform that duty, he has really, on ordinary occasions, nothing to do ; and at the same time that his opinion relieves me but little from re-

sponsibility, and that after all I must act according to my own judgment in case of a difference of opinion: there are but few officers who should be sent from England as second in command, who would not come here with opinions formed, probably on very bad grounds, and with very extravagant pretensions. To this add, that when necessary to detach a body of troops in any situation, but few would be satisfied to remain with the detachment, unless indeed it should consist of nearly the whole army.

‘ If, therefore, Sir Thomas Graham should be obliged to go home, I am not desirous of having any body sent to fill his situation, as far as I am concerned.

‘ Sir Stapleton Cotton commands the cavalry very well; and I am convinced that we shall go on better if nobody is sent to replace Sir Thomas Graham.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th June, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter just received from Pereira, from which it appears that Foy, as well as Clausel, are marching into Castille.

‘ I have ordered a day’s halt for the troops, as Sir Stapleton did not receive the orders in time, and did not march till the day after we expected he would.

‘ I have a letter from Colonel Dickson, of the 1st June, and he had received the instructions which I sent him the day I found that you had moved the 6th division back to their old cantonments.

‘ Believe me, &c.

*Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.’*

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I enclose a letter received last night from Pereira, confirming the report of the movement of the 1st and 2nd divisions into Castille. You will see likewise that it is probable that Mirabete is evacuated and destroyed.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from Salamanca, and one containing reports of the state of things on the Tormes.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from my brother, with some very interesting intercepted letters.

‘ I have a letter from the Governor of Gibraltar, stating what is most extraordinary, viz., that there are only eleven thousand 24 pound shot at Gibraltar ! So that I am much afraid that Lord William Bentinck will be disappointed in his expectations of being supplied from thence. I expected to have fitted him out with not less than forty 24 pounders from thence, for which I have sent some of the guns and all the carriages.

‘ But every day’s experience convinces me that our military machine is very ill arranged, and that there is no depending upon it for any thing. Who would believe that in the great fortress of Gibraltar, which is besides a naval arsenal, from which the ships of war receive supplies of shot, there are only eleven thousand 24 pound shot ? I dare say I shall find the stores equally deficient in powder.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

‘ I beg that, on the receipt of this letter, you will apply to the Admiral for a vessel to take to Gibraltar 20,000 English 24 pound shot, which you will have put on board of her.

‘ These shot are to be placed at the disposal of the Governor of Gibraltar, to fit out an equipment of ordnance, respecting which I have addressed His Excellency.

‘ You will be so kind as to allow no time to be lost in the execution of this order ; and you will apprise the Governor of Gibraltar of the receipt of it, and of the progress of embarking the shot by every opportunity.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Campbell, Gibraltar.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22nd May.

‘ In consequence of the Secretary of State having apprized me that it was the intention of His Majesty’s Government that a force under the command of Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck should be employed on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula during the summer, I considered it my duty to do everything in my power to forward the objects of Government. Accordingly, I sent to Gibraltar the different equipments and troops referred to in my letters to your Excellency of the 19th April, the 10th, 11th, and 27th May, of the last of which I have already sent a duplicate; and I now enclose duplicates of those of the 10th and 11th, lest they should not have reached your Excellency when you shall have received this letter.

‘ I likewise enclose the extract of a letter which I wrote to Lord Mulgrave on the 15th of April, which will show you that the Master General and Board of Ordnance will expect that the means in possession of the ordnance in the garrison of Gibraltar shall be employed in carrying into execution the intentions of His Majesty’s Government in respect to the expedition under the command of Lord William Bentinck, as far as they will go.

‘ After having communicated this information and those papers in one view to your Excellency, you and the officers of the ordnance in the garrison of Gibraltar must be the best judges whether any proportion, or what proportion, of the 24 pound shot in the garrison of Gibraltar ought to be embarked with a view to carry into effect the intentions of His Majesty’s Government.

‘ The total demand of round shot for the thirty nine 24 pounders is 31,200, at 800 rounds for each gun; and the troops at Cadiz being under my command, and I being responsible for the safety of that place, I have ordered that twenty thousand 24 pound round shot may be sent to Gibraltar immediately, to be at your Excellency’s disposal for the purposes of this equipment.

‘ I propose, besides, to send from this country 5000 more, notwithstanding that the late services here have exhausted the stores of all the garrisons in this part of the Peninsula, and that it is not impossible that they may have occasion for the use of them. There will still, however, be a deficiency

which it is advisable should be provided from the stores of Gibraltar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

‘ It is desirable that transports to convey the number of troops stated in my letter of the 15th of April, should be sent to the eastern coast of the Peninsula for the object stated in that letter, as soon as it may be convenient.

‘ I enclose a letter for His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cadiz, who will let the officer in command of this fleet of transports know for what number of troops he is to station transports at Alicante and in Majorca respectively, or whether he is to send the whole to one place.

‘ I am obliged to refer to His Majesty’s Ambassador on this subject, as the Spanish Government had not decided, according to the last accounts on this subject, whether any troops were to proceed from Alicante, or how many from Majorca.

‘ Sir Henry Wellesley will likewise have orders prepared for the officers commanding at those places respectively, to embark the troops when Lord William Bentinck shall send for them.

‘ I send him a duplicate of the enclosed letter, and request that the orders may be ready to be sent off as soon as the fleet of transports shall appear in the offing.

‘ In regard to the sailing of these transports from the places at which they will take on board the troops, and their destination when they sail, that must depend upon Vice Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, and Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck; and I request you will give directions to the officer who may command this fleet of transports, or any division of them, to proceed to the ulterior destination, when the Spanish troops are on board, according to the orders which he will receive from Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, or Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.

‘ It is desirable that the tonnage should be calculated at

one ton and a half for each man, as it is probable that the numbers will exceed 6000 men.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812. 9 P.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd instant. It is very necessary that we should be quite certain of finishing every thing we have in hand, or have recommended to the Marques de Monsalud, at Badajoz, before you come away; but after requesting you would attend to this opinion in fixing the period for your departure, I have no objection to leaving it to yourself.

‘ You will go on with the works already directed by me at our expense, till the Marques de Monsalud shall supply you with money. If he should supply you with money, you will then point out to him the state of the works, and the expense remaining to be incurred to complete each; and those estimated for under the heads Nos. 6, 7, and 10, in the estimate forwarded in your letter of the 17th May. If he should supply you with money for the whole, you will begin Nos. 6, 7, and 10. Next to that work, I conceive that a wet ditch to be brought as far as is practicable is the most important work to be executed. Next to that the completion of any one of the ravelins that you may prefer.

‘ If the Marques de Monsalud should give money only to complete the works estimated for in Nos. 6, 7, and 10, I have no objection to continue those ordered by me at our expense.

‘ I beg you will let me know whether the Spaniards have any and what troops in the garrison, as I want to get the Portuguese troops away.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.*

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I addressed you this day, the original of which you will receive from an

officer of the navy; and the copy of a letter which I have written to Admiral Berkeley.

‘ I beg that you will endeavor to have the orders referred to in the enclosed letters prepared to be sent off to the fleet, when it shall appear in the offing of Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

‘ The officer who will deliver this letter is the commanding officer of a fleet of transports, proceeding to the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, with a view to take in Spanish troops at Alicante and Majorca, for the proposed service under the command of Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.

‘ I request you to let this officer know whether any and how many troops will embark at Alicante, and how many at Majorca, in order that he may distribute the transports under his charge accordingly.

‘ I request, likewise, that you will give him the orders, or duplicates to the officers commanding at these stations, to embark the troops destined for this expedition, when Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck shall send to him; and to sail in these transports to the destination pointed out by his Lordship, or by Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, for the rendezvous of the fleet and army.

‘ The transports are calculated for 6000 men, one ton and a half for each man; and they will hold with convenience 9000 men for a short voyage.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th June, 1812.

‘ I received your letter of the 1st instant, and I am happy to find that you are satisfied that the Government are disposed to reform the abuses of the Custom House. I am quite convinced that the revenue of the Customs on imports

and exports of Lisbon and Oporto, if honestly collected and accounted for, would alone nearly cover the deficit. The export of wines from Oporto is enormous: just call for an account of the duties paid in the year 1811.

‘ I expect an account of the real value of exports to Portugal from Great Britain and Ireland, under the different heads, in the year 1811, which will serve to show what the revenue of the crown of Portugal ought to have been last year, for customs on British produce only.

‘ I have no doubt of the interest which different individuals take in the continuance of the abuses, nor of their efforts to prevent all reform. The person who mentioned to Sir William Beresford that the man employed to superintend the Customs, and to detect and suggest the reformation of abuses, owed his appointment to a job, was ———. The report never reached me in any manner, excepting through Sir William Beresford, and ——— was his authority. But I have generally found ———’s information erroneous on all subjects.

‘ I differ entirely from Senhor Nogueira in regard to the collection of the income tax. 600 contos, or even double that sum, will be far from the truth of the profits of the mercantile class in Lisbon and Oporto alone; and I shall never be satisfied with the collection of that tax till it be collected in the way it is on us in England. Why is the rich merchant in Portugal the only class in the kingdom which has gained, and gained immensely, by the war, to be the class exempted from bearing its burthens? Because the Government are not equal to their situation; because they dare not meet the unpopularity of forcing people to pay what they ought.

‘ Let the following experiment be tried in Lisbon and Oporto, and I shall be satisfied; and I will bear all the odium of the measure, and all the blame if it should not be successful, provided it is sincerely carried into execution.

‘ Both cities are divided into *barrios*. Let there be a collector of direct taxes appointed for each *barrios*. Let each individual, of every description, make the following return, to the collector of the *barrios*.

‘ First; a return, specifying the yearly value of his house, stating whether it is let on rent to one or several persons,

the rent received for it in the year, and whether he lives in it himself.

‘ Secondly; a return of the number of servants, horses, dogs, carriages, &c., which he keeps.

‘ Thirdly; a return of his income, specifying whether arising from rent of landed property, from *commanderías*, from pensions, from interest of money paid by Government, from profits or salary of office, from professional fees and emoluments, such as lawyers, physicians, judges, players, &c. &c., from the profits of commercial speculations of all descriptions, from interest of money lent to individuals, from annuities received from individuals, &c. &c.

‘ Upon these returns, let the collectors of the direct taxes in the *barrios* calculate the amount of the taxes to be paid by each individual in the *barrios*, and demand payment of the same.

‘ Let a return be printed and published of what each individual has made as his return to the collector of the *barrios*. This may be done in one line for each individual, and one sheet for the whole *barrios*. Thus,

Name of Individual.	Value of House.	No. of Servants.	Horses.	Dogs.	Carriages.	Income from Land.	Commanderías.	Pensions.	Interest of Money.	Profits of Office.	Professional Fees.	Commercial Speculations.	Money lent to Individuals.	Annuities from Individuals.

Then let all persons understand that if they make a false return on any head, they are liable to pay treble the amount of what they really ought to pay on that head. If the collector of the *barrios* should receive private information that the return of any person in the *barrios* is incorrect, he should have authority to call together two persons of the *barrios*, who, with him, should be empowered to examine books, &c., and the individual himself, and to adopt all means to discover the truth. On the other hand, if any individual of the *barrios* should conceive that the collector has overcharged him, he should have a right to demand

an investigation, and the collector should be obliged to call two persons to hear, and with him determine upon the representation.

‘ Let this question be first tried in Lisbon and Oporto, and if it does not succeed, if really carried into execution, and if the Government there will not have an opportunity of diminishing some of the taxes, I will bear all the blame.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I do not advert in this system to the Terço Ecclesiastico, which is made a particular *regie* applicable to the whole diocese, and which had better be continued.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 6th June, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 3rd, 2 P.M.

‘ As Foy and Clausel have certainly moved towards Castille, I did not think it probable that Soult would move against you; however, I conclude that the enemy imagine that we have weakened you to a greater degree than we have done. Including Drouet, I do not think that Soult can assemble 25,000 men in Estremadura, unless he should abandon entirely the blockade of Cadiz, and leave Seville, and all the open country, at the mercy of Ballesteros, at the moment at which it is important to him to secure the harvest.

‘ Reckoning the 5th, 17th, and 22nd regiments, which are still in Badajoz, I conceive that you will have not less than 19,000 British and Portuguese, besides the Conde de Penne Villemur and Morillo.

‘ It must be observed upon this force, however, that it is not exactly of the description I should wish to see with you, and it must not be depended upon to manœuvre in presence of an enemy on ground which should not give you an advantage. It must be placed on a strong position, in which I entertain no doubt of the result of any general action. The best position in the country, in my opinion, particularly as Badajoz is now in some degree repaired, is that of Albuera. Whether the enemy attempt to turn it by the right

or by the left, there is an easy movement to the right or to the left, and the position continues equally good, and there is always an easy retreat upon Badajoz, or upon Jurumenha, or such passage of the Guadiana as it might be thought expedient to adopt. It is better at this season than any position, on the north side of the Guadiana, because it covers more country, and because the enemy cannot, without forcing the position, pretend to turn the defences of Portugal, and to enter that kingdom by the passages of the Guadiana about Jurumenha, and by the roads of Villa Viçosa, and Estremoz.

‘ I therefore recommend the position of Albuera to your attention in the first instance, in case Soult should move into Estremadura in force. If you should determine to occupy the position of Albuera, you should appear to determine to hold the wood and the position in front of the wood towards St<sup>a</sup> Marta, and throw up a little ground there, in order to induce the enemy to believe that you have fortified it; you will then have an opportunity of seeing his whole force in and about St<sup>a</sup> Marta, and probably of judging on which side he proposes to manœuvre, and you can always retire before him across the Albuera rivulet, the passages of which should, however, be well reconnaitred.

‘ If you should find Soult inclined to manœuvre by your right, and to enter Portugal by the roads above mentioned, you should place Morillo in Badajoz, and with the remainder of the troops cross the Guadiana, and take a position near Jurumenha.

‘ If you should find that he intends to manœuvre by your left, you should move upon Badajoz, and take a position there, or according to circumstances, take the position of San Christoval.

‘ If you should find Soult advancing, write to the Marques de Monsalud to throw into Badajoz all the troops lately arrived from Cadiz, and all that he can collect in the province; and likewise to General Leite at Estremoz, and desire him to collect the militia again at Elvas, and to occupy Campo Mayor and Ouguela.

‘ I intended to have in Badajoz a supply of provisions for 5000 men for 60 days, which I intended should be made over to the commanding officer of the garrison, in case the

place should be invested, and I had ordered that 600,000 rations should be in Elvas, in order to provide for the contingency, that I might carry the operations of the campaign to the southward. Mr. Routh will let you know the progress which has been made in both those objects, and you will consider both magazines entirely at your disposal. You will recollect, however, that I believe that at present there are no other provisions in Badajoz, but Elvas is well provided. There would not be much harm done if our magazines at Elvas were reduced to 300,000 rations.

‘ I have a letter from the Conde de Penne Villemur, of the 30th, in which he tells me that he has been ordered to move into the Condado de Niebla, and asks my consent. Tell him that I will answer his letter to-morrow, but that I think that just at present the movement would be very imprudent.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I enclose letters of the 4th and 5th from Salamanca, and one from Avila. I have one intercepted letter from Marmont to Jourdan; which I am endeavoring to decipher. It is obvious, however, from what I see in it, that both Marmont and Jourdan discovered that I intended to collect in this direction, in consequence of Hill’s early return; which was certainly occasioned by Sir William Erskine’s false alarm.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel May, R.A.*

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

10 P.M.

‘ I have desired the Commissary General to have delivered over to you at Almeida, 20 carts to carry six hundred 24 pounder shot; 10 carts to carry four hundred 18 pounder

shot, 10 carts to carry 60 barrels of powder, for the equipment of Dickson's howitzers; and 5 carts to carry 30 barrels of powder for the 18 pounders; and 5 spare carts for any thing else you might want. Likewise 80 bullocks to draw 4 iron 18 pounders, at ten pairs each gun; and 5 pairs of bullocks to draw a transporting carriage loaded with ladders, which I desired Lieut. Shanahan, of the staff corps, to cut and make up at Almeida.

' I shall be obliged to you, if you will see the whole of this equipment packed and arranged; and I will speak to Colonel Framingham to send an officer and conductor over to Almeida to morrow, to take charge of it.

' I beg you will fix upon the best of the transporting carriages in the fort to carry the ladders, and desire the officer of the staff to secure them upon it.

' The bullocks and carts will not be at Almeida till the 9th. But they ought to be prepared as soon afterwards as possible.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel May, R.A.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To General Conde de Penne Villemur.*

' à Fuente Guinaldo, ce 7 Juin, 1812.

' MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

' Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a adressé le 3 Mai, qui aurait dû être le 3 Juin.

' Je vais marcher sur l'ennemi en Castille, et jusqu'à ce que je puisse connaître les résultats de mon mouvement il est très important de ne pas s'affaiblir en Estremadure. Je suis sûr que la Régence n'a pas connu l'état des affaires quand elle vous a ordonné de partir pour le Condado de Niebla; et comme elle vous a ordonné de consulter mon opinion, je vous prie de n'y pas marcher, mais d'agir de concert avec le Général Hill, et d'être préparé à jeter en garnison à Badajoz les troupes du Général Morillo, en cas que ce soit nécessaire.

' J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

' *General  
Conde de Penne Villemur.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Conde de Penne Villemur, informing me that the Spanish Government have ordered him into the Condado de Niebla, if I should approve of the movement; and a copy of my answer.

‘I am about to move into Castille, and I have calculated upon the Conde de Penne Villemur and General Morillo continuing in concert with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, till the result of this operation shall be seen.

‘I think it most probable that Soult will move upon General Hill as soon as my march is known; and affairs will be in a bad situation if that General should not be in strength. I am the more anxious upon this subject, because having this day received a return of the army of the South, of the 1st of April, which has been intercepted, I see, that notwithstanding all the reports to the contrary, it consisted then of more than 56,000 effective men; from which, deducting the garrison of Badajoz, since made prisoners, it must now amount to more than 50,000 effective men. The Polish division which had been sent to France are not included in this return.

‘The movements of the enemy may render it necessary for Lieut. General Hill to throw a garrison into Badajoz; and I beg to know where that garrison is to be found, if it is not for the time composed of the troops under General Morillo.

‘The Spanish Government have lately desired that, in case of a movement by Marshal Soult on General Ballesteros, General Hill should make a movement to divert the attention of the enemy from General Ballesteros. I have directed this movement in the notion that General the Conde de Penne Villemur would co-operate in it. It is surely better that, if it be possible, the allied troops in Estremadura should act together in a concentrated body, than that one corps of them should be in the Condado de Niebla, and another at Cordova.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

10 P.M.

‘ I send you copies of three letters in cipher, of which it is very desirable to discover the key; and I shall be obliged to you if you will send them to General Navarro, to try what he can do with them. We can make nothing of them here.

‘ I can see, however, that the King and Marmont have discovered that I intend to carry on operations on this side; and the King had already given orders to Soult on the 7th of May, which he has repeated on the 26th of May, to take a position with a view to those operations. I conclude that the object of those orders is to distract my attention from Marmont by an attack upon Hill. This, I think, will be made; but if Morillo and Penne Villemur stay with Hill, and there is any garrison for Badajoz besides Morillo's troops, Hill will be in tolerable strength; and they will all be disappointed in their expectations of finding a very weak corps in that part of the country.

‘ I shall send you an abstract of the return of the army of the South, the strength of which has certainly surprised me, though I never reckoned it less than from 42,000 to 45,000 men.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th June, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Mr. Deputy Commissary General Pipon, pointing out the inconveniences likely to be felt by this army, in consequence of the excessively disadvantageous rate of exchange at which the Commissaries in the Mediterranean negotiate their bills at Gibraltar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HILL,                      ‘Fuente Guinaldo, 8th June, 1812. 9 P.M.

‘I omitted to tell you in my letter of this morning that I had ordered one of the Portuguese brigades of artillery in the reserve of the army to proceed to join you by the bridge of Alcantara. I shall desire De Lancy to send you the route.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*  
‘*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Dr. M<sup>c</sup>Grigor\*.*

‘SIR,                                      ‘Fuente Guinaldo, 9th June, 1812.

‘As I propose to send to England your report on the mortality in this army, which, however, considering all the circumstances, has not been large, and not amounting to 15,000 men, including losses in actions, from April 1809, to January, 1812, I wish to draw your attention to a few remarks upon your report.

‘In respect to the third recommendation, I have to observe that it is impossible in any army of the size of that under my command to take from the men and return them their equipments at every moment when it appears convenient. The demands for food for the army amount to 200,000 lbs. weight daily, which must be brought from the sea, besides ammunition, supplies for hospitals, equipments of all descriptions, &c. &c.

‘The soldiers, therefore, must keep their blankets during the summer, in order to be certain of having them in October.

‘In regard to the fourth remark, I have to observe that His Majesty has ordered that the soldiers’ accounts shall be settled, and the balance on them paid on the 24th of every month. The pecuniary distresses of this army have prevented obedience to this order, and the pay of the army is seldom less than three months in arrear; but no more than one month’s pay is ever issued at a time, and the balance due on one month’s account only can be given at a time. You will likewise see that under the General Order of this army of the 24th January, 1810, the balance due on one

\* Sir James M<sup>c</sup>Grigor, Director General of the Army Medical Board.

month's account cannot be paid till two months' accounts shall be settled.

' You will likewise see in the General Order that the attention of commanding officers of regiments has been frequently called to the expediency of supplying the soldiers with breakfast; and I believe that in every well regulated regiment they are so supplied when the means can be procured.

' Their rations are *invariably* delivered to the soldiers daily, except on marches; and the army would be incapable of all movement if I were to order that the soldiers should carry no provisions. The British soldiers, on such an occasion, carry three days' bread; the Portuguese soldiers, six days' bread; the French soldiers, fifteen days' bread.

' The only mode that I know of removing sick to the rear is in spring waggons, which are all applied to this service, and in aid of them bullock carts. I am aware that the drivers of the spring waggons are very irregular, and take but little care of their horses; but this, like many other evils in the service, which, although equally the cause of mortality, you have not noticed, and, among others, the irregularities of the soldiers themselves, it is impossible for me to remedy, till the Mutiny Law and the whole system of the service are altered.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Dr. McGrigor.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' MY DEAR HILL,

' Fuente Guinaldo, 9th June, 1812. 9 A.M.

' I enclose an extract \* from the return of the army of the South, of the 1st April, from which you will see that they

\* *Note on the return.*—' The total of the present fit for duty of the French army of the South, on the 1st April, was 56,980, in which are included artillery, engineers, sappers; 2nd battalion of Hesse Darmstadt infantry, 940; marines, 1510, &c. &c. The Hesse Darmstadt regiment was taken in Badajoz, and artillery, engineers, &c. &c., reducing the fit for duty to about 52,000. It will be seen on the other side that the reduction of French infantry, on the return of the divisions, was only 2738; but, besides this French infantry returned as present on the 1st April, and since taken in Badajoz, there was a detachment of 204 men of the 64th regiment, returned detached in the return of the 1st April in Badajoz, which were likewise taken, but these make no diminution of the present fit for duty in this return.

' From

are stronger than any body thought they were. I always thought them about 45,000. However, I think it impossible that they can bring more against you than from 18,000 to 20,000 infantry, and about 4000 cavalry.

‘ Sir Stapleton Cotton had ordered the 4th dragoon guards to join Le Marchant’s brigade, to relieve the 3rd dragoons, not in very good condition; but I have written to Colonel Sherlock to halt at Niza till you shall send him orders; and you had better order him to join his brigade by easy marches. The regiment is now very strong, and in good order.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You will observe that on the day after to-morrow the communication between you and me will pass by Alcantara, and it will therefore be necessary that you should send a person express to Niza to give Colonel Sherlock his orders.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,      ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th.

‘ I consider it most probable that Drouet will retire from Estremadura, unless he should be considerably reinforced, so as to give him a force equal, or superior to that under your command. You cannot follow him out of Estremadura; and as soon as you get rid of him, you cannot do better than canton your troops in the most healthy situations in the province, sending the three regiments belonging to the garrisons back to Badajoz or Elvas; and look to assembling again on Albuera, if the enemy should again enter the province in strength.

‘ From what I see of Soult’s disposition of his troops to relieve Badajoz, and from what I know of the manner in which he was pressed by Ballesteros on that occasion, I conceive that he cannot bring into Estremadura more than three divisions, or half of his infantry, present fit for duty, but he may bring more than 4000 cavalry.

‘ Besides the 56,980 fit for duty, and 4037 detached, of which the greatest number is in the south, there are on the return 4869 sick in hospitals (it is strange there should be so few), 414 prisoners, 410 absent on leave; making a total of 68,283 men, and 12,529 horses of all descriptions.’

‘ By an intercepted letter from Madrid, I see that the King is assembling the army of the centre, which may make some difference in the situation of us all. However, you have two positions from which it will not be easy to dislodge you, that at Albuera, and that of S<sup>ta</sup> Engracia; and I feel no anxiety about you. I wish that I was as strong in respect to the enemy as you are.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,                      ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

‘ I enclose my dispatch. We shall cross the Agueda on the 12th.

‘ I am almost certain that the enemy will move into Estremadura, upon Hill, as soon as it is known that I have moved, and I hope that every thing will be done by Ballesteros, the army of Murcia, and the troops at Cadiz, to divert the enemy from their intentions upon Hill.

‘ I shall send, if possible, by this post, the abstract of the return of the enemy’s force in the south. They have still above 50,000 men.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*  
*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,                      ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

‘ The army are collected upon the Azava, and will pass the Agueda on the 12th instant. As I find from intercepted letters, that King Joseph had, on the 7th and 26th May, given orders to Marshal Soult to make a disposition of the troops under his command, in expectation of the movement which I am about to make into Castille, I have left Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill in such strength in Estremadura, as will, I hope, enable him to keep every thing in tranquillity in that province, and secure our right flank.

‘ All the troops belonging to the army of Portugal are collected in Castille, excepting Bonet’s division, which, however, is reported to have again evacuated the Asturias,

and to have arrived at Leon. I have no official account of this movement.

‘ Marshal Marmont’s quarters are at Salamanca ; but the enemy have destroyed all the bridges on the Tormes, excepting that of Salamanca ; and it is supposed that they propose to evacuate that town, leaving in the fortified convents a small garrison.

‘ Marshal Soult arrived at Seville, from the blockade of Cadiz, on the 28th May ; and I have not heard of his quitting that town.

‘ I have not heard of any movement of troops in the north.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

‘ The outrages committed by the British soldiers belonging to this army have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect upon the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your Lordship’s early attention to the subject.

‘ I am sensible that the best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention to the subject in this view of it than I have done ; and I have been so far successful, that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with their regiments, after the regiments have been a short time in this country. But in the extended system on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances through the country, either as escorts, or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or coming from hospitals, &c. ; and notwithstanding that none of these detachments are ever allowed to march excepting under the command of an officer, or more, in proportion to its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every description are not committed ; and, I am sorry to say, with impunity.

‘ The foundation of every system of discipline which has

for its object the prevention of crimes, must be the non-commissioned officers of the army. But I am sorry to say, that notwithstanding the encouragement which I have given to this class, they are still as little to be depended upon as the private soldiers themselves; and they are just as ready to commit irregularities and outrages. I attribute this circumstance very much to the lowness of their pay in comparison with that of the soldiers.

‘ Within my recollection, the pay of the soldiers of the army has been increased from sixpence to one shilling per diem, with other advantages; while that of the corporals, which was eightpence, has in the same period been raised only to one shilling and twopence; and that of the serjeants, which was one shilling, has been raised only to one shilling and sixpence, both with the same advantages as the private soldiers.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that the old proportions have not been preserved; and the non-commissioned officers of the army not only feel no inclination to preserve a distinction between them and the private soldiers, but they feel no desire to incur the responsibility, and take the trouble, and submit to the privations of their situation for so trifling a difference in their pay, as that of twopence in fourteen pence to corporals, and that of sixpence in eighteen pence to serjeants; and they are indifferent whether they continue non-commissioned officers or not.

‘ The remedy for this evil is to increase the pay of the corporals and serjeants, so as at least to restore the old proportions between non-commissioned officers and soldiers before the first increase of pay to the army at the commencement of the last war. This measure becomes particularly necessary, in consequence of the opinions generally prevalent in respect to the punishment of soldiers; which are certainly so far well founded, that it must be admitted by all, that the best mode of insuring regularity among soldiers is to prevent the commission of crimes.

‘ Then, not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to preserve order in one of these detachments upon a march, owing to the badness of the non-commissioned officers of the army, but the crimes which the soldiers commit remain unpunished.

‘ It is impossible to try these offences while the soldiers

are on their march, from the want of a sufficient number of officers to constitute a Court; and I refer your Lordship to my letter to the Judge Advocate General of the 13th November, 1811\*, for a detail of the difficulties attending the procuring evidence against them when they join the army. I proposed remedies for this evil which have not been entirely adopted.

‘ Then if it should be possible to produce evidence of these outrages, I refer your Lordship to the Judge Advocate General for the opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor General, of the nature of the powers given by the 4th Article of the 24th Section of the Articles of War, to try offences of this description by Courts Martial. It appears that these powers are confined to the infliction of punishments for offences according to the law of England, and of course to the exclusion of corporal punishment.

‘ I beg leave likewise to refer your Lordship to a letter which I wrote to the Judge Advocate General on the 13th of March last\*, to point out the difficulty of the situation in which the members of a General Court Martial and I should be placed, in consequence of the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General; it being impossible for any Court Martial or for me to affix the technical name to any crime committed by a soldier; or to know what was the punishment for that offence under the law of England.

‘ In consequence of this opinion, I have been obliged to send home for confirmation the proceedings of every General Court Martial before which a soldier has been convicted of one of these crimes; and to request the Judge Advocate General to advise His Royal Highness the Prince Regent regarding the measures to be taken upon the subject.

‘ The guard rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners; and the offences of which they have been guilty remain unpunished, to the destruction of the discipline of the army, and to the injury of the reputation of the country for justice.

‘ I have thought it proper to lay these circumstances before your Lordship. I am about to move the army further

\* The drafts of these, and of other papers, of the period between July, 1811, and July, 1812, were lost by shipwreck. A search has been made for these two letters in the office of the Judge Advocate General, but without success; although they are acknowledged to have been received in the answers to them,

forward into Spain; and I assure your Lordship that I have not a friend in that country who has not written to me in dread of the consequences which must result to the army, and to the cause, from a continuance of these disgraceful irregularities, which I declare I have it not in my power to prevent.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

‘ When your Lordship apprized me of the design that Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck should make an attack upon the eastern coast of the Peninsula, with the troops from Sicily, in the course of the summer, I considered it to be my duty to aid his Lordship by every means in my power, with troops, if I could spare them from the service in this part of the Peninsula, with equipments to facilitate the execution of the plans of Government, and with ships to transport the Spanish troops; with which I requested His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cadiz to urge the Spanish Government to co-operate with his Lordship.

‘ Accordingly, I sent in the first instance to Gibraltar the ships named in the margin, containing the stores of which I enclose the return, which had recently arrived from England, with a battering train, from which I ordered that the shot specified in the margin might be landed in Portugal, where shot of those calibres was wanted; and I requested that the Governor of Gibraltar would have the shot in the ships replaced by 800 rounds of round shot, 100 rounds of canister, and 100 rounds of grape shot for each gun.

‘ I have since sent to Gibraltar, likewise to be at the disposal of Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck, the ships named in the margin; and I enclose a return of the ordnance and stores they contain, including the stores which were at Setuval, and those on their march from Elvas to Alcacer de Sal, which were embarked in those ships.

‘ I requested the Governor of Gibraltar, upon that occasion, to have the gun carriages put into a state of repair, and that guns should be fitted to them; and with 800 rounds of round shot, 100 rounds of canister, and 100 rounds of grape,

for each gun, with a suitable proportion of powder, should be embarked in those ships, and in two others which I had requested Admiral Berkeley to send round, the four ships not having been sufficient to contain the whole equipment.

‘ I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to the Governor of Gibraltar upon this occasion.

‘ I have not yet heard of the arrival of these ships at Gibraltar; but I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Lieut. General Campbell, written upon the arrival of the three vessels first mentioned; from which your Lordship will observe that the garrison of Gibraltar is stated not to have in store more than eleven thousand 24 pound shot, and that the officers of the ordnance in that fortress have refused to allow any of it to be embarked at my requisition. I likewise enclose my answer to Lieut. General Campbell, from which your Lordship will observe, that for the purposes of this equipment I have ordered twenty thousand 24 pound round shot from Cadiz to Gibraltar, and five thousand from Lisbon to the same place, notwithstanding the wants at both, and I trust that Lieut. General Campbell will find it convenient to supply the remainder of the demand.

‘ I have likewise sent from this country to Gibraltar two companies of British, and two companies of Portuguese artillery, to remain there in their transports at the disposal of Lord William Bentinck, when he shall send for them; and Lieut. Colonel Jones, and four subaltern officers of Engineers, and two companies of military artificers, including all the sappers there are with this army, with the same intention.

‘ Every ship and all the troops and equipments for this service have sailed from the Tagus; and I trust that your Lordship will approve of these arrangements, and will give orders that the 24 pound shot may be replaced at Cadiz and Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

‘ I enclose the abstract of the return of the army of the South, of the 1st of April last, from which it appears that it

consisted of nearly 57,000 men present and fit for duty, including the garrison of Badajoz. Estimating that garrison at 5000 men of all arms, the army of the South now consists of 52,000, of which about 38,000 are infantry, and about 7000 cavalry.

‘ This army is more numerous and efficient than I imagined it was, and much more so than it was ever represented to be ; and the state of it affords another ground for adopting the plan of operations for the campaign which I have preferred.

‘ I could not take more than 40,000 men into Andalusia, where it appears I should have had another army, that of Portugal, following my march, consisting of at least 30,000 more.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

‘ I wish to know from your Lordship whether it could be possible to give the medal to the Prince of Orange. He has been in the action at El Bodon, and in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz ; and although he is not exactly in the situation which would entitle him to it, he has the rank, and certainly deserves it, and would be highly flattered at obtaining it. I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will let me know if it can be given to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th June, 1812.

‘ The army is collected on the Agueda, and I intend to move forward on the 13th. I am almost certain, from what I have seen of the intercepted letters from Joseph to Soult, and from Marmont to Joseph, that Soult will move upon you with a part at least of his force, notwithstanding that the Marques de Monsalud says in a letter which I have from him this morning, that he believes that Joseph has ordered Soult to approach the Tagus ; he did not send me the paper on which he founds this notion, and, therefore, I am not able to judge of it.

‘ In my letter of the 6th instant, I pointed out to you what I thought would be the enemy’s line of operations, and I recommended certain measures to you. There are still two or three objects to which I wish to draw your attention.

‘ First ; my bridge of pontoons, which is at San Vincente ; I think that for the present, the bridge had better be lodged at Elvas, the bullocks, &c., being kept in the best situation in the neighbourhood for grazing. I request you to give directions accordingly to Lieut. Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher Hereafter, if I should find, from the course the campaign takes, that it is not likely that I shall require that bridge for the communication between you and me by Almaraz, which will depend very much upon the events of the next fifteen days, I shall order that bridge down to Abrantes ; as there is no use in being loaded with too many concerns.

‘ Secondly ; the bridge at Alcantara. We have repaired this bridge by a piece of machinery which can be taken up and laid down at pleasure, but it will require two days’ notice to lay it down, and as much time to take it up. I enclose the copy of the instructions which I have given regarding this bridge, and you will only send notice if you should want to use it.

‘ If you should find it necessary on any account to retire into Portugal, you will in that case send orders to Lieut. Pery at Alcantara, to lodge his bridge, &c., at Marvaõ ; and his bullocks, people, &c., had better continue their march by Castello de Vide, Niza, &c., to Abrantes.

‘ It is very difficult to manage the defence of the kingdom of Portugal, the whole country being frontier. I am quite convinced, that if Soult moves upon you, he will manœuvre by your right flank, and will cross the Guadiana somewhere about Jurumenha, where he will be at no great distance from our magazine, hospital, &c., at Estremoz. We have very little, I believe, in magazine at that place, the greater part having been removed to Elvas, and it is as well that there should be no great accumulation at Estremoz, upon which subject I request you to communicate with Mr. Routh. I have desired Dr. McGrigor to give directions that the hospital at Estremoz may be gradually evacuated upon Alter do Chaõ and Abrantes, leaving in Estremoz only 400 or 500 men, which number can always be moved without difficulty.

‘ By the last account from Brito, I see that there had been some affair with Ballesteros on the 1st, near Bornos, and that some troops had been moved in that direction; this may be true, but we must be certain that we are the great object of the movement.

‘ You will have received my letter about the 4th dragoon guards: the remounts for the second division of cavalry will soon join, and will make you tolerably strong in that arm. There is a Portuguese regiment of cavalry in the forts of Elvas, Campo Mayor, &c., of which, of course, you will make use in the neighbourhood of those places.

‘ The Marques de Monsalud tells me, that besides the regiment of Doyle now in Badajoz, he has 1500 men which he is sending into the place, not reckoning a battalion now on its march from Ciudad Rodrigo; so that Badajoz will be very tolerably garrisoned without Morillo’s infantry. It ought to have 5000 men, if it is likely to be attacked; but half the number are sufficient if it is not, which is the case we have to provide for.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th June, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th. When I was in Zealand, I recollect a person by the name of — —, who was afterwards taken prisoner in a Danish privateer; and I saw him in London, and I believe was of use to him. The particular circumstances I do not recollect; but this I do recollect, that he was of no service to us in Zealand.

‘ Foreigners of that description are of no use to me; and I shall be very much obliged to the Government if they should not allow Mr. — to pass through the country to the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General ———.*

‘ à Fuente Guinaldo, ce 12 Juin, 1812.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ J’ai reçu la lettre de votre Excellence du 8. L’armée sous mes ordres passera l’Agueda demain matin et s’avancera sur Salamanca.

‘ Comme le Roi Joseph commande toutes les armées d’Espagne, votre Excellence peut être assurée qu’il ne verra pas écraser le Maréchal Duc de Raguse, si nous sommes les plus forts, sans faire faire un mouvement quelconque en Estremadure par le Maréchal Soult. Je sais, par les lettres interceptées en chiffre, qu’il a ordonné un mouvement par le Maréchal Soult; mais comme je ne peux pas deviner la clef du chiffre, je ne connais pas le mouvement.

‘ Mais quel que soit le mouvement, il est à désirer que les alliés soient en force en Estremadure; et que les troupes soient bien en main. Vous ferez les mouvemens projetés dans votre lettre du 8, ou non, comme il vous plaira; mais vous devez compter que je serai obligé de changer mes dispositions en conséquence de la faiblesse qui en sera la suite en Estremadure.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *General ———.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 12th June, 1812.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter of the 8th, which I have received from the ———, and of my answer.

‘ It appears that that officer, instead of attending to the interesting events likely to occur in this quarter, is desirous of plundering corn and crimping recruits; and the consequence of these advantageous operations will probably be, that Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill will be too weak to hold his ground in Estremadura, and I shall be obliged to evacuate Castille, to go to his assistance.

‘ I have already sent you my letter of the 7th instant to the ———, in which I have advised him not to lose his communication with Sir Rowland Hill.

‘ I have a report that General Ballesteros was defeated on the 1st of June.

‘ I enclose you an extract from the report of the Chief of the Staff of the army of the South, regarding General Ballesteros’ operations. You will see that he is stopped by any thing like a stronghold, however contemptible ; and I beg that you will again recommend to the Government that he should be equipped with only two or three Spanish 16 pounders, to enable him to lay open any place of this kind, in which the enemy’s small posts may take refuge.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 12th June, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from Dr. M’Grigor, containing observations on the mortality in the 7th regiment, and the 40th regiment, in the last year.

‘ I concur with Dr. M’Grigor in deeming it very desirable that the troops and recruits destined for this army, should be sent out in the winter, before the spring equinoctial gales. They should leave England, if possible, with the first easterly wind in December.

‘ The same rule is desirable for the remount horses for the cavalry and artillery. They likewise should arrive before the equinoctial gales in spring ; and the earlier in the winter the better. It is likewise desirable, that whatever transport tonnage there may be, should be allotted for the remount horses of the several regiments, in proportion to the number of horses belonging to each regiment to be sent out.

‘ The horses for all the regiments are not yet arrived in Portugal ; and very few have yet joined any of the regiments.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Guadapero, 13th June, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

Half-past 1 P.M.

‘ I have a letter from Salamanca of the 9th ; there was nothing very particular. Marmont was still there, and had been at Alba, to reconnoitre the position there.

‘ I have sent the orders for the march to be made to-morrow, which was to have been made this day, under the orders of the 11th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cabrillas, 14th June, 1812.

‘ We crossed the Agueda yesterday, and are so far advanced towards Salamanca.

‘ I have received your letters of the 9th and 11th, and I think Zafra as convenient a position, in the view of your former instructions, and more healthy than that which you before occupied. I hope that the Conde de Penne Villemur will not get himself into a scrape.

‘ We have deciphered the letter you sent, and it goes back to you with the key of the cipher. We have got some letters, however, in cipher, which we have not been able to decipher; but as far as I can judge, it appears to me that King Joseph has ordered Soult to send to the Tagus one third of the force under his command, in order to join some other troops to be assembled there, probably belonging to the army of the Centre. I at first thought this assembly was to take place at the bridge of Arzobispo, and that Soult’s troops were to march without cannon; but having seen by a letter of the 12th, received this day from Clementi Pereira, that a body of troops, attended by five boats, had arrived on the 9th at Talavera, and that the troops had moved on to the neighbourhood, and it is probable that the boats will follow, I think that Almaraz will be the point of assembly for these troops, and that they will communicate by the flying bridge to be formed of these boats.

‘ It is most probable, that if Ballesteros has been beaten, which I am afraid is not unlikely, that Soult will, with a part of his army, cover the movement of the third, which are going to the Tagus, and if this is the case, you can do nothing to prevent the movement, but must attend to your own situation; but if Ballesteros has not been much hurt, and the third of Soult’s army should attempt to move through Estremadura alone, you might make their march

very dangerous and difficult; and I shall be obliged to you to attend to it.

‘ I shall hear from you, of course, the extent of the force which the enemy will send this way.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

Cabrillas, 14th June, 1812.  
12 at Noon.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I received last night from General Castaños some very interesting intercepted documents; among others, a return of the 1st of April of the army of Portugal.

‘ The effective fit for duty are 51,492; of which 48,396 are infantry; 3204 are cavalry; 3393 artillery; and the remainder sappers, &c. &c. There are besides about 1500 infantry, and 1000 cavalry, returned on command at Salamanca, Alba, &c., which ought to be added to the present fit for duty, and would make the army 43,800 infantry, and above 4000 cavalry.

‘ Bonet’s division, consisting of 6270 infantry, are in the Asturias. Castaños tells me that the French are about to evacuate Astorga; and he mentions that the Adjutant, who carried there the order, went on to order Bonet likewise to retire from the Asturias. I reckon that he would receive the order about the 9th, and he might be on the Tormes on the 19th or 20th.

‘ The army of Portugal have 98 pieces of cannon; but they are very badly provided with horses, and I see that some of the cannon have been left at Avila, and some at Talavera; and Marmont has ordered that they may be drawn by bullocks to Tordesillas.

‘ I enclose a letter just received from Salamanca, from which you will see that it is reported that Bonet is coming to join the army. It is also said that some of Foy’s troops are about Talavera; but that I do not credit.

‘ Notwithstanding that the enemy is considerably stronger than I believed he was, I propose to continue our movement forward. We shall at least force them to collect their troops and I see by Castaños’ letter, that he is about to move the

army of Galicia, and he has ordered Mendizabal to move all the troops and guerrillas in the north, so as to cut off all Marmont's communications; and if Marmont should detach, or he should not be joined by Bonet, or the whole of all his divisions, or by the division at Valladolid, we shall be superior to him. I have ordered the march for to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ There are in the army of Portugal 7460 sick; and the grand total amounts to 65,597, including 2277 officers and 11,147 horses, including 2593 belonging to officers.’

*To Lieut. General Sir A. Campbell, Kt.*

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 26th May, and this day that of the 3rd June. I am very much obliged to you, and flattered by your having been my proxy at the installation of the Knights of the Bath; and I agree with you in thinking, that I should not have been less happy even if I had seen the dress in which it was intended I should appear.

‘ In regard to the disposal of the money intended for the ball, I beg that you will do as others do; and I enclose an order for £350 sterling.

‘ Affairs appear to be in a strange state in England; however, I trust that at last some Government will be formed. I always detested home politics, and late occurrences have not given me a relish for them.

‘ You will hear of our march here. The French have a fort which I must take, and then we shall see what I can do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir A. Campbell, Kt.*

‘ I have been considering your situation, and your not going to the Isle of France: pray show every desire to go, at all events, by the earliest opportunity; the iron gets cold, and does not work well, if not struck when heated; and if you show a disinclination to go to that situation, a short

turn might be taken, you might be deprived of it, and it would be difficult to obtain for you another.'

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' MY DEAR HILL,

' Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

' I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th. I have never been more annoyed than by ———'s affair, and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of inquiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at every thing, and their galloping back as fast as they gallop on the enemy. They never consider their situation, never think of manœuvring before an enemy—so little that one would think they cannot manœuvre, excepting on Wimbledon Common; and when they use their arm as it ought to be used, viz., offensively, they never keep nor provide for a reserve.

' All cavalry should charge in two lines, of which one should be in reserve; if obliged to charge in one line, part of the line, at least one-third, should be ordered beforehand to pull up, and form in second line, as soon as the charge should be given, and the enemy has been broken and has retired. The Royals and the 3rd dragoon guards were the best régiments in the cavalry in this country, and it annoys me particularly that the misfortune has happened to them. I do not wonder at the French boasting of it; it is the greatest blow they have struck.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General*

' WELLINGTON.

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' We entered this place yesterday. The enemy still hold the fort which they have made, but I hope soon to have them out.'

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

' MY LORD,

' Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

' The army crossed the Agueda on the 13th instant, and marched forward in three columns, the troops under Don Carlos de España forming a fourth; and the whole arrived upon the Valmusa rivulet, about six miles from hence, on

the 16th. The enemy showed some cavalry and a small body of infantry in front of the town on that day, and manifested a design to hold the heights on the south side of the Tormes. But their cavalry were immediately driven in by ours, and the enemy evacuated Salamanca on the night of the 16th, leaving a garrison of about 800 men in the fortifications which they have erected on the ruins of the colleges and convents which they have demolished. By the fire from these they protect the passage of the Tormes by the bridge, and our troops crossed that river yesterday morning, by two fords which are in this neighbourhood.

‘ The forts were immediately invested by the 6th division, under the command of Major General Clinton, and having been accurately reconnoitred it was found necessary to break ground before them. This was done last night, and I hope that we shall commence our fire to-morrow morning from eight pieces of cannon, at the distance of 300 yards from the principal of the enemy’s works, the possession of which will, I hope, give us the possession of the others.

‘ Major General Clinton conducts these operations.

‘ It is impossible to describe the joy of the people of the town upon our entrance. They have now been suffering for more than three years; during which time the French, among other acts of violence and oppression, have destroyed 13 of 25 convents, and 22 of 25 colleges, which existed in this celebrated seat of learning.

‘ The enemy retired by the road to Toro, and their rear guard was about 15 miles from hence last night. They retired again this morning by the same road; and I understand that they intend to collect their army on the Duero, between Toro and Zamora.

‘ Our advanced guard is advanced on the road to Toro, and the main body of the army in this neighbourhood.

‘ I enclose a return of the army of Portugal, of the 1st of April, which has been intercepted, from which it appears that there are at present under arms 2074 officers, and 51,492 troops in this body, of which 43,396 are infantry, and 3204 cavalry. Of the 4244 men returned detached, there are about 1500 infantry and about 1000 cavalry in this neighbourhood, who will of course be called in to join the army.

‘ I enclose the morning state of this army of yesterday, in which I have marked thus \* those troops which are in this part of the country, the others being in Estremadura, under the command of Lieut. General Hill. To these numbers must be added about 3000 Spanish infantry, under Don Carlos de España, and about 500 Spanish cavalry, under Don Julian Sanchez, who are with the army.

‘ This state includes only the cavalry and infantry of the army; but your Lordship will observe that the enemy are superior to us in numbers in those arms; and it appears from the return, that the enemy have 92 pieces of cannon.

‘ I have adopted every measure in my power to prevent the enemy from collecting their forces against us. I have urged the Conde de Amarante to move upon the enemy’s flank from Braganza, along the Douro, with four battalions of militia and three regiments of Portuguese cavalry, under General D’Urban, and to cut off the enemy’s communication between Zamora and Benavente and Astorga. General Castaños has promised me to attack Astorga with the army of Galicia; and I have urged General Mendizabal and the chiefs of the guerrillas in all the northern parts of Spain, to make an effort to prevent Marshal Marmont from collecting his whole force against this army.

‘ But I am apprehensive that I can place no reliance on the effect to be produced by these troops. The guerrillas, although active and willing, and although their operations in general occasion the utmost annoyance to the enemy, are so little disciplined that they can do nothing against the French troops, unless the latter are very inferior in numbers; and if the French take post in house or church, of which they only barricade the entrance, both regular troops and guerrillas are so ill equipped, as military bodies, that the French can remain in security till relieved by a larger body.

‘ Then General Castaños, although I believe he is equipped with a few guns for the attack of Astorga, has no pecuniary resources to enable him to collect and keep together the army of Galicia. And if the enemy should abandon Astorga to its fate, and should withdraw General Bonet from the Asturias, I am very apprehensive that the advantages of my march into Castille will be confined to regaining the

principality of Asturias for General Castaños, and to the little advantages which the guerrillas will derive from the evacuation of different parts of the country by the enemy's posts.

‘Your Lordship will observe from my letter of the 26th ult., that I did not calculate that the enemy's army of Portugal was so strong when I determined upon this expedition, and I had certainly reason to believe that Marshal Marmont would not evacuate the Asturias. I shall not give up the plan, however, unless I should see that success is not to be looked for, as I am convinced that the most advantageous consequences will result from success in this quarter, or even from my remaining in an advanced position in Castille.

‘From intercepted letters between the King and Marshals Soult and Marmont, which however I have not been able entirely to decipher, I judge that the King's plan referred to in my dispatch of the 10th instant, is to collect a corps in the valley of the Tagus, consisting of a part of the army of the South, and a division of the army of the centre, in order to create a diversion in favor of Marshal Marmont. I had requested the Empecinado to alarm the King for the safety of his situation at Madrid; and I hope that Marshal Soult will find ample employment for his troops in the south in the blockade of Cadiz, the continued operations of General Ballesteros, and those in Estremadura of Lieut. General Hill, whose attention I have called to the probable march of this corps of the army of the South through part of Estremadura.

‘The King is very desirous of restoring the bridge of Almaraz, which can only be for the object of collecting a corps upon the Tagus, but hitherto he has sent there only two small boats, for the purpose of communicating with the post at Mirabete.

‘I enclose a letter from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill\*

\* *To General the Earl of Wellington, K.B.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Zafra, 13th June, 1812.

‘I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the copies of reports which I have received from Major General Slade, relative to an affair between two regiments of the brigade of cavalry under his command, and the brigade of French cavalry under General Lallemant, in the neighbourhood of Valencia de las Torres, on the 11th instant. In which, I am sorry to observe, we have

and its enclosures, being two from Major General Slade, giving an account of an affair which he had with the enemy on the 11th instant, in which, owing to the eagerness and impetuosity of the soldiers, considerable loss was sustained.

‘Your Lordship is aware that misfortunes of this kind have happened more than once in this country from the

suffered severely, and have not gained the advantage which might have been expected.

‘Major General Slade had advanced to Llera, and was to have proceeded the following day in the direction of La Granja, to cover a reconnaissance to be made by the Conde de Penne Villemur on that day, from Llerena towards Azuaga.

‘The 17th and 27th dragoons, under Major General Lallemand, which had been stationed in the neighbourhood of Azuaga, had, however, moved at the same time towards Valencia de las Torres, and Major General Slade was induced to bring him to action.

‘While I forward these reports to your Lordship, I shall feel it my duty to cause further inquiry to be made into the circumstances of this affair, and shall have the honor of communicating them to your Lordship.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General

‘R. HILL.

*the Earl of Wellington, K.B.’*

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘Sir,

‘Llera, 11th June, 1812.  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 4 P.M.

‘I beg to have the honor of stating to you that the enemy, whom I reported this morning to have been in Valencia, advanced upon this place about 9 o’clock with the 17th and 27th regiments of dragoons, under General Lallemand. I immediately advanced with the 3rd dragoon guards and Royals, attacked and pursued him nearly three leagues, to within a short distance of Maguilla, when I had an opportunity of charging him again, broke through his first line, and killed a great many; among the numbers are a captain of the 27th dragoons; and we took an aide de camp of General Lallemand prisoner.

‘I am sorry to say our loss was severe, as the enemy brought a support, and my troops being too eager in pursuit, we were obliged to relinquish a great number of prisoners which we had taken, and to fall back on this place.

‘Nothing could exceed the gallantry displayed by both officers and men on the occasion, in which Colonel Sir Granby Calcraft, and Lieut. Colonel Clifton, commanding the two regiments, particularly distinguished themselves, as well as all the officers present.

‘I beg particularly to report the conduct of Brig. Major Radcliffe, to whom I feel extremely indebted for his assistance on this occasion.

‘I have not yet been able to collect the returns, but I am concerned to say, Lieuts. Windsor, of the Royals, and Homewood, of the 3rd dragoon guards, have fallen into the enemy’s hands, the former having his horse shot, and the latter being wounded.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General

‘JOHN SLADE, Major Gen.

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.’*

*Major*

same cause, and I have frequently been present on occasions when the same conduct in the cavalry was likely to be attended by the same unfortunate results. Notwithstanding that this misfortune has occurred upon this occasion to a brigade consisting of two of the best and most experienced regiments we have, I have concurred with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill in thinking that it is necessary to make a formal inquiry into the causes which occasioned the disorder, and the consequent losses in the attack made by Major General Slade on the enemy on the 11th instant. General Slade's action was occasioned by his advancing to Llera, to cover a movement by the Conde de Penne Villemur on Llerena, in order to collect the harvest of Estremadura; and I learn that the enemy have since retired to Cordova.

*Major General Slade to Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

'SIR,

'Camp near Llera, 12th June, 1812.

'In forwarding the enclosed return of the casualties which occurred yesterday, I feel it my duty to state, in addition to what I had the honor of communicating to you before, that our misfortunes arose from too great eagerness and zeal in the pursuit, after having broke the enemy's first line, each regiment vying with each other who should most distinguish itself, which gave him an opportunity of bringing up fresh troops, and of charging us at a time when we were in confusion.

'I beg leave again to repeat, that the exertions of the officers to restore order were conspicuous, but the two regiments having got mixed in the charge, it took some time before this object could be accomplished, during which we lost most of the prisoners we had taken, and suffered, I am grieved to say, severely. It is a satisfaction to me to be able to add, that the enemy lost in killed and wounded, full as much as ourselves, and considered himself completely routed.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General

'JOHN SLADE, Major Genl.

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.'*

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the affair near Maguilla, on the 11th June, 1812.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	—	2	20	6	22
Wounded .	—	—	26	14	26
Missing . . .	2	10	106	127	118

‘ I have reports from the south, stating that General Ballesteros had had an action with the enemy near Bornos, on the 1st instant, of which I have not received the detail, or any regular confirmation, notwithstanding that there is no doubt of the fact. The result has been stated differently by the two parties, and it is reported by the enemy that Ballesteros is badly wounded. But they have certainly reinforced their troops in that direction since the action, from which circumstance it may be inferred that the success, if on their side at all, was not very decisive.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Salamanca, 19th June, 1812.

‘ I return the enclosures in Dom Miguel Forjaz’s note, respecting Senhor Vasconcellos. Neither Sir W. Beresford nor I know any thing about this person, who, I am informed, has been seized by the French. But it is not impossible that this is part of the trick. Austin should seize him, or should get some of the Spanish authorities to seize him, if the French should let him go.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ On the Heights above Aldea Lengua,  
24th June, 1812. Half past 6 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ The enemy have crossed the Tormes in some force, and are skirmishing with General Bock’s brigade of dragoons, which is in front of Calvarrasa de Abaxo.

‘ I have ordered the 7th and 1st divisions to cross the Tormes at the ford of S<sup>ta</sup> Marta ; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order a brigade and a Portuguese regiment of the 6th division to move out of the town, and to cross the Tormes at the ford below S<sup>ta</sup> Marta.

‘ You should send your baggage, except camp kettles, heavy guns and stores, &c., across the Tormes at the ford of El Canto.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



right of that village. I think it advisable, therefore, that if the men of the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions are not cooking, they should move to the ford of S<sup>ta</sup> Marta. If they are cooking, the movement may as well be delayed till they have done, unless I should see reason to make it earlier, of which I will give you notice.

‘ I was just going over to you, but the enemy’s movement prevents it just at present.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ Heights behind Aldea Lengua,  
25th June, 1812. 6 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I am very anxious to have a little conversation with Colonel Burgoyne, Colonel May, and Colonel Dickson, and shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire them to come to me at the village of Cabrerizos as soon as they can.

‘ They can be there, I conclude, by 8 o’clock, when I shall be there; and if I should not be there, I will send word where I may be found.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 16th and 17th, regarding the reforms in the Portuguese navy. It is difficult to say how far they ought to be carried, but if the British Government undertake to protect Portugal from the Barbary powers, I see no reason why they should have any ships in Europe, excepting probably the flotilla on the Guadiana.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You did not enclose in your letter of the 16th the paper regarding the guerrillas taking the stud of brood mares.’

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 17th instant, and although I have but little leisure just at present, I shall not delay to reply to it \*.

‘ The Chevalier de Souza wrote to me some time ago respecting the schemes for establishing a bank in Lisbon, and for lending money on English securities, upon which I gave him my opinion, and he must, I believe, have received it before he sent his plan to Mr. Hamilton. Nothing can be more absurd than all the reasoning respecting the establishment of a bank in Portugal, to be conducted on the principle of the Bank of England. First, the constitution of the country will not allow of such an establishment. Secondly, the military and political situation of the country is such that no man in his senses, whether native or foreigner, who has capital, will lay it out in this or any other scheme, which shall prevent him removing it from the country at a moment’s notice.

‘ People appear to me to be as wild now in their notions of the security of the Portuguese territory, as they were desponding two years ago. But I who, from repeated reflection, must have a tolerably accurate notion of the real state of this country, and those who will be called upon to lay out their capital upon this banking scheme, and know well the relative force of the contending armies in the Peninsula, and the advantages and disadvantages attending each, and particularly those attending the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, will not be so ready as Senhor de Souza (with his 90,000 men) thinks they will, to take their money out of their chests to lodge it in those of the bank, and eventually in those of the Portuguese Treasury.

‘ At this moment the two armies with which the allied armies are engaged, are exactly double the strength in the field, according to the returns, of the allied British and Portuguese armies; and a more serious accident to Ballesteros than that which befell him in the beginning of this month at Bornos (and which it was totally out of my power

\* This letter must have been written whilst the enemy were manœuvring in view.

to prevent) would bring a larger force upon General Hill, and *coute qui coute*, I should be obliged to withdraw into Portugal, and all the prospects of the campaign would vanish.

‘ I have put out of the question the accidents which may happen to General Hill or to me, as what I have above stated is sufficient to show that Portugal, though I trust she will be saved, is not in that state of security in which these visionaries would represent her.

‘ Then in respect to the British funded security for the capital of the bank, the reasoning upon that part of the subject is as fallacious as that upon other points. We are to collect in England the Portuguese duties upon wines exported from Portugal to England. The first question upon which I am not informed is, whether the existence of these duties is conformable to the treaty? The rest is referable to that part of the subject already discussed. Will Great Britain guarantee to the bank subscribers their capital whether Portugal is lost or saved? If that country should be lost, I believe it will be found that the new possessors will understand the mode of levying a duty upon the export of wine as well as the old; and will the British Government make the people of Great Britain pay, in the price of their port wine, the two duties, viz., the existing one for the benefit of the capitalists of the bank, and the new one for the benefit of the usurping Government?

‘ However, I acknowledge that if all these difficulties could be overcome, the plan for establishing a bank, even with the views detailed in the project, would not be the most beneficial mode in which Great Britain could employ her credit for the advantage of Portugal.

‘ All the other plans considered in the papers which you enclosed, are mere spendthrift schemes for borrowing money on English security, to make up the deficit of the revenues of this country to defray the expenses of the war; which schemes, even if the King’s Government could be brought to listen to them, would fail, owing to the absolute impracticability of procuring specie in the Peninsula, or in England to send to the Peninsula, or of taking from the military chest, for the service of Portugal, more specie than is already given in subsidy.

‘ I have been uniform, and, I believe, correct, in my opinions upon this subject. When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its Government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by performing their engagements in respect to their debts. This is what I have invariably recommended to the Portuguese Government, and if they had attended to my recommendations, instead of flattering themselves with idle hopes of loans to be raised from England, the deficit in the revenue for the great war expenditure of last year, which I calculate at 15 millions of cruzados, would have been covered. I do not ask for new taxes: on the contrary, I would repeal many; but I want a real and fair collection of those which should be allowed to exist. This is the only measure which can relieve Portugal and us; and it is that one of which we ought not to lose sight for one moment.

‘ Honesty in the payment of debts has likewise been attended to. After a great deal of trouble and discussion I, at last, *forced* the Portuguese Government to pay the interest on the paper money in circulation, and on the apolices grandes, by giving notice that I would order the Commissary General to take no more in payment of his bills on the Treasury, if the measure was not adopted. In the mean time the Government jobbed the question of the interest on the apolices.

‘ There is no doubt but that the payment of the interest has had a most material effect in restoring the credit of the paper money securities, notwithstanding that their nominal value in the market has not been materially altered. But let it be recollected that when this measure was adopted we had in the chest nearly £500,000 in paper money, which had accumulated there, and of which we could not dispose; and that we have never more now than the sum received in the month for bills, and that we experience no difficulty in disposing of the paper money to make our payments, particularly in the capital and large towns; and it will be seen that the measure has had a very important effect.

‘ I beg to refer to the calculations in England, regarding the value of bank notes in reference to gold and silver, and

to compare the result with the existing paper money in Portugal, which, till the interest was paid, depended for its existence solely upon its being taken by the Commissary General in payment for bills upon the Treasury; and I believe it will be found that the difference in current value, in reference to gold and silver, is but trifling, while the English bank note, as security, is infinitely superior to the Portuguese paper money.

‘I believe I have now considered all ———’s financial schemes for Portugal, excepting the commissariat notes, and the recoinage of silver from dollars to *cruzados*.

‘Your reasoning upon the commissariat notes is undeniable. The bills drawn upon the Commissary General by his deputies, in payment of supplies, and by him on his deputies at Lisbon, are not very good paper; and I believe that a great deal of money is made by the traffic in them by the *sharks* residing in Lisbon, and other large towns, principally Englishmen, at the expense of the people who furnish supplies, and not improbably at the expense of the public. I have endeavored to prevent these gains, though I fear with but little success; but we may depend upon it that the commissariat notes would be as low in value comparatively with money as the commissariat bills, and it would be totally out of my power to apply a remedy.

‘The other scheme of ——— is, in my opinion, very objectionable. A new cruzado, *cruzado novo*, as it is called, is current for 8 per cent. more than the value of the silver it contains in reference to dollars, and we should gain 8 per cent. by this recoinage. The new cruzado being current at Lisbon principally, it is possible that we should gain this 8 per cent. on all our payments there; but even this is not certain, as we may depend upon it that foreigners, Americans particularly, and our own merchants, from whom we should purchase any thing, would add the 8 per cent., which they would lose on the coin in which we should pay them, on the price of the article which we should purchase from them. But this is not all. The operations in the expenditure of the British army are not confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal. How would the cruzades pass in Spain? Not at all. And we should thus suffer the greatest inconvenience from a scheme, at best, not very worthy of the British Government.

‘ Upon the whole I am convinced that the only measure to be adopted to relieve the Portuguese from their financial difficulties, is never to cease urging them to discontinue all their useless expenses and establishments, and to set to work in earnest to reform the gross abuses which exist in the collection of their revenue.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

*Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

‘ Marshal Marmont collected his army on the Duero between the 16th and 19th instant, with the exception of General Bonet’s division, which I believe is still in the Asturias, and some small garrisons, and he moved forward from Fuente el Saucedo on the 20th. I formed the allied army, with the exception of the troops engaged in the operations against the forts at Salamanca, on the heights extending from the neighbourhood of Villares to Morisco; and the advanced posts of the cavalry and infantry retired upon the army in good order, and without material loss. The enemy remained in our front on that night, and during the 21st; and during that night they established a post on our right flank, the possession of which by them, deprived us of an advantage which might eventually be of importance; I therefore requested Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham to attack them in that post on the 22nd with the troops on the right, which he did with those of the 7th division, which were the reserve of the right, under the command of Major General Hope and Major General de Bernewitz. The enemy were driven from the ground immediately, with some loss. Our troops conducted themselves remarkably well in this affair, which took place in the view of every man of both armies. The enemy retired during that night; and on the following evening, they posted themselves with their right on the heights near Cabeza Velloza, and their left on the Tormes, at Huerta; their centre at Alda Rubia.

‘ The object of the enemy in this movement being to endeavor to communicate with the garrisons in the posts of

Salamanca, by the left of the Tormes, I changed the front of the army, and placed the right at S<sup>ta</sup> Marta, where there is a ford over the Tormes ; and the advanced posts at Aldea Lengua ; and I extended the troops so as to cover Salamanca completely, while I had it in my power to concentrate the army at any point at a short notice.

‘ I sent Major General Bock’s brigade of heavy dragoons across the Tormes, in order to observe the passages of that river. The enemy crossed the Tormes at Huerta, about two o’clock on the morning of the 24th, in considerable numbers of cavalry, infantry, and artillery ; and there was every appearance of a general movement in that direction. The conduct of Major General Bock’s dragoons was conspicuously good upon this occasion. They did every thing in their power to make known the enemy’s movement ; and opposed their advance vigorously under many disadvantages, in order to afford time for the dispositions necessary to be made upon this occasion. As soon as I was certain that the enemy had crossed the Tormes, I requested Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham to cross that river with the 1st and 7th divisions, and I sent over Major General Le Marchant’s brigade of cavalry ; and I concentrated the remainder of the army between Morisco and Cabrerizos, keeping the advanced posts still at Aldea Lengua. At about noon, the enemy advanced as far as Calvarrasa de Abaxo ; but observing the disposition made for their reception, they retired again in the afternoon across the Tormes to Huerta ; and they have since remained in the position which they occupied on the 23rd.

‘ Between the 20th and 22nd, I had a favorable opportunity of attacking the enemy, of which, however, I did not think it proper to avail myself, for the following reasons. First ; it was probable he had advanced with an intention to attack us, and in the position which we occupied, I considered it advantageous to be attacked ; and that the action would be attended by less loss on our side.

‘ Secondly ; the operations against the forts of Salamanca took up the attention of some of our troops ; and although I believe the superiority of numbers in the field was on our side, the superiority was not so great as to render an action decisive of the result of the campaign, in which we should sustain great loss.

Thirdly ; in case of failure, the passage of the Tormes would have been difficult, the enemy continuing in the possession of the forts, and commanding the bridge of Salamanca.

‘ The siege of the forts of Salamanca has not advanced with the rapidity which I expected when I addressed your Lordship last. Although, from the pains taken, and the expense incurred in their construction, and the accounts which I had received of them, I was prepared to meet with some difficulties, and provided an equipment accordingly ; the difficulties are of a more formidable nature than they were represented ; and the forts, three in number, each defending the other, are very strong, although not of a regular construction, and the equipment which I had provided for their attack was not sufficient ; and I have been obliged to send for more, which has created some delay in the operations.

‘ We have breaches open in the Convent of San Vicente, which is the principal convent ; but these cannot be attacked in security till we shall have possession of Fort Los Cayetanos. Major General Clinton made an attempt to carry that work by storm on the night of the 23rd inst., the gorge having been considerably damaged by the fire of our artillery. This attempt unfortunately failed ; and I am concerned to add, that Major General Bowes was killed. He was so eager for the success of the enterprise, that he had gone forward with the storming party, which consisted of a part of his brigade, and was wounded ; and after his first wound was dressed, he returned again to the attack, and received a second wound, which killed him. Our loss in officers and men was likewise considerable.

‘ I expect that every thing that is necessary to get the better of these forts will arrive to-morrow, and that I shall soon have the happiness of reporting that they are in our possession.

‘ We have discovered the cipher in which King Joseph wrote his orders to General Drouet in regard to his operations against Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, which were to move upon the allied troops in Estremadura. Your Lordship will observe from my dispatch of the 10th instant, that I had left Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill in strength, and I

have desired him to collect his troops in the position of Albuera, which is the best in the country ; and to act according to circumstances, and to the movements, of the enemy. By a letter from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill of the 22nd, I learn that General Drouet had been considerably reinforced from Andalusia since the defeat of General Ballesteros at Bornos, in the beginning of the month, and had advanced as far as Almendralejo and Villa Franca ; and Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill had concentrated his troops at Albuera. He had not decided whether he should attack Drouet or not, and he delayed the decision only because he was not quite certain of his strength.

‘ General Ballesteros had sustained a severe loss in his action at Bornos on the 1st of June ; and I understand that he retired to the neighbourhood of Gibraltar.

‘ In the north, General Santocildes, under the direction of General Castaños, has invested Astorga with the Galician army, and is about to attack that place ; in which operation I imagine that he cannot be interrupted, as the whole of the enemy’s army, excepting General Bonet’s division in Asturias, is employed against that under my command.

‘ The guerrillas are in unmolested possession of all parts of the country ; and the enemy’s weak and scattered garrisons are cut off from all communication with each other, or with the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I enclose returns of the killed, wounded and missing, from the 17th to the 24th June inclusive.’ (*Included in the general return at p. 264.*)

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

‘ I enclose several letters in a cipher which we cannot discover, and it is very important that an endeavor should be made to discover it in London. It is the same cipher as is used by the Emperor’s Ministers, and the discovery of the key, therefore, may be important for other objects as well as for our operations.

‘ Matters have not gone on as I could wish at Salamanca ;

but the truth is that my attention has been so much and so constantly taken up with Marmont's movements and my own, that I have not been able to attend to the operations of the siege as I ought.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose the last morning state.’

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cabrerizos, 26th June, 1812. 2 P.M.

‘ I enclose a letter which I received from Lieut. Colonel May on my return here.

‘ I conclude that you have stopped the firing for this day, and I recommend the following preparatory measures to be adopted for an attack to-morrow.

‘ First. The batteries to be all repaired.

‘ Secondly. The approach to be continued as far on as may be possible.

‘ Thirdly. The new approach to be made from which Colonel Burgoyne proposed to mine Los Cayetanos.

‘ Fourthly. Two 24 pound carronades to be in readiness in No. 2, to fire red-hot shot upon those parts of the convent already breached, the roofs, &c. I am not certain that it would not be most convenient to make the attack by daylight, and the shot would be ready to be fired so that the building may be on fire when the attack is made on Los Cayetanos.

‘ Fifthly. Two 24 pound howitzers, with Shrapnell's or common shells, to be placed in the new redoubt, to fire along that part of the exterior work from which the enemy can annoy the assailants of Los Cayetanos.

‘ Sixthly. I wish that this evening or to-morrow morning, you would ride to the left of the Tormes, and look at the ground on which the Ice House stands. I think that guns placed at a low stone wall on the top of that hill would see the reverse of some of the works from which the enemy could annoy the assailants of Los Cayetanos; and if this be true, send over to that point two guns and one howitzer, or three guns of the brigade attached to the 6th division, in order to perform this service during the attack. They must be con-

ceased till the attack shall commence. Take one of the artillery officers with you.

‘Seventhly. Let some of the ladders be carried forward into the trenches before daylight in the morning.

‘Eighthly. Let the ground be well examined on which parties may be posted to keep up a warm fire of musketry on the parapets of Los Cayetanos, and on the works of San Vicente by which Los Cayetanos is defended, during the time the attack is going on, and let a calculation be made of the number of men each of them will contain.

‘I shall be with you to-morrow if I can.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General H. Clinton.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Salamanca, 26th June, 1812.

‘I enclose my last dispatches. The armies are about five miles distant from each other. Marmont will not attack us, and I doubt whether I can attack him, even when I shall have taken the Salamanca forts. At all events, not before we shall have succeeded in that enterprise.

‘In answer to your letter of the 9th and 10th, I have to tell you, that I do not yet know that I shall have demands upon me for more than Don Carlos’ troops, although I think it probable I shall for the troops in Galicia, from Castaños and from Monsalud, for the troops in Estremadura. You had better, therefore, keep the sum you propose, £370,000, disposable.

‘I can give caps and shoes to Doyle’s regiment, but I have not great coats, knapsacks, or canteens. I shall desire Monsalud to supply them with caps and shoes from those I send to him.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘The Right Hon.

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Salamanca, 28th June, 1812.

‘We took the forts of this place yesterday, two of them by storm, and the third by capitulation. It was stormed,

however, at the very moment it capitulated. Marmont has retired, and we march forward to-morrow.

‘ If you should find that Drouet separates his troops, or if he pretends to hold you in check with a smaller body of men than you think you can get the better of, fall upon him, but take care in doing so to keep a very large proportion of your troops in reserve.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Since writing this letter, I have received yours of the 25th. Fall upon the enemy if you can with advantage. I should prefer a partial affair to a general one; but risk a general affair, keeping always a very large body in reserve, particularly of cavalry, rather than allow Drouet to remain in possession of Estremadura, and to keep you in check.

‘ Be assured of the correctness of the return of the 1st April, allowing always for the battalions known to be taken or absent.’

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

Half past 7 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ From all that I can learn, the greatest part of the enemy’s army are at Alaejos and La Nava. One division has certainly gone to Toro, I believe the first; and I have a report that they marched last night at 12 against Silveira. We warned him, however, of their movement towards the Duero three days ago, and I hope he will be safe.

‘ I propose to move to-morrow upon Alaejos.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th. I see no reason to alter the opinion which I formed, that it is desirable to Portugal that the Prince Regent should return to his European dominions, even to Lisbon.

‘ I do not see what assistance it is proposed by Mr. Vansittart’s memorandum to give. This appears to me to contain only another proposal for a bank, and new plans for paying or rather securing old debts; but none to relieve present difficulties.

‘ I shall object to every plan which is to fall upon the military chest of this army. We are not able to answer the demands upon us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I do not know where the writer of Lord Castlereagh’s memorandum found that I had increased the embodied militia from 15,000 to 40,000 for the defence of the frontiers. I recollect desiring that the militia of Silveira, which were embodied; of Trant, which, I believe, were not; and of Wilson, part of which were embodied, might be embodied and moved into Beira, in case the enemy crossed the Agueda in March, when I went to the siege of Badajoz. I never heard it pretended that this militia were 12,000, but the Secretary of State has them as 25,000! I suppose in the same manner as Senhor de Souza has the army as 90,000. To serve this country and Great Britain really becomes too heavy a task.’

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS, ‘ Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th May, regarding Major Macleod. He is a very fine young man, for whom I entertain a very great respect and regard, and he conducted himself remarkably well in the siege of Badajoz, and was very useful in the preparations for that operation; and I think it not improbable that if he had not been wounded early in the siege, I should have had an opportunity of mentioning him in such a manner as that His Royal Highness would have thought proper to promote him, as well as others who were promoted on the same occasion.

‘ The question is, whether I ought now to recommend him for promotion, and I will acknowledge that I feel a great bias in his favor, not only on his own account, but on account

of his brother. But I do not think I ought to do so. Major Macleod is junior to many, even in his own corps, who have not been promoted, whose merit is distinguished, and who would complain, with reason, of injustice and partiality, if he were preferred to them upon the occasion of the siege of Badajoz at this late date.

‘ I hope that he will soon recover and return to us ; and you may depend upon it that there is no person more anxious for an opportunity of recommending his advancement than I am.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

‘ The ammunition to enable us to carry on the attack of the forts having arrived at Salamanca in the afternoon of the 26th, the fire was immediately recommenced upon the gorge of the redoubt of Los Cayetanos, in which a practicable breach was effected at about ten o’clock in the morning of the 27th; and we had succeeded nearly about the same time in setting fire to the buildings in the large fort of San Vicente, by the fire from which the approach to Los Cayetanos by its gorge was defended.

‘ Being in Salamanca at this moment, I gave directions that the forts of Los Cayetanos and La Merced should be stormed ; but some little delay occurred in consequence of the commanding officer of these forts in the first instance, and afterwards the commanding officer of San Vicente, having expressed a desire to capitulate after the lapse of a certain number of hours.

‘ As it was obvious that these propositions were made in order to gain time till the fire in San Vicente should be extinguished, I refused to listen to any terms, unless the forts should be instantly surrendered ; and having found that the commanding officer of Los Cayetanos, who was the first to offer to surrender, was entirely dependent upon the Governor of San Vicente, and could not venture to carry into execution the capitulation which he had offered to make, I gave directions that his fort and that of La Merced might be stormed forthwith.

‘ These operations were effected in the most gallant manner by a detachment of the 6th division, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Davis of the 36th regiment, under the direction of Major General Clinton.

‘ The troops entered the fort of Los Cayetanos by the gorge, and escalated that of La Merced ; and I am happy to add that our loss was but trifling.

‘ The Governor of San Vicente then sent out a flag of truce to ratify the surrender of that fort on the terms I had offered him, viz., the garrison to march out with the honors of war ; to be prisoners of war, and the officers to retain their personal military baggage ; and the soldiers their knapsacks : and notwithstanding that the 9th regiment of caçadores had actually stormed one of the outworks of San Vicente, and were in possession of it, I deemed it expedient to accept the fort by capitulation on those terms, and to stop the attack. I have already informed your Lordship that Major General Clinton commanded the attack against these forts, which was carried on with great vigor and ability ; and he mentions in strong terms of commendation the conduct of the General officers, officers, and troops employed under his command ; particularly Colonel Hinde of the 32nd regiment, Lieut. Colonel Davis of the 36th regiment, Captain Owen of the 61st regiment, Brigade Major Hobart, and Ensign Newton of the 32nd regiment, who distinguished himself in the attack of the night of the 23rd instant, and volunteered to lead the advanced party in the attack of the 27th.

‘ He likewise mentions in strong terms Lieut. Colonel May, who commanded the artillery under the direction of Colonel Framingham, and the officers and soldiers of the Royal Portuguese Artillery under his command, and Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne, Lieut. Reid and the officers of the Engineers, and Major Thompson of the 74th regiment, who acted as an engineer during these operations.

‘ The enemy had been employed for nearly three years in constructing these works, but with increased activity for the last eight or nine months. A large expense had been incurred ; and these works, sufficiently garrisoned by about 800 men, and armed with 30 pieces of artillery, were of a nature to render it quite impossible to take them, excepting

by a regular attack ; and it is obvious that the enemy relied upon their strength, and upon their being sufficiently garrisoned and armed ; as they had left in San Vicente large depôts of clothing, and military stores of every description.

‘ I was mistaken in my estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue these forts ; and I was obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition. This necessity occasioned a delay of six days.

‘ The enemy withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes as soon as they heard of the fall of the forts of Salamanca ; and I have ordered that the works at both places may be destroyed.

‘ The operations against the forts of Salamanca were carried on in sight of Marshal Marmont’s army, which remained in its position with the right at Cabeza Velloso, and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th instant, when they broke up, and retired in three columns towards the river Duero ; one of them directing its march upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas.

‘ The allied army broke up the following day, and are this day encamped upon the Guareña.

‘ We have various reports of reinforcements on their march to join the enemy, but none on which I can rely. I know from intercepted letters, that Marshal Marmont expects to be joined by a division of the army of the North, reported to have been at Burgos on the 24th ; and it is reported that General Bonet had withdrawn from the Asturias by San Andres, and was on his march likewise for the same purpose. It is also reported that General Bonet had received a check in the Asturias, and had sustained the loss of a considerable number of men. If this last report be true, it will account for his withdrawing from the Asturias ; in which province I have reason to believe, from the intercepted letters, that he had been ordered to maintain himself ; and that these orders had proceeded from Paris.

‘ By accounts from Estremadura of the 26th instant, it appears that the enemy still continued in the position which they had occupied in Estremadura ; and Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill was in front of Albuera. It is obvious that they do not intend to attack him, and I have recommended to him to attack them, if he should deem his force suffi-

ciently strong, and of a sufficiently good description to give a fair chance of success, rather than allow them to keep him in check, and to remain in possession of a large part of the province of Estremadura.

‘ I have not yet heard that General Santocildes has commenced his attack upon Astorga. General Cabrera is at Benavente with his division ; and I understand there are Spanish troops in Leon.

‘ The Conde de Amarante has his infantry at Carvajales, and Brig. General D’Urban had crossed the Duero below Zamora, in order to aid in intercepting the enemy’s communication with Toro, before he heard of the fall of Salamanca. I have now desired him, however, to return across the Duero.

‘ I have received no late intelligence from the south.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose a return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army since my last dispatch.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the Forts of San Vicente, Los Cayelanos, and La Merced, and in the position on the heights of Villares, from the 16th to the 27th June, 1812, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	6	5	104	28	115
Wounded . .	28	44	340	—	412
Missing . . .	2	—	11	5	13

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

‘ I omitted to report to your Lordship in my last dispatch the particulars of a very gallant affair of the cavalry in Es-

tremadura, under the command of Lieut. Strenuwitz, the aide de camp of Lieut. General Sir William Erskine. Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill having learnt that the enemy had left at Maguilla a great proportion of the soldiers who had been taken prisoners in Major General Slade's affair of the 11th instant, sent Lieut. Strenuwitz on the 13th with a detachment consisting of 50 men of the 3rd dragoon guards and Royal dragoons under the command of Lieut. Bridges of the Royal dragoons, to bring them in: on his arrival there, he found a detachment of French dragoons, consisting of 80 men, whom he attacked with such conduct and effect, as to kill many, and to take prisoners one officer, 20 men, and 25 horses, with the loss of one man of his detachment killed.

‘ I have frequently had occasion to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. Strenuwitz, and I am happy to have this fresh opportunity of doing so.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 4th of June, in regard to the proposed alteration of the certificates intended to be granted for money expected to be borrowed in this country.

‘ I beg leave to remind your Lordship that it is intended to note the payment of each half year's interest at the back of the certificate, so that it would not be possible for the holder to receive his interest both at head quarters and at Lisbon.

‘ In regard to the other objection to the proposed alteration, viz., that it would be necessary to be prepared with money to pay the interest both at head quarters and at Lisbon, I have to observe that there would be no difficulty in settling with each holder of a certificate at what place the interest should be paid, even though the certificate should be drawn as I had proposed it should be altered.

‘ It is desirable that there should be a place fixed at which the interest should be paid besides the head quarters

of the army, in case the army should be withdrawn from the Peninsula.

‘ It is not probable that either the Treasury or the military chest of the army would be called on to pay, within ten days, the whole amount of the sum of £500,000 sterling, to which the grant of these certificates is limited.

‘ I am quite convinced that I shall never be able to impress on the minds of the people of this country, from whom I expected to derive some resources by the grant of these certificates, that they have any security for their money, if it is to be optional with the British authorities whether they are to be paid in the Peninsula or in England by bills, valuing the dollar at five shillings.

‘ None of these people can know the value of five shillings relatively with a dollar, or any other coin with which they are acquainted, and they will certainly lend nothing upon such a security. I do not propose, therefore, to make any use of these certificates.

‘ At the same time I beg leave to point out to your Lordship how impossible it is to expect that this or any other army can carry on operations in Spain so ill supplied, as this is, with money. We can get nothing from the country without payment in ready money, and every day’s march increases our distance from our magazines and the difficulty of communicating with them. The troops are four months in arrears of pay; the Staff of the army six months; and the muleteers nearly twelve months; and we are in debt for every article of supply, of every description.

‘ I beg your Lordship to advert to the impossibility of remaining any length of time in the forward position which our successes have enabled us to assume, and to reflect upon the consequences which, under these circumstances, would result from any misfortune.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, Bart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Alaejos, 1st July, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 13th of May, and I have received one of the 20th of that month from Lieut. General Lord William

Bentinck, from which I learn that his Lordship was about to detach to Mahon a force under the command of Lieut. General Maitland, which, however, was not of the strength which his Lordship had at first expected he should be able to detach.

‘ It is probable that this force will be by this time at Mahon, and that it will have been met at that post by the equipments and stores which I had sent from this country to Gibraltar, with a request to the Governor to have them repaired and put in order there (of which there is a general enumeration in the margin); and by four companies of British and Portuguese artillery, engineer officers, artificers, &c., who have likewise sailed to Gibraltar from Lisbon.

‘ I trust also that the transports for the conveyance of the Spanish troops to their destination will have arrived at Alicante and in Majorca, and that Lieut. General Maitland will find every thing prepared to enable him to commence his operations.

‘ In regard to the plan of those operations, I still entertain the opinion which I did at first, viz., that the force is not sufficient to attack Barcelona; and that its first object should be to obtain possession of Tarragona, in order to secure the possession of a secure point of communication between the fleets under the command of your Excellency and the army in Catalonia. It is my opinion that that is all which our troops will be able to effect in Catalonia, and the rest of the plan of the Baron d’Eroles, or of any other plan of internal warfare in that country, ought to be left to General Lacy and the troops under his command.

‘ But I think, that as soon as Tarragona shall be in our possession, and such temporary repairs shall have been given to the works as will secure them from a *coup de main*, and measures adopted for those repairs being effectually carried into execution, that part of the force, consisting of the troops from Sicily, Portugal, Majorca, and Alicante, ought to be reinbarked, and proceed to make an attack upon the city of Valencia.

‘ Your Excellency will observe that I was always of opinion that this was the next object to the establishment of the communication by Tarragona, and circumstances have come to my knowledge lately which prove in the clearest

manner that no blow could be so fatal to the interests of the French, or of King Joseph, as to deprive them of this city, and to renew the war in the kingdom of Valencia; and that no diversion, whether in Catalonia, Aragon, or elsewhere, will have the effect of inducing the enemy to relinquish, or will deprive them of their possession of that kingdom and its resources. It must be done, therefore, by a direct attack; and if the attack should first be made upon Tarragona, and the secret of the future plan of the operations of the allied forces is well kept, I entertain no doubt of success.

‘It would doubtless be a great object that Valencia should afterwards be kept, and that the allied force, under Lieut. General Maitland, should be the foundation of our system for maintaining the war in the kingdom of Valencia and the eastern coast of the Peninsula, upon which points I shall communicate to your Excellency and General Maitland my opinion hereafter, if I should find that the plan which I have above proposed is adopted, and if it should be decided that the force under Lieut. General Maitland is to remain in the Peninsula during the winter.

‘After I wrote to your Excellency on the 16th of April, I crossed the Tagus with the army, in order to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, which was effected by the enemy retiring across the Agueda in front of our army on the 24th of that month. It was necessary then to provide for the subsistence of the garrison of that place for some time in advance, and by the time that object was effected, the season was so far advanced, that it was too late for our operations in the southern parts of the Peninsula.

‘I therefore determined to direct them to this quarter; and in the mean time Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill struck a very brilliant and important blow on the enemy’s bridge and establishments on the Tagus, at Almaraz, whereby the direct communication between their northern and southern armies was cut off.

‘We crossed the Agueda on the 13th of June, near Ciudad Rodrigo, and invested the forts which the enemy had constructed at Salamanca, on the 17th; and we took two of them by assault, and one by capitulation, on the 27th, in the presence of the enemy’s whole army.

‘ They retired on the following day towards the Duero, and we have followed them to this point. We hear of their expecting reinforcements, but I have no accounts of any on which I can rely; and, upon the whole, it appears to me that they are as determined as I am not to fight an action in a disadvantageous situation.

‘ From this outline of the state of affairs on this side of the Peninsula your Excellency will see what an important part the forces on the eastern side of the Peninsula have to perform.

‘ I request your Excellency to communicate this letter to Lieut. General Maitland, who, I conclude, will be near you when you will receive it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir E. Pellew, Bart.*

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ Villa Verde, 3rd July, 1812.

Half past 5 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I returned here about an hour ago, and received your letter of this day. I have for some time past been apprehensive that you would be under the necessity of confining yourself, in order to apply the remedies which may be necessary for your eye; but I cannot avoid feeling the utmost concern that this necessity should have become urgent at the present moment, and that I should now be deprived of your valuable assistance. I must, however, make up my mind to this loss; as, from what I have heard, I am apprehensive that no time is to be lost in applying the remedies to your eye, which are most likely to recover it.

‘ I made our light infantry (the 60th) pass the Duero this day under the fire of our cannon, and I left them on the right of the river this afternoon, notwithstanding the enemy’s fire. We had nobody hurt. The enemy, about eight battalions, took post on a height about a mile or more from the river, there being a plain between them and the river. I think we could have dislodged them; but it would have answered no purpose. The enemy are too near for us to keep the post, unless we should pass over the whole army; which it would not be desirable to do, till we shall have found at least one more passage for infantry. I have heard

of another at Castro Nuño, which I have sent officers to look at.

‘ I rather think, from the reports of this morning from the outposts, that Marmont is about to move to his left. But it is impossible to say, as he changes his determination every hour. The infantry certainly moved in that direction this morning; but Stanhope\* tells me, that upon the firing being heard, some were sent towards Pollos, who afterwards returned.

‘ It appears certain that Marmont will not risk an action unless he should have an advantage; and I shall certainly not risk one unless I should have an advantage; and matters therefore do not appear likely to be brought to that criterion very soon. I am anxious to find passages of the Duero, in order to be able to take advantage of his detaching troops to look for provisions, &c.; and I wish to get him to abandon Tordesillas, or to destroy the bridge at that place. The possession of that place and its bridge give him great advantages. It is as near Salamanca almost as Toro, and nearer than Zamora; and we cannot move to the right or left without exposing our communications, so long as he has that bridge. I hope, however, to induce him to abandon it.

‘ I am afraid that the 1st, 7th, and 4th divisions are encamped in an unwholesome situation, and I have desired De Lancey to write to have the two former at least encamped at Medina del Campo, getting their water from the wells of the town; and the latter I proposed to bring towards the centre at Foncastin. We wait for the report on the lower part of the Zapardiel, before the distribution is made.

‘ I propose to go to Rueda in the morning, to look more accurately at the ground in front of the bridge than I could yesterday; and I propose to establish head quarters there in order to be more in the way. I will call upon you in my way.

‘ I have no news whatever from the army of Galicia, or from D’Urban, since the 30th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

\* Captain the Hon. James Stanhope (brother of the present Earl Stanhope), aide de camp to Sir Thomas Graham.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Rueda, 4th July, 1812. 9 P.M.

‘ I have not yet received such accounts of the fords as to enable me to arrange a plan for the attack of the enemy’s detachment opposite Pollos. The upper fords will certainly not answer.

‘ The enemy have shown a small detachment (150 men) at Valdestillas this day, which I imagine must have come from some of the garrisons. Sir Stapleton tells me this evening that the troops which marched yesterday to Valladolid, have returned; but he does not say to what place; probably to Simancas.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marmont to Drouet, of which I have the three copies. It appears that Bonet was at Aguilar de Campo\*; which I take to be two long marches from Valladolid.

‘ I have written to Admiral Martin to request him to send a vessel to Oporto to take you home; and to write to you to Oporto under cover to Governor Trant, to let you know on what day the vessel will have left the Tagus. As the post is not yet regularly established, and has not come in lately with regularity, I send this letter by a messenger.

‘ Wishing you a pleasant journey, and the early recovery of your sight,

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Rueda, 4th July, 1812.

‘ I received this day by Colonel Gordon, your letter of the 16th June; and I assure you, that the arrangement by which you have been placed at the head of the War Department is perfectly satisfactory to me; and you will find that I shall correspond with you with the same freedom and confidence as I have with your predecessors.

\* There is Aguilar de Campos, ten leagues from Valladolid, north east from Medina de Rio Seco. Aguilar de Campo on the Pisuerga, in the province of Palencia, where General Bonet appears to have been, is twenty-three leagues north from Valladolid.

‘ You will be apprized of the state of affairs here, by my late letters to Lord Liverpool. Our principal and great want is money, with which I am afraid you cannot supply us sufficiently. But we are really in terrible distress; I am afraid, in greater distress than any British army has ever felt.

‘ I hope that I am strong enough for Marmont at present, whatever force he may bring from the Asturias or the army of the North; but I am anxious to get Castaños’ Galician corps forward, in order to establish myself well upon the Duero. If we cannot effect that object, we may be obliged to fall back.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To — —.

‘ MY DEAR — —,

‘ Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

‘ At a time when I have other important subjects to think of, it is very unpleasant to me to be obliged to write to you on the conduct of Captain — — towards Mr. \*\*\*\* and Mr. . . . , of the Commissariat.

‘ It appears that Mr. . . . having refused to issue rations twice in one day to Captain — —’s servants, was sent for by Captain — —; and being then employed by Mr. \*\*\*\*, this gentleman desired that Captain — — might be informed he could not then attend him. Captain — — then went to Mr. \*\*\*\*’s department, and in presence of Mr. \*\*\*\*, put Mr. . . . in arrest for not attending him, notwithstanding that Mr. \*\*\*\* assured him that Mr. . . . was actually employed by him in the public service.

‘ The Commissariat is a public department, under the particular charge and direction of the Commissary General and his officers; and no officer of the army, be his rank what it may, has a right as a matter of course to interfere in its duties. I do not mean to say that the General Officers and their Staff are not to superintend the performance of their duties by the officers of all the departments of the army attached to the particular division of troops placed under their command; but the duty of a General and his Staff in respect to these departments is confined to superintendence; he cannot give directions, because he is not responsible for

the performance of the duty of the department; and when his interference goes beyond superintendence, he is liable to be thrown upon his own justification.

‘ Now if the conduct of Captain —— is tried by this plain and simple rule, he will be found highly deserving of blame. I know of no right that Captain —— had to order the attendance of Mr. . . . to give an account why rations had not been issued to his servants. If he has that right, every officer in the division has the same; and if all are to exercise it, and all are to call for Mr. . . .’s attendance when they please, what is to become of the issues to the division? It is clear that he had no such right; and it follows of course, that he exceeded his authority when he placed Mr. . . . in arrest for not obeying this improper command to attend him.

‘ But this is not all. He went to the Commissariat, and in presence of the Deputy Commissary General, who ordered Mr. . . . not to attend him, placed Mr. . . . in arrest. There is certainly no relation of rank between the officers of the Commissariat and the officers of the army; but (putting out of the question the unmanly proceeding of putting in arrest a clerk, who it appeared had acted, and was acting under the orders of his immediate principal) it was a most irregular proceeding to put him in arrest in the presence of his principal of the rank of Deputy Commissary General, who very properly, in my opinion, ordered him out of arrest.

‘ I am very much concerned to be obliged to do any thing unpleasant to Captain ——, who is an officer for whom I entertain a very high respect; but his conduct has been of such an improper description on this occasion, that if he does not make an apology for it, I must remove him from his situation on the staff, and send him to join his regiment.

‘ I enclose you Mr. \*\*\*\*’s report on this transaction; and I am sorry to say that I differ with you upon it. But I must act upon my own views, or I cannot carry on the service; and I only hope that Captain —— will have the good sense to see the impropriety of his conduct, and make that atonement for it which every man who is aware that he has conducted himself improperly, ought to make.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ —— — .’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

‘I enclose a letter from the Commissary General in regard to the supplies demanded by the Portuguese Government in this month, enclosed in your letter of the 23rd June, from which you will see that all the supplies will be given, and at what places.

‘In regard to money, I know that we have absolutely *none*.

‘I expect some from England, of which I shall take care that a proportion, when it does arrive, shall be given to the Portuguese Government. I have written repeatedly to England to make known our distresses.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

‘I observe from your letter of the 13th June to the Secretary of State, that His Royal Highness does not approve of the mode in which I have carried into execution the plan for raising Spanish recruits for this army. The fact is, that I adopted it because any other that was preferred might be adopted in lieu of it; and I suspected what has turned out to be the case, that we should get but few or no recruits. We have not got enough in the whole army to form one company; and I am sorry to add that some have deserted.

‘If His Royal Highness wishes the plan to be altered, and additional companies to be added to each regiment, it can be done the moment I shall receive the notification of his pleasure.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

‘I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, and the copy of one which I have written to him on the plan of operations to be adopted on the eastern coast of the Peninsula.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

‘ I am concerned to have to inform you, that Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham, having for some time suffered from a disorder in his eyes, has at last been obliged to quit the army, and to return to England in order to apply the remedies which are thought necessary.

‘ I have every reason to regret the loss of the assistance of Lieut. General Sir Thomas Graham at this moment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

‘ The army broke up from the encampment on the Guareña on the morning of the 1st instant, and the enemy having retired from Alaejos, encamped on the Trabancos, with the advanced guard at La Nava del Rey. Having heard that the enemy had destroyed the bridge of Tordesillas, and knowing, from intercepted letters, that Marshal Marmont intended to take a position near this town, our advanced guard crossed the Zapardiel, and moved upon Rueda on the morning of the 2nd, supported by the left of the army, while the right and centre moved towards Medina del Campo.

‘ The enemy, however, had not destroyed the bridge over the Duero, as reported ; and the main body of the army had retired upon Tordesillas, leaving the rear guard at Rueda.

‘ Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton immediately attacked the rear guard with Major General Anson's and Major General Victor Alten's brigades of cavalry, and drove them in upon the main body at Tordesillas. As the right and centre of the army were at a considerable distance, I could not bring up a sufficient body of troops in time to attack the enemy during their passage of the Duero ; and they effected that operation without material loss, and took their position on that river with their right on the heights opposite Pollos ; their centre at Tordesillas, and their left at Simancas on the Pisuerga.

‘ I moved our left to Pollos on the 3rd, and obtained possession of the ford over the Duero at that place. But as the

ford was scarcely practicable for infantry, and the enemy's corps was strongly posted with a considerable quantity of cannon on the heights which command the plain, on which the troops must have formed after crossing the ford; and as I could not establish the army on the right of the Duero till I should have adequate means of passing the river, I did not think it proper to push our troops further.

‘ We have since been employed in endeavours to discover the fords of the Duero, which are in general but imperfectly known; and are waiting till they become practicable for infantry.

‘ By that time I hope that the army of Galicia, under General Santocildes, will have been able to advance, the siege of Astorga having been brought to a conclusion. The fire against that place opened on the 2nd instant, but I have not heard with what effect; and I have recommended to General Santocildes to leave a small body of troops to continue the siege, and to move forward with the remainder.

‘ Lieut. General the Conde de Amarante remains at Carvajales, and Brigadier General D’Urban is with his cavalry in rear of the enemy’s right flank at Castromonte. The guerrilla Marquiñez is at Palencia.

‘ General Bonet was at Aguilar de Campo in the end of last month, and orders have been sent to him to join the army. As many copies of these orders have been intercepted, it is doubtful whether he has received them; and I have not heard of his moving. There are no accounts of the movement of the troops of the army of the North.

‘ By the last accounts from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, of the 1st instant, he was about to move to attack General Drouet, whose force he considered inferior to that under his command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 8th July, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th. If Drouet is reinforced, you will of course resume the old position. If you should find that the enemy propose to make the siege

of Badajoz, after they shall have got their reinforcements, and shall have dislodged you from Albuera, you must prepare to take the position on the hill of S<sup>ta</sup> Engracia, and keep your communication by Campo Mayor.

‘ The enemy have got into a strong situation on the other side of the Duero, from which we cannot dislodge them till the river shall fall.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Rueda, 8th July, 1812. 5 P.M.

‘ I learn from Pollos that cannon and carriages, escorted by troops, were passing through San Roman, on the road to Toro, from ten to twelve last night, the numbers of either cannon or troops not stated.

‘ In a report from Tordesillas, it is stated that 8000 men had marched in that direction last night; but this is stated only as a report.

‘ It is necessary to have a good look out kept this night upon the Adaja.

‘ Have we any thing at Puente de Duero, or any communication with the guerrilla who is there? Let me know every thing that passes as soon as possible.

‘ As I see that Palombini’s division, expected from the army of the North, had not arrived at Valladolid this morning, I am inclined to suspect that the movement towards Toro, if it is of more than carriages, has nothing to do with us, but is directed against Santocildes at Astorga. However, it is as well to be prepared to collect our troops; and I have directed that the baggage and Commissariat may be pushed out of the town this night.

‘ I am going towards Pollos to see whether they have made any farther discovery of fords, and shall be back between eight and nine.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Show this to Beresford.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Rueda, 8th July, 1812.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday.

‘ The enemy have got into a very strong position beyond the Duero, to which we cannot look till there shall be more fords in the river.

‘ Sir Rowland Hill tells me that Soult is about to reinforce Drouet still further, and that they talk of the siege of Badajoz. This would ruin every thing. I have given him directions what to do, and I think he may prevent the siege; but if Drouet should be reinforced, it is very desirable that Ballesteros should act.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Rueda, 9th July, 1812.

‘ I have made no alteration in our position since you left us; and the French have continued in their positions on the fords, which it is impossible to cross as long as they hold them in such strength. Indeed it would not answer to cross the river at all in its present state, unless we should be certain of having the co-operation of the Galician troops.

‘ I understand that there was a breach in Astorga yesterday, but I doubt the inclination of the Spaniards to storm it.

‘ Bonet has joined; and on the evening of the 7th the enemy made a movement to their right, and Foy’s division arrived at Toro yesterday. I have not heard that any other troops moved in that direction, and I believe not.

‘ I see by an intercepted letter that Marmont was a little uneasy at the progress of the Galicians and Silveira, and it is probable that these movements are the cause of Foy’s; but, at all events, I propose to move two divisions to La Nava del Rey this evening, in case the enemy should entertain any design of striking upon our communication.

‘ I have an intercepted letter from Marmont to a General Palombini, who is coming by Aranda de Duero to join him

from the army of the North. He had not arrived at Aranda on the 7th.

‘ Marmont has dismounted his infantry officers in order to remount dragoons. If he takes all the horses, he may get 700; but in a letter from Valladolid I see that he gets 400.

‘ I hope that you bear your journey well.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I send this to the Governor of Almeida, with a request that he will send it to meet you at Barca d’Alva; and if you should have passed that place, that he should send it to Oporto.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Rueda, 9th July, 1812.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 24th June, and I do not delay to answer it, as it is possible that there may be an opportunity of sending this letter from Lisbon before the next packet will sail.

‘ You will have seen from my dispatch of the 7th (No. 1) that Sir Thomas Graham has been obliged to quit the army, but I must inform you that it is his determination to return, if he should save one of his eyes. You will be able to learn whether this is probable, and will judge according to what you will hear upon this point; and, regarding the period of his absence, whether it is expedient to make any and what arrangement to fill his station.

‘ In regard to the first arrangement to which you have adverted, I have no objection to it, excepting that it would mortify Sir Stapleton exceedingly. It would likewise be necessary to supersede — —, upon whose *sanity*, I am sorry to say, much reliance cannot be placed. He deprived us of many of the advantages which would have resulted from Sir Rowland Hill’s expedition to the Tagus in May; and it is impossible to trust to his judgment in any critical case.

‘ In regard to the second arrangement, I have to inform you that I do not believe Lord William Bentinck will come to Spain; at least, if he does, it will not be till a late period

in the season. Besides, in case the event should occur for which you wish to provide, you could send an officer from England who would reach the army as soon as Lord William Bentinck could from the eastern coast.

‘ In regard to the third arrangement, I have a great regard for, and entertain a very high opinion of, Sir Edward Paget ; but I think it probable that he would not come, on the chance of Sir Thomas Graham returning to the army.

‘ Considering that Sir William Beresford is here, and would naturally have considerable influence in the conduct of the operations, I acknowledge that, although — — is not exactly the person I should select to command an army, I do not think any evil would result from his holding the command for a short time, till you could make a permanent arrangement. However, I shall be perfectly satisfied with any arrangement you may make.

‘ Since I wrote my dispatch of the 7th, Bonet has joined the army ; and I have a letter from Marmont to General Palombini, directing him to move quickly from Aranda de Duero to Valladolid, with the troops of the army of the North under his command. He is an Italian, and I do not believe his troops are of the best kind. Indeed, it appears, from letters from Marmont to the King, that he does not feel great confidence in them ; but these letters are written in the Paris cipher, of which we have not been able to discover the key.

‘ Marmont has taken the horses from the officers of the army to remount the cavalry. This resource, if he carries the arrangement into execution strictly, will give him 700 additional cavalry. He has heard of the siege of Astorga, and of the collection of force in that direction ; and he detached a division towards Toro and Zamora on the night before last, to acquire a knowledge of what was going on, I believe. This division has been replaced in his line by that of Bonet.

‘ I hear that a breach was open at Astorga on the 7th, but I fear that the Spaniards will not storm it. If they do not, the Governor will not surrender.

‘ I have a letter from Hill of the 4th. Drouet had retired to Ribera, as I expected he would ; but it is reported that additional reinforcements have been sent to him, in which

case Hill will be obliged to retire upon Albuera. But I have no idea that the French will be strong enough in Estremadura to make any impression upon Hill.

‘ They talk of preparing a train at Seville to lay siege to Badajoz ; but that appears impossible, unless they should be able to beat Hill out of the field.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Rueda, 9th July, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote my letter this day, I have received one from Sir Rowland Hill of the 5th, from Bienvenida. The French had retired that day from Usagre, and their rear guard was at Llera. They will certainly now retire entirely into Cordova.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Rueda, 11th July, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I have had no account from Toro since yesterday at 12 at noon. A part of Foy’s troops, about 800, had then moved in this direction, and the remainder were at Toro. Very few, if any, had passed the river ; and those which had passed had done so only for plunder. They were repairing the bridge.

‘ The enemy yesterday morning moved a body of troops, about five battalions, from the camp opposite Pollos, to their right, and we were informed in the evening that these had halted at San Roman, which place is about two miles from Castro Nuño, on the road towards Toro. I desired Don Julian’s officer at Castro Nuño to report to you any event at that place, to which it will be necessary for you to attend. Send a Staff Officer over to Castro Nuño, and let me know the distance from Alaejos, the kind of road, country, &c.

‘ Yesterday evening the enemy moved about a division of infantry from Tordesillas to the camp opposite Pollos, as well as I could judge ; and about the same number from their left to Tordesillas.

‘ I have not yet received the morning reports from Pollos,

but I believe matters are there in the state in which I left them last night. They are so at Tordesillas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General H. Clinton.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 11th July, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter which I received yesterday evening from the Marques de Monsalud, containing the decipher of a letter from the King to the Comte d’Erlon\*. I wish that the Marques had sent the ciphered letter here, or at least an accurate copy of the decipher, as in this letter there are some faults of spelling, &c., and it appears to me that the whole letter is too loosely verded to be intended as a military order. It is, besides, in its present form, not consistent with the King’s orders to Drouet, of which Lord FitzRoy sent you a deciphered copy on the 23rd June.

‘ It is necessary, however, that I should give you some directions for your guidance in case that Drouet, finding that he cannot march over you, according to the King’s orders of the 31st May, should cross the Tagus, according to those of the 21st June. Much will depend upon the force with which Drouet will cross the Tagus, and the description of it. If he takes across with him all the cavalry he has, you must send across the whole of the 2nd division of cavalry, with the exception of one British and three Portuguese regiments: if he should take across only one brigade of cavalry, you must send one brigade across, General Slade’s, and the 2nd hus-sars. If he should take across the Tagus two or three divisions of infantry, you must send across the following troops: Major General Howard’s and Colonel Byng’s brigades of the 2nd division, and General Hamilton’s Portuguese division. All these troops must cross by the bridge of Alcantara, respecting which you must give timely directions to have it put down. They are then to march by the pass of Perales and Guinaldo upon Ciudad Rodrigo, where they will receive further orders from me.

‘ The station for the troops which will remain in Estremadura must depend partly upon the strength which the enemy will leave in the province, and partly upon considera-

\* Lieut. General Drouet.

tions of health. The high grounds about Zafra are the most healthy, but if, on account of the strength of the enemy in the province, the troops cannot remain there, they must be brought back towards Badajoz, &c. It will be necessary that you should superintend the movement of these troops till they shall come within my reach, and then that you should return, and continue in charge in Estremadura.

‘ It is not impossible but that the King may meditate an invasion of Portugal along the valley of the Tagus by Plasencia, as I see that they are very busy at Madrid constructing boats, &c. In order to guard against this, therefore, it might be expedient that those troops destined, according to these directions, to remain in Estremadura, when the others shall come into Castille, should move by easy marches to Caceres, when the others shall move upon Alcantara, and should remain there till Drouet shall have quitted the valley of the Tagus.

‘ If the King should attempt to penetrate by the valley of the Tagus, you must defend the passages of the Alagon, if you should not be in time to prevent the enemy from passing the Tietar; in this case you will bring your whole force across the Tagus, with the exception of the garrison regiments, leaving Estremadura to the care of the Marques de Monsalud.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ There is a regiment of Portuguese cavalry in the valley of the Tagus, under the command of Colonel Diggins, and three very good battalions of militia in Lower Beira, under the command of Brig. General Le Cor.’

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Rueda, 12th July, 1812. 5 P.M.

‘ By a letter just received from Toro, of 11 last night, I find that Foy having left that place, had returned there in the evening with part of his force, and that the work at the bridge proceeded but slowly.

‘ At the same time, all the intelligence and the enemy’s movements lead to a belief that their intention is to cross the Duero at that place.

‘ You will see my intentions from the Quarter Master General’s instructions of this day.

‘ I have ordered General Bradford’s brigade to Castro Nuño, which will give us ample time to collect upon our left.

‘ I write to Don Carlos to desire that any correspondent at Toro may be directed to write to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Rueda, 12th July, 1812.

‘ In reference to Dòm M. Forjaz’s question regarding the post horses at Thomar, Cabaços, Espinhal, and Foz d’Arouge, I have to acquaint you that Major Scovell has discontinued to advance the payment of their maintenance in consequence of their services not being required for the communications of the army; but of course it rests with the Portuguese Government to decide upon the propriety of keeping up this establishment.

‘ He has also ceased to advance the pay for the support of four horses of the ten kept at Golegaõ, in consequence of the line by Thomar being no longer necessary, that by Abrantes being considered fully sufficient for the purposes of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 13th July, 1812. 1 P.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th instant, 9 A.M., and you will have observed from my letter of yesterday that I had anticipated the report expected from you, that Drouet would march in this direction. The King, from accounts received last night, appears to be collecting a large force at Madrid, particularly in cavalry, and I am apprehensive that, after all, the enemy will be too strong for me; but we shall see. Do not let any time be lost unnecessarily.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General  
Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Rueda, 14th July, 1812.

‘ General Bonet joined the enemy on the evening of the 7th instant, and they have since extended to their right as far as Toro, where they have been actively employed in repairing the bridge which they had before destroyed.

‘ It is generally reported that they propose to cross the Duero at that point, when they are reinforced by the troops expected from the armies of the North and Centre.

‘ In regard to the reinforcements from the army of the North, I have reason to believe that General Caffarelli has altered his intention of sending them. Marshal Marmont certainly expected a division under General Palombini, which had been detached from the army of Aragon at Aranda de Duero, in the beginning of this month, but they have not yet arrived there ; and I understand have marched towards the Ebro.

‘ The King has, however, given orders for the collection of the army of the Centre at Madrid, and he has abandoned all the posts occupied by that army in La Mancha, and those in the valley of the Tagus.

‘ The posts of Avila and Mombeltran\*, and all those destined for the preservation of the communication between the armies of Portugal and of the Centre, have likewise been abandoned by his orders, and the troops have marched to Madrid, in order to enable him to take from thence a body of troops.

‘ I have not any account on which I can rely, of the strength of the army of the Centre. It has been stated to be lately as 19,000 men, of which, 5000 cavalry. But this account is much exaggerated, or many of the troops must be Spanish *Juramentados*.

‘ The King has besides ordered General Drouet to join him with a body of troops to be taken from Estremadura ; and from the late movements of that general, I conclude that he has received those orders, and is about to cross the Tagus with about 10,000 men, and to join the army of the Centre.

‘ Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill broke up from Albuera

\* Near the Puerto del Pico.

on the 2nd instant, and moved upon the enemy, who retired before him towards Cordova. His last letter is of the 9th, from Llerena; and at that time, part of the enemy's force had marched upon Fuente Ovejuna from Berlanga; and General Drouet with 10,000 men, with a very small proportion of artillery, had marched through Campillo upon Zalamea.

‘ Sir Rowland Hill has been informed of the King's order, that General Drouet should cross the Tagus, and join the army of the Centre, and he has marched after him; and I ordered him to detach a force to join this army, proportionate to that which General Drouet should take with him across the Tagus, as soon as I was made acquainted with the King's order to General Drouet.

‘ I have no authentic account of the siege of Astorga of a later date than the 5th instant, at which period General Santocildes, who was conducting that operation, entertained no hopes of bringing it to an early termination, and he expected to be in want of ammunition. It is reported that there are two breaches in the place; but I am apprehensive that there is no foundation for these reports.

‘ The enemy's position on the Duero is very strong, and their army is sufficient to occupy it. On their right they have the strong places of Zamora and Toro, which cannot be taken excepting by a regular attack.

‘ Their left rests upon the Pisuerga, which is not fordable any where. They have a fortified post at Simancas, where there is a bridge over that river, and they have fortified, and have a garrison in Valladolid, where there is another bridge. They occupy with their army, and nearly 100 pieces of cannon, the bridge of Tordesillas, and the heights which command the fords of the Duero, from Toro to the Pisuerga.

‘ It is obvious that we could not cross the river without sustaining great loss, and could not fight a general action under circumstances of greater disadvantage than those which would attend the attack of the enemy's position on the Duero.

‘ In truth, the enemy's numbers are equal, if not superior to ours; they have in their position twice the amount of the artillery which we have, and we are superior in cavalry alone, which arm, it is probable, could not be used in the attack we should have to make.

‘ I have again written to suggest the expediency that the siege of Astorga should be carried on by those troops only which are necessary for the operation, and that the remainder of the army of Galicia should be brought forward to the Esla; but in the mean time, I have deemed it expedient to order General D’Urban to cross the Duero, and join the army with the Portuguese cavalry, in order to be more equal to the enemy in that important arm, even though the King should not join the army of Portugal with a reinforcement from the army of the Centre.

‘ I expect that the 5th, 38th, and 82nd regiments will join the army in the course of the next three weeks; and there are not less than 2000 recruits and convalescents on the road. But at this season of the year it is impossible to rely upon the fitness for service of troops just arrived, or recovered from sickness, after such a march. I likewise hope that the detachment from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill’s corps will be near us almost as soon as General Drouet can join the army of the Centre.

‘ I have this day received a letter from Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck, of the 9th of June, in which he has enclosed the copy of one of the same date to the Earl of Liverpool, from which I am concerned to observe that his Lordship does not propose to carry into execution the operations on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, which had been in contemplation, until he shall have tried the success of another plan on the coast of Italy.

‘ I am apprehensive that this determination may bring upon us an additional force of the army of Aragon, but I still hope that I shall be able to retain at the close of the campaign those acquisitions which we made at its commencement.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst,*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Rueda, 14th July, 1812.

‘ I have but little to add to my official dispatch of this day. The determination of ——— to land in Italy is a great disappointment to me. His arrival upon the Eastern

coast at this moment, which would have been certain, would have relieved me effectually. He would have taken Tarra-gona, and most probably Valencia, and we should have made a glorious campaign of it altogether. His success in this Peninsula, or even his appearance here, would have had permanent good effects. I hope that he has decided right, and that he will be successful where he is going; but I cannot believe that the French will allow 15,000 British and Neapolitan troops to remain in Italy; and I am apprehensive that, however successful he may be at first, he will eventually be obliged to embark.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Rueda, 15th July, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd instant.

‘ I concur entirely with you respecting the expediency of General Ballesteros carrying on his operations at present on the side of Gibraltar.

‘ It is true that I at one time preferred that he should be in the Condado de Niebla; and I think it not improbable that occasions might occur in which it might be possible to concert an operation with more advantage between his corps and the allied troops in Estremadura if he were in the Condado de Niebla, than it is, his troops being in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar. But it must be observed that the great object of all, the safety of General Ballesteros’s corps, is best provided for in his station near Gibraltar. From the activity of his operations likewise, and the greater scope there is for them from Gibraltar than from Niebla, I think it very doubtful whether they could be carried on with so much advantage from any station on the right of the Guadalquiver.

‘ From the information received of the strength of the French army of the South, and from the account which you transmitted in your letter of the 12th June of the nature of the enemy’s works at Seville, I consider it quite certain that General Ballesteros could not gain possession of the Carthusian Convent, and he would have no chance of entering

the city from the right of the Guadalquivir. All that we can expect from General Ballesteros is, that he should, by his operations, prevent as many of the enemy as he can from quitting Andalusia to carry their operations into Estremadura. They must maintain the blockade of Cadiz; they must have garrisons in Seville, and in their works on the Guadalete; and likewise one in Malaga, if General Ballesteros should remain where he is, and a corps of observation on his movements.

‘I should hope that, after providing for those services, they would not have the power of detaching into Estremadura such a number as would overpower Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill.

‘An attack upon Seville is doubtless the operation in Andalusia which is most likely to have decided effect; but that should not be undertaken which the evidence before us proves cannot be accomplished. We must not lose in an undertaking of this description such a corps as that under the command of General Ballesteros; and if we cannot undertake that operation, of which the successful result would have the most decided effects, we must others, of which the success is more easily attainable, although the advantage to be derived will be smaller.

‘These general principles will be perfectly understood; and I am convinced that General Ballesteros will do every thing in his power to prevent the enemy from detaching largely to Estremadura, particularly now that I have been obliged to order a detachment of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill’s troops across the Tagus.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Rueda, 15th July, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 2nd; and I enclose one for Sir Edward Pellew, which I beg you to peruse and forward.

‘———’s decision is fatal to the campaign, at least at present. If he should land *any where* in Italy, he will, as

usual, be obliged to re-embark; and we shall have lost a golden opportunity here.

‘ I have an intercepted letter, stating that the King would collect 12,000 men, of which six regiments are cavalry.

‘ Castaños tells me he has ordered the Galician army to Benavente; but I have no account of it from Santocildes.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Rueda, 15th July, 1812.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 8th, and I return the estimates for July. I have not yet heard of the money expected from England. Till it arrives I can give nothing.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this subject to Lord Castlereagh, as I have to Lord Liverpool and Lord Bathurst. War cannot be carried on without money. We are to find money as we can, at the most economical rate of exchange, and then comes Lord William Bentinck to Gibraltar, and carries off four millions of dollars, giving one shilling for each more than we give; and after all, he sends his troops upon some scheme to some part of Italy, and not to the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, as ordered by Government, and arranged with me.

‘ I have never been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen if the Government do not attend seriously to the subject, and adopt some measures to supply us regularly with money.

‘ The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese Government are a joke to ours, and if our credit were not better, we should certainly starve. As it is, if we do not find means of paying our bills for butchers’ meat, there will be an end to the war at once.

‘ I have not leisure to go through the returns; but there never was any thing so fallacious as the statement of 45,000 militia in arms in March and April, or 25,000 at other times. The whole militia are now disbanded, excepting four battalions with Silveira, three battalions in Almeida, and about

4000 men in the garrison of Alentejo. I fully believe that the establishments would not amount to half the number of 25,000, and the effectives to be paid, not to one quarter of it. I shall speak to Sir William Beresford on the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from Admiral Martin, from which you will see that he was to send the Peterel to Oporto for your use on the 9th. I think it probable that that ship will have arrived before you will.

‘ Since my last Marmont has continued to reinforce his right to Toro, and at last, this morning, has moved every thing from opposite Pollos. I came here last night, and have not yet received the reports from Tordesillas. The enemy have continued to repair the bridge of Toro, and Marmont was there yesterday. Astorga is not taken, but I believe Santocildes is at Benavente. It is impossible to communicate with him excepting by a very circuitous route.

‘ Either the Galician army have induced Marmont to collect his troops near Toro, or he has heard that the King is collecting the army of the Centre at Madrid; and he threatens our left and our communications in order to prevent us from molesting the King. I should think that he would do the business more effectually by his left. But he would then leave the communication open between Santocildes and us.

‘ The King has ordered Drouet to cross the Tagus, and we thought some days ago that he was about to obey that order. But by a letter from Hill of the 12th, from Llerena, just received, I find they have sent to Zalamea three regiments of infantry and a small body of cavalry; the main body of the army having retired into Cordova.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 12th, and I hope that being convinced that the enemy were not carrying into execution the King’s orders of the 23rd June, you will not have detached the troops, notwithstanding my orders of the 11th and 13th.

‘ I have this day got a letter from the King to Marmont of the 9th, in cipher, which I cannot entirely decipher; it appears, however, that he thinks that Drouet cannot cross the Tagus, and I suspect that he has ordered General Treillard to collect some troops in the valley of the Tagus, and to move up by Plasencia.

‘ I think it desirable, therefore, at all events, that General Campbell’s Portuguese, and Colonel Byng’s British brigades, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, should move in the direction of Merida, and there remain. Let General Campbell put himself in communication with Colonel Diggins, who is at Plasencia with a regiment of Portuguese cavalry; and if he should find the enemy advancing in that direction, he is to move by Caceres or Alcantara (to order the bridge to be laid for himself), to cross the Tagus, and beat Treillard, if he is sufficiently strong; if he is not, he will retire before him on Castello Branco, and thence into the strong country between the Tagus and the Zezere: if he should retire beyond Castello Branco, he will order the bridge of Villa Velha to be taken up, and floated gradually down the river. Let General Campbell take Colonel Diggins under his orders, if he should cross the Tagus.

‘ I am not quite certain that Treillard will not cross the Tagus and join Drouet; but if that should be the case, General Campbell cannot be better placed than at Merida, neither can he be better placed than at Merida, if Drouet should carry into execution the King’s orders of the 23rd June.

‘ Drouet cannot, at all events, cross the Guadiana by Medellin. It will be necessary that some of your cavalry should attend General Campbell’s movement, but they need not stay with him, as he will find cavalry on the right of the Tagus. It may be a question whether you ought to stay so

far forward as Llerena, when you shall send away General Campbell, of which you must be the best judge: of course, if Drouet should cross the Tagus, you will do as directed in my letter of the 11th July, and it will be particularly necessary to attend to that part of it which relates to the force to come to Caceres, in case of Treillard becoming part of the game with Drouet in the valley of the Tagus.

‘Remember that the bridge of Alcantara takes time to be prepared for the passage of troops.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘Marmont has collected his troops about Toro, with what object I do not know; but we have rather drawn in our right.’

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

7 A.M.

‘The only alteration which I wish to make in your instructions, in consequence of the enemy’s great movement to their right, and the movement which we made yesterday evening, is, that in case the enemy should cross the river at Toro, or the fords below Castro Nuño, you should move at once upon Fuente la Peña with the 6th division, and two regiments of General Le Marchant’s brigade. I will order the 7th division to follow you as soon as the other troops from the right shall approach Alaejos.

‘You should endeavor to get some peasants to watch what passes at the bridge of Toro at night, and desire Lieut. Shanahan to do the same.

‘These movements of Marmont are certainly intended to divert our attention from the army of the Centre, which is collecting at Madrid; if he knows of this circumstance, which I doubt.

‘I have a letter from ——— of the 9th of June. He had sent the 1st division of the expedition to Minorea, and the 2nd division was about to go to Sardinia; but neither of them destined for the operations concerted on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula. He has determined in lieu thereof to try his fortune in Italy with 15,000 men, instead of 6000, which he was to send into Spain. I hope he will succeed;

but I doubt it. There is no solid foundation for his plan. He has not even fixed the degrees of latitude for his operations, much less the place of his landing, nor arranged any of the circumstances which ought to be settled before such a service should be entered on. The French cannot have less than 15,000 men in Italy, and I fear that he will be obliged to re-embark.

‘ If he were again to alter his determination, and now to appear upon the coast of Spain, I believe the army of the Centre would do us but little harm; at the same time that he would succeed in his objects.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

$\frac{1}{4}$  before 9 A.M.

‘ Since I wrote to you I have heard from General Picton that the enemy have withdrawn entirely from opposite Pollos a very large body of cavalry in the morning early, and their infantry at about half-past seven, and marched in the direction of Toro.

‘ I am anxious to hear from you what movements they have made on their left.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

6 P.M.

‘ General Picton has informed me at half-past nine, that the enemy had sent a battalion and a few cavalry out of the wood of Cubillas to the heights opposite his left.

‘ I have just now heard from General D’Urban, who commands about 800 or 900 Portuguese cavalry, which have hitherto been in the rear of the enemy; but thinking they could be more useful on this side of the Duero, I desired him to cross the river; and he is to be this night in the wood of El Piñero, which you will see in the map about a league south from Benialbo, and about the same distance east by north from Fuentes Preadas, on our left of the Val-

de-finjas road. I wish you would communicate with him this night through Lieut. Shanahan. The officer at Val-de-finjas might also communicate with him.

‘Let General D’Urban know that I wish him to be on our left of the Val-de-finjas road, observing the enemy’s movements from the neighbourhood of Toro, and keeping his communication with Lieut. Shanahan and you. In case the enemy should cross the Duero, and he should be obliged to retire, he must join the 6th division on the Gareña. He must let you know beforehand if he should want provisions, and I will take care that he shall be supplied.

‘From the accounts received by the officer who brought D’Urban’s letter, I guess that the enemy are *en masse* between Toro and the Palacio de Cubillas. They have nothing on their right of Toro, and nothing in the valleys in their rear.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General H. Clinton.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

Half-past 6 P.M.

‘Since I wrote to you half an hour ago, I have received an intercepted letter, which makes it clear that the enemy propose to cross the Duero.

‘I beg that you will communicate this night with the officer belonging to Don Carlos’s corps at Villa Franca, in order to receive the earliest information of the enemy’s movements on the Duero, whether at that ford or at the bridge of Toro, where I think it certain that the enemy will cross.

‘If you should move upon Fuente la Peña, send your baggage to Canizal.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General H. Clinton.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

7 P.M.

‘I have just now heard that the enemy have crossed the Duero at Toro in strength, and are in march upon Villa

Buena. If you have not already moved, you should move immediately on Fuente la Peña.

‘ I order the 1st division to march immediately ; and the 7th must follow you as soon as the 1st shall cross the Trabancos.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ Cabrerizos, near Salamanca,

21st July, 1812.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ In the course of the 15th and 16th the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Duero, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable body passed the Duero at Toro, on the evening of the 16th ; and I moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guareña.

‘ It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from passing the Duero at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river, and many of the fords ; but he recrossed that river at Toro in the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Duero on the morning of the 17th, and assembled his army on that day at La Nava del Rey ; having marched not less than ten leagues in the course of the 17th.

‘ The 4th and light divisions of infantry, and Major General Anson’s brigades of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly of the army on the Guareña, and were at Castrejon under the orders of Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed further, in consequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed the Duero at Toro, and there was not time to call them in between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy’s army being at La Nava and daylight of the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to provide for their retreat and junction, by moving the 5th division to Torrecilla de la Orden ; and Major General Le

Marchant's, Major General Alten's, and Major General Bock's brigades of cavalry to Alaejos.

‘ The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn of day of the 18th, and Sir Stapleton Cotton maintained the post without suffering any loss till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned, by Alaejos, the left flank of our position at Castrejon.

‘ The troops retired in admirable order to Torrecilla de la Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank, or in their rear, and thence to the Guareña, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and effected their junction with the army.

‘ The Guareña, which runs into the Duero, is formed by four streams, which unite about a league below Cañizal, and the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right of that river; and I placed the 5th, 4th, and Light divisions on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of the army to cross the Upper Guareña at Vallesa, in consequence of the appearance of the enemy's intention to turn our right.

‘ Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the Guareña at Castrillo, below the junction of the streams; and manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter the valley of Cañizal. Major General Alten's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3rd dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French General de Carrié; and I desired Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole to attack with Major General William Anson's and Brigadier General Harvey's brigades of infantry, the latter under the command of Colonel Stubbs, the enemy's infantry, which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated them with the 27th and 40th regiments, which advanced to the charge with bayonets, Colonel Stubbs's Portuguese brigade supporting; and the enemy gave way; many were killed, and wounded; and Major General Alten's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, 240 prisoners were taken.

‘ In these affairs, Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole, Major General V. Alten, Major General W. Anson, Lieut. Colonels Arentschildt of the 1st hussars, and Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; Lieut. Colonel Maclean of the 27th, and

Major Archdall of the 40th; Colonel Stubbs, Lieut. Colonel Anderson, commanding the 11th, and Major de Azeredo, commanding the 23rd Portuguese regiments, distinguished themselves.

‘The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left, but having reinforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back ours from Vallesa.

‘On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all the troops from their right, and marched to their left by Tarazona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. I crossed the Upper Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo, with the whole of the allied army, in the course of that evening and night; and every preparation was made for the action which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning of the 20th.

‘But shortly after daylight the enemy made another movement, in several columns, to his left along the heights of the Guareña, which river he crossed below Cantalapiedra, and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villoruela; and the allied army made a corresponding movement to its right to Cantalpio, and encamped last night at Cabeza Velloso, the 6th division and Major General Alten’s brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua.

‘During these movements, there have been occasional cannonades, but without loss on our side.

‘I have this morning moved the left of the army to the Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated; and I observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same river near Huerta.

‘The enemy’s object hitherto has been to cut off my communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, the want of which, he knows well would distress us very materially. The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in Castille, and even if we had money, we could not now procure any thing from the country, unless we should follow the example of the enemy, and lay waste whole districts, in order to procure a scanty subsistence of unripe wheat for the troops.

‘It would answer no purpose to attempt to retaliate upon the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond

the ground which they occupy; and provided the enemy opposed to them is not too strong for them, they are indifferent in respect to the quarter from which their operations are directed, or on which side they carry them on.

‘The army of Portugal has been surrounded for the last six weeks, and scarcely even a letter reaches its commander; but the system of organized rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every description than we have. Any movement upon his flank, therefore, would only tend to augment the embarrassments of our own situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon that of the enemy; even if such a movement could have been made with advantage as an operation purely military: this, however, was not the case, and when the French attempted to turn our right, I had the choice only of marching towards Salamanca, or of attacking the enemy in a position highly advantageous to him, which, for several reasons, I did not think expedient.

‘I have invariably been of opinion, that unless forced to fight a battle, it is better that one should not be fought by the allied army, unless under such favorable circumstances as that there would be reason to hope that the allied army would be able to maintain the field, while those of the enemy should not.

‘Your Lordship will have seen by the returns of the two armies that we have no superiority of numbers, even over that single army immediately opposed to us; indeed, I believe that the French army is of the two the strongest; and it is certainly equipped with a profusion of artillery double ours in numbers, and of larger calibres. It cannot be attacked therefore in a chosen position, without considerable loss on our side.

‘To this circumstance, add that I am quite certain that Marshal Marmont’s army is to be joined by the King’s, which will be 10,000 or 12,000 men, with a large proportion of cavalry, and that troops are still expected from the army of the North, and some are ordered from that of the South;

and it will be seen that I ought to consider it almost impossible to remain in Castille after an action, the circumstances of which should not have been so advantageous as to have left the allied army in a situation of comparative strength, while that of the enemy should have been much weakened.

‘ I have therefore determined to cross the Tormes, if the enemy should ; to cover Salamanca as long as I can ; and above all, not to give up our communication with Ciudad Rodrigo ; and not to fight an action, unless under very advantageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely necessary.

‘ Since I wrote to your Lordship on the 14th, I have learnt that General Drouet had not crossed the Guadiana, nor had he moved in that direction. Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill therefore still remains at Llerena.

‘ The siege of Astorga continues. General Santocildes had detached a division of 4000 infantry under General Cabrera, to Benavente. General D’Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, joined on the left of the allied army, on the 17th instant.

‘ The enemy abandoned and destroyed the fort of Mirabete on the Tagus on the 11th instant, and the garrison marched to Madrid to form part of the army of the Centre. They were reduced to five days’ provisions.

‘ From all that I have seen and heard, I am quite certain that the King is making every effort to collect a body of troops to oppose us.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the 18th instant.’

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., near Castrejon, on the 18th July, 1812.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
British . . . . .	61	297	27
Portuguese . . . .	34	96	27
Total . . . . .	95	393	54

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ On the heights near Alba de Tormes,  
23rd July, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ I write to let you know that we beat Marshal Marmont’s army yesterday evening, near Salamanca, and they are now in full retreat, and we are following them.

‘ Our loss has not been severe, I believe, in men ; Marshal Beresford, Generals Leith, Cole, and Victor Alten, are wounded ; General Le Marchant killed. Sir Stapleton Cotton was likewise wounded last night by a shot from one of our own sentries, who took him for one of the enemy.

‘ We have taken a good many prisoners and cannon, above 3000 of the former, and I should think 20 of the latter, and I understand two eagles. All the troops behaved admirably.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Let the Marques de Monsalud know of these circumstances.’

*To Major General Peacocks.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

‘ I beg that if Lord Robert Manners is not quite well when you shall receive this letter, you will tell him from me that I desire he will go to England forthwith. It is of no use his endeavoring to struggle through the next two months in the Peninsula, which are the most unhealthy of the whole year. The sooner he goes, the sooner he will return.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocks.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

‘ My aide de camp, Captain Lord Clinton, will present to your Lordship this account of a victory which the allied troops under my command gained in a general action, fought near Salamanca on the evening of the 22nd instant, which I have been under the necessity of delaying to send till now, having been engaged ever since the action in the pursuit of the enemy’s flying troops.

‘ In my letter of the 21st, I informed your Lordship that both armies were near the Tormes; and the enemy crossed that river with the greatest part of his troops, in the afternoon, by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ The allied army, with the exception of the 3rd division, and General D’Urban’s cavalry, likewise crossed the Tormes in the evening by the bridge of Salamanca and the fords in the neighbourhood; and I placed the troops in a position, of which the right was upon one of the two heights called Dos Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes, below the ford of S<sup>ta</sup> Marta.

‘ The 3rd division, and Brig. General D’Urban’s cavalry, were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, as the enemy had still a large corps on the heights above Babila-fuente, on the same side of the river; and I considered it not improbable that, finding our army prepared for them in the morning on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their plan, and manœuvre by the other bank.

‘ In the course of the night of the 21st, I received intelligence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that General Clausel had arrived at Pollos on the 20th with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the North, to join Marshal Marmont; and I was quite certain that these troops would join him on the 22nd or 23rd at latest.

‘ There was no time to be lost therefore; and I determined that, if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on the 22nd, I would move towards Ciudad Rodrigo without further loss of time, as the difference of the numbers of cavalry might have made a march of manœuvre, such as we have had for the last four or five days, very difficult, and its result doubtful.

‘ During the night of the 21st, the enemy had taken possession of the village of Calvarassa de Arriba, and of the heights near it called Nuestra Señora de la Peña, our cavalry being in possession of Calvarassa de Abaxo; and shortly after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the two hills called Dos Arapiles.

‘ The enemy, however, succeeded; their detachments

being the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer the hill than we were; by which success they strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours.

‘ In the morning the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th caçadores belonging to General Pack’s brigade, were engaged with the enemy on the height called Nuestra Señora de la Peña, on which height they maintained themselves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army *en potence* to the height behind the village of Arapiles, and to occupy that village with light infantry; and here I placed the 4th division, under the command of Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole: and although, from the variety of the enemy’s movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory judgment of his intentions, I considered that upon the whole his objects were upon the left of the Tormes. I therefore ordered Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham, who commanded the 3rd division in the absence of Lieut. General Picton, on account of ill health, to move across the Tormes with the troops under his command, including Brig. General D’Urban’s cavalry, and to place himself behind Aldea Tejada; Brig. General Bradford’s brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos de España’s infantry, having been moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, between the 3rd and 4th divisions.

‘ After a variety of evolutions and movements, the enemy appears to have determined upon his plan about two in the afternoon; and, under cover of a very heavy cannonade, which, however, did us but very little damage, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, apparently with an intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by his fire, our post on that of the two Arapiles which we possessed, and from thence to attack and break our line, or, at all events, to render difficult any movement of ours to our right.

‘ The extension of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that his troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking

him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our right with the 5th division, under Lieut. General Leith, which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th division, and with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve ; and as soon as these troops had taken their station, I ordered Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham to move forward with the 3rd division and General D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under Lieut. Colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights ; while Brig. General Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under Lieut. General Leith, the 4th division, under Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole, and the cavalry under Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under Major General Clinton, the 7th, under Major General Hope, and Don Carlos de España's Spanish division ; and Brig. General Pack should support the left of the 4th division, by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles which the enemy held. The 1st and Light divisions occupied the ground on the left, and were in reserve.

‘ The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner above described, and completely succeeded. Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham formed the 3rd division across the enemy's flank, and overthrew every thing opposed to him. These troops were supported in the most gallant style by the Portuguese cavalry, under Brig. General D'Urban, and Lieut. Colonel Hervey's squadrons of the 14th, who successfully defeated every attempt made by the enemy on the flank of the 3rd division.

‘ Brig. General Bradford's brigade, the 5th and 4th divisions, and the cavalry under Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, attacked the enemy in front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another, bringing forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank in proportion to the advance. Brig. General Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in which, however, he did not succeed, excepting in diverting the attention of the enemy's corps placed upon it from the troops under the command of Lieut. General Cole in his advance.

‘ The cavalry under Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton made a most gallant and successful charge against a body of

the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces. In this charge Major General Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade ; and I have to regret the loss of a most able officer.

‘ After the crest of the height was carried, one division of the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th division, which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way, in consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on the left of the 4th division, after the failure of Brig. General Pack's attack upon the Arapiles, and Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole having been wounded.

‘ Marshal Sir William Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed Brig. General Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's division ; and, I am sorry to add that, while engaged in this service, he received a wound which I am apprehensive will deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for some time. Nearly about the same time Lieut. General Leith received a wound which unfortunately obliged him to quit the field. I ordered up the 6th division, under Major General Clinton, to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon restored to its former success.

‘ The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops which had fled from his left, and by those which had now retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist ; and I ordered the 1st and Light divisions, and Colonel Stubbs's Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was reformed, and Major General William Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the right, while the 6th division, supported by the 3rd and 5th, attacked the front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division ; and the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I pursued them with the 1st and Light divisions, and Major General William Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and some squadrons of cavalry under Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, as long as we could find any of them together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed on their advance ; but the darkness of the night was highly advantageous to

the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover who must otherwise have been in our hands.

‘I am sorry to report that, owing to this same cause, Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton was unfortunately wounded by one of our own sentries after we had halted.

‘We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning with the same troops, and Major General Bock’s and Major General Anson’s brigades of cavalry, which joined during the night; and, having crossed the Tormes, we came up with the enemy’s rear of cavalry and infantry near La Serna. They were immediately attacked by the two brigades of dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made on the enemy’s infantry by the heavy brigade of the King’s German Legion, under Major General Bock, which was completely successful; and the whole body of infantry, consisting of three battalions of the enemy’s 1st division, were made prisoners.

‘The pursuit was afterwards continued as far as Peñaranda last night, and our troops were still following the flying enemy.

‘Their head quarters were in this town, not less than ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night; and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards Valladolid, by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North, which have arrived at too late a period, it is to be hoped, to be of much use to them.

‘It is impossible to form a conjecture of the amount of the enemy’s loss in this action; but, from all reports, it is very considerable. We have taken from them 11 pieces of cannon\*, several ammunition waggons, 2 eagles, and 6 colors; and 1 General, 3 Colonels, 3 Lieut. Colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank, and between 6000 and 7000 soldiers are prisoners†; and our detachments are sending in more at every moment. The number of dead on the field is very large.

\* ‘The official returns only account for 11 pieces of cannon, but it is believed that 20 have fallen into our hands.’

† ‘The prisoners are supposed to amount to 7000; but it has not been possible to ascertain their number exactly, from the advance of the army immediately after the action was over.’

‘ I am informed that Marshal Marmont is badly wounded, and has lost one of his arms ; and that four General Officers have been killed, and several wounded.

‘ Such an advantage could not have been acquired without material loss on our side ; but it certainly has not been of a magnitude to distress the army, or to cripple its operations.

‘ I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship that, throughout this trying day, of which I have related the events, I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the General Officers and troops.

‘ The relation which I have written of its events will give a general idea of the share which each individual had in them ; and I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of every individual in his station.

‘ I am much indebted to Marshal Sir William Beresford for his friendly counsel and assistance, both previous to, and during the action ; to Lieut. Generals Sir Stapleton Cotton, Leith, and Cole, and Major Generals Clinton, and the Hon. E. Pakenham, for the manner in which they led the divisions of cavalry and infantry under their command respectively ; to Major General Hulse, commanding a brigade in the 6th division ; Major General G. Anson, commanding a brigade of cavalry ; Colonel Hinde ; Colonel the Hon. William Ponsonby, commanding Major General Le Marchant’s brigade after the fall of that officer ; to Major General W. Anson, commanding a brigade in the 4th division ; Major General Pringle, commanding a brigade in the 5th division, and the division after Lieut. General Leith was wounded ; Brig. General Bradford ; Brig. General Spry ; Colonel Stubbs ; and Brig. General Power, of the Portuguese service ; likewise to Lieut. Colonel Campbell of the 94th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division ; Lieut. Colonel Williams of the 60th foot ; Lieut. Colonel Wallace of the 88th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division ; Lieut. Colonel Ellis of the 23rd, commanding Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham’s brigade in the 4th division, during his absence in the command of the 3rd division ; Lieut. Colonel the Hon. C. Greville of the 38th regiment, commanding Major General Hay’s brigade in the 5th division, during his absence on leave ; Brig. General Pack ; Brig. General the Conde de Rezende of the Portuguese service ; Colonel Douglas of the

8th Portuguese regiment; Lieut. Colonel the Conde de Ficalho of the same regiment; and Lieut. Colonel Bingham of the 53rd regiment; likewise to Brig. General D'Urban and Lieut. Colonel Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; Colonel Lord Edward Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons; and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby, commanding the 12th light dragoons.

‘ I must also mention Lieut. Colonel Woodford, commanding the light battalion of the brigade of Guards, who, supported by two companies of the Fusiliers, under the command of Captain Crowder, maintained the village of Arapiles against all the efforts of the enemy, previous to the attack upon their position by our troops.

‘ In a case in which the conduct of all has been conspicuously good, I regret that the necessary limits of a dispatch prevent me from drawing your Lordship's notice to the conduct of a larger number of individuals; but I can assure your Lordship that there was no officer or corps engaged in this action who did not perform his duty by his Sovereign and his country.

‘ The Royal and German Artillery, under Lieut. Colonel Framingham, distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire wherever it was possible to use them; and they advanced to the attack of the enemy's position with the same gallantry as the other troops.

‘ I am particularly indebted to Lieut. Colonel De Lancy, the Deputy Quarter Master General, the head of the department present, in the absence of the Quarter Master General, and to the officers of that department and of the Staff corps, for the assistance I received from them, particularly Lieut. Colonel the Hon. L. Dundas and Lieut. Colonel Sturgeon of the latter, and Major Scovell of the former; and to Lieut. Colonel Waters, at present at the head of the Adjutant General's department at head quarters; and to the officers of that department, as well at head quarters as with the several divisions of the army; and Lieut. Colonel Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and the officers of my personal Staff. Among the latter I particularly request your Lordship to draw the attention of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to His Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince of Orange, whose conduct in the field, as well as upon every other occasion,

entitles him to my highest commendation, and has acquired for him the respect and regard of the whole army.

‘ I have had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, and of Brigadier Don Julian Sanchez, and with that of the troops under their command respectively ; and with that of the Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel Alava, and of Brigadier Don Josef O’Lalor, employed with this army by the Spanish Government, from whom, and from the Spanish authorities and people in general, I received every assistance I could expect.

‘ It is but justice likewise to draw your Lordship’s attention upon this occasion to the merits of the officers of the civil departments of the army. Notwithstanding the increased distance of our operations from our magazines, and that the country is completely exhausted, we have hitherto wanted nothing, owing to the diligence and attention of the Commissary General, Mr. Bissett, and the officers of the department under his direction.

‘ I have likewise to mention that, by the attention and ability of Dr. M’Grigor, and of the officers of the department under his charge, our wounded, as well as those of the enemy, left in our hands, have been well taken care of; and I hope that many of these valuable men will be saved to the service.

‘ Captain Lord Clinton will have the honor of laying at the feet of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent the eagles and colors taken from the enemy in this action.

‘ I enclose a return of the killed and wounded.

‘ By letters received from Lient. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, I learn that General Santocildes had left 8000 men to carry on the siege of Astorga, and had joined General Cabrera’s division at Benavente with about 3000; and that the whole 7000 were on their march along the Esla towards the Duero.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Allied Army, under the command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., in the battle near Salamanca, on the 22nd of July, 1812.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total.	British.	Portuguese.	Spanish.
Killed . . .	41	28	625	114	694	388	304	2
Wounded . . .	252	178	3840	133	4270	2714	1552	4
Missing . . .	1	1	254	41	256	74	182	—

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

‘ I hope that you will be pleased with our battle, of which the dispatch contains as accurate an account as I can give you. There was no mistake; every thing went on as it ought; and there never was an army so beaten in so short a time. If we had had another hour or two of daylight, not a man would have passed the Tormes; and as it was, they would all have been taken if ——— had left the garrison in Alba de Tormes as I wished and desired; or, having taken it away, as I believe before he was aware of my wishes, he had informed me that it was not there. If he had, I should have marched in the night upon Alba, where I should have caught them all, instead of upon the fords of the Tormes. But this is a little misfortune, which does not diminish the honor acquired by the troops in the action, nor, I hope, the advantage to be derived from it by the country; as I do not believe there are many soldiers who were in that action, who are likely to face us again till they shall be very largely reinforced indeed.

‘ I am very anxious that a mark of His Royal Highness’s favor should be conferred upon Sir Stapleton Cotton. I believe he would be much gratified at receiving the Red Riband. No cavalry could act better than ours did in the action; and I must say for Sir Stapleton, that I do not know

where we should find an officer that would command our cavalry in this country half so well as he does.

‘ I request your Lordship to send us out remount horses for the cavalry and the artillery. These daily marches, skirmishes, battles, &c., consume an immense number of them; and we can get none here to suit our purpose for either artillery or cavalry. Marmont has now had a reinforcement of not less than 2000 cavalry since I came to Salamanca in June. I hope that we have deprived him of a few hundred of them; and that, at all events, his late reinforcement does not make him now more than 500 or 600 more than he was when he last crossed the Duero. But the loss has fallen principally upon the French infantry; and our cavalry must be kept up, or we cannot stay in the plains. I should wish also to be able to equip some more artillery, and of a larger calibre; as it is not agreeable to be cannonaded for hours together, and not be able to answer even with one gun.

‘ I see that the King is very anxious to collect every thing against us. I think the French could not now remain in Andalusia, probably not south of the Duero, if the Anglo-Sicilian army had appeared upon the eastern coast.

‘ Marmont has lost his arm\*; Generals Foy, Clansel, Bonet, and Ferrey, are wounded; General Thomière is killed. These are five of eight Generals of Division. There are, besides, a great number of Generals of Brigade killed or wounded. General Curto is missing, and I believe is prisoner. How they get on their troops at such a rate, I cannot conceive; but they left this about two this morning, and they will arrive in Valladolid to-morrow.

‘ I will answer your letter of the                   , which I have received, by the next post.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

‘ I cannot allow the dispatches to go off without writing you a few lines respecting our action of the 22nd. You will

\* This intelligence proved to be incorrect.

see our previous movements detailed in my dispatch of the 21st, and that of yesterday.

‘ I took up the ground which you were to have taken during the siege of Salamanca, only the left was thrown back on the heights, it being unnecessary, under the circumstances, to cover the Ford of S<sup>ta</sup> Marta. We had a race for the large Arapiles, which is the more distant of the two detached heights which you will recollect on the right of your position: this race the French won, and they were too strong to be dislodged without a general action.

‘ I knew that the French were to be joined by the cavalry of the army of the North on the 22nd or 23rd, and that the army of the Centre was likely to be in motion. Marmont ought to have given me a *pont d’or*, and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of that, after manœuvring all the morning in the usual French style, nobody knew with what object, he at last pressed upon my right in such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would have either carried our Arapiles, or he would have confined us entirely to our position. This was not to be endured, and we fell upon him, turning his left flank; and I never saw an army receive such a beating.

‘ I had desired the Spaniards to continue to occupy the castle of Alba de Tormes. ——— had evacuated it, I believe, before he knew my wishes; and he was afraid to let me know that he had done so; and I did not know it till I found no enemy at the fords of the Tormes. When I lost sight of them in the dark, I marched upon Huerta and Encinas, and they went by Alba. If I had known there had been no garrison in Alba, I should have marched there, and should probably have had the whole.

‘ Marmont, Clausel, Foy, Ferrey, and Bonet, are wounded badly. Ferrey, it is supposed, will die. Thomière is killed. Many Generals of brigade killed or wounded.

‘ I need not express how much I regret the disorder in your eyes since this action.

‘ I am in great hopes that our loss has not been great. In two divisions, the 3rd and 5th, it is about 1200 men, including Portuguese. There are more in the 4th and 6th; but there are many men who left the ranks with wounded officers and soldiers, who are eating and drinking, and

engaged in *regocijos* with the inhabitants of Salamanca; I have sent, however, to have them all turned out of the town.

‘ I hope that you receive benefit from the advice of the oculists in London.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir T. Graham, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Beresford’s wound is not dangerous. Leith’s arm is broken, and his wound painful. Cole’s wound is through the body, and it is apprehended will be tedious. Cotton’s is through the fleshy part, and the two bones of his arm. It may be a bad wound, if there should be hæmorrhage.’

*To Dr. M’Grigor.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812. 2 P.M.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday at noon, and I am very much obliged to you for the good accounts which you have given me of our wounded. I assure you that I am very sensible of the diligence and attention of the medical department, of which I have reported my sense to the Secretary of State.

‘ I think you will do well to send to Ciudad Rodrigo only those whose wounds are not likely soon to recover, and the movement of whom will not be prejudicial to them, as we must get the men to their regiments again as soon as we can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Dr. M’Grigor.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

‘ I enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Secretary of State containing accounts of the operations of the allied army from the 14th instant, including the general action fought near Salamanca on the 22nd instant.

‘ I beg you to lay before the Spanish Government, for their information, such parts of these dispatches as you may think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.



‘I concur with you in thinking that it is not likely to make the measure worse, to make the full increase of pay to non commissioned officers depend upon their having been in the situation for two years. The enjoyment of some increase, and the hopes of the further increase, will keep them on their good behaviour, and it does not much signify how men acquire good habits; when once acquired, they do not easily abandon them. I should wish, however, if the public could afford the expense, to see the old proportions of pay re-established.

‘The explanation of the Order in Council respecting Spanish merchants is perfectly satisfactory. When I complained of that order, I had it in contemplation to march into Andalusia; and I was apprehensive that I might be involved with the Spanish authorities for the protection of Mr. ——— of Xerez, who has behaved very ill.

‘I am much obliged to you for the intelligence from the North. If the Emperor of Russia has any resources, and is prudent, and his Russians will really fight, Buonaparte will not succeed.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir H. Douglas, Bart.*

‘SIR,

‘Aldea Seca, 26th July, 1812.

‘Marshal Marmont has continued his retreat by Olmedo towards Valladolid, and our troops have followed him; and the main body of the army will be to-morrow at Arevalo and at Muriel, on the Zapardiel river, the advanced guard being forward in pursuit of the enemy, and the army will continue its march along the Zapardiel and Adaja rivers.

‘The King moved from Madrid on the 21st with a corps of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, and arrived yesterday at Blasco Sancho, between Arevalo and Avila. He there heard of the defeat of Marmont, and immediately retired, it is said, towards Villa Castin and Madrid. The direction of his retrograde march, however, is not confirmed; and I think it most probable that he is gone towards Segovia.

‘Under these circumstances, it is most desirable that General Santocildes should approach a little nearer to us with that part of the Galician army which is disposable.

‘ It appears that General Silveira remaining on the Esla, and observing well the garrison of Zamora, General Santocildes might move forward as far as the heights of San Roman, and communicate with our left by the fords of Castro Nuño, to which I will request Don Carlos to detach a party of Don Julian’s cavalry.

‘ If, contrary to my expectations, a part of Marmont’s army should move upon him, he would always have his retreat open across the Esla.

‘ If they should move upon Rio Seco, in order to raise the siege of Astorga, he could move in the same direction, in order to cover that operation ; and on the other hand, he could be so near our left as to be able to co-operate in any offensive plan against the enemy ; or if the sieges of Toro and Zamora should be thought expedient, he would be in readiness to receive the supplies and assistance to carry on these operations.

‘ I request you, therefore, to suggest to General Santocildes to take up this position.

‘ I have not adverted to the garrison of Toro ; as consisting only of 200 men, it cannot give a moment’s uneasiness to anybody.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Aldea Seca, in the province of Avila,

26th July, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 22nd. It is difficult to form an opinion of the enemy’s intentions in the south. From the three letters sent in your letter of the 20th, I judge that the King presses Soult to send Drouet according to his former orders ; yet it would appear from Soult’s letter of the 8th July, that he does not think of such a movement ; and according to your accounts to the 22nd, nothing had been done towards it ; on the contrary, it appeared that he was coming himself into Estremadura.

‘ I think that my instructions to you from the 8th to the 16th of this month provide for every event. First ; that of Soult assembling his whole force in Estremadura. Se-

condly; that of Drouet crossing the Tagus to join the King, according to the orders we know the King sent. Thirdly; that of Treillard making an invasion by the valley of the Tagus.

‘ In regard to the last, it appears not likely to take place, particularly at present, as the King has actually marched from Madrid, and is in front of this army; but you will of course have judged it proper to call in General Campbell’s detachment from Merida, if Soult should be in Estremadura in force: for the purposes of the march to the north of the Tagus, it would be nearly as well placed at Badajoz as at Merida: and if Soult should be in force in Estremadura, sufficient to keep your main body in check, no detachment at Merida can answer any of the purposes for which Campbell’s detachment was to be placed there, or even be in safety.

‘ Marmont has gone in all haste on Valladolid: he left Olmedo this morning. The King was yesterday at Blasco Sancho, between Avila and Arevalo; he there heard of the defeat of Marmont, and went off, it is supposed, towards Villa Castin, that is, Guadarrama and Madrid. I do not understand this movement, as he leaves Marmont’s remains in a manner at my discretion, unless he intends to cross the Tagus with his army of the Centre, to join Drouet and Soult, and fall upon you: however, I shall observe him closely, and can reinforce you, as fast as he can reinforce Soult.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General ———.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Arevalo, 27th July, 1812.

‘ I heard some time ago of some dissatisfaction with his situation on the part of Lieut. Colonel —; but as you did not mention the subject to me, and I heard no more of it on his part, I concluded that it was one of those cases of difference of opinion which sometimes occur among those who mean best by the service; and I took no further notice of what had been mentioned to me.

‘ I had heard nothing of the circumstances of which you

write ; and I beg to know from you, whether you wish what you mention to be formally considered, or only that Lieut. Colonel —— should be removed from the ——th division.

‘ In order to enable you to decide upon this point, it may be expedient to make you acquainted with my opinion. There is no doubt that it is the duty of the Assistant Adjutant General to make such a reconnaissance as you ordered Lieut. Colonel —— to make upon Alba de Tormes; and I cannot understand his refusing to make it.

‘ If you are satisfied with his being removed from the ——th division, I have no objection to the matter being there dropped, as I am convinced that Lieut. Colonel —— cannot be serious in supposing that that which he was ordered to do, was inconsistent with the duty of the Assistant Adjutant General. But if you wish the matter to go farther, it must be regularly inquired into.

‘ I shall take no farther steps upon the subject till I shall hear from you, which I beg may be as soon as may be convenient to you. I shall be at Olmedo to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General ——.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Arevalo, 27th July, 1812.

‘ I have been so much occupied lately, that I have not been able to answer your letter of the 13th of July.

‘ Besides the 100,000 dollars which I told you in my letter of the 16th that I had ordered to be issued to the Portuguese Government, I ordered 100,000 dollars of the money in the town should be likewise given.

‘ I shall desire the Commissary General to send a note of the value of the supplies to Mr. Bell, when he shall furnish them in future.

‘ You omitted to enclose Lord Castlereagh’s letter to which you refer in your’s of the 13th July; although you did enclose a letter from the Deputy Storekeeper General to Mr. Harrison, together with a list of clothing, &c., for the Spanish troops; and a letter from Mr. Herries to Colonel Gordon.

‘ These articles must remain in store at Lisbon, and I

shall order them to be issued in proportion as they may be wanted.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

‘ As the fairest way of enabling His Royal Highness to judge of the merits of the officers and corps engaged in the general action of the 22nd, I think it proper to transmit to you the reports which I have received from the several General Officers commanding divisions engaged; with the exception of the cavalry, Sir Stapleton Cotton not having transmitted a report.

‘ Some of these gentlemen have been rather liberal in their recommendations of officers for promotion, while others have not been so much so; and I have therefore deemed it best to make out a list from the whole, which I beg you to submit to His Royal Highness.

‘ I include Colonel Elley in the list, as His Royal Highness may think it expedient to take this occasion to grant him the rank of Colonel, which he claims as Lieutenant Colonel of six years’ standing of the Blues. He was wounded, and had two horses killed under him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

‘ The army have continued their march in pursuit of the enemy since I addressed you on the 24th instant, and we have continued to take many prisoners.

‘ A part of the enemy’s army crossed the Duero yesterday, near Puente de Duero, and the remainder, their left wing, were in march towards the bridge of Tudela this morning at nine o’clock, when I last heard from our advanced posts.

‘ The main body of the allied army is this day on the Adaja and Zapardiel rivers, in this neighbourhood, the light cavalry being in front in pursuit of the enemy.

‘ I have requested General Santocildes, who is upon the

Esla with 8000 men of the army of Galicia, to move forward to the heights of San Roman on this side of Toro, and to communicate with our left by the fords of Castro Nuño.

‘ It appears that the King left Madrid on the 21st, with the army of the Centre, supposed to consist of from 10,000 to 12,000 infantry, and from 2000 to 3000 cavalry; and he directed his march by the Escorial upon Alba de Tormes. He arrived at Blasco Sancho, between Avila and Arevalo, on the 25th, where he heard of the defeat of Marshal Marmont; and he retired in the evening; and between that time and the evening of the 26th he marched through Villa Castin to Espinar. A non-commissioned officer’s patrol of the 14th light dragoons and 1st hussars, from Arevalo, took in Blasco Sancho, on the evening of the 25th, shortly after the King had left the place, 2 officers and 27 men of the King’s cavalry, who had been left there to follow his rear guard.

‘ I have reason to believe that the King had no regular account of the action of the 22nd till he passed the Puerto de Guadarrama yesterday; but he then returned, and was directing his march upon Segovia. I have not yet heard how far he had advanced.

‘ All accounts concur in regard to the great loss sustained by the army of Portugal; but I think it probable that they will endeavour to join the King on the Upper Duero, if the King should continue on this side of the mountains, unless I should previously have it in my power to strike a blow against his corps.

‘ By accounts from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill to the 24th instant, it appears that the enemy had in some degree reinforced the troops in Estremadura. The Lieut. General had removed to Zafra, as being the coolest and most healthy situation in Estremadura, and preparatory to the detachment which I ordered him to make to the right of the Tagus, in case the enemy should detach in that direction.

‘ It is reported that General Ballesteros had marched on another expedition towards Malaga, and that he was opposed by a division of the army of the South, under General Laval.

‘ I have not received detailed accounts of Commodore Sir Home Popham’s operations on the coast since the capture of Lequeitio, but I understand that he has taken Castro

Urdiales ; and there is no doubt that those operations have drawn the enemy's attention to that quarter, and that General Caffarelli has been able to detach only cavalry to the assistance of the army of Portugal. From the advantage derived from these operations, your Lordship will form a judgment of that which would have been derived, under existing circumstances, from the expedition which had been concerted and agreed upon to the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, with the troops from Sicily, combined with the Spanish troops in Majorca and at Alicante.

‘ I enclose a statement which I have made out from a return in my possession of the strength of the army of Aragon in the month of April, from which your Lordship will see that, after allowing for the divisions detached to the army of the North, under General Palombini, which was destined to join Marshal Marmont, there will still remain a very formidable army under Marshal Suchet, which it is desirable should not be added to the other troops acting against this army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

‘ I enclose the last report of our wounded officers and soldiers. I shall be much obliged to you if you will urge the Medical Board to send us out medical assistance as soon as possible.

‘ I likewise request your Lordship not to forget horses for the cavalry and the artillery, and money. We are absolutely bankrupt. The troops are now five months in arrears, instead of being one month in advance. The staff have not been paid since February ; the muleteers not since June, 1811 ; and we are in debt in all parts of the country. I am obliged to take the money sent to me by my brother for the Spaniards, in order to give my own troops a fortnight's pay, who are really suffering for want of money.

‘ It is said that Marmont cannot live, but could not stop to have his arm cut off, and that a mortification has taken place. It is difficult to judge of the exact loss of the French ;

but it is said to be between 17,000 and 20,000 men. They all agree, that if we had had an hour more of daylight, the whole army would have been in our hands. General Clausel, who is wounded, now commands the army. The only apprehension I have is, that when the army of Portugal and the King shall have joined, they will be too strong for us in cavalry. I am convinced that their infantry will make no stand.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ Boecillo, near Valladolid,  
30th July, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 28th June, with all the enclosures you refer to, excepting your instructions to Lieut. General Maitland; and I am happy to find that, although it appears that you do not expect any successful result from the operations of the Sicilian army on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, to which point I shall advert presently, you had resumed the intention of sending them there. I acknowledge that I thought that, upon consideration, you would find the grounds for your intended expedition to the coast of Italy so little satisfactory, that you would resume the plan for the eastern coast which had been concerted and arranged; and every thing remains in exactly the state in which it was in the beginning of June, excepting that the first division of the Sicilian army has gone, according to your former directions, to Sardinia. I should hope, however, that there will be no inconvenience in bringing it back from thence.

‘ In regard to the aid to Spain to be derived from this expedition, I am concerned to find that you have altered your opinion upon it since you first proposed the measure to Government; and if I did not hope that General Maitland and the Staff and other officers of the Sicilian army would alter their opinion upon a nearer view of what they have to accomplish, and its effect upon the contest, I should despair of any success from persons coming on a service holding such opinions.

‘I am quite certain that they can succeed in taking Tarragona, and in opening a communication between the fleet and the Spanish army by Tarragona—which is in itself a service of the greatest importance. I am likewise quite certain that they can take the city of Valencia; that they will thereby give to the Spaniards, and deprive the French of, an important resource; that the war will revive again in Valencia; and that, if matters are well arranged in that quarter, the enemy will never again gain possession of that city.

‘But if I should be mistaken in my expectations of their success in these operations, I cannot be mistaken in their effect upon my own. I have lately, on the 22nd, beaten Marshal Marmont in a general action, fought near Salamanca, and I have pursued him beyond the Duero; and our troops have this day entered Valladolid. The King is at Segovia, with a corps of 12,000 or 15,000 men; and, having driven Marmont from the lower Duero, my next object is to prevent him and Marmont, if possible, from joining, which I am about to attempt. But either the French must lose all their communications with their troops in the north of Spain, or they must oblige me to withdraw towards the frontiers of Portugal. They cannot effect this object without bringing against me Suchet’s army, or the army of the South, or both. I cannot but think it very important that the attention of Suchet should be diverted from his supposed operations against me by the operations of the Sicilian army, which will go to such important objects as Tarragona and Valencia. I should think it would be diverted from me by the operations of the Sicilian army, if they are in time, because I find that Sir Home Popham, with a few hundred marines and the guerrillas of the north, has succeeded in preventing Caffarelli from detaching any thing to Marmont’s assistance, excepting cavalry, notwithstanding the positive order of the King; and that he had obeyed these orders so far as to order troops to march to Marmont, which, upon hearing of Popham’s operations, he countermanded. Then, if Suchet’s attention should not be diverted from me, and, notwithstanding Marmont’s defeat, the French should become too strong for me in Old Castille, I shall at least have the satisfaction of reflecting, while I am retiring, that Gene-

ral Maitland's progress will be unopposed, and that we shall take Tarragona and Valencia.

‘ But it is not impossible, that neither my success in Castille, nor General Maitland's on the eastern coast, will eventually give any aid to Spain; upon which point I have nothing to say. That is a subject for the consideration of politicians; and, as a military officer, I can advert to any plan only as being likely to be attended with military success, or otherwise; but I beg to remark, that the same observation is applicable by politicians, not only to every military plan, but to the general operations of every war, and even to the objects of the war itself.

‘ I have taken up so much of your attention upon this subject, because, in my opinion, without intending it, you have, by a few words, thrown upon the King's Ministers a larger share of the responsibility for the success of General Maitland's expedition than belongs to them. I am certain he will succeed; and, at all events, he will do good to my operations. But much as I wish for their success, I assure you that I should not give my advice that General Maitland's credit, or the safety of the troops, should be risked for that object only.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

‘ Adverting to the Spring inspection of the 2nd batt. 87th regiment, I have to request that the return of Courts Martial during the period may be an extract from the Courts Martial book; in which must be detailed the soldier's name, the crime for which tried, the name of the officer who ordered the trial, the name of the President of the Court Martial, the sentence, and the punishment inflicted or remitted.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Dr. M<sup>c</sup>Grigor.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 29th, and have spoken to General Alava respecting the requisition on Peñaranda for bedding for the hospital at Salamanca. I shall send the requisition; but you have at Salamanca the Intendant, Señor Mexia, and he is the person who ought to make the requisition, and who has the power to enforce it.

‘Have we any hospital bedding of our own on the way up? Could we not have paillasses and sheets made at Salamanca?

‘We must expect some, I am afraid a large, increase of sickness; but adverting to the size and commodiousness of the buildings at Salamanca, to the existing probability that we shall keep possession of it in security, to the general healthiness of the situation, and to the ease with which the hospital at Salamanca can be evacuated if necessary, I am desirous, if possible, of not allowing the men to go farther back than that place.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Dr. M<sup>c</sup>Grigor.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

‘I have the honor to transmit a dispatch which I have received from Earl Bathurst, containing an application from General Mazaredo to have the regiment which he commands supplied with arms and clothing; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will comply with his wishes, and have the “Voluntarios de la Patria” furnished with arms and clothing from the equipments at your disposal at Cadiz, provided the corps should be in a sufficient state of discipline to receive arms.

‘In the event of there being any clothing in store of the pattern of that worn by General Mazaredo’s regiment, I will thank you to cause that to be issued on this occasion.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

‘ In compliance with the directions contained in your Lordship’s dispatch of the 30th of June (No. 6), I have requested His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cadiz to supply General Mazaredo’s regiment with arms and clothing from the equipments now at his disposal at that place.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Santocildes.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 1st August, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letters of the 30th, and I have written to the Conde de Amarante to request him to form the blockade of Zamora.

‘ I should hope that your Excellency would experience no difficulty in procuring mules to draw the artillery which I have placed at your disposition, by requisition on the large towns of Leon, the Asturias, and Castille.

‘ I have moved here in consequence of the reports of the King’s intention to move to Aranda de Duero, to join the remains of the army of Portugal; but it appears that he has taken the position at Segovia principally to cover Madrid, and I conclude he will move as soon as I shall approach him.

‘ I have learnt that the enemy have still about 200 men in Tordesillas; and I beg leave to recommend to your Excellency to send a force to take them, and gain possession of that town and the bridge over the Duero. They have nothing in Simancas.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Santocildes.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General the Conde de Amarante.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 1st August, 1812.

‘ Having suggested to General Santocildes the expediency that he should cross the Duero with the troops under his command, it is desirable that, in order to protect the communication of General Santocildes with the kingdom of Galicia, the troops belonging to your Excellency’s division,

now upon the Esla, should blockade Zamora, at least on the right of the Duero, if it should not be practicable for them to effect that object on the left of that river.

‘The garrison of Zamora consists of 800 men, I believe without cavalry, and your Excellency will be the best judge whether the force under your command, now on the Esla, is sufficient to undertake the blockade of that place on one or both sides of the Duero, under existing circumstances, and you will blockade the place or not, on one or both sides of the Duero, as you may think best.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Conde de Amarante.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To General el Conde de Penne Villemur.*

‘MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘Cuellar, ce 2 Août, 1812.

‘J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence, sans date, sur l’habillement de la 5<sup>me</sup> armée Espagnole. D’abord il faut que je vous dise que je n’ai pas encore d’habillement pour la cavalerie. En second lieu, il paraît que le regiment de l’Union est bien habillé, et il serait inutile de l’habiller de nouveau; mais si vous voulez envoyer un officier avec des charrettes à Alcacer do Sal, vous recevrez l’habillement pour 1400 hommes pour les regiments 1<sup>er</sup> de Leon et Tiradores de Badajoz.

‘Je ne puis vous donner aucune reponse sur votre proposition de lever un corps d’Hussards pour servir avec les troupes Anglaises; vous devriez la faire à votre Gouvernement.

‘Je vous prie d’ordonner à votre Commissaire que vous enverrez à Alcacer do Sal, de donner un reçu pour les articles d’habillement qu’il recevra.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘*El Conde de Penne Villemur.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘SIR,

‘Cuellar, 2nd August, 1812.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th of July, and with it the duplicates of the enclosures in a letter of the 28th June, which I had received from Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.

‘ I have now the honor of enclosing the copy of a letter which I wrote to Admiral Sir Edward Pellew on the 1st ultimo, containing my opinion on the line of operations to be followed, which I have every reason to believe will be successful.

‘ I hope that you will be joined by General Roche’s division.

‘ I have to inform you that this army beat Marshal Marmont in a general action, fought near Salamanca, on the 22nd of July; and we have pursued him beyond the Duero, and have taken possession of Valladolid. Marshal Marmont is badly wounded.

‘ The King had collected the army of the centre to co-operate with Marmont; and he retired first upon Madrid. He afterwards came forward to Segovia, where he remained till yesterday morning; but finding that I had turned some troops upon him, after Marmont had been driven across the Duero, he has retired through the Guadarrama to Madrid.

‘ I enclose a list of the corps of Suchet’s army, and their strength of non-commissioned officers and rank and file, as present and fit for duty in April last. The 20th and 60th regiments besides belong to this army, but I do not know their strength; and I am inclined to doubt their being with it.

‘ Since this return, Suchet has sent a division, under General Palombini, to join the army of the North, and I believe some troops to join the King.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 2nd August, 1812.

‘ I write to inform you that I have ordered the Commissary General to pay the chest of the aids 100,000 dollars on account of the subsidy for August. You received 200,000 dollars in July; that is, 100,000 of the sum received from England, and 100,000 of another sum.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 3rd August, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received farther intelligence of the strength and disposition of the army in Valencia.

‘ On the 18th June, the troops in the enclosed list, of which you have the strength under arms in the list I sent you yesterday, were distributed as therein stated in the kingdom of Valencia.

‘ It appears that they were collected on and south of the Jucar about the 20th of July, and that the 2nd division, under General Harispce, had some success near Castalla, where they were attacked on the 21st, as it is stated, by 12,000 men, under the command of General Joseph O’Donnell and General Roche.

‘ It appears that Suchet felt great uneasiness respecting a fleet which appeared off the coast of Cullera at that period ; which fleet I suppose to be either the empty ships attached to General Roche’s division at Alicante ; or the transports with General Roche’s division on board, returning to join you at Majorca, after hearing that Lord William Bentinck had sent the troops under your command ; or the transports attached to General Roche’s division, with Spanish troops on board, proceeding to make a landing on the coast of Valencia, in co-operation with the attack by Castalla.

‘ The 16th regiment, stated in the enclosed paper to be at Cuenca, arrived at Madrid on the 30th of July.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Maitland.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Roche.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 3rd August, 1812.

‘ I write to let you know that we beat Marshal Marmont in a general action fought near Salamanca on the 22nd of last month. He and many other General Officers were wounded, and some killed ; and the army almost destroyed as a military body. We pursued them beyond the Duero, and they are going to Burgos.

‘ The King assembled, at Blasco Sancho, the army of the Centre, and was in march to join Marmont, when he heard

of his defeat; he retired on the 25th, and went through the Guadarrama, but returned again to Segovia on the 27th, from whence he retired to Madrid on the 1st instant. He is very anxious to receive reinforcements from Suchet; and one regiment, the 16th, has joined him at Madrid. It arrived there the 30th.

‘I see by the French accounts, that the troops under General Joseph O’Donnell met with a check at Castalla on the 21st instant. They say that you were with them. But as there was likewise an expedition at sea off Cullera, I trust that that part of the story is not true; and that you will have joined the troops with which you were destined to act, and which have at last arrived at their destination.

‘Pray let me hear from you. I send this letter to General Joseph O’Donnell, to be opened by him or any of the Spanish or English generals.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Roche.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Cuellar, 3rd August, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 7th of July, and I am much obliged to you for what has been done for March and Lord Charles Manners.

‘In respect to Colonel Gordon, I hope that you will feel no uneasiness in regard to representations quite unauthorised by me, in respect to his being sent here. If I had felt any objections to the appointment I should have objected to it with as much freedom as I consented to it with readiness; and I entertain no doubt that he will be of much use to the army and to me.

‘I do not consider Stewart to have resigned his office, nor do I know how Pakenham feels about succeeding to it if he has. I will, however, speak to him. I am glad to find that Lord Aylmer is coming out, as it is time that we should have somebody besides Waters at the head of the Adjutant General’s department.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cuellar, 3rd August, 1812.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 8th July, in which you have informed me of the additional sums of money sent, and to be sent for the use of this army. I am much obliged to your Lordship for this attention to our wants.

‘ The arrival of the money will not only be very convenient and tend much to our security, but adverting to the comparative prices of all sorts of grain in this country and on the coast of Portugal, and to the expense of transport, I can assure your Lordship that it will decrease that part of the expense which defrays the consumption of grain by the troops and horses, to the amount of very nearly two thirds of the whole amount.

‘ Your Lordship will therefore see how important it is to keep up, if possible, the supply of money to the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cuellar, 3rd August, 1812.

‘ ——— has transmitted to me a copy of his letter of the 29th June to the Earl of Liverpool, in which he has informed his Lordship of his intention to resume the plan of sending the expedition to the eastern coast of Spain; and I received yesterday a letter of the 18th of July, of which I enclose a copy, from Lieut. General Maitland, who has arrived in Majorca in command of the British and German troops.

‘ I was concerned to observe in the letter from ——— to the Earl of Liverpool, that it was the opinion of ———, and the general opinion in Sicily, that the Spanish cause would derive “no real aid” from this expedition; notwithstanding that ——— had been the first to propose the expedition to the east coast of the Peninsula, and that I had concurred with him in thinking that it would be highly advantageous to the cause of the Peninsula in general, and to the operations of the army under my command in particular.

‘ Notwithstanding the disadvantage with which every service is carried on by officers who are of opinion that their

efforts will be useless; and notwithstanding that it appears too by the enclosed letter from Lieut. General Maitland, that he is not satisfied with his force, and not decided as to his object, I now entertain no doubt respecting the military success of this expedition, if the plan of operations is carried into execution which I suggested to ———— when the expedition to the east coast of the Peninsula was first in contemplation \*; and which I repeated to Admiral Sir Edward Pellew in my letter from Alaejos of the 1st July †.

‘ It is true that, owing to the alteration of the destination of the expedition, General Roche’s division has returned from the rendezvous to Alicante; and it is probable that they will not be employed in the first instance as was intended and expected. But it appears that they are employed in operations in Valencia against the army under the command of Marshal Suchet; and so far, they divert the attention of a part of his force from the troops under the command of Lieut. General Maitland.

‘ If the Lieutenant General should be successful in taking Tarragona, he will have rendered a most important aid to the cause in Spain. The Spanish army in Catalonia will again have a secure point of communication with His Majesty’s fleet, and with the Government at Cadiz; and the war in Catalonia will assume a new aspect. If Lieut. General Maitland should be able afterwards to take the city of Valencia, he will deprive the enemy, and will give to the Spaniards a resource of the utmost importance to both; and the retention of the possession of that city, connected with the position of the allied army in Castille, must have the most important result respecting the enemy’s position in the South of Spain. But I may be mistaken regarding the military success of Lieut. General Maitland’s expedition; and it is possible, though by no means probable, that he will fail in his attack upon Tarragona, and may not be able to make that proposed upon Valencia. I beg leave, however, still to submit to your Lordship my opinion that the disposable troops in Sicily could not be employed in a manner more advantageous to the cause of the allies in Spain, than in drawing the attention of the enemy to the east coast.

\* See page 5.

† See page 264.

‘ In my dispatch of the 28th ultimo, (No. 8) I transmitted to your Lordship a return of the army under the command of Marshal Suchet, to which the command of the army in Catalonia has recently been added. I see from the intercepted letters, that the King has been most urgent with him to send troops into Castille to reinforce the armies of Portugal and of the Centre; and one regiment, the 16th of the line, arrived at Madrid on the 30th of July. There is no doubt that still farther reinforcements would have been sent before this time if expectations had not been entertained on the eastern coast of the arrival of the troops from Sicily; and they would now be sent before long, if those troops did not appear upon the coast.

‘ I may be mistaken; but it appears to me to be an important military object to the cause of the allies, not to allow the brave army under my command to be overpowered in Castille by the junction in operation against them of all the French armies in Spain. In every view, therefore, of success or failure by the troops under Lieut. General Maitland, it appears to me that they will render material aid to the cause of the allies in Spain.

‘ I now beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to that part of Lord William Bentinck’s instruction to Lieut. General Maitland, enclosed in his dispatch to the Earl of Liverpool, of the 29th June, in which his Lordship directs the Lieut. General to quit the coast in the second week in September.

‘ It is perfectly true that His Majesty’s Government had at first in contemplation only a short service on the east coast; and that I reckoned upon the co-operation of the troops from Sicily, only till the period of the equinoctial gales.

‘ Circumstances, however, have now materially altered; and either my position in Castille must be supported by the continuation of the appearance of the troops on the eastern as well as on the northern coast of the Peninsula, or it must be expected that I shall be obliged to withdraw into Portugal at an early period after those troops shall have withdrawn.

‘ If Lieut. General Maitland should succeed in taking Valencia, there appears no reason for which he should quit the coast, unless, indeed, the enemy’s army in the kingdom of Naples should be so reinforced, as that the island of Sicily shall be in danger.

‘ If he should not succeed in taking Valencia, as long as the allies shall remain in possession of Minorca, Alicante, and Carthagena, there appears no reason why the fleet of transports and troops under the command of Lieut. General Maitland should quit the coast, or should discontinue their efforts to alarm the enemy for the safety of their possession of Valencia. The expedition to the northern coast might likewise remain on the coast to keep up the alarm which has already been so useful to this army.

‘ This is my view of these operations at the present moment ; and I hope that, if your Lordship should concur in it, you will send orders accordingly to Lieut. General Maitland, and to Sir Home Popham.

‘ Circumstances may put it in my power to acquire fresh successes, particularly against the army of the Centre ; and this army may by its own efforts secure its position in Castille at least till the French shall evacuate Andalusia. It will then remain to be considered what ought to be done with the Sicilian troops ; but in the mean time, I trust that your Lordship will not allow them to withdraw from the Peninsula, as ordered, in the second week in September.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Officer commanding His Majesty's Ships at Coruña.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 4th August, 1812.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send one of His Majesty's ships to England with my aide de camp, Captain the Earl of March \*, who has charge of dispatches which it is important that His Majesty's Government should receive at an early period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Officer commanding  
His Majesty's Ships at Coruña.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 4th August, 1812.

‘ I take the opportunity of Lord March's going to Coruña with dispatches for England, to write you a few lines to in-

\* The Duke of Richmond, K.G.

form you that we have driven Marmont's army, I believe, as far as Burgos, since our victory of the 22nd of last month. I have come here with our right, in order to look a little after the King, who had assembled the army of the Centre about Segovia, but he has retired upon Madrid.

‘ I beg leave to congratulate you upon the success of your operations. They have been of great use to me, as I know that Caffarelli was prevented from detaching more than cavalry to Marmont's assistance, and that he even recalled a division of troops which had marched for that purpose. I trust, therefore, that you will not discontinue them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 4th August, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th July, enclosing one of the 7th May from Lord Strangford. I beg that you will mention to Lord Strangford how much obliged to him I am for the trouble he has taken about grain for us ; and I beg that you will, without loss of time, take measures for the importation to Portugal, from the Brazils and River Plata, of as large quantities of wheat and wheat flour, principally, as can be got ; and of barley, oats, and Indian corn.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cuellar, 4th August, 1812.

‘ The French army of the Centre, after having passed through the Guadarrama pass, and after its head had arrived at the Venta de San Rafael, returned to Segovia, where King Joseph arrived on the 27th of July at night. The object of this movement was apparently to divert the allied troops from the pursuit of the army of Portugal, and to enable the latter to maintain themselves upon the Duero, in which, however, the enemy did not succeed. Their rear guard remained in some strength on the left of the Duero during the 28th and 29th ; but the Light and 1st divisions, and the cavalry, having crossed the Eresma and Cegar rivers on the latter day, the enemy's rear guard retired during the

night across the Duero, and thence followed the movements of the main body towards Villavañez, abandoning Valladolid, and leaving there 17 pieces of cannon, a large quantity of shot and shells, and other stores, and the hospital, with about 800 sick and wounded.

‘ The guerrilla chief, Marquiñez, took 300 prisoners in the neighbourhood of Valladolid on the 30th. Our advanced guard crossed the Duero, and our parties entered Valladolid on the same day; and I had the satisfaction of being received by the people in that city with the same enthusiastic joy as I had been in all other parts of the country.

‘ The army of Portugal having thus crossed and quitted the Duero, it was necessary to attend to the movements of the army of the Centre, and to prevent a junction between the two on the Upper Duero, which it was reported was intended. While therefore the advanced guard and left continued the pursuit of the army of Portugal, I moved the right along the Cegar to Cuellar, where I arrived on the 1st instant.

‘ The King retired from Segovia on the evening of the 1st, and marched through the Guadarrama; and he left at Segovia an advanced guard, principally of cavalry, under General Espert, having destroyed the cannon and ammunition which were in the castle; having carried off the church plate and other valuable property, and having levied a considerable contribution on the inhabitants of the town.

‘ I have not yet heard whether a detachment which I sent to Segovia yesterday, under Brig. General D’Urban, had entered that town.

‘ The Army of Portugal have continued their retreat towards Burgos.

‘ The siege of Astorga is not yet brought to a conclusion; but upon finding that the King had returned from La Venta de San Rafael on the 27th of July, I requested General Santocildes to come nearer to this army, and to cross the Duero with that part of his corps which had approached that river, and he is now at La Nava del Rey; but he is now about to return to the right of that river, and he will place himself near the fords of Pollos and Herreros, and communicate with our left.

‘ The enemy have continued to increase their force in

Estremadura, and had moved about the 27th or 28th towards the Guadiana, and threatened a force which I had requested Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill to place at Merida, with a view to its march to the right of the Tagus, in case the enemy's long-threatened detachment should move in this direction. But Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill having moved from Zafra to Villa Franca, the enemy retired again into La Serena.

'I enclose Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill's report of a very handsome affair with the enemy's cavalry on the 24th of July, by the division of cavalry under the command of Lieut. General Sir William Erskine\*.

\* *Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B., to General the Earl of Wellington, K.B.*

'MY LORD,

'Zafra, 27th July, 1812.

'I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a letter from Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine, and one from Major General Long, reporting an affair between some of our cavalry and three regiments of the enemy's cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Ribera, on the 24th instant.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'General  
the Earl of Wellington, K.G.'

'R. HILL.

*Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine to Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

'SIR,

'Los Santos, 25th July, 1812.

'I have the honor to report to you that a body of the enemy's cavalry, consisting of two regiments of dragoons and one of chasseurs, under the command of General of Brigade Lallemand, attacked yesterday morning the Portuguese piquet at Hinojosa, which they drove in as far as Ribera, where four squadrons of Portuguese cavalry were stationed under the command of Colonel Campbell†.

'The force under Colonel Campbell being greatly inferior to that of the enemy, he was under the necessity of retiring upon Villa Franca, which he did in the best order, Major General Long advancing at the same time from Villa Franca, with the brigade of British cavalry under his command, and Captain Lefebvre's troop of horse artillery to support him. The enemy, on perceiving the advance of General Long's brigade, halted on the high ground betwixt Ribera and Villa Franca, General Long also halting until joined by a part of his brigade that had been detached in the morning to observe the enemy on the side of Usagre. During this interval I directed Major General Slade, with two regiments of his brigade, to move from Los Santos, and directed its march on the left flank and rear of the enemy. As soon as General Long had collected the whole of his brigade he moved forward against the enemy, who immediately withdrew beyond the defile at Ribera. General Long passed the defile to the right and left of the town, and attacked the enemy with much spirit, whilst the artillery fired with good effect from the high ground on the Villa Franca side of the defile. The enemy retired rapidly upon Hinojosa

† *Maréchal de Campo Sir John Campbell, K.C.T.S.*

‘By accounts from Cadiz of the 24th July, I learn that General Ballesteros having moved towards Malaga, some

closely followed; from Hinojosa the enemy retired to Llera, and from thence to Valencia de Las Torres. They were followed as far as Llera. At Hinojosa the two regiments under Major General Slade joined Major General Long’s brigade, having made a very rapid march at a trot from Los Santos; but from the great distance could not arrive in sufficient time to cut off the enemy’s retreat upon Llera.

‘Major General Long speaks in the highest terms of all the troops under his command, particularly the horse artillery, who displayed great activity in their movements and precision in their fire, by which the enemy suffered very considerably. The loss of the enemy on this occasion has been about 30 men, and a great many horses killed; 11 men and above 30 horses taken. The loss on our side has been only one man killed, and seven wounded.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘W. ERSKINE.

*Major General Long to Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine, Bart.*

‘SIR,

‘Villa Franca, 25th July, 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose Colonel Campbell’s report upon the proceedings of yesterday, at the point where he was more immediately engaged; and his report is sufficiently circumstantial, and, as far as I can judge, correct, to render it unnecessary for me to expatiate on the subject.

‘I received the report of the enemy’s advance upon Ribera too late to admit of my preventing his occupying that town, and the commanding heights on this side. The account of his force was so differently represented, that having three troops of the brigade absent, I thought it not advisable to act against him until they could be recalled; and as the attempt to dislodge him might bring on a serious affair, on ground of which all the advantages were on the enemy’s side, I was anxious to secure the support of the 3rd dragoon guards, stationed at Fuente del Maestre, and to wait for the report of what might be passing on the side of Usagre, before I commenced any offensive movement.

‘Finding upon the arrival of the patrol from Usagre, that no enemy was in that neighbourhood, I directed the troops under my command (without waiting longer for the 3rd dragoon guards) to proceed against the enemy. They retired across the river, which enabled me to bring up the artillery upon the heights they had relinquished, and to employ it with evident and very good effect; and I continued my advance upon, and pursuit of the enemy as rapidly as I thought consistent with the preservation of order and regularity, beyond the defile of Hinojosa, when, from the lateness of the hour, the fatigue sustained by the Portuguese troops, the artillery and one squadron of the hussars, I judged it proper to halt.

‘Nothing could exceed the steadiness of the 9th and 13th dragoons, the activity of the artillery, and the precision of their fire, or the good countenance and gallantry displayed by those portions of the Portuguese troops and of my own brigade, that had the opportunity of closing with and engaging the enemy. And I consider myself justified in estimating the loss of the latter, at the very lowest, at 45 men killed and prisoners. With respect to the horses, so many

apprehensions were entertained that he was cut off from San Roque and Gibraltar, by the rapid movements of General Villatte's division from the blockade of Cadiz to the neighbourhood of Los Barrios; and it appears that General Laval, with another division, was between General Ballesteros and Malaga.

‘ There had been no accounts from Gibraltar of a later date than the 21st, at which time it appears to me that it was not practicable for General Ballesteros to retire to Gibraltar; but I trust that, finding that to be impracticable, he will at once have taken his line of retreat upon the kingdom of Murcia.

‘ It appears that when Lieut. General Roche found that were left mutilated and killed in the field, and others caught and carried away by the peasants, that I have no criterion by which to judge of the enemy's loss in this respect, but we have only brought away 20.

‘ I feel myself particularly indebted to Colonel Campbell for his assistance and co-operation; and I should be wanting in justice if I omitted to express my admiration of the conduct of the artillery under the immediate orders of Captains Lefebre and Whinyates, and my approbation of the spirit displayed by a squadron of the 2nd hussars, under Major Wissel, supported by the two divisions of the 9th and 13th dragoons, under Lieut. Handley of the former, and Lieut. Edwards of the latter regiment.

‘ It is equally my duty to acknowledge the services I received from Captain Wemyss and Lieut. Strenuwitz, two of your personal Staff, whose zeal, spirit, and exertions were, as usual, conspicuous; nor are the officers of my own Staff (Brig. Major Dunbar and Captain Dean) less deserving of my notice.

‘ Enclosed is a return of casualties sustained upon this occasion.  
‘ I have the honor to be, &c.  
‘ Lieut. General  
‘ R. Long, Major Gen.  
Sir W. Erskine, Bart.’

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of Major General Long's brigade, in an affair with the Enemy near Ribera, on the 24th July, 1812.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	—	—	—	—	—
Wounded . .	—	—	6	7	6
Missing . . .	—	—	—	1	—

Lord William Bentinck did not propose to carry into execution the plan of operations which had been concerted on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, he returned with his division from Majorca to Alicante.

‘ I judge from the French accounts which I have received, that General Joseph O’Donnell, who commands the Spanish army of Murcia, and, it is said, General Roche, attacked the French General Harispe, on the 21st of July, at Castalla in Valencia, while a body of troops in a fleet of transports, as I believe, coming from the south, threatened a landing on the coast near Cullera. The French reports state that Generals O’Donnell and Roche were defeated by General Harispe, and lost 3000 prisoners and 3 pieces of cannon ; but Marshal Suchet had collected the greatest part of the French force in Valencia, consisting of three divisions of infantry and his cavalry, on and to the south of the Jucar.

‘ The 16th French regiment, from Marshal Suchet’s army, joined the army of the Centre at Madrid, on the 30th of July.

‘ Lord William Bentinck having resumed the expedition to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, I have a letter from Lieut. General Maitland, of the 18th July, announcing his arrival at Majorca, and stating that the troops which were sent from Sicily, the equipments from Portugal, and the troops under General Whittingham, were collected there.

‘ I have received no further accounts of the operations under Sir Home Popham.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I have just heard that the French troops under General Espert have withdrawn from Segovia by San Ildefonso.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cuellar, 4th August, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from Dr. M’Grigor, giving an account of the sick and wounded officers and soldiers, and a medical return of the sick and wounded officers.

‘ I likewise enclose the money state of the field army of the 1st of August ; and a memorandum, showing the dif-

ference of our numbers by this and the state of the 12th of July, enclosed on the 14th of July.

‘I am sorry to say that the British troops are by no means healthy, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to make moderate marches with them, and to encamp them in healthy situations, and that they have never failed to receive their regular food.

‘The 5th and 38th regiments, and the troops recently arrived from England, are excessively unhealthy; and those arrived from the Mediterranean, viz., the 2nd batt. 4th regiment, from Ceuta, and the 82nd regiment, from Gibraltar, are not much better, although the latter have not yet joined the army, and are not on the returns.

‘The truth is, that neither officers nor soldiers are accustomed to march. The soldiers are very irregular; and, owing to their irregularities, are not able to bear the labor of marching in the heat of the sun; and then the commanding officers of each of the 2nd batt. 4th, the 1st batt. 5th, 38th, and 82nd regiments, as well as the commanding officer of the 1st batt. 42nd regiment, have disobeyed the orders which were given to them, to have their men supplied with blankets before they marched from Lisbon, and they are consequently very inadequately protected, in comparison with the other soldiers, from the sun in the day time, and from the dews at night.

‘It gives me great concern to be obliged to bring under your Lordship’s view this state of this fine army; but bad as it is, I think there is reason to apprehend that it will become worse in the course of the next two months.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Cuellar, 4th August, 1812.

‘I have the pleasure to send you a letter from Dr. M’Grigor, which I have received since I wrote my dispatch on our sickness this day. However, it is very bad; and it is melancholy to see the finest and bravest soldiers in the world falling down, owing to their own irregularities, and the igno-

rant presumption of those who think they know better what is good for them than those do who have been serving so long in this country.

‘ If your Lordship should reinforce this army by an entire regiment, or regiments of infantry, I recommend that they should come to Coruña. Let cavalry or artillery horses, or detachments of recruits for infantry, go to Lisbon as usual.

‘ Let regiments of infantry coming to Coruña bring with them articles of equipment according to the enclosed list; and I will take measures to have those regiments provided with mules and means of transport at Coruña, and that they shall be fed and taken care of on the road.

‘ If you should send any regiments to Coruña, and there should be any recruits ready to be sent at the same time for any other regiment in the army, they might come by Coruña likewise, attached to the regiment, and under charge and direction of its commanding officer.

‘ It would be desirable to send with any regiments which should land at Coruña a Staff Surgeon and a hospital mate, in case any men should become sick on the road, that they might not want medical assistance, as I fear they could get none in Galicia. I am in hopes, however, that as the weather becomes cool in Galicia and Leon at an earlier period of the season than it does in Portugal, and particularly as there is no *new* wine in Galicia, troops marching through that province in August and September will not suffer in their health as they would in Portugal, and that we shall get them to the army in a tolerable state for service. But many preparatory arrangements must be made for cavalry and artillery horses, and for recruits, which can be made only at Lisbon, for which reason I recommend that these should be sent to that place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cuellar, 4th August, 1812.

‘ I send duplicates of my dispatches of the 21st, 24th, and 28th ultimo, and dispatches of yesterday’s and this day’s date to England by my aide de camp, Captain the Earl of March,

by Coruña, as I think it possible that they may reach your Lordship at an earlier period than by way of Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Ross.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 5th August, 1812.

‘ General Roche or General O'Donnell will have apprized you of recent events in this quarter, and I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th July.

‘ I beg that you will leave a sufficient garrison in the forts of Las Galeras and Atalaya, and will proceed with the remainder of the troops under your command to join and put yourself under the command of Lieut. General Maitland, applying to Captain Adam, or any other officer of the navy on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, to provide you with means to transport your troops.

‘ In case Lieut. General Maitland should not land on the Peninsula, or should re-embark, you will understand that you are to return to Carthagena, with the troops under your command, from which place you are detached only for the moment; and you will be so kind as to retain in your hands the control over all that is going on there, and desire the commanding officer to report to you every thing that occurs.

‘ I shall apprize Major General Cooke of my having given you these instructions, which I send open to General O'Donnell; and you will be so kind as to communicate them to General Maitland.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Ross.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Roche.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cuellar, 5th August, 1812.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you on the 3rd. It is useless to tell you or General O'Donnell what I propose to do, because you cannot aid in my plans. I only request that you may not be defeated again; and to accomplish this object you must not attack the French if success is not quite certain.

‘Threaten as much as you can, but do not engage in serious affairs.

‘Send the enclosed to General Ross, and the other to General Maitland. You may peruse both.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Roche.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Cuellar, 5th August, 1812.

‘I believe you are aware that I have always had the best intelligence from Salamanca, which was given to me by persons residing there at the constant risk of their lives, who have uniformly refused to be rewarded for their services, which they very justly considered to be rendered to their country. They have now applied to me to have their services considered and rewarded by the Spanish Government, and I enclose you the papers which they have sent me; and I request you to use your utmost influence with the Government, that they may attend to the claims of these worthy individuals.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cuellar, 5th August, 1812.

‘I have this day received your letters of the 14th, 17th, two of the 20th, and one of the 21st, which had been delayed in consequence of my having given orders that the post might be stopped when Marshal Marmont was moving on our right flank.

‘In answer to that of the 17th, I have to assure you that I never authorised Mr. Mackenzie to issue that or any other Proclamation. I must observe, however, that our situation in Portugal is rather a difficult one. We are required to make the greatest exertions to carry on the war, and the Government give us no assistance, and take no steps to have their own orders and regulations carried into execution. Then, if any subordinate British officer surpasses the bounds of his authority in order to call forth adequate exertion, the subject is immediately made one of serious complaint and

remonstrance. How long is this state of things to continue to exist?

‘ I have referred your letter to the Commissary General, and have desired him to call upon Mr. Mackenzie to account for his conduct in issuing such a Proclamation.

‘ In your letter of the 20th, I see another instance of the readiness of Dom M. Forjaz to make any complaints, and to discover any excuse for not doing that which ought to be done. The truth is, that we owe nothing to the Portuguese Government on account of posts, as will very easily be shown; and I have ordered the accounts to be closed up to the 29th of June last. But if we owed any large sums, it must be admitted that we have before paid them regularly; and I see no reason whatever why Dom M. Forjaz should be allowed to delay paying Mr. Reynolds till the army account should be settled. However, the army account shall be settled forthwith, and there shall hereafter be no accounts whatever with the Portuguese Post Office.

‘ In answer to your other letter of the 20th, regarding an increase of subsidy, I have but to repeat that not only I shall not propose, but I shall oppose myself to every augmentation of the Portuguese subsidy in any shape.

‘ It was always settled that the British officers in the Portuguese service were to be paid from the chest of the “aids;” and neither the Paymaster General of the army, nor the Paymasters of their regiments, know any thing about their pay. Mr. Bell, as keeper of the chest of the “aids,” makes such arrangements as he thinks proper, either with provincial paymasters, or others, for their payment of these officers; and I deny that the supplies of money from the Commissariat to the chest of the “aids” has been so low as to prevent latterly their regular payment.

‘ I refer to my letter of the 9th of May to Dom M. Forjaz, and to the state of our subsequent payments to the end of July, to show that the payments in money and kind by the Commissariat have exceeded the subsidy; but the real state of the case is, that the omission of the Government to supply other funds for the support of the army has rendered it necessary to issue to the military chest, from the chest of the “aids,” all the money which has been lodged in the latter, and nothing has remained to pay the English officers.

‘ I believe the arrangement was, that the Portuguese Government should make a specific demand for supplies of grain and provisions by the 20th of every month for the succeeding month, with which I would comply if I could; and I wait for that demand for the month of August.

‘ In regard to money, I have already ordered, as I told you in my letter of the 2nd instant, that 100,000 dollars should be given immediately for August; and I shall order that further sums be given when I shall hear that we have them to give.

‘ I have but one answer to give to your letter of the 21st. The Government will make such regulations as they may think proper regarding entries of grain, or other supplies for the British army, and they shall be obeyed as far as it may be in my power to enforce them. If the army should suffer any inconvenience from such regulations, I shall make a representation on the subject to my own Government, who will take such measures as they may think proper.

‘ I conceive that there are strong objections to any interference on the part of the officers of the Portuguese Government in the army stores, or in the purchases by the British Commissariat; nor do I see what object this interference is to attain. I do not approve of the Portuguese *employés*, from top to bottom; and it is not improbable that the object of this interference, and these inquiries, is to enable some of them to give information to the sellers and importers of corn of the state of our stores, to enable them to regulate their sales according to this information. However, let the Government regulate the matter as they please, and their regulation shall be obeyed; and if I should find that inconvenience results from it, I shall inform my Government of it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

#### MEMORANDUM.

*To be communicated to General Santocildes.*

‘ Cuellar, 5th August, 1812. ’

‘ The army under Marshal Marmont having decidedly retired upon Burgos, and that of the King upon Madrid, the Light and 1st divisions of the allied British and Portu-

guese army, which have been hitherto towards the river Duero, have received orders to move nearer to the main body of the army, which will move towards Madrid.

‘ The body of Major General Anson’s brigade will remain at Villavañez, in order to keep up the alarm on that side ; and two or three squadrons are to be sent to Peñafiel, in order to observe the Upper Duero.

‘ General Alava is requested to give directions that the guerrillas of Saornil and El Principe [may place themselves under the directions of Major General Anson.

‘ The 6th division of infantry, and certain other troops, of which a list will be sent to Major General Clinton by the Quarter Master General, are to remain at Cuellar ; and those troops of Major General Anson’s brigade of cavalry, which have lately been employed to keep up the communication with the 1st and Light divisions, must now be employed to keep up the communication with Major General Clinton.

‘ It is recommended that General Santocildes should remain on the right of the Duero, about Tordesillas, occupying Simancas, and communicating with Major General Anson at Villavañez, through Valladolid.

‘ The guerrillas of Marquíñez should act under the directions of General Santocildes, and should observe all that passes towards Palencia, &c., on the right of the Pisuerga.

‘ The Conde de Amarante should continue to blockade Zamora, on the right of the Duero.

‘ In case the enemy should move by Palencia, and endeavor to raise the siege of Astorga, or the blockade of Zamora, while the allied British and Portuguese army will be engaged towards Madrid, which is not very probable, as they have nothing but the cavalry in a state fit for service, the Conde de Amarante must necessarily raise the blockade of Zamora, and retire behind the Esla ; and General Santocildes should likewise take such a position with his troops on the Esla, as to cover the operations of the siege of Astorga.

‘ If the siege of Astorga should be brought to a conclusion, and that part of the army of Galicia should be at liberty, we shall be informed of it ; and this event will make so important a change in our situation, that a new

arrangement will be suggested to General Santocildes for the whole army.

‘ In case the enemy should manœuvre by the Upper Duero, moving above the junction of the Pisuerga, Major General Anson should retire upon Major General Clinton’s corps, at Cuellar, and, if necessary, both upon Segovia, so as to draw nearer to the army. In this case, and more particularly if the enemy should not have moved any troops upon Palencia, or the right of the Pisuerga, General Santocildes should cross that river at Simancas, and by moving along the Duero, endeavor to cut off their communication with Burgos.

‘ The troops under Don Julian to be directed by General Alava, to follow the movements of the allied British and Portuguese army.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To General Santocildes.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Mozoncillo, 5th August, 1812. 6 P.M.

‘ Upon considering our situation in all its views, I have thought that I should do most good to the cause by marching immediately upon Madrid, and by endeavoring to dislodge the enemy from thence; and I enclose the memorandum of the plan which I have ordered for the troops under my command remaining on the Duero, and at Cuellar; of that for the Conde de Amarante; and of that which I recommended for the adoption of your Excellency.

‘ I propose to return to this part of the country, and to resume our plans on Zamora, as soon as I shall have removed the King from Madrid.

‘ I recommend to your Excellency to attend to the enemy’s movements from Burgos, towards the kingdom of Leon. I propose to return into Old Castille as soon as I can; but I think it most likely that as soon as they shall hear that I am gone towards Madrid, they will move some troops in the direction of the kingdom of Leon, and much will depend upon your being on the Escla before them.

‘ You should lose no time in getting to your army your guns from Salamanca; and in removing from Valladolid the shot and shells to Salamanca, and the guns into Galicia.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Santocildes.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Santocildes.*

‘ SIR,

‘ San Ildefonso, 9th August, 1812.

‘ When I was at Valladolid, it was settled between General Alava and me that the officers and soldiers whom the French had left there should be sent off to Coruña; and I understood from General Alava that Don Benito Marquñez had sent off all, of both descriptions, who were able to bear the journey. Yet I have heard that French officers have appeared in the streets of Valladolid, perfectly recovered, and with their swords on.

‘ I beg to draw your Excellency’s attention to this subject, and to point out to you the impropriety of the existence of such a practice, and the inconvenience which must result from it.

‘ It is desirable that, as soon as any officers or soldiers should recover sufficiently they should be sent off to Coruña; and that every measure should be adopted which is practicable, in order to interrupt the communication between the enemy at Burgos and the city of Valladolid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Santocildes.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ Torre Lodones, near Madrid,

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

11th August, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th instant, but none others, whether in cipher or in ordinary writing.

‘ I beg to observe to you that I have no cipher in which I could correspond with you; and unless the Spaniards in the north are very different from those I have seen elsewhere, or the enemy opposed to you more active than those I have met with, you have no reason to apprehend that your letters will be intercepted. Those to whom they may be entrusted may not choose to take the trouble of carrying them; but they would prefer death to delivering them to the enemy.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your account of your operations. In regard to those which you have proposed to General Mendizabal, I beg to remind you that Marmont’s army have fled to Burgos; and, although they are not in a

state to meet us, or any other body that can be called an army, I fear they would be too much for Mendizabal and his guerrillas. Mendizabal will of course have heard of Marmont's march to Burgos, and will have taken care to keep out of the way.

‘ In regard to Mendizabal's operations, it is difficult, if not impossible for me to point out what they ought to be, as I am entirely ignorant of his force and means. I have never yet seen or heard of a Spanish corps capable of undertaking any serious operation against the enemy, such as the siege of Burgos would be, even if Marmont's remains had not gone there, unless in co-operation with a British corps ; and I cannot recommend for Mendizabal that which I am quite certain he has not the means of accomplishing.

‘ In regard to us, after I had driven Marmont's army beyond the Duero, and that they had quitted that river on their way to Burgos in a state of disorganization and distress, from which they will not soon recover, I turned my attention towards the army of the Centre, under the King, which was collected on my flank and in my rear. They have retired from Madrid, and I hope to be in that city to-morrow, and if I can, give the King a blow ; and when the army of Galicia, which has now been two months engaged in the siege of Astorga, can bring that operation to a close, I may turn my attention to the north. But we have still too many enemies in the centre and south untouched to think of that side.

‘ In the mean time, the guerrillas in the north, and Mendizabal, should do every thing in their power to harass the enemy, to prevent them from collecting magazines of provisions, and, above all, from communicating with each other. Any town or village which should supply the enemy with any thing, unless obliged by force of arms, should be destroyed.

‘ If the Spaniards will not raise regular armies, and fight like other people, we must make the whole population enter into the war if they choose to continue it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ The numbers in your signal book would be as good a cipher as we could use ; but you must send me a book by a

messenger from Coruña, and let me acknowledge the receipt of it before you use it in this manner.'

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

'Torre Lodones, near Madrid,  
11th August, 1812.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'I received this morning your letter of the 3rd, enclosing the intelligence from America.

'As the mouth of the Channel, and the coasts of Portugal and Spain, will swarm with American privateers, it will be very desirable that you and Admiral Martin should write, as I shall, to England, to have measures adopted for the security of our packets in particular, and for the general security of our communication with Coruña on one side, and Cadiz and Gibraltar on the other.

'In regard to the first, I shall recommend that we may have, at all times, a ship of war cruising off Cape Finisterre, and that the packets homeward bound should be ordered to make Ushant, from whence they should be seen in safety to Falmouth; and that those outward bound should be ordered to make Cape Finisterre.

'In regard to the second object, I propose to recommend that the Admiral of the Lisbon station should be reinforced in frigates and craft to enable him to secure the communication between Cape Finisterre and the Rock of Lisbon, and between the Tagus and Cadiz and Gibraltar.

'Believe me, &c.

'*His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

'WELLINGTON.

'We shall be in Madrid to-morrow. I am not quite certain whether the enemy mean to leave a garrison in the Retiro.

'The advanced posts were this day withdrawn towards Talavera; but I see by letters from Hill of the 6th that to that day nothing had moved from Estremadura to join the King. I propose to detain the mail till we shall have entered Madrid.'

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ Torre Lodones, near Madrid,  
‘ 11th August, 1812.

‘ SIR,  
‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, containing a memorial from Lieut. Colonel Stewart, of the 50th regiment, in favor of the widow of Captain Candler of that corps, and one from Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham, forwarding and recommending an application from the widow of Captain Prescott, of the Royal Fusiliers, to receive some provision for herself and children. I beg you will submit these papers to the favorable consideration of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.  
‘ I have the honor to be, &c.  
‘ *Colonel Torrens.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ Torre Lodones, near Madrid,  
11th August, 1812.

‘ MY LORD,  
‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Marshal Sir William Beresford, on the subject of the clothing for the Portuguese army; and I beg to recommend that, if your Lordship should approve of the arrangements proposed by the Marshal, measures may be taken to insure the early arrival of all the equipments required.  
‘ I have the honor to be, &c.  
‘ *Earl Bathurst.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ Madrid, 13th August, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,  
‘ I have long intended to write to you, but I have really not had time to write to any body. I was much concerned to learn that you were so unwell; but I hope that you will soon be better, as I am very anxious to have you again with the army.  
‘ Our operations, since you left us, have been as follows. We followed Marmont as closely as we could to the Duero, but he marched at such a rate, and our troops were so much fatigued, that after the first day we did him but little mischief. After driving him from Valladolid, it appears that

he and the King, who had returned from this side to Segovia, had thoughts of joining at Aranda de Duero, and I moved our right to Cuellar. I there gave the troops a day's halt, upon finding the King retired upon Madrid; and afterwards I thought that, upon the whole, the best thing I could do would be to move upon the King and fight him, or force him from Madrid, which I have carried into execution.

‘I could not go farther north without great inconvenience, and I could at that moment do nothing else. I have left Anson's brigade on the Duero to observe Marmont; and Clinton's division, and all the new infantry, at Cuellar, to support and keep the communication with him.

‘The King has retired upon Aranjuez and Toledo, leaving a garrison in the Retiro.

‘We had a devil of an affair on the evening of the 11th. The French, 2000 cavalry, moved upon the Portuguese cavalry; D'Urban ordered them to charge the advanced squadrons, which charge they did not execute as they ought, and they ran off, leaving our guns (Captain M'Donald's troop). They ran in upon the German cavalry, half a mile or more in their rear, where they were brought up; but they would not charge on the left of the Germans. These charged and stopped the enemy; but Colonel de Jonquières was taken, and we have lost a good many of these fine fellows. There are 20 killed, and about as many wounded and prisoners. We likewise lost three guns of M'Donald's troop in the Portuguese flight, but the French left them behind.

‘If Elley is recovered, I wish you would desire him to have an eye to the sick and wounded horses and men of the cavalry, particularly of Ponsonby's brigade, which are at Salamanca.

‘The 5th dragoon guards are very weak. I have written to England about horses; but I am sadly apprehensive that our horses will fall off terribly before the campaign will be over. They are now, however, in as good condition (the Germans in better) as they have been during the campaign: but the wear and tear in these constant marches and skirmishes must wear them out.

‘I have desired the light dragoons and hussars to mount some of their dismounted men upon French and Spanish captured horses. I think that the heavy cavalry also might

do something of the same kind: that is, they might mount upon French horses the men who attend the baggage, and bring all the effective English horses into the ranks. I wish you would turn this suggestion over in your mind.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I shall make every body shoe up while we shall be engaged in the siege of the Retiro.’

*To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Madrid, 13th August, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 29th June, regarding your pay. Your name was not included in the abstract solely by mistake, which mistake I have had rectified, and the matter will be settled as you wish.

‘ You see by the date of this letter that we have got on since you left us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

*the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Madrid, 13th August, 1812.

‘ Having found that the army under Marshal Marmont continued their retreat upon Burgos, in a state not likely to be able to take the field again for some time; and knowing that I could not quit the river Duero in pursuit of them at the present moment, without incurring great inconvenience, and exposing the rear and communications of the army to the operations of the army of the Centre, under the King, I determined to move upon that army, and to endeavor to bring the King to a general action, or to force him to quit Madrid.

‘ Accordingly I moved from Cuellar on the 6th instant, leaving there the 6th division, and the regiments which had lately joined the army from England and Gibraltar, and which were in a state of health not to be able to bear the march, and Major General Anson’s brigade of cavalry on the Duero, to observe the movements of the army of Por-

tugal. These troops were put in communication with General Santocildes' division of the army of Galicia, likewise on the Duero, near the fords of Pollos and Herreros; and the parties of guerrillas under Marquínez, Principe, and Saornil, were attached to Major General Anson and General Santocildes, and objects fixed for their attention. We arrived at Segovia on the 7th, and at San Ildefonso on the 8th, where I halted one day, to allow the right of the army more time to come up.

'No opposition was made to the passage of the troops through the mountains; and Brig. General D'Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, the 1st light battalion of the King's German Legion, and Captain M'Donald's troop of horse artillery, had been through the Guadarrama pass since the 9th. He moved forward on the morning of the 11th, from the neighbourhood of Galapagar, and supported by the heavy cavalry of the King's German Legion from Torre Lodones, he drove in the French cavalry, about 2000 in number, and placed himself at Majalahonda, with the Portuguese cavalry, and Captain M'Donald's troop, and the cavalry and light infantry of the King's German Legion at Las Rozas, about three quarters of a mile distant.

'The enemy's cavalry which had been driven off in the morning, and had moved towards Navalecarnero, returned about five in the afternoon; and Brig. General D'Urban having formed the Portuguese cavalry in front of Majalahonda, supported by the horse artillery, ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy's leading squadrons, which appeared too far advanced to be supported by their main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but unfortunately turned about before they reached the enemy; and they fled through the village of Majalahonda, and back upon the German dragoons, leaving behind them unprotected and unsupported the guns of Captain M'Donald's troop, which had been moved forward to co-operate with the cavalry. By the activity of the officers and soldiers of Captain M'Donald's troop, the guns were, however, moved off; but owing to the unfavorable nature of the ground over which they were moved, the carriage of one was broken, and two others were overturned, and these three guns fell into the enemy's hands.

‘ The Portuguese dragoons having fled through Majalahonda, were rallied and re-formed, when the heavy dragoons of the King’s German Legion, which were formed between that village and Las Rozas, and the German cavalry, charged the enemy, although under many disadvantages, and stopped their further progress ; but I am sorry to say that they suffered considerable loss, and that Colonel de Jonquières, who commanded the brigade, was taken prisoner.

‘ The left of the army was about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles distant, at the Puente del Retamar, on the Guadarrama river ; and Colonel Ponsonby’s brigade of cavalry and a brigade of infantry of the 7th division, having moved forward to the support of the troops in advance, the enemy retired upon Majalahonda as soon as they observed these troops, and night having come on they retired upon Alarcon, leaving our guns at Majalahonda.

‘ I have reason to believe, both from the manner in which the enemy came on to the attack of the Portuguese troops, and from other circumstances, that they had been informed that we had none but Portuguese dragoons in front, and that there were no troops in the neighbourhood to support them. The occurrences of the 22nd July had induced me to hope that the Portuguese dragoons would have conducted themselves better, or I should not have placed them at the outposts of the army. But every day’s experience shows that no reliance can be placed on cavalry which is not in a perfect state of discipline, and of which the men do not feel a perfect confidence in the officers. I shall therefore not place them again at the outposts, or in situations in which by their misconduct they can influence the safety of the other troops.

‘ I am happy to report that the officers of the Portuguese cavalry behaved remarkably well, and showed a good example to their men, particularly the Visconde de Barbacena, who was taken prisoner. The conduct of the brave German cavalry was, I understand, excellent, as well as that of Captain M’Donald’s troop of horse artillery. The light infantry battalion were not engaged.

‘ The army moved forward yesterday morning, and its left took possession of the city of Madrid, the King having re-

tired with the army of the Centre by the roads of Toledo and Aranjuez, leaving a garrison in the Retiro.

‘ It is impossible to describe the joy manifested by the inhabitants of Madrid upon our arrival; and I hope that the prevalence of the same sentiments of detestation of the French yoke, and of a strong desire to secure the independence of their country, which first induced them to set the example of resistance to the usurper, will induce them again to make exertions in the cause of their country, which being more wisely directed, will be more efficacious than those formerly made.

‘ The heavy guns, with the aid of which we took Salamanca, are in the rear of the army, and I hope that we shall not find it difficult to take the Retiro. But I believe that we must break ground before the place.

‘ I have not yet heard that Astorga has fallen; but the garrison which the enemy left in Tordesillas, about 260 in number, surrendered to General Santocildes on the 5th instant.

‘ I have received no further reports of the situation of General Ballesteros since the 21st July.

‘ I have letters from General Joseph O'Donnell and General Roche of the 26th July; and the army of Murcia, under the command of the former, was defeated by General Harispe on the 21st July. It appears that the Spanish troops moved forward to attack General Harispe's posts at Castalla and at Ybi. Those which attacked the former were repulsed with the loss of 2000 men and two pieces of cannon. Those which attacked the latter, under the command of General Roche, conducted themselves remarkably well, and covered the retreat of the troops under General O'Donnell, and afterwards effected their own retreat in good order to Alicante.

‘ I have not heard from General Maitland since the 18th of July.

‘ There has been no movement of importance in Estremadura as late as the 9th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Affair at Mjalahonda,  
on the 11th of August, 1812.*

	King's German Legion and Royal Horse Artillery.				Portuguese.			
	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.
Killed . . .	1	1	18	12	3	—	30	11
Wounded . .	5	5	36	12	3	—	49	5
Missing . . .	1	—	20	44	1	1	21	37

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Madrid, 13th August, 1812.

‘ You will see in my dispatch my reasons for moving on this city, to which I have to add that I could undertake nothing else excepting the siege of Zamora, for which I shall have time till the end of September. As the siege of Astorga is not concluded, it would have answered no purpose to undertake that of Zamora at present. But we must have Zamora and Toro before the Duero shall fill. A further reason for moving to Madrid is, that I think my being here will have a good effect throughout Spain and all Europe.

‘ I have heard of war being declared by America, and I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to our communications by the packets. We may depend upon it that the mouth of the Channel and the coasts of Portugal will swarm with privateers, and it will be necessary to take some steps to protect the packets.

‘ I have desired Mr. Stuart to suggest to Admiral Martin to station a vessel off Cape Finisterre; and I would beg leave to recommend to your Lordship that the outward bound packets should be directed to make Cape Finisterre, and those homeward bound to make Ushant; and that the squadron off Brest should be directed to detach a small vessel to see them in safety to Falmouth.

‘ It would be necessary also that the Admiral at Lisbon should be reinforced in small vessels, to enable him to

observe the coasts of Portugal and Spain, as far at least as Gibraltar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ The troops that are with the army have improved in health in the last week. I do not know how those are at Cuellar, but I am afraid not as they ought to be. I hope your Lordship will not forget horses for our cavalry and artillery.’

*Capitulation proposed by General the Earl of Wellington, Commander in Chief of the Allied Army, and accepted by Colonel La Fond, Commandant of the Fort of La China.*

‘ 14th August, 1812.

‘ 1st. The garrison shall march out of the fort with the honors of war, and shall lay down their arms on the glacis.

‘ 2nd. The garrison, and persons of every description in the fort, shall be prisoners of war.

‘ 3rd. The officers shall be allowed to retain their swords, their baggage, and their horses, according to the number allowed them by the regulations of the French army; and the soldiers shall keep their knapsacks.

‘ 4thly. The magazines of the fort of every description shall be delivered to the officers of the respective departments, and the French Commandants of Artillery and of Engineers, shall furnish lists of the contents of each depôt. The plans of the fort shall also be delivered to the Commanding Officer of the British Engineers.

‘ 5thly. This capitulation shall take place at four o’clock in the afternoon, and the gates of the fort shall be occupied by the troops of the allied army, as soon as this capitulation is ratified.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ This capitulation is ratified by the Colonel Commanding the Fort of La China.’

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Madrid, 14th August, 1812. 7 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 13th ; and you will have heard that we have this day taken the Retiro, with 1800 men, 200 pieces of cannon, and 20,000 stand of arms ; and I think it nearly a matter of indifference what movement the army of Portugal may make.

‘ The only thing I recommend is that which you have suggested yourself, viz., to move the point of communication from Medina to Arevalo. Indeed, upon your letter of yesterday, this might as well be done at all events, and I gave orders accordingly to Scovell and the Commissary General ; but if you should have found occasion to alter the communication, I hope you will have sent back along the road as far as Salamanca.

‘ I shall expect further intelligence from you ; and shall feel no difficulty now in going to you at a moment’s notice.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Madrid, 15th August, 1812.’

‘ I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the garrison of the Retiro surrendered by capitulation yesterday ; and I have now the honor to enclose a copy of the capitulation.

‘ We invested the place completely on the evening of the 13th ; and in the night, detachments of the 7th division of infantry under the command of Major General Hope ; and of the 3rd division of infantry, under the command of Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham, drove in the enemy’s posts from the Prado, and the Botanical Garden, and the works which they had constructed outside of the park wall ; and having broken through the wall in different places, they were established in the palace of the Retiro, and close to the exterior line of the enemy’s works enclosing the building called La China. The troops were preparing in the morning to attack these works preparatory to the arrangements to be

adopted for the attack of the interior line and building, when the Governor sent out an officer to desire to capitulate; and I granted him the honors of war, the baggage of the officers and soldiers of the garrison, &c., as specified in the enclosed agreement.

‘ I enclose a return of the strength of the garrison, which marched out yesterday at four o’clock on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. We have found in the place 189 pieces of brass ordnance in excellent condition, 900 barrels of powder, 20,000 stand of arms, and considerable magazines of clothing and provisions, and ammunition. We have likewise found the eagles of the 13th and 51st regiments, which I forward to England to be presented to His Royal Highness by my aide de camp, Major Burgh\*.

‘ The King has retired across the Tagus, and his head quarters were, by the last accounts, at Ocaña.

‘ I have received no letters from General Maitland since the 18th of July; but I have received a letter this day, from General Joseph O’Donnell of the 10th instant, from Murcia, in which he informs me that General Maitland had arrived at Alicante on the 7th instant with the troops from Sicily, where he was about to land; and that he, General O’Donnell, intended to join him with 3400 infantry, and 1100 cavalry, and 8 pieces of cannon, besides the troops of General Roche’s division, in order to co-operate in his operations against Marshal Suchet.

‘ As the Italian division of Suchet’s troops are with the King, and the 16th French regiment, I should think that the allies will be numerically the strongest in the kingdom of Valencia, although inferior in composition; and that proportion of them at least which will land from their ships, in a state of equipment very unfit to take the field. I should have preferred the plan of conjoint operations with the Navy which I had proposed for the consideration of the naval and military officers in the Mediterranean, or any other of that description, to the plan which it appears is in contemplation; but I hope this plan will be successful.

‘ I see by a letter from General Ballesteros to Lieut. General Sir R. Hill of the 29th July, that he had been in Malaga on the 14th July, after an engagement with Gene-

\* Major General Lord Downes, K.C.B., &c.

ral Laval near Coin. General Ballesteros was at Graza-  
lema on the 9th; and he states that General Villatte, with  
a strong division, was near San Roque, and he is therefore  
cut off from Gibraltar. I have a letter from Lieut. General  
Sir R. Hill of the 8th instant; and although General  
Drouet had been in movement for three days, it does not  
appear that his movements are of any importance; or  
have any reference to the state of affairs in this part of the  
country.

‘I have received a report of the 13th from Lieut. General  
Clinton at Cuellar, that a detachment of the army of Por-  
tugal had made a movement from the neighbourhood of  
Burgos towards Valladolid. But I imagine this movement  
is made solely with a view to obtain provisions.

‘I enclose returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in  
the affair at Majalahonda on the 11th instant \*; and of the  
loss in the attack of the works of the Retiro †.

‘This dispatch will be delivered by my aide de camp  
Major Burgh, who will be able to explain any further cir-  
cumstances relating to our situation; and I beg leave to  
recommend him to your Lordship’s protection.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘Since writing this dispatch, I have received a letter of  
the 10th from General Maitland from Alicante, of which I  
enclose a copy, in which that officer informs me that he had  
on that day landed at that place.

‘I have omitted to inform your Lordship that I ordered  
on the 5th that General Ross might join Lieut. General  
Maitland with the troops at Carthageña, excepting a suffi-  
cient number to garrison the forts Las Galeras and Atalaya,  
which are the two most important points at Carthageña.’

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘SIR,

‘Madrid, 16th August, 1812.

‘The state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula, in Estre-  
madura and Andalusia, induces me to be of opinion that the  
time is at last arrived at which it will be expedient for the

\* See p. 356.

† One rank and file killed, and 16 wounded.

troops stationed at Cadiz to take some more active measures than it has been possible to adopt hitherto, in order to raise the blockade of that place. It is certain that the effect of these measures, if they should not raise the blockade, will be to divert the enemy's attention more effectually from General Ballesteros, and from General Sir Rowland Hill; and possibly the whole together, combined with events in this and other quarters, may produce not only the raising of the blockade, but the evacuation of Andalusia.

‘ I request you, therefore, to consider of a plan, and the means of executing it, for the attack of the enemy's troops opposite Cadiz, by which the blockade is maintained. You, on the spot, must of course be the best judge of this plan, upon which, at this distance, I can scarcely venture to form an opinion. But it should be founded solely on its own grounds; should be unconnected with any plans of operation by other corps of troops in the field, excepting as far as the operations of those corps should affect the strength of the blockading army, and should combine the following objects. First, the security of your own position on the Isla and at Cadiz; secondly, the facility of carrying the plan into execution with the largest proportion of troops which can be employed upon it, consistently with the first object, against the smallest body of the enemy. The attack should be made, therefore, against one of the enemy's flanks from your weakest point, which I take to be Santi Petri; but in this I may be mistaken; and the foundation of the plan should be an attack in the way of assault or of siege of his works, as he does not intend to attack yours in that way.

‘ If, therefore, the enemy's works on his left flank should be too strong to be taken by storm, you should encamp your troops and break ground regularly before them, and carry them one after another, if you should be strong enough to cross the river of Santi Petri at all; and you will bear in mind in these operations, that as long as you can withdraw your troops back to their position on the Isla, and your artillery and stores, which if depôts of too cumbrous a magnitude are not formed, will not be difficult, you accomplish my object if you oblige the enemy to recall troops from operations against General Ballesteros or Sir Rowland Hill.

‘ I beg you to consider and suggest a plan through His

Majesty's Ambassador for the consideration of the Regency, on the principles above pointed out; and that it may be carried into execution without further reference to me, without loss of time.

' I enclose the copy of an order which I sent on the 5th instant to Major General Ross.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Major General Cooke.*'

' WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Maitland.*

' SIR,

' Madrid, 16th August, 1812.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant.

' I broke up from Cuellar on the 6th, and marched upon Segovia, and thence by San Ildefonso and the passes of Navacerrada and the Guadarrama to this place, leaving at Cuellar, and on the Duero, a considerable detachment to observe the movements of the enemy's troops in the north of the Peninsula.

' The King's army retired before us; and we entered Madrid on the 12th, a French garrison still occupying the Retiro. We invested that place completely on the evening of the 13th; and on that night the troops of the 3rd and 7th divisions drove the enemy from their works outside of the Park wall, within which, and in the Palace of the Retiro, they were established during the night. In the morning we were preparing to attack the exterior works of La China, when the enemy capitulated; and we have taken about 2400 prisoners, 189 pieces of cannon, 20,000 muskets, clothing, and military stores of all descriptions.

' The King retired across the Tagus, and was, on the 13th, at Ocaña. He marched yesterday morning towards Villatobas and Corral de Almaguer; and it now appears certain that he is going into the kingdom of Valencia.

' Including the Italian division of Suchet's army, commanded by General Palombini, and the 16th French regiment, he has, I should think, from 17,000 to 20,000 men, of which number from 2000 to 3000 are cavalry, the greater part French, of the 12th, 18th, 19th, and, I think, 22nd dragoons. There are some Westphalian and Spanish cavalry, and some of all nations. There is the 75th French

regiment of infantry, three battalions, 1500 strong; one battalion of the *12me légère*, 500; and either one or two battalions of the *28me légère*. All the rest are troops of Baden, Westphalia, Spanish *juramentados*, and the King's guards of all nations, and are not very respectable.

‘ I do not know upon what plan of operations you propose to proceed. If circumstances should suit, and you propose to move forward on Valencia, I recommend to your attention my first campaign in Portugal. I kept the sea always on my flank. The transports attended the movements of the army as a magazine, and I had at all times, and every day, a short and easy communication with them. The army, therefore, could never be distressed for provisions or stores, however limited its means of land transport; and, in case of necessity, it might have embarked at any point of the coast.

‘ If you should not advance according to this or any other plan, I have no doubt that you can maintain Alicante against both Suchet and the King; and if you should effect that object, and keep Carthagena, I hope still to derive further advantages from the prosperous state of the campaign.

‘ I think it proper to apprise you that I have applied to the Secretary of State, to annul that part of the instructions from Lord William Bentinck which directs you to quit the coast in the *second* week in September; and you will therefore remain either on the coast of Spain, or in the adjacent islands, till you shall receive further orders from the Secretary of State, notwithstanding the instructions from Lord William Bentinck.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Maitland.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Madrid, 16th August, 1812.

‘ I enclose my dispatches, which will make you acquainted with the state of affairs here. The King is decidedly off to Valencia; and I hope now to be able to clear out Andalusia by a direct movement on that kingdom before the year closes. However, much will depend upon circumstances.

‘ I have ordered Maitland to remain on the eastern coast, notwithstanding Lord William Bentinck's instructions, till he shall receive the further orders of the Secretary of State;

and I have desired him to wait for them. I am going to write to Hill to tell him that he need not now attend to me in any manner, unless Soult should move through La Mancha with his whole army; and to desire him to push Drouet hard; and I desire General Cooke to cross the Santi Petri, if the French army of the blockade is not much stronger than him; and if he can do nothing else, he must proceed regularly against the enemy's works. All this will prevent Soult from detaching towards Valencia, unless he should go with his whole army; and if he should, my object is gained.

'The time of the Spaniards here has hitherto been spent in *regocijos*; and never did I see such joy as there is in all ranks. We shall now, however, proceed to business, I hope, and shall think of raising and disciplining troops, and of finding means to pay and support them.

'I have not heard of Castaños since the 2nd. He was then at Lugo, which place he was to quit on the 4th. His presence, as being the Chief in all this country, is much wanted here.

'Besides the events mentioned in the enclosed dispatches, Toledo has been evacuated, and Guadalaxara, with a garrison of 900 men, has surrendered upon capitulation. They insisted upon surrendering to me; but I forced them to surrender to the Empecinado. I do not mention these events in this dispatch, as the first depends upon a guerrilla report, which is not always true; and I do not approve of some of the articles of my *confrère's* capitulation; and I have sent it back to him.

'Ever yours most affectionately,

'The Right Hon.

Sir H. Wellesley, K. B.'

'WELLINGTON.

*General the Marquis\* of Wellington, K.B., to Major General Walker.*

'MY DEAR GENERAL,

'Madrid, 18th August, 1812. ♪

'I have received your letter of the 7th; and I assure you that I should have been very sorry if you had remained at Lisbon one moment after it was in your power to quit that place, in order to obey any order of mine, or to conform to any military rule. Your case is beyond all rule, and I should

\* Advanced to the dignity of Marquis of Wellington, 18th August, 1812.

be much concerned if you allowed yourself to be put to any inconvenience by considering it in any other light.

‘I hope that you will soon be able again to join us; and in the mean time,

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Walker.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Madrid, 18th August, 1812.

‘I have heard that the Government have appointed Señor ——— to be Intendant of the province of Salamanca, instead of Señor Mexia, in whose favor I have applied. I applied for Mexia only because he had rendered important services; and I must add, that since he has acted as Intendant under the orders of General Castaños, he has conducted himself remarkably well; and has been of material service to the army, as well British as Spanish.

‘I am quite certain, that the existing Spanish Government have no intention of doing any thing offensive to me; but if I did not feel this, certainly I should entertain doubts of their intention, in consequence of this appointment. Señor ——— is the person who was employed by the Central Junta to attend this army. He is not only the most useless and inefficient of God’s creatures, but is an impediment to all business; and he cannot speak one word of truth. After knowing the truth of all my complaints of those days, and as he assured me (and I believe him), reporting them to his employers, he suddenly turned round when the Junta sent Señor \* \* \* \* with a sum of money to supply our wants, (which sum of money Señor \* \* \* \* put into his own pocket) and he swore that we wanted nothing, and were amply supplied. He had the impudence to tell me so at Truxillo; and after I had forced him to acknowledge that he told a falsehood, I turned him out of the room, and desired that I might never see his face again. Whether the Government appoint him or not, I shall of course hold no communication with him; and it will remain for the Government to consider whether it is desirable that such a man should be appointed to a situation in which he can have any thing to say to this army.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will be so kind as to apply to the Government to appoint Don Alexis Guillem of Salamanca, to be a Canon of the Cathedral of Santiago, in Galicia. He is more intelligent, and has rendered more service to the cause than any man in Spain ; and I earnestly entreat that he may receive this appointment.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Madrid, 18th August, 1812.

‘ Considering it desirable that a brigade of heavy artillery, 24 pounders, and a brigade of 9 pounders should be in reserve with this army, I enclose estimates of the carriages, horses, &c., which will be required to be added to the ordnance establishments which we have at present.

‘ The 9 pounders are already at Lisbon ; but I request your Lordship to give directions that the 24 pounders, horses, &c., required for the whole equipment, may be sent to Lisbon as soon as may be convenient ; and that we should have an additional company of artillery.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Madrid, 18th August, 1812.

‘ The King retired from Ocaña on the 16th instant, and his army are in march towards Valencia. The enemy have abandoned Toledo, which has been taken possession of by a party of the guerrillas of El Medico.

‘ In consequence of the King’s retreating, and in order to get the troops under shelter from the sun during this month, I have moved the whole to the Escorial, with the exception of the light and 3rd divisions of infantry, and General Alten’s brigade of cavalry, which will continue at Madrid.

‘ Since the capture of the Retiro, the garrison of Guadaluaxara, consisting of 700 men, has surrendered to the Empeinado by capitulation, on nearly the same terms as those which I granted to the garrison of the Retiro.

‘ By reports from Major General Clinton, I learn that a

part of the remains of the army of Portugal had moved forward from the neighbourhood of Burgos, and some of their detachments were understood to be in Valladolid on the 14th instant, General Santocildes having withdrawn the troops of the army of Galicia, which occupied that town. Some of their detachments were likewise on the right of the Pisuerga. I think it probable that they have made this movement in order to drive back the Galician troops from the neighbourhood of Pollos and Herreros, that they may communicate with, and probably carry off the garrisons of Zamora and Toro. It is not impossible likewise, that they may attempt to relieve Astorga, and to withdraw that garrison. I had expected they would make this movement as soon as they should get them together, when I undertook the march upon Madrid; and I suggested to General Santocildes that he should fall back in time upon the Esla, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to oppose the enemy vigorously. As the allied British and Portuguese army would be obliged to attack Toro and Zamora, in case the enemy should not withdraw from these places, and possibly even Astorga, adverting to the slow progress which has been made in the siege of that place by the Galician army, I do not consider it a misfortune that the enemy should withdraw the garrisons; as we shall be saved a long march at an unfavorable season, and an operation which will take time, and in which we must expect to incur some loss.

‘I have ordered Major General Clinton from Cuellar to Olmedo.

‘By accounts from Lieut. General Sir R. Hill of the 12th, it appears that General Drouet had drawn in his right from La Guareña; but he still held Hornachos.

‘By accounts from Cadiz to the 6th instant, it appears that General Villatte had returned to the blockade. General Ballesteros had taken 300 prisoners at Osuna; and by the reports of the position of the troops, it appears that the road to Gibraltar is again open to him.

‘In consequence of the retreat of the King into Valencia, and the certainty that it is not intended to join the troops under Drouet to the army of the Centre, and of the landing of the troops under General Maitland at Alicante, I have again released the troops under Lieut. General Sir R. Hill

from the necessity of attending to the movements of this army; and have directed the General to move with activity upon Drouet, to drive him entirely out of Estremadura, if his force should be sufficient; and to threaten to enter Andalusia.

‘I have likewise directed Major General Cooke to consider of a plan for attacking the works of the blockading army before Cadiz, either by assault, or more regular approach, if it should be necessary; and to carry that plan into execution, if he should consider his force sufficiently strong to be able to quit the protection of his works on the Isla at all. By these measures, aided by the operations of General Ballesteros, we shall at least harass the enemy in Andalusia, and we shall prevent him from detaching to other quarters; and we may induce him to withdraw entirely without the necessity of collecting in Andalusia a larger force.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Madrid, 18th August, 1812.

‘In reference to the correspondence which has lately taken place on the subject of providing supplies of ammunition for Cadiz, I beg leave to transmit, for your Lordship’s information, an extract of a letter from Major General Cooke, stating the quantity of ammunition which has lately been expended at Cadiz, in his opinion, without adequate object; and the remonstrances he has made on the subject to the Spanish authorities through His Majesty’s Ambassador.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Madrid, 18th August, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 23rd July, in which you have enclosed statements of the bills drawn on the Treasury from this country between the 1st January and the 4th July, upon which I beg to assure you that they afford no evidence of the quantity of specie which has gone through the military chest in that period.

‘The Commissary General is very unwell; but I hope by the next post to let you know the exact amount which we have received in money.

‘The whole sum of £410,000, drawn by Commissary O’Meara is for provisions and supplies for the troops at Cadiz; and the sum of £386,000, drawn by Mr. Mackenzie at Oporto, is for the same. The whole of the drafts of Mr. Duff is for money, more than half of which is spent at Cadiz, &c.; Mr. Pipon’s drafts are generally for supplies of provisions purchased from the Americans, &c., and a very small proportion for money; but you shall know exactly how this matter stands.

‘In the mean time, whatever may be the sums for which we have drawn, we are in the greatest distress, which is certainly at present occasioned in some degree by our distance from Lisbon, and the difficulty of carrying the money to the army. I have been able to pay the troops only half of their pay for the month of April, the Staff only for February; and I did that by applying to our own service the money sent by my brother for Spanish services.

‘I am sorry to say that I have reports that the sick and wounded officers at Salamanca have been obliged to sell their clothes to get money.

‘The want of money in the army is become a most serious evil; and we may trace to this want many of the acts of plunder and indiscipline by which we are disgraced every day. We must be regularly supplied, or we cannot go on.

‘More has been done by Government lately than had been done for many months, I may almost say years, before; but I think that Government have been wrong in employing the Bank to make their purchase of bullion to supply this army. My opinion has invariably been, that if a small sum, even £100,000, were sent out every month, it would enable us to manage the exchanges, and to obtain our money at a cheaper rate. I can never believe that inconvenience would be felt in England by the export in coin of £100,000 every month; but the fact is, that Government go to the Bank to procure the coin, instead of employing their agents to purchase it as the dealers in coin do; and the Directors of the Bank, having upon their shoulders the supply of the coin for the interior circulation, as well as the supply of the wants of

Government for the service abroad, act like all other men ; they supply that demand which is made with most noise and clamour, and our distant whispers are unattended to. Thus, when the China fleet arrived lately with a sum of money, the Bank took the whole that I believe appeared on the manifest for the interior circulation, and did not give us even a shilling ; and we get the gleanings.

‘ I am quite convinced that if Government were to employ an agent to purchase £100,000 every month, the circulation in England would not feel the drain, and we should be very much relieved, and the exchanges would be much improved. We must, however, prevent Lord William Bentinck from coming to Gibraltar and carrying off four millions of dollars at 6*s.* 8*d.* each, while we give from 5*s.* 4*d.* to 5*s.* 8*d.*

‘ You will see how we stand by the report in my dispatch. I think that the French mean to carry off the garrisons from Zamora and Toro, which I hope they will effect, as otherwise I must go and take them. If I do not, nobody else will, as is obvious from what has been passing for the last two months at Astorga. My wish is now to canton the army for two or three weeks, till the rains in September, and then to march into Andalusia with part of it, and Hill’s corps, so as to be certain that Soult will go out.

‘ Any other but a modern French army would now leave the province, as they have absolutely no communication of any kind with France, or with any other French army ; and they are pressed on all sides by troops not to be despised, and they can evidently do nothing. But I suspect that Soult will not stir till I force him out by a direct movement upon him ; and I think of making that movement as soon as I can take the troops to the south without incurring the risk of injuring their health. In the mean time I must have possession of the whole course of the Duero, and I may then venture to leave in this part of the country a large detachment of our army, and the Galician army, which I hope I shall get Beresford to command. I am not so certain of this, however, as he is still confined by his wound.

‘ I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry *viva*, and are very fond of us, and hate the French ; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of all

the nations that I have known; the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country. I can do nothing till General Castaños shall arrive, and I do not know where he is. I am afraid that the utmost we can hope for is, to teach them how to avoid being beat. If we can effect that object, I hope we might do the rest. My opinion is, that the Government and Cortes should come to Ciudad Rodrigo, or the frontiers of Galicia, which I think of proposing to them; but I must wait till I see Castaños.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Madrid, 20th August, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th; and although I approve of the expedition to Huelva, I am inclined to be of opinion that the operation which I recommended to you in my letter of the 16th instant would, upon the whole, answer the best effect.

‘ As far as I can judge of your force, and that of the Spaniards on the Isla, I should imagine that you would be able to operate upon the enemy’s works for the blockade with 10,000 men, still keeping a sufficient body opposite the Trocadero, and on your own left towards La Carraca. If I should be correct in this conjecture, you will have enough for your object, and the enemy will soon be forced to adopt some decided line respecting the blockade, and possibly regarding their position in Andalusia.

‘ You must operate with heavy artillery, however, at once, if you cannot carry the enemy’s works by assault, or you may depend upon it that you will effect nothing that is important, even in the way of diversion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Madrid, 20th August, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, in which you have enclosed the translation of one

from the Minister of Grace and Justice, and a letter from the same Minister to myself, in which he has informed me that the Cortes had, at the recommendation of the Regency, done me the honor to confer upon me the order of the Golden Fleece.

‘ I beg that you will request the Minister of Grace and Justice to take an early opportunity of returning to the Regency and the Cortes my thanks for the favor with which they have viewed my services, and for the honor which they have been pleased to confer upon me.

‘ I have made application to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent for permission to accept this honorable mark of distinction, and of the favors of the Cortes and Government of Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Madrid, 20th August, 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter and its enclosures from Sir Henry Wellesley, by which I have been informed that the Cortes and Government of Spain have been pleased to confer upon me the order of the Golden Fleece.

‘ I beg your Lordship to lay these papers before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and to request his permission that I may accept the honor which the Government and Cortes of Spain have conferred upon me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Madrid, 23rd August, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 18th respecting the appointment of Señor — to be Intendant of Salamanca, I find that official notification of that gentleman’s appointment has been received, which, however, I hope will be cancelled as soon as you shall have received my letter. Alava and O’Lalor (particularly the latter) know the reason which I have to complain of this person, and both have made representations against the appointment.

‘ So much depends upon the regular supply of our armies, that I hope the Spanish Government will take care to avoid making themselves so far responsible for this important object, as to dismiss from the office of Intendant of Castille a man who has hitherto given the greatest satisfaction, and to place in it one entirely inefficient; one who before was a very efficient cause of our withdrawing from the Spanish territory, and whom I was obliged to turn out of my house.

‘ I do not at all like the way in which we are going on, particularly in relation to appointments to offices and great situations, in which branch of the Government alone it is, I am afraid, in the power of the existing Regency to do much good.

‘ They have sent an inefficient person, a ——— to command in Estremadura, displacing Monsalud, with whom we have all hitherto gone on well.

‘ Another equally inefficient, and without character, General ———, has been sent to supersede Don Carlos in Old Castille; and I learn that they have appointed a General ——— to command in New Castille, in which situation is included that of Governor of Madrid, which is at present by far the most important post in the country, with duties to be performed which require activity and intelligence; and yet the person selected to fill this office is, I understand, an idiot, of between seventy and eighty years of age.

‘ I assure you that I do not at all like the way in which we are going on, and persons here are much dissatisfied with the neglect of them by the Government.

‘ A month has now elapsed since the battle of Salamanca, and I have not even heard of General Castaños.

‘ Excepting in this town, where there was no regular authority when I entered it, and when I forced them to proclaim the constitution, and proceed to the elections immediately, these ceremonies have been, as usual, unaccountably delayed; and at Valladolid, Santocildes contrived to delay them till the French came in, and there the constitution has never been proclaimed at all, and the town is still governed by the French authorities.

‘ I am afraid also that, owing to the usual delays, the French found there their artillery and stores, and, what is particularly to be lamented, their muskets, of which they

were much in want, as, even of those who were not wounded in the battle, the greater number threw away their arms afterwards, or during the retreat.

‘What can be done for this lost nation? As for raising men or supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. Indeed, there is nobody to excite them to exertion, or to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the people, or of their enmity against the French. Even the guerrillas are getting quietly into the large towns, and amusing themselves, or collecting plunder of a better and more valuable description; and nobody looks forward to the exertions to be made, whether to improve or to secure our advantage.

‘This is a faithful picture of the state of affairs; and though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in Castille, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do any thing, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards, or I may say, from any individual of the Spanish nation.

‘I enclose the copy of a letter from Sir Howard Douglas of the 18th, and the copy of intelligence from Salamanca of the 20th, which will show you how Spanish military affairs are going on.

‘I hope the French will carry off the garrisons of Zamora and Astorga, as well as that of Toro. Any thing is better than that I should have to attack and carry those places; but I am repairing my heavy train for that object, and my troops are in march in that direction; and I must go if the French should maintain their garrisons. But whether I go, or the French should withdraw these garrisons, what will the world say? What will the Spanish nation in particular say of the Spanish officers and army upon such occurrences as the failure to take such a place as Astorga, after nearly three months’ siege, and of allowing the garrison of Zamora to be relieved and carried off by a defeated army? At the same time I am so well aware of the inefficiency of the Spanish officers and troops when alone, that I recommended the measures which will enable the enemy to relieve Zamora; that is, foreseeing that the French would endeavor to relieve or carry off the garrison of Astorga as soon as they should

hear that I had marched towards Madrid, I recommended that Santocildes should take care to be first upon the Esla; but if I had conceived 8000 Spanish to be equal to 4000 men of any other nation, I should have recommended him to maintain the blockade of Zamora, and to cover the siege of Astorga.

‘ Pray request General O'Donnell to peruse the account of the transactions at the head quarters of the army of Galicia, given by Sir Howard Douglas. Can any army carry on operations against the French under such circumstances? I have a great regard for General ——; but I should like to know what military part he plays in this drama. If he is a commander in chief, why does he not put himself at the head of his troops? The army of Galicia is the only one in Spain, and the 8000 men under Santocildes the active part of that army. Why is not the Commander in Chief with that part? These are questions which must occur to every reflecting mind; but there is no inquiry in Spain on subjects of this description.

‘ I am apprehensive that all this will turn out but ill for the Spanish cause. If, for any cause, I should be overpowered, or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the people of England say? What will those in Spain say? That we had made a great effort, attended by some glorious circumstances; and that from January, 1812, we had gained more advantages for the cause, and had acquired more extent of territory by our operations than had ever been gained by any army in the same period of time, against so powerful an enemy; but that, being unaided by the Spanish officers and troops, not from disinclination, but from inability on account of the gross ignorance of the former, and the want of discipline of the latter, and from the inefficiency of all the persons selected by the Government for great employment, we were at last overpowered, and compelled to withdraw within our own frontier.

‘ What will be Lord Castlereagh's reply to the next proposition for peace? Not that we will not treat if the Government of Joseph is to be the guaranteed Government, but he will be too happy to avail himself of any opportunity of withdrawing with honor from a contest in which it will be

manifest that, owing to the inability of those employed to carry it on on the part of the Spaniards, there is no prospect of military success. Thus this great cause will be lost, and this nation will be enslaved for the want of men at their head capable of conducting them.

‘ Pray represent these matters to the Government and the leading men in the Cortes, and draw their attention seriously to the situation of their affairs.

‘ I have a letter from General Maitland of the 17th. He was at Monforte, Roche at Alcoy, O'Donnell at Yecla; and Suchet at San Felipe, it is supposed about to cross the Jucar. Maitland says that Soult is certainly about to retire, and he says, through Valencia. I do not know how he has discovered either one or the other fact. I have later intelligence from Andalusia, and I do not believe Soult will retire till I go there.

‘ I have not heard of the King for two or three days. He was near Belmonte when I heard last.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Madrid, 23rd August, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 14th, enclosing one from Don E. de Bardaxi, in regard to rations for the British Commissariat, for officers in the Spanish service who may land at Lisbon, and have occasion to travel through Portugal in the service of Government, or on their private affairs.

‘ I concur in thinking that some measure should be adopted to supply these officers with provisions, but I see no necessity why they should be so supplied by the British Commissariat, and I am glad that you declined interfering.

‘ It appears that Mr. Pipon has misunderstood the orders which have been given on this subject. I do not allow any officer or soldier in the Spanish service to receive rations from the British Commissariat, who is not travelling through Portugal by a route from the Quarter Master General of the army, or one from the Assistant Quarter Master General, with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill.

‘ When General Castaños, or any other officer, wishes to

send an officer or detachment through Portugal, application is made to one of these authorities for a route, and in that route is specified where provisions are to be received.

‘I cannot allow any person, excepting the authorities above mentioned, to give these routes; and, therefore, when any Spanish officer or detachment may land in Portugal, and may have occasion to march through the country, receiving provisions from the British Commissariat, application for a route must be made here.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘SIR,

‘Madrid, 24th August, 1812.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 17th.

‘According to the last accounts which I have of the King’s force, his rear guard had gone to La Roda on the 19th.

‘By the accounts of the 17th, which I have from Estremadura, it would appear that Soult was about to make a general movement in Andalusia, but in what direction it is difficult to judge. I should imagine, however, in the direction of Granada and Murcia.

‘I do not know what garrison has been left in Carthagenas besides the detachment of His Majesty’s troops in the castles of Las Galeras and Atalaya; I should hope, a sufficient body to prevent the enemy from getting possession of that post by a *coup de main*, on his passage through the kingdom of Murcia.

‘As the allied forces in Valencia and Murcia will necessarily be thrown upon the defensive for a moment, while the enemy will be in strength in those parts, and as I conclude that the greater part of those forces will be collected in Alicante, it would be desirable to strengthen our posts at Carthagenas during the same crisis, which I hope will be only momentary.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Maitland.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Madrid, 24th August, 1812.

‘ I have been going on for more than three years upon the usual allowance of a Commander in Chief, that is ten pounds per diem, liable to various deductions, among others of income tax, reducing it to about eight guineas; but it will be necessary that Government should now either give me an additional pay under the head of table money, or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge some of the expenses, such as charities, &c., which I am obliged to incur, in the existing state of this country, or I shall be ruined.

‘ It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services, but I believe there is no service in which a Commander in Chief with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British service. Indeed, as far as I can learn, there is no instance of an officer holding a permanent command in the British service, whose receipts have been confined to ten pounds per diem, with deductions. They all receive either the allowance of a Government, with that of a Commander in Chief, or an allowance of some other description; but I doubt that the trouble or responsibility or the expenses of any at all equal mine. However, I should not have mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect in these days to be well served at the lowest possible rate of expense, if I did not find that I was in a situation in which I must incur expenses which I cannot defray without doing myself an injury.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Madrid, 25th August, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Dr. M<sup>c</sup>Grigor, containing the names of the medical officers of this army who are absent from it, to whom it is desirable that orders should be given for their immediate return to their duty; and a letter from the same person, with a requisition of the additional assistance he considers necessary for the performance of the service under his charge, and recommend-

ing officers to be promoted to different situations in that department. I beg you to submit these papers to the Commander in Chief, and desire his attention to the remarks which I have placed on Dr. M'Grigor's letter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Madrid, 25th August, 1812.

‘ The King has continued his march towards Valencia, and, according to the last accounts which I have received, his rear guard was on the 19th at La Roda.

‘ I have received a letter of the 17th from Lieut. General Maitland, who had marched from Alicante and was at Monforte; General Roche was at Alcoy, from whence Suchet had retired to San Felipe; and it was supposed he was about to cross the Jucar. General O'Donnell was on the same day at Yecla, in Murcia.

‘ The enemy's troops from Valladolid drove in Major General's Anson's piquets at Tudela on the 18th. The General, however, still maintains them on the left of the Duero.

‘ The enemy have moved a body of troops from the neighbourhood of Valladolid, consisting of about 6000 infantry and 1200 cavalry, under General Foy, which, on the 17th, carried off the garrison of Toro. They then were joined by a body of infantry of the same strength, which had likewise marched from the Pisuerga on Rio Seco, and the whole were, on the 20th, about two leagues distant from Benavente; the Galician troops, with the exception of the cavalry, which still remained at Benavente, having marched towards Astorga. The enemy had left the garrison of Zamora still blockaded by the Conde d'Amarante, but I have reason to believe they will relieve and probably carry off that garrison, on their return from their expedition towards the Astorga.

‘ Your Lordship will have observed from my last dispatch, that I had expected, when I moved towards Madrid, that the remains of the army of Portugal would make the movements towards the Duero, and for the relief of Zamora, Toro, and

Astorga, which they have made; and I suggested to General Santocildes that he should be certain of being on the Esla before the enemy.

‘ My motive for this suggestion was the apprehension that the detachment of the army of Galicia, or the whole army of Galicia engaged singly with the enemy, would be defeated, even by the remains of the army of Portugal; and I considered it of little importance that the enemy should relieve and carry off these garrisons, which it was obvious must be attacked by the allied troops under my command, at great inconvenience and some loss if we hoped to succeed. But it is not very encouraging to find that the best army in Spain, that of Galicia, cannot take such a place as Astorga after a siege of more than two months; that every important operation must be performed by the allied British and Portuguese army; and that it would be imprudent to risk the best army in Spain alone in operations against the enemy, even after the enemy have sustained such a defeat as that near Salamanca on the 22nd of July.

‘ I am not discouraged by these facts, but I wish that the Spanish Government would reflect seriously upon them; and it might be hoped that measures would be adopted to apply a remedy.

‘ Major General Clinton did not move to Olmedo, according to my first orders, and I have not heard that he had moved in that direction in obedience to a second order which I had sent him. His movement in that direction in time would have been a check upon those which the enemy have made against the Galician army, and upon all their operations in that quarter.

‘ By accounts from Cadiz of the 9th instant, I learn that General Cruz had returned to that port, with the detachment which had been sent to the southward for the relief of General Ballesteros. Another expedition had immediately been fitted out, consisting of 3500 Spanish troops, under General Cruz, and 1500 British and Portuguese, under Colonel Skerrett, with a view to attack Niebla. These troops had landed at Huelva on the 14th and 15th, but the enemy evacuated and destroyed the castle of Niebla on the 12th.

‘ It is generally reported, and I have reason to believe,

that the enemy's army of the South is about to make a general movement. It is difficult at this distance to form a judgment in what direction, but it is supposed in that of Granada, and Valencia; and from some circumstances which have been stated, such as that carriages with baggage had been sent from Druet's detachment towards Cordova, and that all persons belonging to the civil departments were to march with the army, I am inclined to believe there is some foundation for this supposition.

'I have apprized Licut. General Maitland of this notion of Soult's movement, and have desired him to take care that Alicante and Carthagená do not fall by a *coup de main* effected by his troops on their march.

'I have informed Major General Cooke that I prefer a direct attack upon the enemy's posts before Cadiz, to any other operation by way of diversion, if he should think himself sufficiently strong to attempt to leave the Isla; and I conclude that the troops will immediately be recalled from Niebla, and the attempt made upon the enemy's posts if they should still maintain them.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Earl Bathurst.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

'SIR,

'Madrid, 27th August, 1812.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant, regarding the demands of the Portuguese Government for the month of September, and I have ordered 2000 moios of wheat, 1000 of barley, and 1000 quintals of salt meat to be issued from the British stores.

'I beg you just to observe that the quantity of wheat is sufficient for 100,000 men for 30 days.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

'SIR,

'Madrid, 27th August, 1812.

'In answer to your letter of the 16th instant, I have to inform you that I have appointed Captain Mackenzie, of the

77th regiment, to be Commissary for prisoners of war at Lisbon, and have directed him to take charge of all the prisoners of war now at that place, or who may be sent there hereafter: and I beg that you will apply to the Portuguese Government, that all the prisoners now in charge of the Portuguese departments may be delivered over to the charge of Captain Mackenzie, when he shall be ready to receive the charge.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Madrid, 27th August, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th, and I hope the official accounts of the battle of Salamanca will have given as much satisfaction as that first received. The consequences of that battle have already been very important, and if I am not much mistaken will be still more so.

‘ In respect to the departments of the Adjutant General and Quarter Master General, all the departments of this army, excepting the medical department, were already in communication with the Quarter Master General. I do not know why the medical department was in communication with the Adjutant General’s department; but that department particularly ought to have been in communication with the Quarter Master General. Every thing else remains as it has always been.

‘ I am not sorry that Colonel Gordon has been with this army. He sees now the real difficulties of our situation, and he, as well as others, may derive some advantage from seeing what an army, particularly a British army, in the field really is. I hope he likes his situation and will remain in it, and that I shall not have the disadvantage of having another Quarter Master General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Madrid, 29th August, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 24th, I have received a dispatch from the Secretary of State of the 7th instant, enclosing instructions to yourself of the 6th of August.

‘ I send you a copy of that part of these instructions which relate to your conduct. I do not send the whole, as the communication is not quite secure, and the latter of them refer to points of which it is desirable that the enemy should have no knowledge.

‘ Your instructions place you under my command. They direct you to return to Sicily, if Lord William Bentinck should require the troops under your command to return to that island, in consequence of any danger menacing it, in his opinion, requiring your return, unless I should have given you orders to remain in the Peninsula, notwithstanding such orders.

‘ You are directed to be governed as to your departure from the Peninsula by your communications with Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, if the safety of the troops under your command should depend on the protection to be afforded by the fleet.

‘ If the safety of the troops under your command should not be compromised by the absence of the fleet, it will not be necessary for you to regulate your departure from the Peninsula by any maritime movements which Sir Edward Pellew may think it advisable to make.

‘ In my letter of the 24th, of which I enclose a duplicate, I recommended certain measures to your attention, which I find, by a letter from General O'Donnell of the 25th instant, that you had adopted, in consequence of the junction in Valencia of the army under the King with that under the command of Marshal Suchet.

‘ It does not appear to me at all probable that these armies united will make any attack on you, nor, as long as you will be in the strength in which I understand from General O'Donnell that you are in Alicante, is it probable that both united will make any attack upon the positions occupied by this army and its detachments. Affairs, therefore, cannot be in a better state for all the objects which I have in view in this quarter and in other parts of Spain.

‘ If Marshal Soult should move in the direction of Valencia, I shall have early intelligence of his movement; and I shall have it in my power to adopt such measures to aid the troops at Alicante as I may think proper.

‘ I beg that as soon as possible, you will let me know whether ships can lie in safety at Alicante during the gales which may be expected in the next month. If they cannot, you should send to Malon, without loss of time, all those not required for the supply of the troops under your command.

‘ I also request to know from you whether it be possible to embark from Alicante, if the enemy should invest the place: as far as I can judge from the plan, it is so.

‘ General O'Donnell has informed me that the yellow fever prevails at Carthagena. If that should be the case, General Ross should keep on shore only that part of the British garrison which may be sufficient to occupy Las Galeras and Atalaya, and the remainder should be kept afloat in the offing.

‘ There is no chance of Soult's attacking that place if the yellow fever prevails, as it is reported to do, throughout the country.

‘ There was no knowledge in Estremadura on the 23rd of Soult's commencing his movement.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Since writing the above, I have received yours of the 20th; and I enclose a duplicate of mine of the 16th, which appears to be the only one you have not received.

‘ Tell General Ross that I have received his of the 18th, and he may keep his troops on the island instead of afloat, as I had proposed; and take care to remove any men who may fall sick at Carthagena as soon as possible, and keep them in a separate place on that island.

‘ I shall answer your letter fully this day in cipher, and you can decipher it when you get the cipher, which is now on its passage from England. In the mean time I rely upon you to secure Alicante.

‘ I take measures this day to have you supplied with provisions; and I recommend that both the British and Spanish troops should maintain their positions outside of Alicante

as long as possible, in order that both, but particularly the latter, may draw provisions from the country, and that their consumption may not fall on the magazines of the town.'

PROCLAMATION.

'SPANIARDS!

'Madrid, 29th August, 1812.

'It is unnecessary to take up your time by recalling to your recollection the events of the last two months, or by drawing your attention to the situation in which your enemies now find themselves.

'Listen to the accounts of the numerous prisoners daily brought in, and deserters from their army; hear the details of the miseries endured by those who, trusting to the promises of the French, have followed the vagabond fortunes of the Usurper, driven from the capital of your monarchy; hear these details from their servants and followers who have had the sense to quit this scene of desolation, and if the sufferings of your oppressors can soften the feeling of those inflicted upon yourselves, you will find ample cause for consolation.

'But much remains still to be done to consolidate and secure the advantages acquired. It should be clearly understood that the pretended King is an usurper, whose authority it is the duty of every Spaniard to resist; that every Frenchman is an enemy, against whom it is the duty of every Spaniard to raise his arm.

'Spaniards! you are reminded that your enemies cannot much longer resist; that they must quit your country if you will only omit to supply their demands for provisions and money, when those demands are not enforced by superior force. Let every individual consider it his duty to do every thing in his power to give no assistance to the enemy of his country, and that perfidious enemy must soon entirely abandon in disgrace a country which he entered only for the sake of plunder, and in which he has been enabled to remain only because the inhabitants have submitted to his mandates, and have supplied his wants.

'Spaniards! resist this odious tyranny, and be independent and happy.

'WELLINGTON.'

*To Lieut. General Mailland.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Madrid, 30th August, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 20th.

‘ It does not appear to me to be probable that the King and Suchet, even when joined, will make any attack upon you at Alicante, and you should endeavor to maintain yourself at a distance from the town, so as to draw supplies of provisions from the country as long as you may find it to be possible, particularly for the Spanish troops.

‘ In expectation of being obliged to retire within the works of the place, you must immediately land from the transports a sufficient quantity of provisions to last the troops under your command, including General Roche’s and General Whittingham’s divisions, for one month ; and I have directed that one million rations of flour or biscuit, and five hundred thousand of salt meat, may be immediately sent to Alicante for the use of the troops under your command, from which quantity you will replace what you will have taken out of the store ship or transports, or you will make such other use of it as you may think proper. But you will in the first instance take from the store ships and transports a quantity of provisions to last the troops under your command not less than one month, and for as much longer as you may deem it expedient to have provisions in Alicante.

‘ I am aware that taking provisions out of the transports may interfere with the execution of orders which you may receive from Lord William Bentinck to return to Sicily, but I take the responsibility of that inconvenience upon myself.

‘ As far as I can judge from the plan of Alicante, there will be no difficulty in communicating with the ships, even though the place be closely invested ; and if the measures above referred to should not provide sufficiently for the troops under your command, you must take more provisions from the transports, and you must apply to Mr. Tupper to assist you in importing provisions for your troops.

‘ If it be true that, notwithstanding Alicante be closely invested, it is possible to communicate with ships in the offing, there can be no more difficulty in instructing you regarding your military conduct at that place than regarding the provisions. Nothing of importance can be done till

Soult shall have joined the King; and you will then understand that I expect you to maintain yourself at Alicante as long as it may be possible.

‘I conceive that it will be possible for you to maintain yourself even against Soult and the King united, as long as you can keep the communication open with the sea; but as soon as you find that communication so seriously menaced as to be in danger to be lost, you are to withdraw and embark the whole army, English as well as Spaniards.

‘I proceed to-morrow to join the detachment of this army collected at Arevalo, with which I shall march to drive the detachment of the enemy’s army of Portugal from the Duero, which have advanced to that river since I have been in this quarter, and to establish a good communication between this army and the Spanish army of the north, to which Astorga has recently surrendered.

‘As soon as matters shall be there arranged to my satisfaction, I propose to return here; and I hope by that time to be joined by Sir Rowland Hill and his troops from Estremadura, if Marshal Soult should have evacuated Andalusia. If he should have marched through Granada and Murcia into Valencia, I shall be here, I hope, before he can be in a situation to do you any injury.

‘Two divisions of this army, and a brigade of cavalry, remain here, and two divisions, and one brigade of cavalry, at the Escorial, during my absence in the north.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Maitland.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Marques de Astorga, Conde de Altamira.*

‘SIR,

‘Madrid, 30th August, 1812.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 7th instant, and its enclosre, and I have forwarded the letter to your agent in this city.

‘I beg to return your Excellency my best thanks for the politeness of your letter, and for your kindness in permitting me to use your Excellency’s palace in this city.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marques de Astorga.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Madrid, 30th August, 1812.

‘I have received a letter from the Minister of Grace and Justice, by the hands of Colonel Don Ildefonso Ruez de Ribera, together with the Collar of the Order of the Golden Fleece.

‘I request you will return my thanks to the Minister for this mark of the favor of the Regency.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.  
Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Madrid, 30th August, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 17th instant. I am not desirous that any rule should be departed from in investing me with the Order of the Golden Fleece, and I will wait till there shall be an opportunity for some Sovereign to invest me. You will send me the usual licenses and dispensation. I wish you would send me the Order of San Fernando, or a drawing of it, that I may have it made in England.

‘I send my dispatch off this day.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon.  
Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Madrid, 30th August, 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose a return of intrenching tools required for the service of this army, which I will thank your Lordship to have sent to Lisbon as soon as possible.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Madrid, 30th August, 1812.

‘According to accounts which I have received from General Joseph O'Donnell, commanding the Spanish army of Murcia, of the 25th and 27th instant, I learn that the King had decidedly marched into Valencia.

‘ His troops passed the castle of Chinchilla (the garrison of which fired upon them), and they arrived at Bonete on the 24th. The cavalry under General O'Donnell, 1500 in number, were at Albacete on the 25th, and the General himself, still at Hellin on the 27th, and his infantry, 4000 in number, were in that neighbourhood.

‘ It appears, that upon hearing of the King's approach to the kingdom of Valencia to join Suchet, Lieut. General Maitland had determined to retire eventually upon Alicante, with the Sicilian division under his command; and the Spanish troops under Generals Whittingham and Roche. He had advanced as far as Elda; but he retired to Monforte, from whence he writes on the 20th; General Whittingham's division being still at Elda, and the Spanish cavalry advanced to Castalla.

‘ I have directed the General to maintain himself at Alicante; and I have ordered that he may be supplied with provisions.

‘ General Maitland's determination to retire upon Alicante, and his stating that he has a sufficient number of men to maintain himself there without the assistance of General O'Donnell's corps, and the reports which General O'Donnell had received of the intention of Soult to join the King's army in Valencia, through Murcia and Granada, and the prevalence of the yellow fever in Murcia, had induced General O'Donnell to move to the northward, and I have suggested to him to put himself in communication with the allied army in this quarter.

‘ Since I wrote to your Lordship on the 25th instant, I have received reports that the garrison of Astorga had surrendered by capitulation on the 19th, to the number of 1200 men. General Foy arrived at La Bañeza for their relief on the 21st, with the detachment which I informed you was in march for that purpose; and his parties found the place abandoned by the Spanish troops, the French garrison having been carried away as prisoners; and I expect that he arrived at Zamora on the 25th or 26th.

‘ As soon as the King's march into Valencia was decided, I ordered the 1st and 5th divisions, General Pack's and General Bradford's brigades, and Colonel Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, to assemble at Arevalo, to which place the 6th

division had been marched also by General Clinton by mistake; and I propose to join these troops, and to proceed to establish a secure communication between this army and the army of Galicia; and to drive off the parties of the army of Portugal which have come forward to the Duero since I have been obliged to attend to the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘ The reports still continue to prevail of the intention of Soult to evacuate Andalusia, and I enclose a paper which is a translation of the order issued to the army of the South on the 15th instant, the Emperor’s birth-day, from which there is reason to believe that such a design is entertained; and General O’Donnell tells me in his letter of the 27th from Hellin, that he has reason to believe that the march will be by Granada and Murcia. Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill had no intelligence that the march was commenced on the 23rd instant, when I last heard from him; but there was every appearance of it; and it is reported that General La Cruz’s troops were in possession of San Lucar La Mayor, and even of San Lucar at the mouth of the Guadalquivir. If these reports should be well founded, the siege of Cadiz is certainly abandoned.

‘ I propose to return to this part of the country, as soon as I shall have settled matters to my satisfaction on the right of the Duero; and I hope I shall be here, and shall be joined by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill before Soult can have made much progress to form his junction with the King.

‘ With a view to Sir Rowland Hill’s march, we are employed in repairing the bridge at Almaraz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

#### MEMORANDUM

*For Major General Baron Charles Alten and Don Carlos de España.*

‘ Madrid, 31st August, 1812.

‘ It being necessary that I should go to the northward with the troops assembled at Arevalo, the 3rd and Light divisions, and General Victor Alten’s brigade of cavalry, are to remain at Madrid till further orders, with one bat-

talion of Don Carlos' infantry. The 4th division will be at the Escorial, and Don Carlos' division at Segovia; General D'Urban's cavalry at the Palacio de Rio Frio.

‘ The King having decidedly gone into Valencia, and there being in that kingdom a body of the allied troops too strong for Marshal Suchet, and no intelligence having been yet received of the commencement of the march of the army of the South, it does not appear at all probable that the enemy will attempt to disturb the tranquillity of this part of the country during the time that I shall be absent. But it is necessary to provide for all events, and the following instructions are to be attended to.

‘ General Joseph O'Donnell, in command of 4000 infantry and 1500 cavalry of the army of Murcia, is at Hellin, on the frontiers of Valencia; and I have recommended to him to throw his rear upon this town, and to communicate with our troops which will be here; and to fall back upon them if it should be necessary.

‘ The Empecinado, with the troops under his command, is gone forward by Cuenca, towards the frontiers of Valencia.

‘ In case the enemy should advance in force, it must be from the south; and if the force should not be considered too strong, particularly in cavalry, the 3rd, Light, and Don Carlos' divisions, and General Alten's and General D'Urban's cavalry, must be collected on the Tagus about Aranjuez, first to cover the retreat upon them of General O'Donnell's corps, and next to oppose the farther progress of the enemy. The guerrillas of the Medico must be thrown into Toledo.

‘ Attention must be paid to the fords about Fuentidueña by the Empecinado, or the troops collected in that direction, if the enemy should direct his march by Tarancon. When the enemy shall advance, all the arrangements must be made for the evacuation of Madrid, such as sending away sick, stores, &c.; and eventually, for the destruction of every thing which cannot be carried away.

‘ If the enemy's force should be deemed too strong for the allies, the city of Madrid must be evacuated, the troops must march by the Escorial upon Arevalo, as soon as General Joseph O'Donnell shall either have joined on his retreat, or shall have made his retreat in another direction.

‘ Orders have been given to Major Hartmann of the Royal

German Artillery to make arrangements for destroying the stores, and burning the buildings in the Retiro, which orders he will lay before General Alten and Don Carlos de España. If the retreat from Madrid should be determined upon, measures should be immediately adopted for destroying every thing in the Retiro according to those orders, before the troops shall depart. If the troops should be assembled on the Tagus, and the retreat from thence should afterwards be determined upon, orders should be given for destroying the stores and buildings in the Retiro, for which the preparations should be arranged as above stated, as soon as the retreat from the Tagus shall be determined upon. A constant daily communication must be kept with me by the guides who will remain on the road.

‘ I have been much satisfied with the conduct of the allied troops since they have been in Madrid. I trust that the same good conduct of officers and troops will continue; and that General Alten will enforce my orders respecting these points.

‘ In case it should be determined to destroy the stores and buildings in the Retiro, it will be necessary to order the inhabitants of Madrid to take away the palisades from the ditches, particularly of the exterior works. It is imagined they will do this willingly if only permitted.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Lieut. General Mailland.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Castin, 2nd Sept., 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 30th, I have received your letter of the 24th August.

‘ I beg you will understand that I propose that the troops under your command should occupy the heights outside of Alicante, which are to the southward and westward of the town, to rest your left on the sea.

‘ As the cipher sent by the Secretary of State is deficient as affording no means of spelling words, I propose to use that which I sent to Lord William Bentinck, when it is necessary to cipher words not to be found in the Secretary of State’s cipher.

‘ Understanding from a letter from General Donkin that

the alphabet sent to Sir Edward Pellew was not correct, I think it probable that that sent to Lord William may not have been so, and I enclose another. You will of course have the instructions how to use it.

‘ Head quarters are this day at Villa Castin, and will be to-morrow at Arevalo.

‘ I am happy to find from Colonel Jones’s report that there will be no difficulty in supplying you with provisions at Alicante to any amount you can require. If this should be the case, it would be a great convenience to me if you would write to Mr. O’Meara, the Deputy Commissary General at Cadiz, to say that you will not require the provisions which I had ordered should be sent for your use.

‘ I hear that the enemy have evacuated Zamora, which is a fortunate event, as it will enable me to rejoin the troops to the south at a more early period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Licut. General Maitland.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ à Arevalo, ce 3 Sept. 1812.

‘ Je vous envoie une lettre du Général Castaños, et une pour le Général Maitland à Alicante, que je vous prie de faire envoyer par ma cousine la Marquesa de Alcañices; et une pour la Condesa de Clinchon, que je vous prie de donner au Colonel Ribera pour être apportée à Cadiz.

‘ Le concierge du palais a deux étendards pris à Guadaluaxara par l’Empecinado, que vous devriez envoyer à Cadiz par le Colonel Ribera, pour être présentés au Gouvernement.

‘ Le Général Castaños était à Astorga le 30; l’Armée de Galice sur l’Esla. Les Français étaient encore à Valladolid et sur le Duero aujourd’hui. Nous allons à Olmedo demain.

‘ Nous avons les gazettes d’Angleterre du 15, venues par la Coruña. Les nouvelles de la Russie ne sont pas mauvaises. On dit que le Danemarck fait la paix avec les alliés.

‘ J’ai rencontré aujourd’hui la Marquesa de Alcañices et Guillen auprès de Labajos. Ils seront à Madrid demain.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *General Don Carlos de España.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.*

‘ à Arevalo, ce 3 Sept., 1812, à 2 heures  
de l'après midi.

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ J’ai reçu ce matin votre lettre du 30 à Villa Castin, et je viens d’arriver ici. Je compte m’avancer sur Olmedo demain matin. Je crois que Soult a l’intention de quitter le midi de l’Espagne, mais qu’il aye cette intention ou non, il est fort nécessaire de chasser tout-à-fait les troupes de Marmont sans perdre du temps, pour me laisser en liberté de m’opposer à Soult avec toutes mes forces. Je prends donc avantage du moment que le départ du Roi m’a donné, pour venir de ce côté ci, et je pousserai les choses aussi loin que je pourrai. Mais j’ai grand besoin de votre assistance. J’ai des grosses pièces, et j’ai l’idée de faire même le siège de Burgos. Mais il faut que cela dépende des circonstances ; et en tout cas il faut établir une bonne communication entre vos troupes et les miennes, et être ferme sur le Duero. Il est fort à désirer que vous vous avanciez vers Valladolid avec toutes vos troupes aussi-tôt que vous recevrez cette lettre ; et que je puisse m’aboucher avec vous bien-tôt. Je compte être à Valladolid le 6 de ce mois ; mais je vous écrirai tous les jours jusqu’à ce que j’aie le plaisir de vous voir.

‘ J’envoie un officier pour examiner Zamora et Toro et me faire un rapport de l’état où ces places se trouvent ; parceque je crois qu’il conviendrait beaucoup à nos opérations futures de tenir ces deux places, ou au moins une des deux. Je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez envoyer l’ordre qu’on les laisse voir à l’officier que j’y enverrai ; et qu’on cesse de travailler à leur destruction, si on l’a déjà commencée jusqu’à ce que j’aie le plaisir de vous voir.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *General Don F. X. Castaños.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Olmedo, 4th Sept., 1812.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will let me know when you get any detailed reports of the stores for the Spanish army sent to Coruña. The Government have been pleased to leave at my disposal the stores sent to the Peninsula for the Spanish army ; and I had wished that the whole should be sent to Cadiz or Lisbon, because I have with those

places a constant communication, because I can command a communication between those places and every other part (of the coast at least) of the Peninsula, and because there are at those places persons whose services I can command to take charge of the stores, to distribute them as ordered, and to account for them. I do not possess those advantages in relation to Coruña.

‘I am very glad that Mr. Forster has given licenses to American ships to import corn to Lisbon. I wish you would give licenses to Portuguese ships to do the same from America. We should then be certain of receiving the supplies. We cannot be certain that Americans having a license to import to Portugal, will not import to France; taking the risk of running the latter part of the passage.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I conclude that Sir William Beresford has seen and approved of the recruiting papers. I shall write about the northern militia as they deserve.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Olmedo, 5th Sept., 1812.

‘I think it my duty to enclose, to be laid before the Spanish Government, a letter addressed by General J. O'Donnell to Lieut. Colonel Jones, stating the total want of provisions in Carthagená.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*  
*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Olmedo, 5th Sept., 1812.

‘I beg to refer to you a letter which I have received from the Commissariat of the brigade of Royal Carabineers with General Joseph O'Donnell's army; and I request, that if it be in your power, you will supply this corps with the clothing and cavalry equipments which it requires, and have them forwarded to Alicante as soon as possible.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*  
*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘I have great pleasure in informing you that I have received the directions of the Prince Regent to invest you with the Order of the Bath, which direction I shall obey with the greatest satisfaction when the insignia, which I expect by the first messenger, shall come out. I hope that you will be well enough to come to head quarters, but if you should not I will try to go to you.

‘They are sending us immediately a remount of between 700 and 800 horses for the cavalry, and three squadrons of the Blues, and four of the Life Guards, so that we shall be tolerably strong again.

‘I hear that Soult has raised the siege of Cadiz, and as in that case we may have to make an effort to hold our ground in New Castille, I have thought it proper, in expectation of Soult’s raising the siege of Cadiz, to move this way, and oblige the army of Portugal to go further off. We turned them out of this place this morning.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’*

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘I have received your letters of the 1st by Lieut. Macfarlane, whom I send back to you.

‘The French evacuated this town yesterday morning, and their rear guard was last night at Dueñas, on the road to Burgos. I shall follow them as far as I can; but I must attend to the south, where it is reported that Soult is in movement, having raised the siege or blockade of Cadiz.

Believe me, &c.

‘*Commodore*

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir Home Popham.’*

*To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.*

‘MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘à Valladolid, ce 7 Sept., 1812.

‘Je suis arrivé ici ce matin. J’ai passé le Duero hier, comme je vous l’ai annoncé; mais j’ai trouvé l’ennemi bien

posté à La Cisterniga, et en force dans la ville ; et comme j'ai vu que je pourrais seulement emporter le poste de La Cisterniga hier après midi, et que je n'aurais pas eu le temps de manœuvrer pour les forcer de quitter la ville, j'ai remis l'affaire jusqu'à ce matin.

‘ Ils sont restés dans la ville jusqu'au dernier moment, et en sont sortis enfin par le pont qu'ils ont fait sauter. Ils ont aussi fait sauter le pont de Simancas hier au soir. Je les ai laissé, il y a une heure, marchant sur Cabezon.

‘ Ils m'ont paru être de 16 à 18,000 hommes ; mais je crois que Foy les a rejoint ce matin. Je désire beaucoup avoir de vos nouvelles, et si vous avez marché, et où vous êtes. Je compte donner un jour de repos à mon monde demain, et j'espère avoir de vos nouvelles.

‘ On me dit que le siège de Cadiz est levé ; mais je n'en ai pas des nouvelles officielles.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ General

*Don F. X. Castaños.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ à Valladolid, ce 7 Sept., 1812.

‘ Je suis arrivé ici ce matin, l'ennemi ayant quitté la ville à regret. Je vous prie de ne pas laisser publier dans la Gazette où je suis. Je vous envoie une lettre du Général Vives, qui exige votre attention. Vous voyez qu'il dit qu'il n'a pas assez de monde pour donner une escorte de 300 hommes aux prisonniers depuis Ciudad Rodrigo jusqu'à Sabugal. Comment cela peut-il arriver ?

‘ Sur les affaires de *las traidoras* je vous conseille d'agir selon la constitution. Vous n'avez aucun droit de les faire aller dans un convent si elles ne le veulent pas. Mais vous pouvez les prévenir, que si elles ne sont pas discrètes, vous ne pouvez pas les protéger ; et peut-être qu'elles voudront y aller elles-mêmes. Vous devez leur envoyer les lettres anonymes qui vous parviennent sur leur compte. Ce serait la seule attention que j'y donnerais à votre place, à moins que ces dames ne commettent des faits qui puissent donner prise à la loi.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ General

*Don Carlos de España.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General G. Murray*

‘MY DEAR MURRAY,

‘Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 18th August, for which I am much obliged to you, and I assure you that I have every day fresh reason to regret your departure.

‘I hear that the siege of Cadiz is raised; and there is a storm brewing up from the south, for which I am preparing by driving the detachments of the army of Portugal away from the Duero; and I propose, if I have time, to take Burgos from them. In the mean time, I have ordered Hill to cross the Tagus by Almaraz, when he shall find that Soult moves out of Andalusia. There are three divisions of this army at Madrid and the Escorial, and between *Aliados* and Spaniards I shall have there above 40,000 men.

‘I have, I hope, relieved General Maitland of all anxiety at Alicante, by taking upon myself all responsibility, and giving him positive orders for his conduct, so that he will only have to fight in a good position, his supplies being secured to him from the sea. By keeping this detachment at Alicante, with Whittingham’s and Roche’s Spaniards, I shall prevent too many of the gentlemen now assembled in Valencia from troubling me in the upper country.

‘Matters go on well, and I hope before Christmas, if affairs turn out as they ought, and Boney requires all the reinforcements in the North, to have all the gentlemen safe on the other side of the Ebro.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General G. Murray.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 22nd, and I am very much obliged to you for thinking of our Lieutenant Generals, but I am afraid we shall have more of them than we shall have divisions. I enclose a list of our divisions and of the Generals of them, and you will see how we stand.

‘I put Pakenham to the 3rd division by General Picton’s desire when he was ill; and I am very glad I did so, as I must say he made the manœuvre which led to our success in

the battle of the 22nd, with a celerity and accuracy of which I doubt that many are capable, and without both it would not have answered its end. Pakenham may not be the brightest genius, but my partiality for him does not lead me astray when I tell you that he is one of the best we have. However, he keeps the division till General Colville or some other shall return to it, and he will then go to his Fusileer brigade.

‘ Sir John Murray is a very able officer, and I should be very glad to have him, but you will see that we have now no room for him. I should not be sorry to lose the services of — —; and I think Major General Hope cannot bear the climate: but I shall be sorry to lose him, as he is very attentive to his duty. I think also that General Campbell will not last long.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir John Murray, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR MURRAY,

‘ Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, for which I am much obliged to you. I have written to Torrens about you, but we have at present no vacancy. All our divisions are filled, except the 3rd, and there are three Lieutenant Generals coming out.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir J. Murray, Bart.*’

*To His Royal Highness the Duke of York.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness’s letter of the 15th August, marked “Private,” regarding the command of the two brigades of Guards.

‘ When General Campbell went to the command of the 1st division of infantry, I allowed Colonel the Hon. T. Fermor\* to succeed to the brigade of Guards, as being the senior officer, because General the Hon. E. Stopford was in Eng-

\* The late Earl of Pomfret.

land, of whose appointment to this command your Royal Highness had before approved, and I could not make any other arrangement without taking upon myself to appoint an officer to command this brigade. I told Colonel Fernor that the arrangement was but temporary, and that when General Stopford should return to the army he must resume the command of the brigade of Guards, unless your Royal Highness should have ordered any other arrangement.

‘ I think that notwithstanding that many officers of superior rank are coming out, Major General Campbell will still remain in command of a division; and Major General Cooke must remain at Cadiz, in consequence of the orders of the Secretary of State, notwithstanding that I have accounts that the blockade is raised.

‘ Your Royal Highness will have been informed that Major General Wheatley died at the Escorial on the 1st instant; and I am concerned to add that I left Major General Hulse very unwell at Arevalo on the 4th, and worse accounts have since been received of him. Major General Hulse is at present in the command of the 5th division. I request your Royal Highness will therefore let me know what arrangements shall be made for the command of the two brigades of Guards in the event to be apprehended of the death of Major General Hulse, or of one brigade if Major General Hulse should fortunately recover. As I have not yet heard of General Stopford’s arrival at Lisbon, I can receive your Royal Highness’s commands before I shall have occasion to decide whether he shall resume the command of the brigade now with the army, to which he was before appointed with your Royal Highness’s approbation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness  
the Duke of York.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. *Sept. 8.*—I am concerned to have to inform your Royal Highness that the melancholy event which I expected has occurred: Major General Hulse died yesterday morning at 10 o’clock, at Arevalo.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your several letters to the 22nd, for which I am much obliged to you, and I sincerely congratulate you upon the favorable prospect which you have before you. I still think, however, that you will require an enlargement of the basis of your Government, in order to carry on your business in the House of Commons. I have not heard of the young men who are in office, but I should doubt their being a substitute for Mr. Canning.

‘ I am much concerned that Pole is not with the Government. I have always been on the best terms with all my brothers, and I am very sorry that he does not belong to a Government which I am serving, and by which I have been so kindly treated.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You will see that I have got General Maitland at Alicante. I have given him positive instructions, which will relieve his anxieties, and he will have nothing to do but fight in a good position if he should be attacked, and receive his provisions from the sea; in the mean time by having an army at Alicante, I shall prevent too many of the enemy from leaving Valencia to annoy me in the upper country.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 22nd August, in which you have communicated to me that it is the intention of His Royal Highness to propose to Parliament at its next meeting, to grant me the sum of one hundred thousand pounds, to enable me to support suitably the honors which His Royal Highness has recently been pleased to confer upon me.

‘ I request your Lordship to take an early opportunity of expressing my gratitude to His Royal Highness for all his favors; they are far beyond my hopes, and I can show my gratitude for them only by continuing to serve His

Royal Highness with the same zeal and devotion which have already acquired for me such substantial proofs of His Royal Highness's favor.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘ I am very much obliged to your Lordship for having adverted to my expenses in this country, and for having provided for them so handsomely. You will have received a letter from me on this subject since you dispatched yours of the 22nd. I should never have written upon it if I had not incurred, an enormous expense at Madrid, which I could not bear.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘ Upon referring to my dispatch to your Lordship of the 24th July, as printed in *The London Gazette* of the 16th August, I observe, that although I reported my sense of the conduct of the German brigade under Major General Bock, on the 23rd July, I omitted to include the name of the Major General, in the enumeration which the dispatch contains of Officers who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves.

‘ I beg to take this opportunity of rectifying this omission; and of assuring your Lordship that the Major General distinguished himself in the operations which led to the charge, and in the charge made by the gallant troops under his command, as he has upon every occasion which has offered since he has been under my command.

‘ From my personal observation, and the reports which I have received since the action of the 22nd July, I am afraid that I have omitted the names of many other officers who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves; and in a case in which all did their duty in a manner so honorable to themselves and to their country, the limits of a dispatch do

not permit the mention of the names of all who have drawn the notice of their superiors by their conduct. I must, however, correct the omission of which I have been guilty in the case of Lieut. Colonel Arentschildt and the 1st hussars of the Legion, who were highly distinguished by their conduct throughout the whole of the day of the 22nd July; and likewise in that of Lieut. Colonel Elley, the Assistant Adjutant General, who attended Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton throughout the action, was wounded by a bayonet in the charge made by General Le Marchant's brigade, and had two horses killed under him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Valladolid, 7th Sept., 1812.

‘ I quitted Madrid on the 1st instant, in order to direct the movements of the troops ordered to be collected at Arevalo as reported in my dispatch of the 30th of August; to which I subsequently added the 7th division of infantry, and Major General Bock's brigade of dragoons.

‘ We moved from Arevalo the 4th, and passed the Duero on the 6th, at the fords of Herrera and El Abrojo.

‘ After General Foy had found that the garrison of Astorga had surrendered by capitulation, he returned to the Escla, and marched upon Carvajales with a view to surprise and cut off the corps of Portuguese militia which had been employed under Lieut. General the Conde de Amarante in the blockade of Zamora. The Lieut. General, however, made good his retreat without loss to the frontiers of Portugal; and General Foy carried off the garrison of Zamora on the 29th of August, and marched for Tordesillas.

‘ I cannot avoid drawing your Lordship's attention to the conduct of the Conde de Amarante, and of the militia under his command in these operations. The zeal of the militia of the province of Tras os Montes in voluntarily serving beyond the frontier of the kingdom, deserves the highest commendation.

‘ The whole of the remains of the army of Portugal having been thus collected between this place and Tordesillas, we found their advanced guard yesterday strongly posted on

the heights of La Cisterniga, and I knew that there was a considerable body of troops in and about this town. As it was late in the day before our troops had crossed the Duero, we did not move forward till this morning. The enemy retired from La Cisterniga during the night; and they abandoned the town on our approach to it in the morning, and crossed the Pisnerga, and blew up the bridge. They were closely followed by Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby with a detachment of the 12th light dragoons through the town; but as some time had elapsed before the infantry could come up, the enemy could not be prevented from destroying the bridge.

‘ They then retired along the right of the Pisuerga to Dueñas, where their rear will probably halt this night.

‘ When General Foy moved towards Astorga, the army of Galicia retired; and since his march to the Duero, they have again advanced to the Esla. I have requested General Castaños, who is now with the Galician army, to move forward and put himself in immediate communication with me; and I propose to push the army of Portugal as far as I can, preparatory to the operations which I may expect to the southward.

‘ I have received several reports that Marshal Soult had raised the blockade of Cadiz, and had entirely evacuated Seville about the 25th or 26th of August; but by some unaccountable accident, I have received no letter from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill since the 25th, nor any from Cadiz of a later date than the 17th. I give credit, however, to the reports to which I have above referred; and I shall return to the south as soon as I shall be made acquainted with Soult’s progress.

‘ The Empecinado has informed me that General Villa Campa had taken prisoners the troops which had been the garrison, and had evacuated Cuenca after the surrender of the Retiro. These troops amounted to 1000 men, with two guns, and belonged to Suchet’s army.

‘ My last accounts from Lieut. General Maitland are of the 24th. He was then in Alicante. Major General Ross had returned to Carthagena with his detachment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 31st of August, and I conclude this will find you at Truxillo, or possibly further on. It appears now quite clear that Soult has evacuated the south-west parts of Andalusia, but I am not certain whether he will direct his march upon Granada or upon La Mancha; from Drouet’s movement upon Cordova, I should think upon Granada.

‘ Upon the receipt of this letter I beg you will cross the Tagus at Almaraz, and canton your troops with their right at Almaraz, and their left at Oropesa. Come forward yourself to Oropesa. Colonel Diggens commands a regiment of Portuguese cavalry at Plasencia, or thereabouts; order him to join you. Establish letter parties from Oropesa through the mountains to Avila, and thence to Arevalo, to communicate with the guides of this army which are there.

‘ Establish other letter parties direct from Oropesa to Madrid, to communicate with the Light, 3rd, and 4th divisions, and General Alten’s cavalry which are there. General Charles Alten is the senior officer.

‘ Let the parties understand well what they are to do, and send somebody along both roads to make arrangements that men and horses may be fed.

‘ I quitted Madrid on the 1st, and came here with the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, and General Anson’s, Colonel Ponsonby’s, and Major General Bock’s cavalry, in order to drive Marmont’s parties to a greater distance preparatory to the events likely to occur about Madrid and the Tagus. We drove them from hence on the 7th, and I have waited here to receive accounts of the army of Galicia, and shall move on to-morrow; but I shall return to Madrid as soon as I shall hear that the plot thickens to the southward.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st of August, regarding the Portuguese cavalry. I did not answer the former one upon that subject, because I wished to see and talk to D’Urban before I wrote to you. He appears, by what I hear from Hervey, anxious that the proposed punishment should not be carried into execution; and it is as well, therefore, that it should be left alone. As for sending this cavalry to the rear, that is impossible just at present. We have still a good deal upon our hands, and we are worse provided with cavalry than our neighbours; and a body commanded by such a man as D’Urban, even though they will not fight, are better than none. In fact, they behaved infamously, and they must not be employed again alone, or with our cavalry, who gallop too fast for them, but only as they were on the 22nd of July, viz., in support of our infantry, and with English dragoons with them.

‘ From some mistake in the post office, Colonel Gordon received your letter regarding the not sending you the distributions before I received that which you wrote to me on the 1st instant; and I immediately pointed out to him, not only the propriety that a General Officer in your station should receive the distribution, but the absolute necessity for it, in order to enable you and your Staff to carry on your duty; and I desired him to alter a letter he wrote to you from Olmedo accordingly.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what you wish to have done with Assistant Provost Mackay, who is in confinement at Salamanca. It is very clear to me that he knew the Portuguese serjeant was serjeant of the guard, and he had no right to confine him; and for this, if you wish it, he shall be dismissed from his station. But what is to be done to the Portuguese serjeant of the guard, who resisted the authority of the Provost, and protected the depredators?

‘ As for Mackay’s releasing the serjeant, I believe he had a right to do so, and probably the confinement of the serjeant may be deemed a sufficient punishment for his offence.

‘ The office of Provost is not adverted to in the Mutiny

Act and Articles of War; and the application of the authority of the British Provost to the Portuguese army is quite irregular. But I believe if we did not so apply it, the unfortunate inhabitants of the country would derive but little advantage from its establishment.

‘ You will learn the news here from my dispatch.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Dalbiac\*.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘ I enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which the late Major General Le Marchant was President, from which it appears that the sentences were agreed to, and had been written out, but the Major General had omitted the formality of signing them.

‘ The Court will recollect whether this is the fact, and if it is so, I request you to sign the proceedings in presence of the General Court Martial, annexing to them a minute of your having done so by my orders conveyed in this letter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

*Lieut. Colonel Dalbiac,*  
*4th Dragoons.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Commissioners of the Transport Office.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose duplicates of cartels which I have given to Lieut. Colonel the Visconde de Barbacena of the 12th Portuguese dragoons, Lieut. Miranda of the same regiment, and Captain Dynely of the Royal Artillery, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will have them delivered to Lieut. Colonel Voirol, Captain Gravelle, and Lieut. Londeaux, and have those officers sent to France by the first opportunity, in exchange for the three first mentioned.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Commissioners of*  
*the Transport Office.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

\* Major General Sir Charles Dalbiac, K.C.H.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 31st. If the Government have any funds to spare, I see no objection to their buying up and destroying paper money.

‘ I must observe, however, that the Portuguese paper money is not at a discount, in relation to silver, much greater than the excess of the market price of silver in England beyond the Mint price, by which excess the depreciation of Bank of England notes is estimated. Now, I believe that the security for a Bank of England note is infinitely better than that for the Portuguese paper; and it is no bad thing if the regular payment of the interest has brought the Portuguese paper to a par nearly with Bank notes.

‘ The reason why the payment of the interest has not materially affected the discount is, that since the interest has been paid, the paper has *really* been in circulation: before, it was not; it was locked up in our chest, and its value was supported solely by our taking it in payment for our bills on England. But we could go on no longer in this way; and I must have prevented the Commissaries from taking the paper at all, if measures had not been adopted to raise its credit.

‘ I do not see exactly what part our Commissaries are to play in the purchase of this paper by the Government out of the funds allotted for the payment of the interest.

‘ I do not know what business Captain —— has to communicate at all with Dom Miguel Forjaz, or with any body excepting his commanding officer. Does Dom Miguel Forjaz wish that the enemy should have plans of his works? and will he answer for his Portuguese militia, &c., to keep the prisoners employed solely on the road, and not to allow them to see the works? The prisoners are now under our charge, and I hope that not a man of them will remain at Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, No. 27, of the 21st August; and I beg to acquaint your Lordship that I concur entirely in Sir R. H. Kennedy’s opinion regarding the expediency of appointing a Board, consisting of an officer of the army, one of the Commisariat, and one of the Department of Accounts, to consider of the claims of the inhabitants of the Peninsula for supplies furnished to the British army, for which they may not possess regular vouchers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘ Since I wrote my dispatch, No. 28, I have received a dispatch of the 29th from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill from Llerena, to which place the General had moved in pursuit of the troops under General Drouet.

‘ He sends me the enclosed letter from Colonel Skerrett, who commands the British and Portuguese troops which compose part of the detachment under General La Cruz, from which I learn that the allies had entered Seville on the 27th.

‘ I conclude that the blockade of Cadiz is raised, as I have received several accounts of the destruction of military stores at Seville by the enemy before they withdrew their force from thence; but I have received no authentic account of the raising of the blockade. I enclose the only one which I have received.

‘ Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill will move to the bridge of Almaraz as soon as he finds the evacuation of Andalusia decided upon.

‘ I beg to congratulate your Lordship upon these events.

‘ I have halted here this day to give rest to the troops, which have marched for several days, and to receive intelligence from General Castaños.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘I send the dispatches by the messenger, Mr. Vick, to Coruña, in hopes that he will find there the ship *Sylvia*, which brought him to Santander.

‘I understand that the Earl of March, whom I sent to Coruña from Cuellar on the 4th of August, in consequence of Sir Home Popham’s offer to send a vessel to England with any dispatches which I might forward, and who arrived at Coruña on the 8th, was still there on the 31st, waiting for a vessel to convey him.

‘I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to my letter of the 13th of August, regarding the necessity of providing for the safety of the packets on their passage to and from Lisbon.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Valladolid, 8th Sept., 1812.

‘I am very much obliged to you and to the Government for all that has been done for me, for which I have requested Lord Liverpool to thank the Prince Regent.

‘I shall receive with gratitude any honor which His Royal Highness may think proper to confer upon me, but the addition proposed to my arms is the last which would have occurred to me. It carries with it an appearance of ostentation, of which I hope I am not guilty; and it will scarcely be credited that I did not apply for it. However, I prefer the addition proposed by your Lordship\* to that proposed by Lord Wellesley.

‘I am quite surprised at the conduct of the ——. I always thought the Order of the Bath that mark of the

\* ‘Whitehall, 25th August, 1812.

‘His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, hath been graciously pleased, by an especial warrant, to grant unto Arthur, Marquis of Wellington, Knight Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s forces in Spain and Portugal, His Majesty’s Royal license and permission that he and his descendants may bear, as a Royal augmentation, *in the dexter quarter of the arms of Wellington*, AN ESCOCHEON, charged with the Crosses of St. George

King's favor which it was most desirable to an officer to receive; and I mentioned it to you, as I thought it likely it would be agreeable to ——. It might be very proper to create him a Peer, but I would not propose such an arrangement to Government. Even if it had been proper that I should do so for any officer, I should have considered it my duty to make Government acquainted with what I know are \* \* \* \* 's feelings on this subject. He was much disappointed and hurt that this mark of the King's favor was not conferred upon him when the restrictions ceased, and I really believe that his regard for me alone prevented him from resigning his situation. If ——— had been made a peer, I really believe he would have resigned, notwithstanding that he is junior to ———. But your Lordship is aware that we none of us act discreetly in cases in which our own passions are concerned; and I believe that my friend \* \* \* \* is anxious to obtain this honor for the very reason which would induce the Government to doubt the expediency of granting it to him.

‘I should be very glad to have the assistance of General Fane, but we have no vacancy at present in the cavalry. The situation he held with General Hill is filled by ———. But he is a Lieut. General, and must continue in that situation; and unless Fane should get the brigade of Horse Guards, there is not even a brigade of cavalry vacant for him.

‘Upon referring to my dispatch, I observe that as it relates to the affair with the rear guard on the 23rd, as well as to the action of the 22nd, I ought to have mentioned General Bock; but I did not mention him, because neither he nor the German brigade were engaged in the general action. I shall correct this; but I would suggest to your Lordship, that as this was a general action, in which all the troops

St. Andrew, and St. Patrick, being the Union badge of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, as a lasting memorial of the glorious and transcendent achievements of the said Arthur Marquis of Wellington, on various important occasions, but more particularly in the recent brilliant and decisive victory obtained over the French army by the troops under his command, near Salamanca, on the 22nd day of July last; such Royal augmentation being first duly exemplified according to the laws of Arms, and recorded in the Herald's College. And also to command that this especial mark of His Majesty's Royal favor be registered in this College of Arms.’

were at least in the cannonade, and all shared in the pursuit, even though not engaged in the action, all the General Officers present should receive the thanks of Parliament. I am aware that this is a question of Parliamentary practice, in which I may be wrong.

‘ I have no particular partiality to my son’s title; but as the King had conferred it upon me, I did not think it proper to apply to have it altered. I believe he ought to be an Earl; and as the Earldom is not of that title, I believe there must be some alteration. I have no desire, however, that the title itself should be altered, nor even that my son should be made an Earl, unless it should be necessary.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Valladolid, 9th Sept., 1812.

‘ As I understand that General Hamilton is still very unwell, and as the Conde de Amarante will, it is to be hoped, now have little to do in Tras os Montes, I wish you to consider whether it would not be expedient to appoint him to command Hamilton’s division during the absence of the latter. I only suggest this for your consideration.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Valladolid, 9th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 5th, and I imagine that Colonel Elley has been troubling you on subjects on which he might have relied on my exertions in his favor. In regard to his promotion, I enclose you what Torrens says of it. The Duke of York says the same. It is not given to him now, because the Commander in Chief is unwilling to make a precedent of giving an officer the rank of Colonel by brevet as a reward for service. Whether right or wrong, this is a reason which cannot be overcome.

‘ I did Colonel Elley an injustice in not mentioning his name in my dispatch of the 24th; and I declare I thought

I had mentioned it. However, I corrected this omission in a dispatch I wrote yesterday respecting him and other officers; but I am not certain that I have not so far done him an injury by attending to his wishes upon this subject, as that his promotion will be delayed.

‘ It is obvious that the Duke of York will not make the precedent of promoting for service to the rank of Colonel. This shows that a man is not the best judge of what is good for himself.

‘ In regard to Captain —, I cannot recommend him now; but I will on the first occasion that offers. He likewise has done himself a great injury by writing an intemperate letter, which I ought not to have forwarded for him, respecting the promotion of Major —; and the fact turned out to be, that his money for the purchase was not forthcoming, according to the regulations: another proof that we are none of us the best judges in cases in which we are personally concerned.

‘ I wish to God you were well\*. Matters are going on famously. Hill’s corps will soon be across the Tagus; and I shall have the whole army either together or in close communication. The blockade of Cadiz is raised, Seville evacuated, and Soult retiring through Andalusia.

‘ I am about to join here with the Galician army, and to push the French as far as I can, and then return with some of the troops, particularly the heavy cavalry, towards Madrid. I have ordered the 2nd hussars round from Cadiz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ à Valladolid, ce 9 Sept., 1812.

‘ Je vous envoie mon aide de camp, le Colonel Gordon, pour vous expliquer l’état des affaires, et pour vous montrer combien il est urgent que l’armée de Galice se mette en communication avec nous le plutôt possible, et que je puisse tourner toute mon attention à notre droite.

\* Wounded at Salamanca.

‘ L’infanterie de l’avant-garde a marché ce matin vers Dueñas, où l’armée les suivra demain. Les Français étaient hier matin à Dueñas.

‘ Je mettrai mon Quartier Général demain à Cabezon ou Cigales.

‘ C’est vraiment très important que je puisse m’aboucher avec vous ; sans quoi nous courons risque de perdre la Castille en gagnant l’Andalousie et la Valence. Mais nous garderons tous trois si nous pouvons faire un bon arrangement pour ces pays ci. Le blocus de Cadiz est levé, nos troupes sont entrées à Seville ; Soult est en pleine marche pour évacuer l’Andalousie. Il reste à savoir par où il passera. S’il passe par Granade nous avons le temps pour tout. S’il vient par La Manche, il faut que je retourne tout de suite à Madrid.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *General*  
*Don F. X. Castaños.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Cooke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Valladolid, 9th Sept., 1812.

‘ You will have received the orders of the Secretary of State to send to Lisbon the 3rd batt. 1st Foot Guards, which were to be relieved, as I am informed, by the 2nd batt. 59th regiment ; and I conclude that you will have carried those orders into execution before you will receive this letter.

‘ In the course of yesterday and this day, I have received accounts to which I give credit, that the enemy had entirely raised the blockade of Cadiz, and it is now necessary that I should give you the instructions which I have received from the Secretary of State for your guidance, in case of the occurrence of this event.

‘ You will withdraw the British garrison from Tarifa, with the exception of the Royal artillery and engineers, who are to continue to construct the works and buildings on the island till further orders.

‘ The following troops are to be embarked and sent round to Lisbon without loss of time, unless you should have the means of transport, &c., so as to enable you to march them through the country, viz. :

Detachment of the 2nd hussars, K.G.L.

20th Portuguese regiment.

3rd batt. 1st Foot Guards.

Detachment 2nd batt. 95th regiment.

Company of the Royal Staff Corps.

2nd batt. 87th regiment.

Captain Rowan's and Captain Dickson's companies of artillery.

All the artillery horses and mules, excepting 170 horses.

Artillery drivers in proportion to the number of horses and mules sent.

‘ Colonel Skerrett must come in command of these troops.

‘ If you should be able to equip the troops as they ought to be, to be enabled to march through the country, they must move by Seville, Monasterio, Medellin, Truxillo, &c.

‘ In case the troops should land at Lisbon, Colonel Skerrett will have instructions from General Peacocke for his guidance. If they should march, he must do every thing in his power to communicate with General Hill, and through him with me. If he should have any sick with his detachment in passing through Estremadura, he must send them to General Hill's hospitals at Elvas, from the British magazines at which place he may draw supplies; giving notice to the Commissary there of his wants, and sending means of transport to convey what he will require.

‘ If the troops should march, they must have with them the necessary officers of the Commissariat, Medical Department, &c., and each man must be equipped with a blanket, as well as his great coat; they must likewise carry a bill hook for 10 men. The men must be provided with tin camp kettles, one for six men; which they must carry. If there should be no tin camp kettles, they must have those made of cast iron, which must be carried on mules, one for the kettles of each company. There must be a mule to carry the entrenching tools of each regiment; one to carry the Paymaster's books; and one the Surgeon's chest of each regiment.

‘ If the troops should march, you will send with them a 9 pounder brigade of ordnance, and one hospital waggon

for each battalion, drawn by six of the waggon train horses if you should have any hospital waggons at Cadiz.

‘ I have received the orders of the Secretary of State to desire that you will stay in command of the British troops which will remain at Cadiz and Carthagena, consisting of  
4 companies of the Royal Artillery.

Artillery Drivers.

Engineers.

2nd batt. 47th regiment.

2nd batt. 67th regiment.

Waggon train.

De Watteville’s regiment.

Battalion of foreign recruits.

170 Artillery horses.

‘ In case the 2nd batt. 59th regiment should have arrived at Cadiz before you will receive this order, you will send either that battalion, or the 2nd battalion 47th regiment, with Colonel Skerrett’s detachment, according to your judgment which of the two is most fit for service in the field.

‘ Whenever the 2nd batt. 59th regiment shall arrive after you shall have carried these orders into execution, you will send to Lisbon whichever of that battalion, or the 2nd batt. 47th regiment, is most fit for service, retaining at Cadiz one British battalion.

‘ I beg you to lay these instructions before His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cadiz, for the information of the Spanish Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Valladolid, 9th September, 1812.

‘ Major General Cooke will lay before you the instructions which I have sent him in consequence of the information which I have received, which renders it probable that the enemy have raised the blockade of Cadiz, and have evacuated the south west part of Andalusia.

‘ I beg you will do me the favor to congratulate the Spanish Government on this event ; and at the same time

convey to them the following suggestions. The experience which I have acquired in military affairs has taught me not to rely implicitly on any prosperous state of affairs. An accident, trifling probably, abstractedly, may be attended by the most important consequences; and it is the duty of a prudent Government, by precautions to prevent, or at all events diminish the evil which may result from such accidents.

‘ I earnestly recommend to them, therefore, first, to keep up the works which have been formed at the Isla and Cadiz at such vast labor and expense; and never to leave that place without a respectable garrison. With this view, and to take care of the stores belonging to the British Government which are there, I have desired that some troops might remain at Cadiz.

‘ 2ndly. To have all the enemy’s works completely destroyed, and all the guns and stores in them, in the lines of the Guadalete and in Seville, &c., removed to Cadiz without loss of time.

‘ 3rdly. To secure the Peninsula of the Trocadero by good works, in the same manner as has been done with the Isla, and the communication between the Isla and Cadiz.

‘ I have above recommended to the Spanish Government nothing of which I have not myself set the example. All the works which saved Portugal in 1810, and will, I trust, eventually save the Peninsula, are kept in the most perfect state; and many improvements have been made to them, and additional works have been constructed since the French have been obliged to retire from Portugal. On the same principle, the chief engineer of the British army is now employed in the repair and improvement of the works of Badajoz; and the works of all the towns on the frontiers of Portugal are kept in the best state, and the towns are sufficiently garrisoned to preserve them against a *coup de main*.

‘ I am sorry to say that this is not the case in respect to Badajoz or Ciudad Rodrigo. In the former place, I understand that there are not more than 700 men, and in respect to the latter, the Governor informed me some days ago, that he could not afford a detachment of 250 men to escort the prisoners taken in the Retiro, till they should be relieved by the garrison of Almeida. The consequence of any check

to the allied armies which would oblige them to retire upon either of those places, would be the fall of the place for want of a garrison to defend it.

‘ I recommend that General Ballesteros’ army should be reinforced as far as may be possible, and that it should carry on operations at all times between the enemy on the one side, and Cadiz and Seville on the other ; taking care not to be committed.

‘ I have ordered General Hill to draw nearer to me, and he will cross the Tagus, and move towards Madrid. I shall thus have the whole of the allied British and Portuguese army collected, and communicating by a short communication.

‘ I shall, I hope, be in communication with the army of Galicia by my left ; with the army of Estremadura by my right ; and I am already in communication with the troops under General O’Donnell from Madrid.

‘ Thus, General Ballesteros will always be on the left flank, or rear of the enemy, while I shall be in their front ; supported by the Spanish armies of Galicia, Estremadura, and Murcia ; and it may be hoped, that, unless some accident happens, they will not be long on this side of the Ebro.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Memorandum for the Commissary General.*

‘ Cigales, 10th September, 1812.

‘ As six squadrons of the Life and Horse Guards are coming out to Lisbon, consisting of 900 horses, it will be necessary to make arrangements for providing this brigade with the regulated number of mules to attend them, viz., 450.

‘ These mules might be hired in Estremadura, and might be collected for them at Elvas, Badajoz, and Campo Mayor. The Commissary General is requested to report the progress in obtaining these mules.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To General Santocildes.*

‘ à Dueñas, ce 12 Sept., 1812.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

à 8 heures du matin.

‘ Je viens de recevoir votre lettre d’hier à 9 heures du soir. Il est bien vrai que je vous ai donné rendez-vous à Valladolid, mais c’était pour le 6 ou le 7, et non pour le 12 ; et depuis je n’ai jamais pu vous dire où vous devriez aller, parceque jusqu’aujourd’hui je n’ai pas su où vous étiez. Il y a trois jours que mon aide de camp est allé vous chercher et le Général Castaños, par la route qu’on m’avait indiqué que vous marcheriez.

‘ J’espérais que, sachant que j’étais hier à Dueñas, vous vous seriez rapproché de moi aujourd’hui ; mais je vois que vous en êtes plus éloigné, et que vous avez continué toujours votre marche sur Valladolid.

‘ A présent je vous prie de rassembler vos troupes le 14 à Palencia.

‘ Je pars tout de suite pour Magaz. Mes troupes ont marché ce matin, et continueront de s’avancer.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &amp;c.

‘ *General Santocildes.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Don Ramon Noblezo y Lozemo.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR.

‘ Magaz, 12th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter, and a most beautiful pair of pistols which you have forwarded to me ; and I beg leave to return you my most sincere thanks for the honor which you have done by sending me this beautiful present.

‘ Believe me, &amp;c.

‘ *Don Ramon Noblezo y Lozemo.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Memorandum for the Quarter Master General.*

‘ Magaz, 12th Sept., 1812.

‘ It is necessary that arrangements should be made at an early period for bringing up the clothing of the troops which should be put on them about Christmas.

‘ There are two great roads by which to communicate with the army, viz., that by Badajoz and that by Ciudad Rodrigo.

Besides these, there is that by Castello Branco and Plasencia ; but this falls into the road from Badajoz to Madrid, and difficulties might be experienced in using it. Indeed the only roads which can be used for this or any other purpose, are those upon which previous arrangements will be made.

‘The clothing for the troops in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions, and General Alten’s, General Slade’s, and General Long’s brigades of cavalry, might be sent by Elvas and Badajoz ; that for the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, Colonel Ponsonby’s, General Bock’s, and General Anson’s cavalry, by Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘The three modes of communicating with Badajoz should be adopted, viz., by the Alcacer do Sal river, by the Tagus to Abrantes, and by the great road from Aldea Gallega.

‘Each road should be allotted for the baggage of one or two divisions.

‘The clothing which is to come by Ciudad Rodrigo should be transported from Lisbon to Oporto or to Figueira, at the mouth of the Mondego. From Oporto it must come by water to Barca d’Alva, and from thence to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo in carts.

‘From Figueira it must come up the Mondego in boats as far as Foz Daõ, and thence in carts by Celorico to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘Each mode should be allotted to one or more divisions.

‘The only mode of arranging this carriage of the clothing forward from Elvas and Badajoz, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, is to have the work done by stages.

‘It is supposed that the clothing for each regiment will require on an average 30 carts, and it is supposed that in the manner above proposed there will not be much difficulty in transporting the clothing to Elvas and Badajoz, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘The Commissary General should then make arrangements for working carts at certain stages on the great military lines of Salamanca, Arevalo, &c., from Ciudad Rodrigo ; and of Merida, Truxillo, the bridge of Almaraz, Oropesa, Talavera, from Elvas and Badajoz.

‘It is obvious that the same number of carts, or rather carts to carry the same weight, should be at each stage.

‘The Quarter Master General at Lisbon would then send

off the clothing, for which commanding officers of regiments should be directed to write by one of the lines of communication to Elvas and Badajoz, or Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, as above arranged.

‘The officer of the Commissariat at Aldea Gallega, Abrantes, Alcacer do Sal, Oporto, and Figueira, Barca d’Alva and Foz Daõ, should be directed to find means of conveyance for the clothing of those places respectively, on the requisition of the officers or non-commissioned officers in charge of it.

‘An officer of the Quarter Master General’s department should be stationed at Elvas, and another at Almeida, to communicate with the officers of the Commissariat, and to regulate the loading and departure of the clothing of the several regiments, which should be sent on in succession by stages. According to this mode of proceeding, all the clothing of the army would reach the regiments in about eight or ten weeks, supposing that the stages of the carts did not require more than a week for each trip, and that there were carts in sufficient numbers to carry the clothing of two regiments at a time.

‘The officers of the Quarter Master General’s department at Elvas or Badajoz, or at Almeida, or Ciudad Rodrigo, should be directed to report to the Quarter Master General the arrival and departure of the clothing of each regiment at or from that station, specifying in charge of whom, and upon how many carriages loaded.

‘The officer of the Commissariat at each stage on the road should report when the clothing of any regiment passes his stage, in charge of whom, and on how many carts loaded; by which means it would be known at all times what progress the clothing should make, and where the clothing of every regiment might be.

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Magaz, 12th Sept., 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 30th August. I do not know what to recommend to you about the Government. It appears to me that every thing in which the Spaniards are

concerned is going on as badly as possible ; and I really believe there is not a man in the country who is capable of comprehending, much less of conducting, any great concern. If there was, it might be worth while to endeavor to have him appointed to the Government. As it is, things cannot well be worse than they are, and it is better that we should not interfere in any way.

‘ As for military matters in this quarter, I wrote to Castaños from Madrid on the 30th, to tell him that I was going to move upon Valladolid, and eventually to drive the French across the Ebro, if I had time ; and requesting that the army of Galicia might join me at Valladolid, where I should be on the 6th. He says he did not receive my letter of the 30th, nor another I wrote him on the 3rd from Arevalo, till the 7th. But the fact is that I marched from Madrid to Valladolid, halted one day and turned out the French, before the courier could carry my letter to Castaños. Then Santocildes has been six days marching. He was yesterday within three leagues of us, and knew it last night, but he has this morning moved to Valladolid, eight leagues from us, and unless I halt two days for him, he will not join us for four or five days. Then, out of 30,000 men that they feed in Galicia, he has only brought 11,000 infantry and 350 cavalry to join us.

‘ What do you think of his losing all the guns and stores we took in Valladolid in the pursuit of Marmont’s army, and 400 of the prisoners ? Then I desired him to proclaim the Constitution forthwith, but having delayed it *à mañana*, the French returned, and the Constitution was not proclaimed till I drove them out the other day.

‘ I certainly did right in proclaiming the Constitution at Madrid the day after I entered it. I did the same at Valladolid, and I shall do the same wherever I go.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Magaz, 12th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th. My dispatch of the 18th August will have shown you what description of

ordnance I wished to have; and I write to General Peacocke to desire him not to send the 12 pounders.

‘I was misled by Sir H. Popham to send March to Coruña from Cuellar. He arrived there in four days, but there was no vessel to take him away till the 31st.

‘I assure your Lordship that you can depend no more upon the reports of ——— than you can upon those of any body else; and I earnestly recommend to Government to publish respecting the army only what comes from myself. I write a report once a week, which contains all occurrences, and I should think that the public might be satisfied with these reports. It might have been as well also if Sir H. Popham’s exultation upon the success of his operations in diverting the attention of the enemy from me, had not been published. I mention this because I know that the French act a good deal upon any information from our papers, which they deem at all authentic.

‘Your Lordship will see that Andalusia has been evacuated and the siege of Cadiz raised; but I do not much like the way in which affairs are situated. I cannot get the Spaniards to make an exertion for themselves; and they are really more backward in the military art than I had thought it possible. Of 30,000 men who are fed as soldiers in Galicia, Santocildes has brought into Castille only 11,000 ragged infantry and 350 cavalry, and I cannot prevail on these to make a direct movement to join me. The object of our operation to the north is therefore making but slow progress, and I fear that I shall have to return to Madrid without having accomplished it. ——— has contrived to quarrel with ——— and ———, and he is here instead of being at the ——— head quarters.

‘I have a letter from Sir R. Hill of the 4th, from Castuera, but he had not received my orders to approach the Tagus, which river I have since sent him orders to cross. Here also there will, I am afraid, be some delay.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To General Dumouriez.*

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,      ‘à Torquemada, ce 13 Sept., 1812.

‘ Il y a long temps que je ne vous ai pas écrit, car je savais que je ne pourrais vous rien apprendre que vous ne trouveriez pas dans mes dépêches. Enfin voilà le blocus de Cadiz levé, et l’Andalousie évacuée par les Français, par les suites d’un mouvement en Castille, et de la bataille de Salamanque et ses suites. Tout le monde paraît vouloir se rassembler en Valence; et en attendant que les plans se développent, que les troupes du Général Hill s’avancent d’Estremadoure, et que les troupes Espagnoles puissent se rassembler, je chasserai les parties de l’armée de Marmont du Duero; et je les pousserai aussi loin que je le pourrai, et je tâcherai d’établir une bonne communication entre les détachemens Anglo Portugais que je dois laisser ici, et l’armée de la Galice, afin d’assurer ma gauche quand je serai engagé vers Valence.

‘ La prise de Madrid a été un coup très avantageux en vue politique et militaire. Il nous a fait beaucoup de bien; et, je crois, nous a valu l’évacuation de l’Andalousie.

‘ Il faut que je vous prie tous en Angleterre de ne pas voler trop vite. De corps vraiment militaires en Espagne à opposer aux Français, il n’y a que l’armée Anglo Portugaise. Pour les autres, j’en serai satisfait s’ils ne se laissent pas détruire. Voilà tout ce que je leur demande. Mais vous devez sentir qu’on ne peut pas faire grand chose bien vite, avec une telle disparité de forces.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Au Général Dumouriez.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Torquemada, 13th Sept., 1812.

‘ I beg you to apply to the Portuguese Government for permission to import the grain mentioned in the enclosed letter from the Commissary General, free of duty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Torquemada, 13th Sept., 1812.

‘ Referring to your letter of the 25th August, I have the honor to enclose a letter from Dr. McGrigor, stating, that notwithstanding five Surgeons and twelve Hospital Mates have been ordered to proceed forthwith to this country, he shall still require those for whom he made a demand on the 22nd ult.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I beg to observe that there is not a single medical officer in reserve with this army, and to refer you to the list sent home in my letter of the 25th ult., of those absent. I beg leave likewise to inform you, that we have not one officer of the Commissariat in reserve, to be employed on any service; or one officer of the Pay Department; and I am now obliged to send officers of the regiments in charge of money from one station to another; not one regiment being complete in officers. It is very desirable that heads of departments should advert to the returns sent home regularly from this army, and keep all the departments complete in officers. Requisitions from me can be sent only when wants occur, take one month to get home, and three months before the army can receive the benefit of them.’

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Torquemada, 13th Sept., 1812.

‘ I received from the Adjutant General by the last post a letter of the 1st of August, in answer to one which I wrote to him on the 15th of April last, in regard to the transmission of invalids from Portugal to England. and the settlement of their accounts.

‘ Since I received His Royal Highness’s orders, to which my letter of the 15th of April was an answer, I have had frequent complaints from the Superintendent of Hospitals of the detention in Portugal of soldiers after Medical Boards have invalidated them; which detention has invariably been occasioned by the necessity of settling their accounts pre-

vious to their being sent to England under His Royal Highness's orders.

‘ Upon receipt of the Adjutant General's letter of the 1st of August, I desired Dr. M'Grigor to put in writing what he had frequently reported to me on this subject, and I now enclose his letter.

‘ In truth, my dear Torrens, the difficulties under which we labor are but little known in England. First : there is no soldier in the army who has at present been paid to a later date than the 24th of April for want of money. His accounts are settled every month. But, 2ndly ; if a soldier has been in hospital since the month of March last, at which time the soldiers had not been paid later than January, and the pay for March not received till June or July, I should like to know how it is possible for any officer to come to a settlement by a correspondence with one officer, who has to settle the accounts of probably 500 men going to England at the same moment ? It is quite impossible ; and the consequence is, that the poor men are detained three, four, or five months, to the loss of many, till the correspondence respecting their accounts is finished, during which time many settle all accounts with this world.

‘ It is a great error to suppose that the lower orders are always right in their complaints, and the higher orders always in the wrong. My experience has taught me, that nine times in ten, the soldiers loudest in their complaints and claims have no ground for either the one or the other ; and are generally in debt to their Captains. Those who are wounded invariably either throw away or sell their necessities ; and whether the ground is held or not by the army, they claim compensation from the public. Their claim can be settled only by a Board. No officer of a regiment has the power either to admit or to refuse it. Yet, if a soldier makes such a claim at Lisbon, the officer who is to settle the soldiers' claims before they go to England must detain at least as many as one transport will contain, till the claims of one for losses of this description shall be inquired into by post ; every letter now requiring three weeks to get an answer. While this is going on, many die who might be saved ; and after all, a soldier's account can never be settled satisfactorily excepting with his regiment.

‘ I have ordered General Peacocke to carry strictly into execution His Royal Highness’s orders ; and I shall repeat my directions to him by this post. But I shall be much obliged to you, if you will lay before him the enclosed letter ; and make known to him what I have above represented.

‘ There is no point in the service to which I have at all times paid so much attention as to the settlement of the soldiers’ accounts : I consider early settlements to be essential to discipline ; but I am quite convinced that it is impossible to attain His Royal Highness’s object in this country without detaining here the men three or four months after the necessity for their return to England shall have been pronounced ; and the consequences are seen in Dr. M’Gri-gor’s letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Torquemada, 13th Sept., 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from Major General Hope, from which you will see that he is obliged to quit the army. Indeed his health has always been in such a state as that he could not be said to be fit for service in this country. It does not appear to me to be necessary to relieve him, as you will have observed from my last letter that we have more General Officers to command divisions than we have divisions to be commanded. What we want in them is health, good will, and abilities to perform the duties of their situation. I am sorry to say that the perpetual changes which we are making, owing to the infirmities, or the wounds, or the disinclination of the General Officers to serve in this country, are by no means favorable to the discipline and success of the army ; and do not augment the ease of my situation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Torquemada, 13th Sept., 1812.

‘ I see that some person employed by Lord Castlereagh has made some discoveries approaching to the key of the

Paris cipher, in which some letters were written, which I have transmitted to your Lordship.

‘ It is obvious, from the perusal of this cipher, that this discovery is not complete; but as nearly all the letters which we now intercept are written in this cipher, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me what has been discovered.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Torquemada, 13th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have continued to follow the movements of the army of Portugal since I last addressed you, but I have not pressed them as hard as I might, as I wished to be joined by the army of Galicia. These troops, to the number of 11,000 infantry, 350 cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery, will be at Palencia, about three leagues from hence, to-morrow.

‘ Your Lordship will have received from Major General Cooke the reports of the enemy’s having raised the blockade of Cadiz, in the night of the 24th of August\*, and of the very handsome attack made by the allies under General La Cruz on the enemy’s rear guard, at Seville, on the 27th of August, in which attack the allied British and Portuguese troops under Colonel Skerrett distinguished them-

\* *Major General Cooke to General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cadiz, 26th August, 1812.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the enemy abandoned his position and works opposite to Cadiz and the Isla on the night of the 24th and morning of the 25th, except the town of Puerto S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, where a body of troops remained till the middle of the day, and then withdrew to the Cartuga. He has left a very numerous artillery in the several works, and a large quantity of stores and powder; and although most of the ordnance has been rendered useless, he appears to have retired from his position with more precipitation than I should have expected.

‘ A considerable body of cavalry was brought down previous to the retreat commencing.

‘ The towns of Puerto Real and Chiclana are now occupied by detachments of Spanish troops; and a party of the Hanoverian hussars is at the first mentioned place, to which Colonel Lambert had moved from the Portazgo with them, and some light troops from this division.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General  
the Marquis of Wellington, K.B.*’

‘ G. COOKE, Major General.

selves. The bridge of Seville was thereby saved, and the enemy was prevented from destroying many guns and valuable stores which the town contained.

‘ Marshal Soult directed his march upon Granada, and General Drouet upon Jaen, according to the last accounts. I have not heard of the arrival of either at those places. General Ballesteros, reinforced by the Spanish troops under General La Cruz, and by other Spanish troops detached from Cadiz, making in the whole, as I am informed, a corps of 15,000 men, was in pursuit of the enemy.

‘ I have directed Major General Cooke, by the instructions of which I enclose a copy\*, to send to join this army the allied British and Portuguese troops now at Cadiz, with the exception of one British battalion, the Regiment de Watteville, and the battalion of foreign detachments and four companies of British artillery, the engineers, &c., which are to remain at Cadiz: and I have desired Major General Cooke to remain at Cadiz in the command of these troops, and those at Carthagena.

‘ The troops will be sent round to Lisbon, or will march, according to the facility which Major General Cooke will experience in providing for them on their march. I am inclined to believe they will march, as I understand, from Major General Cooke’s last letter, that he was about to move the troops to Seville.

‘ My last accounts from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill are of the 4th instant. He was then at Castuera in Estremadura, but he had not received my instructions of the 24th August to approach the Tagus. I have since sent him orders to cross that river and to move upon Oropesa.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Santocildes.*

‘ à Torquemada, ce 14 Sept., 1812.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

à 8 heures du matin.

‘ J’ai continué à avancer depuis que je vous ai écrit le 12, et mes troupes seront aujourd’hui à Palenzuela, et le Quartier Général et le gros de l’armée à Cordovilla.

\* See page 414.

‘ Il serait à désirer que vous puissiez venir demain avec vos troupes à Quintana del Puente.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *General Santocildes.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Xavier Elio.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cordovilla, 14th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 9th instant.

‘ I recommended to his Excellency General Joseph O’Donnell that he should put himself in communication with this army, lest the troops under his command should be destroyed by those of Soult, on the expected march of the latter from Andalusia into the kingdom of Valencia; and I recommended the same to you.

‘ All that I am anxious about is that none of the bodies of Spanish troops now existing should be defeated, as I am of opinion that if that misfortune can be avoided for a short time, there are grounds for me to hope that we may be able to oblige the enemy to evacuate the Peninsula.

‘ Under these circumstances, your Excellency will be the best judge whether, with a corps now consisting of 4000 infantry and 1300 cavalry, which when more than double that number were lately defeated by one French division, it is expedient that you should expose yourself to be attacked by an army which does not amount to much less than 50,000 men.

‘ In regard to the proposal of your Excellency, to draw from Alicante the division of Spanish troops under the command of General Roche, I have to remind your Excellency that these troops are the garrison of Alicante; and your Excellency is much mistaken if you suppose that I will allow the British troops under Lieut. General Maitland to be the garrison of Alicante, instead of those under General Roche.

‘ I now give notice to your Excellency, that if I do not learn by the return of the courier that you have ordered General Roche to remain at Alicante, I shall send orders to General Maitland to embark the troops under his command from Alicante, where it will, in that case, be useless for them to remain.

‘ The facts regarding Alicante are as follow :—There are

no provisions in the place for the Spanish troops, and the place cannot be supplied unless the communication should be kept open with the sea. The communication with the sea will be lost unless the troops at Alicante can maintain themselves on the heights outside of the town; and there will not be a sufficient number to hold that position, if the troops under General Roche should be withdrawn.

‘ If the eastern heights cannot be maintained, your Excellency will see the necessity for my withdrawing my troops; and your Excellency will do well to give orders that the Spanish troops under General Whittingham should be withdrawn likewise; and it will be necessary that your Excellency should be prepared to give satisfactory reasons to the Government for the loss of this important post.

‘ I would also request your Excellency to consider the measure of weakening the force at Alicante, under another point of view. It appears to be the enemy’s intention to collect his army in Valencia, or possibly in Valencia and La Mancha; and I am doing every thing in my power to collect the largest and most efficient body of troops which I can, in order, if possible, to oblige them to evacuate that kingdom, or, at all events, to enable us to maintain the ground which we have acquired.

‘ The views of all ought to be directed to these objects; and certainly nothing will facilitate their execution to such a degree as the maintenance in Valencia on the flank and rear of the enemy of such a post as Alicante, garrisoned by a corps which must secure it, and which is sufficiently strong to take the field, and re-conquer the kingdom of Valencia, in case the enemy should weaken the force which it is expected he will have in that quarter.

‘ I beg your Excellency will consider the suggestions which I have above detailed, and let me know whether you intend or not to withdraw General Roche from Alicante, that I may take my measures accordingly.

‘ I assure your Excellency that I have no object in wishing to keep a strong corps at Alicante, excepting views for the benefit of your country, which at least have the merit of having been maturely considered.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

*General*

*Don Xavier Elío.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Revilla, 15th Sept., 1812.

‘ I received by the packet by Coruña your letter of the 28th August, in which you enclosed the copies of the correspondence which you had had with Lord Somerville, respecting the purchase of the manor of Wellington, and the estate of Wellington Park. I am very much obliged to you for your attention to my interests. It rarely happens that a person in your situation has leisure to attend to his own private affairs, much less to those of any other individual; and it is particularly gratifying to me to find that not only your Lordship, but Mr. Perceval had recollected me when a property was offered for sale which I am most anxious to possess.

‘ When the Prince Regent promoted me in the peerage last spring, and made an addition to my pension, I determined, for the sake of my sons, to lay out all the money I had in the purchase of land in Great Britain, and I directed that inquiries might be made for a suitable purchase for me. I likewise intend to lay out in the same manner the sum of money which His Royal Highness has declared his intention to recommend to Parliament to grant me.

‘ The inquiries which have been made have not hitherto produced any favorable result; and I could not make any purchase with which I should be so well satisfied as that on which you have written to me. I am ready therefore to pay the money as soon as I shall receive your answer to this letter. I am rather inclined, however, to wish to receive the estate and manor as a gift from the public as part of the £100,000, if your Lordship should see no objection. But if there should be any, I shall be too happy to make the purchase out of my private funds.

‘ While writing upon this subject, it occurs to me, that as I propose to lay out all the money which the public will grant me in the purchase of land in Great Britain, it would save me some trouble, and might probably be more advantageous to the public, if the value were granted in land. However, I suggest this to your Lordship, to be attended to only in case there should be no objections.

‘ I beg leave once more to return you my thanks for your kind attention to what would be gratifying to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool,*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 20th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 3rd, 6th, and 10th instant. In that of the 3rd, in which you have returned answers to the queries contained in my letter of the 29th ultimo, it appears to be the opinion of the Admiral, that the troops can be embarked as long as your extensive line can be maintained; but that the communication with the sea would be difficult and uncertain, and probably only partially practicable, if it should depend upon the lower lines. The opinion of the Admiral concurs with the notion which I had formed on this subject when I instructed you to maintain your position till you should find the communication with the sea to be so seriously menaced, as to be in danger of being lost.

‘ It appears to me that as long as you can maintain the castle of Alicante, and the hills to the south, your communication with the sea would be easy and certain.

‘ I should hope, therefore, that it would not be impracticable to embark the whole of the troops, after you are of opinion that you can no longer maintain the exterior line.

‘ His Majesty and the public have a right to expect from us that we should place a reasonable confidence in the gallantry and discipline of the troops under our command; and I have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having tried them frequently, they have never failed me; and in a position particularly on the flanks of which the enemy cannot manœuvre with the advantage of a superior cavalry, their success may be relied upon.

‘ With a full knowledge of the defects of the Spanish troops, I feel the same confidence in them when placed on a position, and having the advantage of the co-operation and example of the British troops; and I entertain so little doubt of your success if you be attacked, that there is nothing I wish for so much, for your own honor and the ad-

vantage of the cause, as that the enemy should attack you *de vive force*.

‘ If they should proceed by a regular attack upon your field positions, or upon those fortified posts with which they are connected, you will at least have time to estimate your danger, and leisure to make all your arrangements, and embark at the moment such a measure may be necessary.

‘ I assure you that your facilities for embarkation are much greater, and your prospects better, even if left by yourself, than mine were in the year 1810.

‘ I advert to this subject in order to inspire you with confidence in your own situation; which you may depend upon it is so good that I only fear that the enemy will not think of touching you.

‘ Cornet de Lobo is an officer of this army. I shall be obliged to you if you will give him 200 dollars, to be sent to his father by means of a flag of truce from your out-posts, together with any money, clothes, &c., which he may have brought with him. Desire him to return and join his corps forthwith, as he may depend upon it that the French will not allow him to see his father. I should have prevented his going if I had known of it. Let me know how I shall repay you the 200 dollars.

‘ We invested this place yesterday, and took by storm last night the horn work, which commands the greatest part of the works of the castle. I doubt however that I have means to take the castle, which is very strong.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Maitland.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 20th Sept., 1812.

‘ I think it proper to send to you a copy of a letter which I have received from General Maitland of the 30th ultimo, likewise the copy of one of the 2nd instant, and the copy of a letter which I have written to him this day.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 20th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 14th, in which you have informed me that you will be at Oropesa on the 18th; and I beg that on the receipt of this letter you will move with all the troops under your command to Toledo. You will throw your cavalry forward in La Mancha; and canton your infantry in Toledo and Aranjuez, taking care that the officers and troops respect the King’s houses and gardens.

‘ I enclose you the instructions which I gave to Major General Charles Alten when I quitted Madrid. I have ordered the Major General to place himself under your command; and I beg you to communicate with General Elio, who commands the troops which are under the command of General O’Donnell, and with Don Carlos de España.

‘ I can scarcely think it possible that, with such a force as you will have, you will not be able to defend the Tagus; therefore a part of these instructions may not be applicable to your situation.

‘ I think it desirable that you should leave the troops of this army in their present situations till you shall find it necessary to order them forward to the Tagus.

‘ I enclose the order which I have sent to General Cooke, regarding the disposal of the troops at Cadiz. I beg you to send an officer to meet Colonel Skerrett in Estremadura, with orders to follow your march across and along the Tagus; and to join the troops under your command.

‘ I send a duplicate of this letter to Major General Charles Alten, to be forwarded to you, and he will report himself to you.

‘ As soon as you shall be established at Toledo, and shall have opened your communication with me through Madrid, you may take off the latter parties ordered to be placed up to Arevalo by my letter of the 8th inst.

‘ I order General Charles Alten to continue to correspond with me.

‘ It appears that it would be desirable to deprive the enemy of Consuegra, to which I beg to draw your attention.

‘ I request you to order Colonel Buchan to return to

Elvas with the 5th, 17th, and 22nd regiments of Portuguese infantry of the line, and the 3rd regiment of cavalry. I did not know there was a fourth regiment of infantry belonging to the garrison. If there is, it should return likewise.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

*Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR PAGET,

‘ Villa Toro, 20th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 8th and 12th, and I am delighted to find that you are come out. I direct this letter to Ciudad Rodrigo, to which place I think it probable that you will come from Castello Branco, as it is scarcely possible that it can meet you at the latter. You will do well to come to head quarters by the military route of Salamanca, Arevalo, Valladolid, &c. Arevalo is a little out of the way ; but I have kept our communication by that point, because it answers for communication with Madrid and with Hill, who is, I hope, at Oropesa.

‘ When I found that the King had decidedly passed the mountains into Valencia, I determined to make use of the time which would elapse before I could go to the south (which I then thought it possible I should be obliged to do) in settling our affairs upon the Duero, and in establishing a good communication between us and the Spanish army of Galicia.

‘ The probability that Soult would evacuate Andalusia, of which I was aware before I quitted Madrid, or the certainty that he had raised the siege of Cadiz, and abandoned Seville, which I obtained at a subsequent period, was not calculated to induce me to alter this determination. I was certain that, whenever Soult should connect himself with Suchet and the King, we should be pressed a little on the Tagus, and that it was desirable to remove to a distance all embarrassments existing on this side, and to strengthen ourselves as much as possible in this quarter, preparatory to the events which might be expected on the Tagus.

‘ We passed the Duero on the 6th, and drove the French from Valladolid : on the 7th we pushed them on, but not

very vigorously, till the 16th, on which day we were joined by about 12,000 men of the army of Galicia. We then drove the enemy before us to Burgos: on the 17th they retired through the town that night, and have since continued their march to Riobena\*.

‘ The castle of Burgos commands all the bridges over the Arlanzon so completely, that we were not able to cross that river till yesterday morning. We immediately drove in all the enemy’s posts; and last night took by storm a horn work lately constructed upon a hill within 300 yards of the castle, which has a considerable command over many of the works of the castle. Although we succeeded, the operation was not very well carried on, and I am afraid that our loss is not less than 300 men. After all, I am a little apprehensive that I have not means to take this castle, which the French have strengthened to the utmost of their power. I shall be able to judge better however in a day or two. Although I have here only four divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, I think that with the Spaniards we are strong enough for any thing the French have or can now bring against us on this side. If I could get this castle, I think I might take some of the force southward, and I must still endeavor to do so, even though I should not succeed in taking the castle.

‘ I have accounts from Madrid to the 17th. They had not any late accounts of Soult, which could be much relied upon; nor does it appear that he had quitted Granada. He had intended to move into Valencia through Murcia; but as the yellow fever prevails in Murcia, I think he will pass by Caravaca to Albacete; from whence he will communicate with the King in Valencia. I have one account stating that he was on the 9th within nine leagues of Caravaca; but, on the other hand, I have letters from General Elio from San Clemente to the 15th, who does not mention Soult, of whom he must have heard, if he had been on the 9th so far forward as is stated. I have now given you an outline of our situation as far as I am acquainted with it.

‘ Besides Hill’s corps I have three weak divisions and two

\* Thus written in the draft of this letter, and also in the great map of Lopez; but Rubena in the *Diccionario Geografico-estadistico* of Miñano, and the *Guia de Caminos* of the Madrid Post Office.

weak brigades of cavalry, at and near Madrid. But we shall have, I should think, not less than 12,000 Spaniards, besides innumerable guerrillas; indeed we have plenty of that commodity every where; and Ballesteros has 12,000 or 15,000 men, which will be on Soult's left, where are likewise 4000 or 5000 men on their march from Cadiz; and there is an army under General Maitland at Alicante. Upon the whole therefore I do not despair of the continuance of our success through the campaign, particularly if the cavalry expected from England should land at an early period.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.*’

*To Major General Baron Charles Alten.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Villa Toro, 21st Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, and I enclose the duplicate of a letter to General Sir Rowland Hill, which I beg you to peruse and to forward to him by an officer express to Oropesa. If he passes through Talavera he will probably meet him there.

‘ You will put yourself under the orders of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, and will communicate with him as well as with me.

‘ Desire your brother to take the command of his brigade.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Baron Charles Alten.*’

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Villa Toro, 21st Sept., 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I am anxious to confine the enemy a little more to the castle; and I have it in contemplation to take possession this evening of the exterior line of their works. As I understand that Colonel Brown\* was of great service, at the siege of Salamanca, in keeping down the enemy's fire of La Merced, by the possession of the neighbouring houses, I shall be obliged to you if you will leave him in charge of the troops of the 6th division in the town, and direct him to

\* Sir Gustavus Brown, then Major in the 60th regiment, and Lieut. Colonel commanding the 9th Portuguese Caçadores.

make arrangements for placing the troops under his command in the houses close to the walls, and for keeping possession, as soon as we shall be prepared to lodge ourselves in the exterior line.

‘ I shall also be much obliged to you if you will look at the posts occupied by the Spaniards, and see whether, by a better connection of their posts with ours, or by a better arrangement of them, we could confine the enemy more effectually than we have hitherto.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Mr. Heydeck, Professor of Oriental Languages.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 21st Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th inst., and I had before received those which you had written me, to which I did not write an answer, as they did not appear to require one.

‘ I beg leave to return you my thanks for your last letter, and to assure you that I shall be happy to receive from you the communication of any facts, the knowledge of which by me you think interesting to the cause.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Heydeck.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 21st Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th; the mistake regarding the Spanish clothing originates in the constant practice of our Government in corresponding with two persons on the same subject. This clothing was to be at my disposal and in charge of the Commissary General, one of the officers of this army. For what reason then are they to trouble you with it? and it is obvious that with the best intention you and I may give different orders regarding it, and your arrangements may not suit mine. My letter to you of the 8th July referred only to the equipments for 5000 cavalry. My orders to the Commissary General to send clothing to Coruña, and my letter to Admiral Martin to request him to supply shipping for that clothing, referred

only to the particular clothing mentioned in the order for the Galician army, and for the guerrillas of Marquíñez.

‘ It appears, however, that in consequence of your letter to England, all the clothing for the Spanish army to be at my disposal is to go to Coruña, besides the clothing which I have sent there for these purposes ; and besides the equipments for the cavalry referred to in my letter to you on the 8th July.

‘ We are at cross purposes, therefore, on this subject. You have sent me accounts of the clothing transmitted from Lisbon to Coruña under my own orders. I want to have the accounts of the clothing sent there, or to be sent there by the Secretary of State : in consequence of your letter I have disposed of the former. I must know accurately what there is before I can dispose of the latter.

‘ I concur with you respecting licences to vessels under Portuguese colors.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S.—I enclose an estimate of the value of the supplies to the Portuguese Government in this month.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 21st Sept., 1812.

‘ I continued to follow the enemy with the troops under my command till the 16th, when I was joined at Pampliega by three divisions of infantry and a small body of cavalry of the army of Galicia, his Excellency the Captain General Castaños having arrived at head quarters on the 14th. The enemy had on the 16th taken a strong position on the heights behind Celada del Camino, and arrangements were made to attack them on the morning of the 17th ; but the enemy retired in the night ; and they were driven on the 17th to the heights close to Burgos. They retired through the town in the night, leaving behind them some clothing and other stores, and a large quantity of wheat and barley ; and have since continued their retreat to Briviesca, where it is reported that they have been joined by 7000 conscripts.

It is likewise reported that the Prince of Essling has been ordered by the local government in France to come and take the command of the army.

‘The castle of Burgos commands the passages of the river Arlanzon in the neighbourhood and the roads communicating with them so completely, that we could not pass the river till the 19th; when we effected that operation in two columns, the 5th division and General Bradford’s brigade above, and the 1st division and General Pack’s brigade and General Anson’s cavalry below the town.

‘Burgos is situated in that division of Spain allotted to the army of the North; and General Caffarelli, who had been here on the 17th, had placed in the castle a garrison of the troops of that army, consisting, as is reported, of 2500 men. The enemy had taken considerable pains to fortify the castle of Burgos; and had occupied with a horn work the hill of San Miguel, which has a considerable command over some of the works of the castle at the distance of 300 yards. They had likewise occupied other parts of the hill with flèches and other works for the protection of their piquets and out-posts.

‘As soon as the 1st division crossed the Arlanzon on the 19th, the enemy’s out-posts were driven in by the Light infantry battalion of Colonel Stirling’s brigade, under the command of Major the Hon. C. Cocks, supported by Brig. General Pack’s brigade; and the enemy’s outworks on the hill of San Miguel, with the exception of the horn work, were occupied by our troops, which were posted close to the horn work.

‘As soon as it was dark, the same troops, with the addition of the 42nd regiment, attacked and carried by assault the horn work which the enemy had occupied in strength. In this operation Brig. General Pack, Lieut. Colonel Hill of the 1st Portuguese regiment, Colonel Campbell of the 16th Portuguese regiment, Major Williams of the 4th caçadores, Major Dick of the 42nd regiment, and Major the Hon. C. Cocks of the 79th, commanding the light infantry battalion, distinguished themselves. The latter, in particular, led the attack of the enemy’s posts in the morning, and entered the horn work by the gorge at night. We took three pieces of cannon and one Captain and 62 prisoners; but I am sorry

to add that our loss was severe, as appears by the enclosed return.

‘ It was impossible to ascertain the exact state of the works of the castle of Burgos till we had obtained possession of the hill of San Miguel; and as far as I can judge of them, I am apprehensive that the means which I have are not sufficient to enable me to take the castle. I am informed, however, that the enemy are ill provided with water; and that their magazines of provisions are in a place exposed to be set on fire. I think it possible, therefore, that I may have it in my power to force them to surrender, although I may not be able to lay the place open to assault.

‘ Since the 19th we have been employed in establishing ourselves on the hill of San Miguel, and in constructing those works which are best calculated to forward our future operations.

‘ The whole of the army have crossed the Arlanzon, with the exception of the 6th division and one division of Spanish infantry.

‘ I have accounts from Lieut. General Hill of the 14th. He was then at Truxillo, and had received my orders, and was to be at Oropesa on the 18th. I have ordered him to march to Toledo, and to defend the Tagus; taking under his command the three divisions of this army, and Lieut. General Alten’s and General D’Urban’s cavalry, and Don Carlos de España’s division of infantry, which are at and near Madrid.

‘ I have not heard that Marshal Soult has yet left Granada. He was still there on the 8th. General Ballesteros had followed the enemy’s movements from the Guadalete, and had been very successful. He was at Loja on the 6th.

‘ The enemy had abandoned Andujar and Jaen; and the line of their retreat was certainly through Valencia; but it is not impossible that, when they shall have heard that I have moved to the North, they will endeavor to pass through La Mancha, which General Hill’s position will prevent.

‘ The last accounts I have from Alicante are of the 10th. The King’s army and that of Soult were still in Valencia.

‘ I have no late accounts from Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the assault and capture of the Fort of San Miguel, on the 19th September, 1812.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	6	5	60	—	71
Wounded . .	15	21	297	—	333
Missing . . .	—	—	16	—	16

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 21st Sept., 1812.

‘ I beg to draw your attention to the letters which I transmit this day from Lieut. General Maitland.

‘ You will see that a reinforcement has already arrived for the army of Portugal, and that more are expected. Some time will elapse, however, before that army can be formidable; and if I can bring this siege to a fortunate conclusion at an early period, I do not yet despair of working the French beyond the Ebro, particularly if Sir Home can draw the attention of the army of the North, so as to prevent any large proportion of that body from being brought against us. The worst of our situation is, that the Spaniards can do nothing by themselves; we must have British troops every where, and I am afraid that I must be wherever a serious operation is to be carried on.

‘ General Paget is arrived and on his way up. He will be of great use.

‘ The Spaniards have no cavalry. The guerrillas are almost useless in serious operations, even when with our troops; and we have not enough for the extent of ground we are obliged to occupy, and the system of our operations.

‘ Our loss was much greater on the 19th than it ought to have been; which was to be attributed very much to the inexperience of the —nd regiment. If I had had here

some of the troops who have stormed so often, I should not have lost a fourth of the number.

‘I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 31st August, and for the money. Napoleons will pass here very well.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Villa Toro, 21st Sept., 1812.

‘It is very necessary that the heads of the Commissariat and Medical Departments, and the Deputy Paymaster General, should attend to the state of the civil departments of this army. We have not at this moment an officer of any one of those departments in reserve; and I am obliged to employ the regimental Surgeons to attend the general hospitals, to the great inconvenience of the regiments.

‘With every regiment in the army deficient in officers, owing to the number of sick and wounded, and those doing duty with the Portuguese service, I am obliged to furnish officers of the army to take charge of money going from one station to another for the service of the civil departments; because there is no officer of either the Pay Department or the Commissariat who can be spared to go in charge of the money.

‘There are many officers of the Pay, Commissariat, and Medical Departments, who have gone to England for the recovery of their health, and have never returned to their duty. I shall transmit you a list of their names. The rule which I have adopted in respect to the Officers of the Staff, should be applied to them; viz., that if absent on account of sickness for more than two months, they should forfeit their Staff pay. It is not reasonable that the public should pay officers Staff pay who are unable to serve.

‘The heads of civil departments will tell you that there are with this army a number of officers larger than ever before attended any British army; but they forget that our operations are extended infinitely beyond those of any army that has been sent abroad lately; and that owing to the nature of the war in which we are engaged, and of the allies

with whom we co-operate, they are extended to a much greater degree than might be expected, even in this war. In fact we want officers of the civil departments for two armies of our number, instead of for one. The only mode in which we can be kept complete, is for the heads of departments in England to pay attention to the returns, and to replace officers as soon as they shall learn that those here have fallen sick, or are gone home.

‘As nearly the whole army is here, I see no reason why the whole of the officers of the civil departments of the army should not be here likewise.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Villa Toro, 22nd Sept., 1812.

‘I received this morning your letter of the 12th, and I am happy to find that your general health has been improved by your journey. I have no doubt that the voyage will be of use to you.

‘I shall be very glad to receive any official complaint, or any complaint which I can notice, of the conduct of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to the French prisoners. In the mean time, I have stopped their pay.

‘If I should find that the order of the Tower and Sword is prostituted, I shall not wear it, and will recommend to all British Officers to follow my example; and I request you will inform Dom M. Forjaz of this determination, or any other person who will carry it to the Prince Regent.

‘I have ordered the greatest part of the troops at Cadiz, including the 20th regiment, either to join the army through Estremadura, or to proceed to Lisbon, according as Major General Cooke may have it in his power to provide for them. I rather think they will march, as I understand from his letters that they had already moved up to Seville to wait for orders; so that they must have means.

‘I have ordered Hill’s corps to Toledo, sending back to Portugal the 5th, 17th, and 22nd regiments, and the 3rd regiment of cavalry. Hill talks of a fourth regiment, as one

of the garrison regiments which I ordered him to send back; but I conclude he means a battalion of caçadores, which, whether regiment or battalion, has been halted in Estremadura, and is ordered to Elvas.

‘I conceive that the time is now arrived when the greatest part, if not the whole, of the Portuguese militia, may be disbanded. I should think one complete regiment, and a battalion of caçadores, with the artillery, a sufficient garrison for Elvas; another regiment might be placed at Almeida, and one at Abrantes, with dismounted cavalry, &c.

‘There might be two battalions of militia kept in arms in the North in case of accidents, and every thing else throughout the kingdom might be disbanded. I should hope that this reduction of expense would enable the Government to provide for the pay of the army beyond the frontiers. I assure you that the deficiency of their pay is become a matter of serious importance; and unless the Government can provide for it, we must draw back.

‘I do not believe we are at all behindhand with the subsidy; but if we are, it is to the amount of a mere trifle; and I will not admit for a moment that the irregularity of the payment of the subsidy is any excuse for the irregularity of the payment of the troops. I still insist upon it, that the Portuguese Government have not adopted the measures which they ought to adopt, to raise that revenue from the country which the country is able and ought to be made to pay, whether the subsidy is in arrear or not; and however the right to demand money may increase in consequence of the decrease of the demand for supplies in kind, in consequence of disbanding the militia, I give notice that I cannot increase the advances from the military chest of this army. The Portuguese Government had better take an early opportunity of representing this matter to the King’s Government, and not trouble me upon it when they shall feel the evil.

‘I have desired Hill to order Colonel Diggins to join his corps with his regiment of cavalry. You will see, from my dispatch of yesterday, how we stand. I hope that we may take this place; but I doubt it. I have neither officers nor good troops, the whole of which I have left behind me; and

I can undertake nothing with hopes of success without great loss. However, if I can get the place, which the French have made very strong, at an early period, I hope I shall have a fine game before me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Villa Toro, 22nd Sept., 1812.

‘ I received your letter last night. I was on the point of writing to inform you that I should be happy to have the benefit of your assistance again, when I heard from Colonel Torrens that you were appointed to the Staff of this army. I shall be very happy to place you in your old situation, which I hope I shall be able to do. But you had better come up to head quarters by Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, and Arevalo. You will hear at the two last where head quarters are; and before I see you, I shall know whether I can place you where you were before.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. W. Stewart.*’

*To Major General Oswald.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 22nd Sept., 1812.

‘ I received your letter of the 14th this morning, and I am happy to find that you are appointed to the Staff of this army. You will do well to proceed from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, and thence to Arevalo and Valladolid to join the head quarters of the army. You will hear at Salamanca or Arevalo where they are.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Oswald.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Plan for the attack of the exterior line of the Castle of Burgos.*

‘ 22nd Sept., 1812.

‘ 1. Lieut. Colonel Brown to take possession of the houses along the south front as soon as it is dark.

‘ 2. He is to be supplied with 12 axes, which are to be

sent to him by a person who will certainly find him this night.

‘ 3. The 400 men of the 1st division ordered to be in readiness, are to move as soon as the moon rises, and to proceed to the *flèche* immediately on the right, looking from the camp, of the horn work. Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne will take care that there is an officer to conduct them to the spot.

‘ 4. They are then to take up the ladders and 12 axes, and are to proceed and place themselves under cover of the banks opposite the exterior line of the castle.

‘ 5. At 11 P.M. 200 men of this party are to move forward to storm the wall of the exterior line at the place pointed out by officers to be named by Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne. The remaining 200 men are to be formed behind the bank, and are to protect by their fire the advance of the party to storm. The storming party are to consist of 30 men, to carry five long ladders, 12 men with axes, and then one officer and 20 men, who are to mount the ladders, to be followed immediately by 50 more as soon as the ladders are planted, and then by the remainder of the party of 200 appointed to storm.

‘ 6. At ten minutes before eleven, Colonel Brown is to order 130 men of the troops under his command to move out from the houses on the south front of the castle. They are to pass the small ditch, &c., and are to move up to the palisade, which they are to cut down, and open a communication with the storming party, which will move to the front of the line.

‘ 7. These men are to protect the right of the storming party, being themselves covered by the palisade; and Colonel Brown will direct that a heavy fire may be kept up from the houses to be occupied by his troops on the enemy’s interior line.

‘ 8. As soon as the enemy are driven from the interior line, and the storming party are established in the guard house, and a communication established with Colonel Brown’s detachments, the 200 men in reserve behind the bank are to be employed at work in laying open the wall, and in securing the storming party on the ground before morning.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, ‘ à Villa Toro, ce 22 Sept., 1812.

‘ Je vous envoie une gazette de Madrid, dans laquelle il est encore une fois question de moi et de l’armée sous mes ordres.

‘ Je vous prie de faire savoir à l’imprimeur de cette gazette, qu’il ne peut pas rendre un service plus important à l’ennemi que de donner des nouvelles sur l’armée alliée, et sur tout sur moi. Je sais que les Généraux Français, sur tout ceux à la distance, ne savent que ce qu’ils apprennent par les gazettes que le Gouvernement et les Cortes sont assez fous pour laisser imprimer partout en Espagne. L’imprimeur à Madrid jugera s’il est convenable de fournir ces nouvelles à l’ennemi. Je ne serais pas du tout étonné si Suchet et Soult se dirigent vers Madrid ; et je vous prie de dire à Messieurs les magistrats de la ville de Madrid, et à l’imprimeur de la gazette de Madrid, que si j’y vois encore mon nom, ou la designation du lieu où je suis, ou d’aucun détachement de l’armée sous mes ordres, je retirerai mes troupes, et je laisserai la ville de Madrid à son sort.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ General  
Don Carlos de España.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL, ‘ à Villa Toro, ce 24 Sept., 1812.

‘ Vous voyez les conséquences des nouvelles publiées dans la gazette du 5. Je l’ai bien dit que vers le 15 nous verrions que les Français de Valence se mettraient en mouvement. Comme ce Monsieur a déjà tant publié, je vous prie de lui faire publier que le Général Hill, avec son armée, est à Tolède, et qu’on m’attend tous les jours ; mais rien de plus.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ General  
Don Carlos de España.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Villa Toro, 26th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have heard of your arrival at Lisbon, and I am happy to find that you are pretty well. I enclose an anonymous

letter, which contains some facts regarding Colonel Campbell, which probably might as well be inquired into.

‘ We are not going on in a very satisfactory way here ; however, if we are lucky in the next two days I think I shall take the place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 26th Sept., 1812.

‘ I am much in want of 40 barrels of gunpowder, each containing 90 pounds, for the attack of this place ; and I should be very much obliged to you if you can let me have this quantity from the ships under your command.

‘ I send with this letter one to the principal Spanish authority at Santander, to request him to supply 20 mules to carry here this quantity of powder, whose hire I will pay on their arrival with this army ; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate with this gentleman, and urge him to send the powder without loss of time.

‘ If he will let me know by what road it will pass, and on what day, I will send relays of mules to meet it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

*Sir Home Popham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Villa Toro, ce 26 Sept., 1812.

‘ Je vous envoie l’ordonnance pour le payement de la seconde moitié du mois de Juillet.

‘ Il faut que je vous dise cependant que je ne suis pas du tout satisfait de la conduite de la garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo. J’ai des plaintes de la part de tous les officiers qui ont passé par là dernièrement, de la conduite atroce qu’ils ont tenu envers les prisonniers Français, dont ils étaient l’escorte depuis Ciudad Rodrigo jusqu’à Sabugal ; sur-tout ceux qui étaient prisonniers par des capitulations à Madrid et à Guadalaxara, signées par moi.

‘ Vous savez, Mons. le Général, sous quelles conditions j’ai promis de donner la solde aux troupes sous vos ordres ;

et vous savez si j'ai agi selon ma promesse. Le fait est que vous avez reçu plus que mes troupes depuis que cet arrangement a eu lieu.

‘ Mais je ne donnerai plus d'argent aux officiers et troupes qui n'ont pas de discipline, et qui osent piller et massacrer des prisonniers de guerre avec lesquels j'avais fait capitulation. Les officiers de la garnison n'ont pas fait leur devoir, ou ce malheur ne serait pas arrivé ; et je ne payerai pas des officiers qui ne font pas leur devoir. N'ayant pas fait leur devoir ils auraient du être punis ; et je ne payerai pas les chefs qui ne punissent pas ceux qui négligent leurs devoirs.

‘ J'espérais pouvoir vous envoyer des rapports officiels sur ce sujet, que vous auraient mis dans le cas de punir ceux qui ont mal agi ; mais je ne les ai pas encore reçus. Je n'ai pas voulu détenir plus long temps la solde de votre division ; mais je vous prie de retenir dans vos mains celle de la garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo, jusqu'à ce que je sois satisfait que ceux qui ont commis ce désordre ont été punis.

‘ J'ai un hôpital à Ciudad Rodrigo ; on me dit que la ville est si sale, que je crains que je serai obligé de l'en éloigner. Je vous prie d'en dire un mot au Gouverneur.

‘ Agréé, &c.

‘ General

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Don Carlos de España.*

*To His Excellency Charles Stuart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 26th Sept.; 1812.

‘ I have not yet received from Mr. Dalrymple the statement of prices to enable me to answer your letter of the 17th as fully as I could wish ; but having made up my mind upon one point in the question which is the principal one, I think it best to lose no time in writing to you.

‘ The horses would be of no use to the British army, and I believe of none to the Portuguese. The latter can get as many horses as they have money to pay for, from Spain, at a cheaper rate.

‘ If the Egyptian corn can be ground by Portuguese mills, which is I believe doubtful, and that it can be got at all, for goods, or military stores, take it at any reasonable

price; and write to England for the goods; or I will endeavor to give some of the latter from Portugal and Cadiz.

‘ If the corn cannot be got without *money*, I am afraid we must do without the corn, for we were never so badly off for money as at present. However, if the corn is reasonably cheap, and it can be ground, and Sampayo, or any other can do any thing in the business, without distressing or rather depriving the military chest of any money, I will come into any arrangement that may be deemed expedient on the subject.

‘ Brito had better go to Madrid; but you must settle this matter with Sir William Beresford.

‘ I find that the Portuguese Commissaries refuse some wheat offered to them to supply their last demand. Surely the stomachs of the Portuguese soldiers are not nicer than those of our soldiers; and Senhor Cardoso cannot suppose that I would allow the soldiers of either nation to eat bad bread! The truth is, that there is no better wheat than what has been offered to him; and if it will not answer we cannot supply their wants. I know the reply, “ Then give us money,” to which I make the usual rejoinder, “ I have none to give.”

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 26th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, and I am very happy that you are gratified by my presumption in reminding Lord Castlereagh of your claim to promotion in your line, or to some mark of His Majesty’s favor\*.

‘ I assure you that I did it from a sense of justice to you, which I hope will render the act still more agreeable to you; nor did I think or wish that it should ever come to your knowledge.

\* Referring to a letter written to Lord Castlereagh on the 18th of August, ‘ suggesting the propriety of conferring some mark of Royal favor upon Mr. Stuart.’ The draft of the letter is missing. Sir Charles Stuart was gazetted Knight of the Bath on the 26th of September, 1812, but not actually knighted by Lord Wellington till the 17th of January, 1813,

‘ I am very happy to find that Lord Castlereagh had thought of you before he could have received the suggestion which I made to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Villa Toro, 27th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters from the 16th to the 21st, and I now enclose my late dispatches, from which you will see how we stand.

‘ We shall see in what form the proposition will be made to me to command the Spanish army, which I shall accept of, if it should be conferred in such a manner as to enable me to be of any service to the cause. At all events I will explain myself fully on the subject.

‘ I strongly recommend to you to withhold all interference in the formation of any new government.

‘ Can you supply Ballesteros with clothing and shoes ?

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 27th Sept., 1812.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you can let me have from the squadron under your command at Santander one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of biscuit, for which I will send to Santander.

‘ We are not getting on very rapidly, and I do not feel certain that I shall succeed, as I have very little artillery and stores for my object; but I hope I may succeed. The enemy appear to be collected at Pancorbo and Miranda.

‘ I send this in the cipher transmitted by Mr. Croker.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Popham.*

*To the Earl of Mulgrave.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 27th Sept., 1812.

‘ I enclose two letters which I have lately received from Colonel Robe, to which I wish to draw your attention, and to have your opinion on their contents. An officer of the Drivers, Lieut. —, was lately put into arrest for absenting himself without leave, and taking with him horses, mules, and drivers, belonging to the Brigade of Artillery, to which he was attached; and upon the inquiry, which I made into the circumstances of his arrest, it appeared to me that the number of drivers, horses, and baggage mules allowed to an officer of Drivers in this army, was enormous. I therefore desired that inquiry might be made from Colonel Robe, whether it was customary in the artillery to provide for the carriage of the officers’ baggage, when they received bât and forage; in answer to which inquiry, the letter of the 10th of September was received.

‘ In this army there is no baggage of any officer carried by the public, excepting of those of the Artillery. I believe that the custom of the Artillery service is as stated by Colonel Robe; but it appears that the allowance to a Lieutenant of Drivers of one horse, two mules, and two drivers, is rather more than is necessary, or than what ought to exist.

‘ It appears that the horse is no longer allowed, and one driver as the servant of the officer, and one mule for the baggage of the captain, and one for two subalterns, are as much as ought to be necessary, or ought to be given.

‘ However, of course I shall make no alteration on this subject till I hear from you.

‘ We have a difficult job in hand, that is, to take a very strong castle well provided with artillery, and with a numerous garrison, without incurring a large loss of men, if possible, and without being provided with sufficient artillery, and without a large expenditure of ammunition. We are getting on, however, and I hope we may succeed. But I wish I could be a little more certain of success. If we do succeed soon, I hope to send the French army beyond the Ebro before the winter is over.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Mulgrave.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 27th Sept., 1812.

‘ The operations against the castle of Burgos have been continued, since I addressed you on the 20th; and on the night of the 22nd, I directed that an attempt might be made to take by storm the exterior line of the enemy’s works, one of the batteries destined to support our position within them having been in such a state of preparation as to afford hopes that it would be ready to open on the morning of the 23rd. The attack was to have been made by detachments of Portuguese troops belonging to the 6th division which occupied the town of Burgos, and invested the castle on the S.W. side on the enemy’s left, while a detachment of the 1st division under Major Lawrie of the 79th should scale the wall in front. Unfortunately, the Portuguese troops were so strongly opposed that they could not make any progress on the enemy’s flank; and the escalade could not take place. I am sorry to say that our loss was severe. Major Lawrie was killed, and Captain Frazer, who commanded a detachment from the brigade of Guards, was wounded\*. Both these officers, and indeed all those employed on this occasion, exerted themselves to the utmost; but the attack on the enemy’s flank having failed, the success of the escalade was impracticable. We have since established ourselves close to the exterior wall, and have carried a gallery towards it; and I hope that a mine under it will be completed in the course of to-morrow. In the mean time our batteries are completed, and ready to open upon the enemy’s interior lines, as soon as we shall have established our troops within the exterior lines.

‘ The enemy’s army are about Pancorbo, and at Miranda on the Ebro, with their advanced posts at Briviesca. They have made no movement to interrupt our operations.

‘ Marshal Soult left Granada on the 15th, and marched towards the kingdom of Valencia, it is said by Caravaca. General Ballesteros entered Granada on the 17th.

‘ I imagine that Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill is by

\* Now Colonel of the Ross-shire militia, son of the late Lieut. General Alexander Mackenzie Frazer. His leg was amputated.

this time at Toledo; but I have not heard from him since he passed the Tagus.

‘General Elio, who now commands the troops lately commanded by General Joseph O’Donnell, took Consuegra by capitulation on the 22nd.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 20th to the 26th September, 1812, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	7	2	50	—	59
Wounded . .	12	13	264	—	289
Missing . . .	—	—	—	—	—

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Villa Toro, 27th Sept., 1812.

‘I enclose the return which I have received of the medical department in this country, from which your Lordship will see how much we are in want of medical assistance. This want arises entirely from the practice of waiting till the last moment to send out the officers required from the Medical Board.

‘The returns go to them regularly, but for what purpose it is difficult to say, as no deficiency is ever supplied till the demand is made, and three or even four months then elapse before a medical officer, whose services are probably immediately required, can reach the army, after a requisition is made.

‘I likewise beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the practice of the Medical Board in promoting to vacancies in this army. Instead of promoting the officers on the spot, who deserve promotion highly from their merits and services,

officers are selected in England, the Mediterranean, or elsewhere, to be promoted. The consequence is, increased delay in their arrival to perform their duty; and all who do arrive are sick in the first instance.

‘It would be but justice to promote those on the spot, who are performing the duty; and we should enjoy the advantage, and the seniors of the department at least would have experience in the disorders of the climate, and of the troops serving in this country; to which climate they would have become accustomed.

‘The juniors of the department only could, generally speaking, be absent from their duty from want of health.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Villa Toro, 27th Sept., 1812.

‘I enclose a memorandum from Dr. McGrigor regarding his allowance, to which I beg to draw your attention; and I shall be very happy if something can be done for him. He is a most deserving man, and has conducted the department of which he is the head with great success.

‘You will see by the morning state how we stand in respect to sick. The army in general is more healthy than it was at this season last year; indeed there is no disorder among the old soldiers, and none of them would be in hospital, if we had not had so many wounded during the campaign. But the regiments recently arrived, whether from England or the Straits, are very unhealthy; and the loss by death is almost confined to them. I am afraid that our soldiers are not sufficiently exercised in marching, when at home or in foreign garrisons; and they become sickly as soon as they are obliged to make a march. The non-commissioned officers, and I am afraid the officers, are very bad, and they neglect to attend to the food of the soldiers; and when they first take the field, they are not aware of the necessity of attending to this important point themselves.

‘We are getting on, but not so rapidly as I could wish; and I wish I could be more certain of final success. It is not easy, however, to take a strong place, well garrisoned,

when one has not a sufficient quantity of cannon ; when one is obliged to save ammunition on account of the distance of our magazines ; and when one is desirous of saving the lives of soldiers. Then, nothing in the way of assault can be done excepting by a British soldier ; and we cannot afford to lose them at this distance from England and the sea. I shall know in a day or two whether I can take the place, and how soon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 28th Sept., 1812.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will have sent to Alicante, for the use of the troops under the command of General Bassecourt, 2500 suits of infantry clothing ; and if you can provide him with any equipments for cavalry, I will thank you to supply him with the articles named in the margin.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To Major General Baron Charles Alten.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Villa Toro, 29th Sept., 1812.

‘ I wish that you would employ working parties of the 3rd and Light divisions to take up the palisades in the ditch of the exterior as well as of the interior line of the walls in the Retiro ; and let them be piled in convenient piles within the exterior line, between that and the interior line. You will give the piles of wood in charge of the Commissary ; to be used eventually as firewood. But in case it should be necessary to withdraw the troops from Madrid, and to destroy La China, and the stores, as contemplated in my Memorandum of the 30th August, the piles of palisades must be burnt, and they must be formed with a view to that contingency.

‘ The troops employed on this occasion are to receive working money, and you will do well to relieve the party every six hours. That is to say, one party to work from six

till twelve, the other from twelve to six every day, till the work shall be done. You will give the superintendence of it to some officer.

‘ Inform Don Carlos that I have given you these instructions; which I have arranged with General Castaños.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General

Baron Charles Allen.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Villa Toro, ce 29 Sept., 1812.

‘ J’ai reçu votre lettre du 25, et je vous renvoie la lettre qui était dans le baton qui était pris sur votre espion. J’ai perdu le baton.

‘ Agrééz, &c.

‘ General Don Carlos de España.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Don Antonio Tarracio de Cortabarría, Civil Commissioner  
at Madrid.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 29th Sept., 1812.

‘ I have heard with great satisfaction of your arrival at Madrid; upon which I beg leave to congratulate you.

‘ I beg at the same time to offer you my services and assistance in any way in which you may think that I can be of any use to forward your views.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Don A. T. de Cortabarría.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Don Antonio Turracio de Cortabarría.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 29th Sept., 1812.

‘ I beg leave to recommend to your attention Don Alex. Guillem, who is now at Madrid, and whom I have requested to wait upon you.

‘ He is a gentleman of Salamanca, with whom I have long been acquainted, and have had the most intimate correspondence on public affairs; and I have not met in Spain any person with more upright intentions, or possessing such correct views of public affairs as he has. It is really most desirable that his country should have the advantage of his talents; and I had long determined to recommend

him to the attention of the person who should be employed in the situation which you fill.

‘ He is a clergyman ; and I have recommended him to the government for a provision in the Church in Galicia, which I hope he will obtain. But this will not prevent him from devoting his talents to the public service under you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don A. T. Cortabarría.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

#### MEMORANDUM.

‘ Villa Toro, 29th Sept., 1812.

‘ The mine to be exploded this night at twelve o’clock.

‘ The covering party in the trenches, which is ordered to be augmented in the evening to 300 men, and the working party must be moved into the village before the mine is sprung, excepting 100 men of the covering party, who are to remain in the parallel on the right and left.

‘ As soon as the mine shall be exploded, the breach which it will have made must be stormed.

‘ The 100 men who are to remain in the parallel while the mine shall explode, are to be the storming party.

‘ An officer and twenty men are to advance immediately from the right of the parallel to the breach ; keeping on their left the trench leading to the breach of the mine.

‘ These 20 are to be supported by 50 more of the 100, which 50 are to advance as soon as the leaders of the first party shall have ascended the breach.

‘ That part of the covering party which shall have been sent to the village before the mine shall be exploded are to return, and form in the parallel as soon as the explosion shall take place, and the storming party must be supported on the breach.

‘ The working party must be in readiness to establish the party on the breach.

‘ The Field Officer will take care to tell off his parties according to these orders ; and that the officers commanding each party understands clearly what he is to do ; where he is to go ; and at what time.

‘ In case the enemy should commence a fire from the parapet on the leaders of the storming party, the 80 men

which are to remain in the parallel till they shall mount the breach, are to fire upon the parapet so as to keep down the fire of the enemy.

‘ The field officer of the day, on the hill of San Miguel, is to move a detachment of 50 men into the hollow way between the horn work and the castle, at about eleven at night. This detachment will move up and make a false attack on the gate leading from the exterior line to the esplanade in front of the castle, as soon as the mine shall explode. Lieut. Colonel Brown will likewise keep up a fire from the houses on the enemy’s left of the exterior line; and will make a false attack on the church, &c., at the moment of the explosion; and if he can, he will get possession of the house still held by the enemy.

‘ He will keep up a fire on the palisades in front of the gateway of the interior line.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Master of the Ellen Transport.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Villa Toro, 1st October, 1812.

‘ You will be pleased to deliver to the person who will put this letter into your hands 200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, for the use of the Portuguese army, taking his receipt for the same.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Master of the Ellen Transport.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Villa Toro, 1st October, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd September, and have perused all the enclosures. It will be very inconvenient, and increase the difficulties of my situation very much, if the communication by sea along the coasts of Portugal and Galicia should not be secure. I had written to — — on the subject, and have received an answer, which proves how clear it is that in our country it is better to suffer any public inconvenience, than to venture to suggest a measure as a remedy which is to be carried into execution by another public department. In future, therefore, I shall complain of inconveniences when they shall be severely felt, and shall

not trouble Government with my expectations of them, and with suggestions of remedies or preventatives.

‘ I concur entirely with you regarding the proposed measure of selling lands in Portugal. It is, like many other schemes, easily suggested by those unacquainted with the circumstances of the country, but very difficult of execution. If we could prevail upon the Prince and clergy to allow us to sell their property, where should we find purchasers? I do not mean to say that there are not plenty of people in Portugal with money to enable them to purchase; but who believes that this money would be well laid out in the purchase of land in Portugal, under existing circumstances?

‘ The danger of Portugal is lessened, but it is not entirely removed. The fate of that kingdom may still depend upon the result of military operations, upon which I, who conduct them, would not recommend to any body to rely entirely. If the war in Russia should fail, Portugal may again become the seat of war in the Peninsula. Who would be desirous of having property in Portugal under such circumstances? After all, whether we or the French ultimately succeed in the Peninsula, it does not appear to me that matters are likely to be in such a state in either Spain or Portugal, as to render a purchase very desirable in either country for some years to come.

‘ I do not recommend our Government to have any thing to say to the Portuguese paper money. I do not think they could materially raise its exchangeable value in reference to silver, and I am quite certain that they could not extend the sphere of its circulation. In a former letter I have shown you how the British Government would be affected, and the risks they would incur, by taking as security for any loan, or for any such operation as the substitution of English for Portuguese paper, the produce of a tax depending upon the continuance of the independence of Portugal.

‘ The great fault of these and other schemes of this description is, that the proposers of them have not duly considered the nature of the war in which we are engaged, and its consequences, as well to us as to the natives of the Peninsula, nor the character of our enemy.

‘ I do not believe that there is any great export of specie from Portugal at present. There was a very considerable

export during the last year, but then Portugal depended upon this export for articles of the first necessity. I suggested to Government to endeavor to procure these articles from the British American provinces, from the Mediterranean, &c., but I do not know that any thing has been done. As long as the American war lasts I fear that the export of specie must continue, unless Government should adopt successful measures to supply Portugal with corn, from the British colonies or the Mediterranean.

‘ I have received Mr. Vansittart’s papers from Lord Bathurst, to which I shall write an answer, and will send it to you.

‘ I will let you know to-morrow how much of the demand for October will be given to the Portuguese Government; but as I told Sir William Beresford that I think all the Portuguese militia may be disbanded, I think it probable that they will not require so much as they have asked for October.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have desired that the Portuguese Government may have the supplies required for October; likewise 100,000 dollars of a sum of money expected from Gibraltar, and 100,000 of another sum expected from England.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Villa Toro, 2nd October, 1812.

‘ I have received General Alten’s and Don Carlos’ reports to the 29th; but the movements and intentions of Soult and the King do not yet appear to me to be quite clear. They have to guard against the allied force collected at Alicante on the one hand, and against Ballesteros, who I learn is to be about Alcaraz, on the other; and one can hardly believe that they will venture to move towards the Tagus in force by the road of Albacete. If they do not move in force they can effect nothing. If they do, they will expose their interests in Valencia, which is an important resource to them too great to risk. Yet if they do not purpose to move to the Tagus, one cannot understand why the King should have gone to Almanza.

‘ Supposing the march of both to be towards Cuenca, and thence towards Soria, in order to communicate with the troops on the Ebro, the object might have been accomplished with equal, if not greater ease, by his movement from Valencia by the route of Utiel and Requena. On the other hand, if the object had been to move to the Tagus, much time has been lost by the route taken by Soult, and a vast distance gone by bad roads; and a junction might have been formed with equal, if not greater ease, by the march of Soult direct from La Carolina on Consuegra; and the march of the King by Albacete into La Mancha. However, the next movement will show what is intended.

‘ It is desirable that you should have the banks of the Tagus examined from the junction of the Jarama or Manzanares to the bridge of Sacedon, and even higher. I understand that there are several fords above Fuentidueña, where there is a *barca*, and fords there at Villamanrique and at Oreja, and even at Aranjuez in dry weather. I also understand that the ground on the left bank commands that on the right. Below the junction of the Jarama there are likewise fords in dry weather; but the banks on the right of the river command those on the left.

‘ You should likewise have the course of the Jarama or Manzanares examined from Madrid to its junction with the Tagus below Aranjuez, as I believe it affords an excellent position.

‘ We are not going on well at all; and although I have not given up all hopes, I am afraid we shall not succeed in taking this castle. It is very strong, well garrisoned, and well provided with artillery. I had only three guns, one of which was destroyed, and another much damaged last night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 2nd October, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter by Captain the Hon. P. Bouverie, and have conversed with him on your plans and your means of carrying them into execution.

‘ The great object for me is that you should draw the attention of the enemy, by your operations, from those which

we are carrying on on this side, and that you should prevent Caffarelli from detaching troops to aid Marmont's army. It would be desirable for many reasons that you should get possession of Santoña, and also of Guetaria; but I confess that I entertain so bad an opinion of the Spanish troops that I do not think you can rely upon them; and the body of marines which you have with you is not sufficiently large to do much of themselves, or to be a very efficient example to the Spanish troops.

‘ In regard to diversion, I imagine that the season is now too far advanced for you to think of Guetaria again. Your efforts therefore will be necessarily confined to Santoña, respecting which place the enemy are very anxious, for many reasons. You might continue your preparations for the attack of Santoña; and let me know exactly what you would wish Mendizabal and the troops under his command to do, as well while the preparations are in progress, as when all will be prepared for the attack, and during the attack, if you should think it expedient to carry that operation into execution.

‘ I am very much afraid that I shall not take this castle. It is very strong, well garrisoned, and well provided with artillery. I had only three pieces of cannon, of which one was destroyed last night, and not much ammunition; and I have not been able to get on as I ought. I have, however, got a mine under one of the works, which I hope will enable me to carry the exterior line; and when that shall be carried I hope that I shall get on better. But time is wearing apace, and Soult is moving from the south; and I should not be surprised if I were obliged to discontinue this operation in order to collect the army.

‘ It is unfortunate that you should have plenty of cannon and ammunition, but that you want good soldiers, and I no want of the latter, but very little of the former. The means of transport, however, required to move a train from the coast or from Madrid, where we have plenty, are so extensive, that the attempt would be impracticable.

‘ I am obliged to you for the powder and biscuit: I shall send for the latter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

*Sir Home Popham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 2nd October, 1812.

‘ The bearer hereof is employed by General Castaños to destroy some of the roads leading into Spain from France, for which he requires 200 quintals of gunpowder. I shall be very much obliged to you if you can aid him with this powder, in order to enable him to perform the service on which he is employed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir Home Popham.*’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Villa Toro, 2nd October, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter about Doyle, and I wish it was in my power to do any thing for him, in order to gratify you, but I am afraid that he cannot get what he wants, viz., the rank of Colonel. Others who have been promoted were not Lieut. Colonels, so that their promotion cannot be a precedent. Besides, to promote Doyle would put him over the head of several deserving officers of this army, among others of Cadogan.

‘ I am sorry to say that we do not get on well : of three guns we had, one was destroyed, and another very much damaged last night. The place is really very strong, well garrisoned, and well provided with artillery. I do not yet despair, however.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ Upon referring to the Army List I find that Doyle is next above Cadogan ; but still there are several meritorious officers in this army, whom he would pass over, were he to be promoted to the rank of Colonel.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 2nd October, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th September, in which you have enclosed the translation of one of the same date from Don Ignacio de la Pezuela,

by which I have been informed that the general and extraordinary Cortes have been pleased to confer on me the command of all the Spanish forces; for which mark of the confidence of that assembly and of the Government, I beg you to express to the Secretary of State my most grateful thanks.

‘ I am most earnestly desirous of doing every thing in my power to forward and attain the legitimate objects of the Spanish nation in their just contest with France; and I feel no objection to taking upon myself the additional labor and responsibility which must attend my exercise of the command of the Spanish armies. But I cannot announce my acceptance of the honor conferred upon me by the Cortes and Government until I shall receive the consent of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, for which I shall make an immediate application.

‘ I feel the less regret on account of this delay, because having long been in the habit of communicating confidentially with the General Officers commanding the different corps in which the Spanish army is divided, of making them acquainted with the general view of the operations which I hoped to carry on with the allied British and Portuguese army under my command, and of suggesting to them the line of operations which they should adopt, in order to forward the objects which I had in view, I have invariably received from them the utmost attention, and every support and assistance which it was in their power to give; and I am convinced they will continue the same practice even though I am not invested with the supreme command. The public interests, therefore, can suffer no inconvenience by my reference to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, of the decision on my acceptance of the honor conferred on me by the Cortes.

‘ This mark of the confidence of the Cortes and Government, and the terms in which it has been conveyed to me, afford the most satisfactory proof to my mind that those authorities are convinced that in the command with which I have already been intrusted by two members of the alliance, I have done my utmost to forward the general cause of all the allies. It is not necessary to make any professions on this subject; and I hope that in the new and more pro-

minent situation in which I shall be placed, as the Commander in Chief of the armies of all the allies in the Peninsula, I shall have not only the full support, but the confidence of the Spanish Government, Cortes, and nation, that the measures which I shall adopt are dictated by an honest and correct view of what is best for the general cause in which all are so deeply interested.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*Memorandum for Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne, Royal Engineers.*

‘ Villa Toro, 4th October, 1812.

‘ The mine in the exterior line is to be exploded this afternoon, at o’clock.

‘ The 24th regiment is to be employed to storm the breaches made in the exterior line by the explosion of the mine, and by the fire of the artillery.

‘ The storming party for each breach is to be formed of one officer and 20 men; who are to rush forward to the breaches as soon as the mine shall explode. These are to be supported by 50 men for each breach; who are not to move out of the parallel till they shall see the leading men of the storming parties ascend the breaches. The remainder of the regiment to remain in the parallel, in readiness to support those who shall be in the breach.

‘ The covering party in the parallel of the exterior line must keep up a fire on the parapet, so as to keep down the fire of the enemy. The breaching and other batteries are to enfilade the exterior line, and the second and other lines, so as to support the attack.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Brown will fire on the rear of the enemy’s new palisade, and will make a false attack from the village; and if possible, get along the wall inside either palisade, which he will break through.

‘ As soon as the storming party shall have entered the breach made by the mine, they are to turn to the left, and break through the palisade, and communicate with the storming party of the old breach.

‘ The working parties and engineers will be prepared to establish the parties in the breaches.

‘ Colonel Kelly will tell off the parties for these several services ; and they will be ready to rush forward the moment the mine shall explode.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

‘ Colonel Sturgeon has been ordered to lay at Almaraz a bridge of the same description with that which is laid at Alcantara ; and as soon as it is ready, and quite clear that it will answer your purposes, I wish that the bridge of pontoons which is at Almaraz should be taken up, and that Lieut. Piper should have orders to go with it by Plasencia through the pass of Baños to Salamanca. Let him report his progress to me by every opportunity through the Commanding Officer at Salamanca.

‘ It will be necessary that you should send a small guard with Lieut. Piper, as far as Salamanca, if he has not one already.

‘ I have received your letters to the 29th. I do not write to General Ballesteros, because I do not know exactly where he is ; but I believe he is at Alcaraz. At least I understand he was ordered there.

‘ Tell him, that I think the best thing he can do under existing circumstances, is to hang upon the left flank and rear of the enemy, if they should move by the *débouché* of Albacete towards the Tagus. If they should move towards Cuenca, and the northward, he should come into La Mancha, still holding the same situation relatively with the enemy, and communicating by his own left with your right.

‘ We carried the exterior line of the castle yesterday evening, without material loss. But this is altogether the most difficult job I have ever had in hand, with such trifling means. God send that they may give me a little more time !

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th, and I am glad to find that you are better.

‘ I wish that some mode could be discovered of procuring money to pay the Portuguese subsidy without reference to me in any manner. I certainly do everything in my power to make good the payments ; and order money to be issued on this account when any is expected, and long before it is received. At the moment that every service in the army is in arrear, the subsidy alone is regularly paid. There is positively no arrear of the gross subsidy ; and having made an estimate in the month of May last of the state of the subsidy, and of the sum which the Portuguese Government might expect in money after receiving certain articles in kind, that sum has been exceeded in the monthly payments which have since been made, notwithstanding that the distresses of the army have been such, that I am ashamed to mention what they have occasioned.

‘ However, I will never write another syllable about the subsidy to anybody. It is no concern of mine ; and all that I shall do, as long as the payment is a charge on the military chest, will be to hand over such sums as I think we can do without. I have ordered that 200,000 dollars may be given this month from a sum expected from Gibraltar, and another from England.

‘ It is really necessary, however, that some steps should be taken to insure the application of that part of the subsidy which is paid in money, to the payment of the troops serving with the army of Spain ; which expense it could more than cover. 70,000 dollars would have paid the troops with me for a month in August.

‘ Something or other has made a terrible alteration in the troops for the worse. They have lately, in several instances, behaved very ill ; and whether it be owing to the nature of the service, or their want of pay, I cannot tell ; but they are not at all in the style they were. I am rather inclined to attribute their misbehaviour to the misery and consequent indifference of both officers and soldiers, on account of their want of pay. If it be true, as I declare it

is, that the subsidy is not in arrears, ought the pay of the Portuguese army to be in arrears at all? Ought it to be in arrears for a longer period than the pay of the British army? That it is so, there is no doubt; and yet Dom Miguel, &c., will produce hundreds of documents to prove this assertion to be false, and contrary to the evidence of all the officers of the army, that the men have the money in their pockets.

‘It is really deserving your attention to look into this subject, and to insist upon the money being applied in the first instance to this necessary purpose.

‘I refer you to my dispatch of the 4th instant. I do not know what to say of this d——d place. Our success of yesterday evening has opened a new scene to us; but our final success is still doubtful. Luckily, the French give me more time than I had a right to expect.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

MY DEAR SIR,

‘Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

‘Our mine succeeded, and we took the enemy’s exterior line by storm yesterday afternoon with small loss. The 24th regiment behaved admirably well. The powder is arrived, for which I am very much obliged to you. I wish you would let me have, and would send me 40 barrels more.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Commodore*

*Sir Home Popham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Joseph Banks, K.B., Recorder of Boston.*

‘SIR,

‘Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd September, in which you have enclosed the record of the act of the Corporation of Boston, by which they have unanimously presented to me the freedom of the borough.

‘I beg that you will take an early opportunity of returning my thanks to the Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Councilmen of Boston for this mark of their attention; and that you

will assure them of my earnest desire to merit their approbation by a continuance of my efforts to serve His Majesty.

' I beg to return you my thanks for the handsome terms in which you have conveyed the sentiments of the Corporation of Boston.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Sir Joseph Banks, K.B.*'

' WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

' I have received your letter of the 26th. I suppose the Portuguese Government will arrange some mode by which the troops will reap the advantage of the arrangements made with the Spanish Regency, for procuring food in the country; and I hope that till that arrangement is made in a satisfactory manner, you will take care that their commissaries shall be supplied with money. Otherwise, if care is not taken upon this subject, I see very clearly that the provision for these troops will fall upon me.

' You may depend upon it that this arrangement is just so much waste paper. The Spanish Government have not the power to provide for their own troops; how can they provide for the Portuguese?

' Believe me, &c.

' *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*'

' WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

' MY LORD,

' Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

' One of the mines which had been prepared under the exterior line of the castle of Burgos was exploded at midnight of the 29th, and effected a breach in the wall, which some of the party, destined to attack it, were enabled to storm; but owing to the darkness of the night, the detachment who were to support the advanced party missed their way, and the advance were driven off the breach again before they could be effectually supported. The breach effected by the mine was not of a description to be stormed except at the moment of the explosion, and it was necessary to improve it by fire, before the attempt could be repeated. But all our endeavors to construct batteries in the best

situation to fire upon the wall failed, in consequence of the great superiority of the enemy's fire. One of the only three battering guns we had and two carriages were destroyed, and another gun was much injured. In the mean time another mine had been placed under the wall, which was ready yesterday, and a fire was opened yesterday morning from a battery constructed under cover of the horn-work.

‘The fire from this battery improved the breach first made; and the explosion of the mine, at five o'clock yesterday evening, effected a second breach. Both were immediately stormed by the 2nd batt., of the 24th regiment, under the command of Captain Hedderwick, which I had ordered into the trenches for that purpose; and our troops were established within the exterior line of the works of the castle of Burgos. The conduct of the 24th regiment was highly praiseworthy; and Captain Hedderwick and Lieutenants Holmes and Fraser, who led the two storming parties, particularly distinguished themselves. I am happy to add, the operation was effected without suffering a very severe loss.

‘The enemy are still upon the Ebro, and have not made any attempt to interrupt our operations. It is reported they have extended to their left as far as Logroño.

‘My last reports from the frontiers of Valencia are of the 25th. It is stated that King Joseph was at Almanza, with 15,000 men, to join Marshal Soult, who was on his march through Murcia from Granada. My last letter from Lieut. General Maitland is of the 21st ultimo. He was about to relinquish the command on account of ill health, and give it over to Major General Mackenzie.

‘Lieut. General Sir R. Hill is on the Tagus, between Aranjuez and Toledo. I have not yet heard what steps Major General Cooke has taken in obedience to the orders which I gave him to send a part of the troops composing the garrison of Cadiz to join Lieut. General Sir R. Hill.

‘By the last accounts I have of General Ballesteros he was at Granada, but he has been ordered to Alcaraz.

‘I enclose a return of killed and wounded since the 27th ultimo.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 27th September to the 5th October, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	—	5	71	—	76
Wounded . .	11	10	302	—	323
Missing . . .	—	—	4	—	4

*To His Royal Highness the Duke of York.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose extracts of letters to the Secretary of State, which will make your Royal Highness acquainted with the state of the operations against the castle of Burgos to this day. I beg leave to recommend Captain Hedderwick, Lieut. Holmes, and Lieut. Fraser of the 24th regiment to your Royal Highness’s favor and protection.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness  
the Duke of York.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 5th October, 1812.

‘ I enclose the copy of a dispatch from Sir Henry Wellesley, by which I have been informed that the Spanish Government have conferred upon me the command of their armies.

‘ The circumstances affecting the decision on this subject have in some degree changed since it was last under the consideration of His Majesty’s Government, and it is certainly quite impossible that operations can be successfully carried on by the allied British and Portuguese armies, and by the Spanish troops, without some concert among the different divisions of which each may be composed. Indeed,

as in the course of the war the Spaniards have lost nearly all their cannon, and all their cavalry, they cannot act generally in bodies separate from the armies of the allies; and it is expedient, on every ground, that the general command should be vested in one person.

‘ I have not thought proper therefore to decline to accept the offer made to me by the Spanish Government, in my answer to Sir Henry Wellesley, which I enclose; and as they required to have an answer, I have expressed a disposition to accept the command, if it should meet with the approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

‘ I beg that your Lordship will take His Royal Highness’s pleasure on this subject.

‘ I am sorry that I cannot say that the Spanish troops are at all improved in their discipline, their equipment, their organization, or their military spirit. I entertain but little doubt that in the same field with our troops they will behave well; and it may be possible, by good management, to prevent a repetition of those terrible disasters to detached corps by which the enemy were enabled to overrun the country, and to bring the contest almost to a conclusion. But the means of effecting this object, and my power over the army, will be much increased, and the army itself will be much improved, by the adoption of measures by His Majesty’s Government to insure the application of whatever subsidy may be advanced to the Spanish Government to the payment of those troops actually employed in co-operation with the allied British and Portuguese army, in operations against the common enemy.

‘ It must be observed, however, that unless money can be procured to make good any engagements of this description which may be entered into with the Spanish Government, the performance of such engagements will become a burthen upon the military chest of the army, and will so far cramp our operations.

‘ My object, in the latter part of my letter to Sir Henry Wellesley, was to guard against the pretensions which the Spanish Government might form, to direct the operations of the war, in consequence of their appointment of me to command the Spanish armies.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To C. Herries, Esq., Commissary in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 6th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th of July last, containing a memorial from the deputies to you, as Commissary General, for an increase of their pay; and I beg to acquaint you, that in consideration of the duty performed by officers of that rank, and of the responsibility of their situations, I conceive that it would be expedient to grant them an additional allowance of per diem (treasury pay.)

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ C. Herries, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.*

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ à Villa Toro, ce 7th Oct., 1812.

‘ Je ne vous ai pas répondu officiellement sur les opérations du Général Mendizabal, parcequ’il est bien difficile de donner une opinion sur les opérations d’un corps quelconque, qui n’est pas en état de faire aucune opération. Le Général Mendizabal est à présent tenu en échec par un corps Français à Durango, de la moitié de sa force, et on ne peut pas compter qu’il puisse avoir du succès en quelque opération qu’il peut entreprendre contre l’ennemi.

‘ J’ai prié le Chevalier Popham de faire tout ce qu’il pourra pour attirer l’attention de l’ennemi vers la côte. Je crois qu’à présent il ne peut plus rien faire contre Guetaria; mais je l’ai prié de faire des préparatifs pour l’attaque de Santoña; et même de faire l’attaque de cette place s’il le peut. Je l’ai prié aussi de m’indiquer comment il croira que le Général Mendizabal pourrait l’aider, afin que je vous soumette ses idées. Si Popham peut faire cette opération, le Général Mendizabal pourra ou l’aider ou tâcher de le couvrir. Si Popham ne peut pas faire cette opération, alors le Général Mendizabal ne peut pas mieux faire que de se tenir où il est; faire travailler et discipliner ses troupes; et laisser faire des courses par les guerrillas et les troupes légères sur les communications de l’ennemi, et rendre difficile leur subsistance dans le pays.

‘ Le Général Mendizabal doit prendre grand soin de ne

pas être battu ni coupé dans les Asturies et la Galice : si l'ennemi s'avance sur lui en force, il doit se retirer sur les Asturies ; et si l'armée de la Galice était dans le cas de se retirer et de passer le Duero, le Général Mendizabal doit se porter dans la Galice pour en défendre l'entrée, si l'ennemi se portait de ce côté là. Voilà ce que je pense sur les opérations du Général Mendizabal.

‘ Je vous envoie une lettre qui m’a été donnée hier par le Colonel Robe, qui annonce qu’il est arrivé à Madrid un Brigadier d’artillerie Espagnole, pour prendre le commandement du Retiro. Quand j’ai quitté Madrid j’ai fait des arrangemens avec Don Carlos pour renvoyer à Ciudad Rodrigo tous les canons et munitions utiles qui étaient au Retiro ; et j’ai ordonné qu’on fasse des arrangemens pour détruire tout ce qu’on ne pouvait pas emporter, et le bâtiment de la China, si on était dans le cas d’abandonner Madrid avant que tout ne fut emporté. Je crois que faute de moyens de transport très peu a été emporté encore ; et quoique je ne croye pas qu’on puisse être dans la nécessité d’abandonner Madrid, je ne peux pas en être sûr ; et je suis bien sûr que si on est dans ce cas, tout sera détruit sans faire du mal à la ville, si on laisse l’affaire dans les mains du Colonel Hartmann ; mais je n’en serai pas aussi sûr si on la donne au Brigadier Espagnol. Je vous prie donc de décider lequel des deux vous voulez avoir. En peu de jours nous saurons s’il est possible qu’il peut devenir nécessaire d’évacuer Madrid ; et s’il ne l’est pas, nous pourrons donner la place au Brigadier Espagnol pour en faire ce qu’il en voudra.

‘ Je suis très inquiet sur l’état des munitions de votre armée. On m’a dit qu’il y a très peu de coups pour vos huit pièces de canon. Nous avons ramassé des boulets de 4 que nous pourrions vous donner, pour lesquels vous pourriez prendre de la poudre à Santander. Il est nécessaire aussi de donner un peu d’attention à l’état de vos munitions à fusil. Nous n’en avons jamais avec l’armée plus qu’il n’en faut pour les troupes Anglaises. Les Portugais en portent pour eux-mêmes. Ainsi il faut compter, qu’en cas d’affaire, nous ne pouvons pas vous en donner. Si vous n’en avez pas ce qui est nécessaire, vous ferez bien d’en envoyer chercher tout de suite à Santander, pour lesquelles je vous donnerai un ordre.

‘ Je vois que quelque unes des troupes ont des fusils Français, pour lesquels nous n’avons pas de munitions.

‘ Je serai bien content quand je saurai que l’habillement des troupes est arrivé.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *General*

*Don F. X. Castaños.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 7th Oct., 1812.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the Portuguese Government levy any and what duties on the importation of corn into Portugal.

‘ There is nobody to whom I mention the notable arrangement between the Portuguese and Spanish Government for feeding the Portuguese troops in Spain, who is not amused by it. I am afraid, however, that the Portuguese Government rely upon it, and consider it no longer necessary to send money to supply their troops. I have already advanced money to the Portuguese Commissariat; and I request you to give notice that I shall give no money from the military chest at Lisbon, if I find that this Spanish arrangement is relied upon for the supply of the troops acting in Spain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 9th Oct., 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter received last night from Admiral Durham, through Sir Home Popham, which contains bad news. I have a confirmation from the French outposts that something of the kind mentioned has happened.

‘ We have a practicable breach in the second line, notwithstanding that all our guns and carriages are what is called destroyed; and I am now endeavoring to set on fire the magazine of provisions. I cannot venture to storm the breach. We have used such an unconscionable quantity of musket ammunition, particularly in two *sorties* made by the enemy, one on the 5th, and the other yesterday morning,

that I cannot venture to storm till I am certain of the arrival of a supply.

‘ I have sent to the rear and to Santander; and we are making some. But I have not yet heard of any approaching. I fear, therefore, that we must turn our siege into a blockade.

‘ I am sorry to say that we lost poor Cocks in the *sortie* yesterday morning. He is on every ground the greatest loss we have yet sustained.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Villa Toro, 9th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 5th and 6th. I do not think it yet decided whether the enemy are or not about to move towards the Tagus. If the King or Suchet’s troops have gone to Albacete, as would appear by Wisch’s report, it is clear that they are about to move in that direction; if they are Soult’s troops, this is not so clear; particularly if it be true, as is reported, that the King and Suchet have returned to Valencia. I have reports here that Suchet is going to Aragon, and that the King is expected at Pamplona.

‘ I send you a letter from Admiral Durham, containing bad news. I have a similar report from the French outposts in my front. We have a practicable breach in the second line, notwithstanding that all our guns and carriages are destroyed; and I am now about to set fire to the magazine of provisions. But I am afraid I can do no more. I cannot venture to storm, having but little musket ammunition. Our consumption has been enormous, particularly in two *sorties* made by the enemy on the 5th, and yesterday morning; in the last, I am sorry to say, we lost poor Cocks, which has grieved me much.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 9th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 4th and 6th, and I am glad to find that you will be able to remain on the coast during the winter.

‘ We have made a practicable breach in the second line of the enemy’s works; and we are now firing hot shot on the magazine, but I am afraid I cannot storm for want of musket ammunition. Our expenditure has been beyond all calculation, particularly in two sorties made by the enemy on the 5th and yesterday morning.

‘ I sent a fortnight ago to our magazines in the rear, as well as to Santander, for a supply; and if I should have reason to expect a supply from either, I shall storm when the magazine is on fire; if not I must turn our siege into a blockade.

‘ Let me know exactly what you wish Mendizabal to do, and what troops you wish him to detach towards you, and I will arrange the matter with General Castaños. I shall give you notice if any circumstances should make me move to the south. Soult and the King and Suchet are certainly in motion, but I do not think that the direction of their march is yet decided.

‘ Admiral Durham’s news is not satisfactory. I am sure there is some truth in it, as I have reports of something of the kind from the French outposts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir Home Popham.*’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Villa Toro, 10th October, 1812.

‘ I was aware of the mistake in the date of your first letter of the 6th. I received this morning that of the 6th in the evening, and at the same time letters from Don Carlos of the 7th.

‘ I cannot believe that Soult and the King can venture to move forward to attack you in the position on the Tagus, without having possession of the forts in the province of Murcia and of Alicante; unless indeed they propose to give

up Valencia entirely. They will in that case bring with them a most overwhelming force, and you would probably be obliged to retire in the direction given to General Alten. I shall of course hear from you constantly, and I should join you on the Adaja.

‘ It will be necessary, however, that you should attend to some circumstances. If you should retire in that direction, it will be necessary to order the new bridge at Almaraz to be taken up and destroyed, if there are not means at hand of carrying it away. If there are such means it should be removed, the rope work particularly, to Elvas. My pontoon bridge should, if in time, get across the Tietar, and go up to Salamanca; if not in time, it must go round by the bridge of Alcantara and do the same.

‘ I hear from Brito that the Cadiz troops marched from Seville on the 28th; if that is the case, they ought now to be near the Tagus. If they should not have crossed the Tagus when you shall retire, let them march by Caceres to Alcantara, and proceed thence by Guinaldo and Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ If they should have crossed the Tagus, and should have arrived at or be near Talavera when you retire, let them proceed to Avila, and join your right by Blasco Sancho. I believe there is a road for carriages from Oropesa to Avila, by which they should go, if they should have arrived at Oropesa when you shall have decided to withdraw from the Tagus; or if they should not have arrived at Oropesa, or if there should be no road from thence to Avila, they must be directed to march upon Plasencia, and thence by the Puerto de Baños and Bejar towards, the *barca* de Avila. This last mentioned movement, however, must depend upon the state of the Tietar. I believe there is neither bridge nor *barca* on the lower parts of that river, and therefore, if it should not be fordable at the time that Colonel Skerrett would have to execute the proposed movement, he might be in a scrape. It is best, therefore, that the bridge at Almaraz should not be taken up, if Colonel Skerrett’s detachment should have crossed the Tagus, until his movement shall have been decided, in order that, in case he should not be sufficiently forward to join you from Talavera or Oropesa, or that the Tietar should be in such a state as

that it cannot be crossed, he may be able to get back across the Tagus, and to make his march by Alcantara.

‘ I write all this, as I always do, to provide for every event, not believing that these instructions are at all necessary. I have at the same time to look after troops joining from England by Coruña.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 10th October, 1812.

‘ I enclose a report from the Quarter Master General of the state of the waggon train with this army.

‘ I take this opportunity of adverting to a report recently communicated to me by the Quarter Master General, regarding the misapplication of the carriages of the waggon train in this army to carry baggage; together with the draft of an order which General Hamilton proposed should be issued upon this subject, both of which had been laid before His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.

‘ I have not issued the order suggested by General Hamilton, because there is no foundation whatever for the report that the carriages of the waggon train are misapplied to the purposes of carrying baggage. I have never been able to bring forward a sufficiency of them to carry the sick and wounded of the army; and I am quite certain there is no instance in this army of their having been applied to any baggage, excepting indeed by the officers of the waggon train themselves, as has recently appeared.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*

WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD.

‘ Villa Toro, 11th October, 1812.

‘ The enemy have made two sorties on the head of the sap between the exterior and interior lines of the castle of Burgos, in both of which they materially injured our works, and we suffered some loss. In the last, at three in the morning of the 8th, we had the misfortune to lose Major the Hon. C. Cocks of the 79th, who was field officer of

the trenches, and was killed in the act of rallying the troops who had been driven in. I have frequently had occasion to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Major Cocks, and in one instance very recently in the attack on the horn work of the castle of Burgos, and I consider his loss as one of the greatest importance to this army and to His Majesty's service.

‘ Notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy, our troops are established within about a hundred yards of the enemy's interior line, which we have it in our power to assault; and we have effected a good breach in another part of the same line, and our troops are established close to the breach.

‘ I am sorry to say, however, that the consumption of musket ammunition by the troops has been so large, particularly in the late sorties made by the enemy, that notwithstanding that some has been made, and that a supply of powder and musket ammunition has been received from Commodore Sir Home Popham, I cannot venture to allow the consumption of ammunition which must take place in the storm of the enemy's works, till I shall be certain of receiving a further supply.

‘ I have ordered to Santander the transports which have musket ammunition on board at Coruña, and an officer of the ordnance has been waiting at Santander since the beginning of the month, to receive what is required.

‘ I have heard that the vessels sailed from Coruña on the 3rd instant, but I have not yet heard of their arrival at Santander. I likewise sent to the magazines of the army in the rear, on the 24th of September; but I have not yet heard of the approach of the ammunition. I am obliged to defer any further attack upon the enemy till I shall be certain of a supply.

‘ In the mean time we are carrying on our works underground; and I hope that I shall have another mine in readiness in a day or two; and we are endeavoring to burn the enemy's magazines by the fire of hot shot.

‘ The enemy have not made any movement to interrupt our operations. They are still upon the Ebro, and I understand have received another reinforcement from France.

‘ By the accounts which I have from Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, of the 7th instant, it appears that Marshal

Soult joined the King on the frontier of Valencia and Murcia, on the 29th of September. A detachment of Marshal Soult's army occupied Albacete on the 3rd instant, and a small detachment of cavalry was as far forward as Minaya, on the 6th instant; but I do not consider the movement to be as yet decided.

‘ I have not yet heard of General Ballesteros having passed the Sierra Morena, or at all of his movements since the 17th of September, when he entered Granada; nor have I heard from Major General Cooke since he received my directions for the movement of the troops under his command.

‘ I have reports, however, that the troops marched from Seville on the 28th of September.

‘ I enclose a return of the killed and wounded since the 6th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 6th to the 10th October, 1812, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	7	4	116	—	127
Wounded . .	16	8	268	—	292
Missing . . .	—	—	18	—	18

*To Lord Somers.*

MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 11th October, 1812.

‘ As I have before had the honor of writing to you respecting your son \*, I cannot allow my dispatch to go to England with the melancholy account of the loss which you have sustained, without addressing a few lines to you.

\* Major the Hon. C. S. Cocks, 79th regiment, killed on the 8th.

‘ Your son fell, as he had lived, in the zealous and gallant discharge of his duty. He had already distinguished himself in the course of the operations of the attack of the castle of Burgos to such a degree as to induce me to recommend him for promotion; and I assure your Lordship that if Providence had spared him to you, he possessed acquirements, and was endowed with qualities, to become one of the greatest ornaments of his profession, and to continue an honor to his family, and an advantage to his country.

‘ I have no hope that what I have above stated to your Lordship will at all tend to alleviate your affliction on this melancholy occasion; but I could not deny myself the satisfaction of assuring you that I was highly sensible of the merits of your son, and that I most sincerely lament his loss.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Somers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Villa Toro, 12th October, 1812.

‘ I hope that the rain which annoys us so much reaches you likewise, and I should think that you will have the Tagus in such a state as to feel no apprehension in regard to the enemy’s operations, be their numbers what they may.

‘ It is quite clear to me, however, that the King, Soult, and Suchet, are joined on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia, from the accounts from Madrid of the 9th, which I have received this day, and from letters from Alicante of the 29th. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that I should raise this siege, and proceed to the south, and I shall do so as soon as the weather holds up a little.

‘ I recommend to you to have the bridge of Sacedon mined, particularly if the rain should have rendered the fords of the Tagus impassable. Have no scruple in destroying the bridge of Toledo, or that of Aranjuez, or any other, if it be at all important to your operations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 12th October, 1812.

‘ I have received this morning your three letters of the 10th, and one without date, written after the arrival of the *Surveillante* and *Ellen*.

‘ I have sent to General Castaños respecting the movement of the troops under General Mendizabal towards *Santoña*. The orders to them shall go this night.

‘ In regard to your own notions, I would beg leave to suggest to you the following considerations:—If I should raise the siege of this place, and should move from hence, the movement will be occasioned by the necessity of collecting our forces in *Castille*, in consequence of the collection of the enemy’s forces in the south and east of the *Peninsula*, and their movement upon *Madrid* in too great force for Sir *Rowland Hill*.

‘ We must expect that I shall be followed by the troops composing what is called the army of *Portugal*, but I shall likewise be followed by those composing the army of the *North*, if all apprehension of your operations should cease, in consequence of your removal from *Santander* or from the coast, of the squadron and battalion of *Marines*.

‘ In your letter of the 10th you mention your intention to return to *England*, in the case supposed, with the *Venerable* only, and you do not mention the two battalions of *Marines*.

‘ If you were not known to be in that ship, possibly her removal from the coast (the remainder of the squadron and the *Marines* staying at *Santander*, or elsewhere on the coast) would not be very important; but the enemy, as well as the *Spaniards*, will be convinced that nothing is intended to be done, even though the *Marines* remain, if you should go away in the *Venerable*; and I apprehend that I shall have upon my hands in *Castille* more of the enemy than I can well manage.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*  
*Sir Home Popham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR PAGET,

‘ Villa Toro, 13th October, 1812.

‘ I enclose the letters received from the South this morning, from which you will see that matters are not pressing there. I likewise enclose one from General Mackenzie, and one from General Donkin, the former containing intercepted letters, which show the state of the enemy in that quarter. I can scarcely doubt of their intention to unite in La Mancha.

‘ I have just received a report that the enemy are in motion in our front. About 1500 infantry and 600 cavalry drove in our piquets at Monasterio this morning. I am going out to the front at Riobena immediately, and shall send word if it be necessary that any troops should move.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 13th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 29th.

‘ In case the enemy should advance from Valencia into La Mancha, with a view to attack our troops on the Tagus, you must endeavor to obtain possession of the town and kingdom of Valencia. You will march from Alicante, or will embark, as you may think best. The ordnance and stores must of course go by sea, and you will observe, if you march, that you must at all times keep your communication open with the sea.

‘ As you are but ill provided with cavalry, you will take care not to risk an action with a superior force of the enemy, particularly if they should have a superior force in cavalry.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 14th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have not answered your letter of the 2nd, regarding the proposal that the Portuguese troops in Spain should be

supplied from the resources of the Spanish Government. I had already made an arrangement of this description with the Intendant of Salamanca, from which the armies of both nations had, I believed, derived some advantage (to what amount I cannot tell), before the Intendant, recommended by me, had been displaced. Since that event in the province of Salamanca we have derived no advantage from that arrangement, nor any in other provinces, partly because the Spanish Government have to this moment appointed no officers to take charge of their concerns in the provinces, and partly, because their own numerous but useless troops eat up every thing. We have not, therefore, and ought not, I think, to expect any great resource for either army from the country, without payment; and I am sure we ought to avoid holding out any hopes to the Portuguese Government of such a resource. They shall have, as they already have had, their share of any resource of this kind that may offer.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 4th, I have to mention, that it appears to me to be impossible to adopt the arrangement proposed; viz., to allow Senhor Cardoso to go into the market to purchase corn with our bills. The truth is, that Senhor Cardoso is a very honest man I believe, but he likes meddling in our concerns, and he is anxious to acquire the influence over the corn merchants in Lisbon, which would result from his making purchases for the Portuguese army. I wish there was money to enable Sir Charles Stuart to pay the subsidy; but as there is not, it will not answer to allow Senhor Cardoso to go to market with our bills. I do not believe that our Commissariat buy, or have in their possession, bad corn. I do not know why they should, if good corn can be procured, which I believe it can. I am much more inclined to believe that Senhor Cardoso complains without reason, in order that he may attain his *little* object, than that Mr. Pipon buys bad corn, and offers it to Senhor Cardoso.

‘ All these questions give me a great deal of additional trouble, which I should be delighted to avoid by any practical arrangement; but I have never yet had any before me, and we must only get on as well as we can, and prevent our

inferiors from interrupting the course of the public service by their private views and complaints about nothing. I see, by a letter from Sir Charles Stuart of the 6th, that he concurs very much with me in the notions which I have formed of the causes of Senhor Cardoso's complaints.

'In regard to money I can say nothing, excepting that I will give what I can. If I am to fix the sum, which will be given monthly, it must be the smallest. I wish I could do more.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal*

'WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Villa Toro, 14th Oct., 1812.

'Upon consulting with Mr. Kennedy regarding the purchase of corn in Egypt, he concurs very much in my opinion, that if the corn can be got with goods it is desirable to have it; but that *we* are not in immediate want, and it is better not to have it than to allow money to be spent in the purchase, which would find its way into the military chest. Kennedy appears to doubt that Sampaio can spend any money in this way which would not find its way into the military chest.

'I concur very much in your opinion regarding the cause of Cardoso's complaints of the corn offered to him by Mr. Pipon. He wants to have the *little* influence over the corn merchants, and *la petite gloire* which would result from making purchases in the market. I wish we had money to spare to enable him to make these purchases.

'I do not see any inconvenience that will result from your giving Senhor Cardoso, at the market price, any cargoes that may be consigned to your orders, if the Commissariat do not want them. This is a very different arrangement from your bills going into the Lisbon market to purchase corn for Senhor Cardoso, on Senhor Cardoso being allowed to purchase corn in the market with your bills, or those of the Commissary General. I am afraid, however, that you will find the concern a very troublesome one.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

'WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Villa Toro, 14th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters to the 10th, and finding that matters do not press in the South, as they appeared to press, according to the accounts received for some previous days, I continue our operations here, which afford some prospect of a successful termination.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I think you would do well to send to Ballesteros a copy of the letter from the Minister of War, directing him to take the position at Alcaraz.’

*To Major General the Hon. C. Stewart.*

‘ MY DEAR STEWART,

‘ Villa Toro, 14th Oct., 1812.

‘ I received your letter of the 18th September by the last post. I had already answered the letter which you wrote to me regarding your office, and I told you, that it was not at all inconvenient to me that you should remain in England as long as you should find it convenient, and that I would not hear of your resignation. Goodman is now doing the duty of the office, poor Waters being very ill. Goodman does the business remarkably well ; but I hope we shall soon have Waters again, particularly as the hunting season is coming on apace, the hounds are on the road, and I shall want Waters for the earth-stopping business, if not for that of the A. G. He has been very near dying, poor fellow, and what is worse, I hear he has lost all his dogs, including Sevilla.

‘ I have in hand the toughest job I have ever undertaken ; but, notwithstanding deficiencies of means of all kinds, I hope I shall succeed yet. If I do, I shall be better satisfied than I have ever been with any success.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*  
*the Hon C. Stewart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 14th Oct., 1812.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me forty barrels more of gunpowder, as soon as you can with convenience.

‘ There is nothing new from the South. Matters do not appear to press there at all.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir Home Popham.’*

*To Lieut. Colonel Gore, 33rd Regiment \*.*

‘ MY DEAR GORE,

‘ Villa Toro, 14th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 10th of September, for which I am much obliged to you; and I am glad to find that you have prospects of getting men to complete the regiment. I should wish, for the sake of the officers, to get men enough to form a second battalion; but I am afraid that that is impossible, till I shall have more leisure to attend to the concerns of the regiment than I have had.

‘ As well as I recollect, I gave the band a set of instruments some time ago; but I have no objection to give them another. You will accordingly order a set, and desire the agents to pay for it on my account.

‘ I beg you will order what you think proper and necessary for the regiment in the way of clothing and accoutrements; and I consider you, and not myself, responsible that they shall be in every respect fit for service, as far as depends upon me.

‘ I give you no authority which my predecessor did not give me, and I believe every preceding Lieut. Colonel of the 33rd regiment; and I am confident that you will execute the task with the same feeling for my pocket, and regard for my interests, combined with a just sense of what is due to the public and the soldiers, which my predecessors and I felt for the interests of Lord Cornwallis.

‘ I am very anxious that no alteration should be made in the uniform or appointments of the regiment, which is not required by the orders of the army and the regulations of

\* Major General Gore, killed at Bergen op Zoom.

the service. Every thing is now, I believe, as I found it twenty years ago; and if once we begin to alter, we shall have nothing fixed, as there are no bounds to fancy.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will send me by post the button which you propose to substitute for that at present worn.

‘ Let me know whether I can do any thing for the regiment, or for any individual in it. I am glad you have got a serjeant major whom you like. But we ought to have serjeants of our own, fit to be serjeants major.

‘ Remember me most kindly to your brother if you should be with him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gore,*  
*33rd Regiment.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 14th Oct., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness’s letter of the 16th of September; and I assure you that there is no person more anxious than I am to adhere strictly to the rules of the service established by your Royal Highness; and I am highly flattered and grateful for the confidence which your Royal Highness has been pleased to place in me, and for the attention which you have given to any suggestion which I have thought it proper to make to you.

‘ In regard to the two subjects referred to in your Royal Highness’s letter, that which your Royal Highness has done was suggested to me by Colonel Gordon; and knowing that he had possessed your confidence, and that he was in the habit of communication with the officers at the head of the several departments at the Horse Guards, I consented to his writing to England on those subjects. I saw his letter to your Royal Highness regarding the arrangements of the Waggon Train; and as well as I can recollect, I saw a letter which he wrote either to your Royal Highness or General Calvert, regarding the formation into a garrison battalion of the soldiers belonging to regiments in this army invalided for garrison duty at Belem.

‘ I acknowledge that it did not occur to me that those were official communications; and I allowed them to be

made by Colonel Gordon, only because he had suggested what was proposed to be accomplished, and he appeared to understand thoroughly the arrangements; and because I believed that he was in the habit of writing to your Royal Highness, and to the Officers of the General Staff at the Horse Guards. Independently of my desire to avail myself of your Royal Highness's permission to address myself directly to your Royal Highness on every subject, I am perfectly aware that the Staff Officers of the army are attached to me to enable me to communicate my orders to my inferiors, and otherwise to assist me in the performance of my duty; but not to carry on my communications with my superiors; and therefore I should not have allowed Colonel Gordon to write even upon the subjects referred to, if I had considered what he was writing at all of the nature of an official communication.

‘Your Royal Highness may depend upon it that nothing of the kind shall occur in future.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Royal Highness  
The Duke of York.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To — — —.

‘MONSIEUR,

‘à Villa Toro, ce 16 Oct., 1812.

‘J’ai eu le plaisir de recevoir votre lettre du 8 du courant; et je vous prie d’agréer mes remerciemens pour les renseignemens que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer sur les événemens qui ont eu lieu depuis mon départ de Madrid.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘à — — —.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral G. Martin.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Villa Toro, 17th Oct., 1812.

‘I have this day given orders to the Commissary General to send to Coruña, for the use of the Spanish army, 7,500 suits of clothing, and other equipments for that number of men; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will comply with the application which will be made to you by the head

of his department at Lisbon for a vessel to convey these stores to Coruña.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K. B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Villa Toro, Oct. 17th, 1812.

‘ I issue an order this day, disposing of the troops which will arrive under the command of Colonel Skerrett, which I request you to have executed. The troops in this direction should come either from Talavera or Avila; or from Talavera or the Escorial. I do not know whether General Cole has broken up our establishment at the Escorial; if he has, your Commissary must take care of their troops till they reach Arevalo.

‘ I shall desire the Commissary General to place his establishments again at the Escorial, if General Cole has taken them away.

‘ The rain of these last two days must have settled the Tagus for you for some time. What reports have you of that river? Do the upper parts become fordable in the winter season after the rain has ceased? for how many days generally? Let me know when you write what the state of the river is.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K. B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Toro, 17th October, 1812.

‘ I have received two letters from you of the 12th, and two of the 14th instant; and I am sorry to observe that Lord Keith has altered his intentions respecting the squadron under your command, between the 18th of September and 5th instant.

‘ I shall not be under the necessity of withdrawing from here, unless the enemy’s armies collected in Valencia should move upon the Tagus in too great force for Sir R. Hill. The probability that this will be the case diminishes daily, as our reinforcements are advancing daily from the South as well as from Coruña; and I believe that Ballesteros has

taken the position in La Mancha which I proposed for him ; which renders the enemy's movement upon the Tagus very improbable.

‘ The possession of Santoña is very important in every point of view, particularly if the possession should facilitate your remaining on the coast. You know best whether you can obtain the possession with the means in your power. If you cannot, and if you think that the attempt will draw towards you the enemy's operations, and that you may be obliged to withdraw from Santander, it is much better that the attempt should not be made. What I want is, that your squadron and marines should remain on the coast during the winter, by which they will render me the important service of preventing the enemy from taking the whole army of the North across the Ebro. If they should lose Santander, it is very obvious that they must go to Coruña or home ; and either would be a misfortune under our present circumstances.

‘ You will judge from your means whether it is fit to attack Santoña. I wish I could send you a better General than Mendizabal, and better troops than his are ; but they are not to be found. I do not see the advantage, however, which would result from Lord Keith's proposal that General Mendizabal should join me. I have more of that kind than I know what to do with.

‘ In regard to my making Santander my post of communication with England, it is quite impossible at present ; I should doubt the practicability of the plan at any time, on account of the want of means of transport in the neighbouring country ; but it certainly would not answer till the army should be firmly established on the Ebro, or probably further on.

‘ In consequence of your application of the 17th of July to Sir H. Douglas, I have directed Lieut. Colonel Bourke to provide Colonel Campillo with 1000 stand of arms, and I beg you to let me know if you are desirous that he should receive another supply in addition to the above number. It has not been customary, I believe, to give shoes and great coats to guerrillas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

*Sir Home Popham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 17th Oct., 1812.

‘ In compliance with the desire expressed in your Lordship’s dispatch (No. 56) of the 1st instant, I have given directions that General Espoz y Mina may be supplied with 2500 stand of arms, with pouches and belts, and a proportion of ammunition and 2500 suits of clothing. These articles of equipment will be forwarded to Santander.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 17th October, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd ulto. (No. 49), and I have perused the memorandum it contains from His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, regarding the levy and discipline of Spanish troops by British officers.

‘ I doubt whether it will be possible to overcome the prejudices and remove the disinclination of the Spanish Government and officers to receive any assistance from British officers in disciplining their troops. As far as I have observed, they do not admit the superiority of our discipline, and do not attribute to that cause our success. However, if His Royal Highness the Prince Regent should consent to my taking upon myself the command of the Spanish armies, I shall take an opportunity of submitting to the Spanish Government a proposition on this subject.

‘ If it is expected that this measure should be as successful as one of a similar nature has been in Portugal, it will be necessary to provide for the regular payment of the officers and troops to be thus raised and trained. It is impossible to place any reliance on the Spanish resources; in fact, the abuses of the Government and the misfortunes of the country have entirely annihilated them. But I should think that a due application of the British subsidy, if it could be realised in specie, would provide for the pay, not only of this corps, but of the whole effective operating army.

‘ I form this opinion from the expense of the corps of troops under Don Carlos de España, which has been paid

under my direction since June last. It consists of 4000 men present for duty, including the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the expense of the pay of the officers and men is 25,000 dollars a month, or 300,000 dollars per annum. The million sterling of subsidy would, at the same rate and under the same arrangements, pay 50,000 men under arms; which number I am apprehensive that the Spanish nation will not have in the course of this war.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 17th October, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch No. 51, of the 24th September, in regard to the Portuguese finances, and I have perused with great attention all the papers which it contains.

‘ Your Lordship may be assured that the only practicable remedies for the deficit in the Portuguese finances consist in augmentations of revenue, to be obtained by reforms of abuses in the collection of the customs of the Kingdom, and in the collection of taxes on income, and of the direct taxes generally, in the great towns of Lisbon and Oporto particularly, and by saving unnecessary expenses.

‘ It is evident to me that the Conde de Funchal \* is not accurately informed on the subject on which he has written. I have given every facility in my power to prevent frauds on the Portuguese revenue, under the cover of importing stores for the army, from a knowledge that His Majesty is essentially interested in the prosperity of the Portuguese finances; and in point of fact no stores are admitted duty free, unless I request His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon to make application to the Government for an order to the Custom House to pass goods in that manner.

‘ Since the year 1810, I have never applied for an exemption from duties, excepting for clothing or stores actually imported for officers or regiments belonging to the army; or on account of the public, for the army at large.

\* Senhor de Souza Coutinho, Portuguese Minister at the Court of St. James’s.

‘I do not apply for an exemption of duties for articles brought to Portugal for sale on speculation. Frauds however may be committed by masters of transports, and of other vessels resorting to Portugal on account of the public; but to prevent these frauds is one of the objects of my repeated remonstrances to the local Government of Portugal to reform the Custom House.

‘I know that the taxes upon income, and the direct taxes in Lisbon and Oporto, were very ill collected; and no measure has been adopted by the Government which has satisfied my mind that it was a remedy to the existing abuses. I proposed for the consideration of the Government, to be applied to the large towns, the system which prevails in England, with some alterations, particularly a publication of the returns of income which should be made by different individuals, in order to obtain greater accuracy from those who should make them. But the Government declined to adopt what I proposed, and there the matter rests; and as far as the produce of the taxes on income and of the direct taxes would affect the deficit, I believe it remains as it was.

‘It rests with the Government and not with me to see that strangers pay the taxes upon income, and the direct taxes; and I hope they will be more successful with this description of persons than I know they are with the Portuguese possessors of large capitals.

‘In regard to savings, I have desired Marshal Sir William Beresford to send to their homes all the militia, excepting the few absolutely necessary for the interior duties; and I have not failed to urge the suppression of the naval expenses of the Government.

‘I do not know that there is a larger Staff to the Portuguese army than is required. It is certainly true, however, that for want of money, the Portuguese army is very ill equipped with many essentials for service; and that I am frequently much embarrassed by their wants. Much of what appears under the head of military expense, consists in pensions to widows, to retired officers, &c. &c.; the provision for these classes provided by the country, viz., the produce of the revenue of the military orders being applied to purposes different from those for which those orders were

originally endowed. I believe that the hospitals are much better arranged, and that they are managed with more economy by the persons employed by Marshal Sir William Beresford, than they were.

‘I have no knowledge of “frauds or extortions” on the country; or “violence on the magistrates,” committed by the officers of the Commissariat of the British army; and if the Conde de Funchal has any knowledge of such acts, I hope he will make them known to me in detail. If he has not, I hope that he will have no objection to make known the authority he had for making so serious a charge in a public document.

‘It is perfectly true, that owing to the poverty of the Government, “exactions and violence” (but not “frauds” as far as I have any knowledge) have been practised by the officers of the Portuguese Commissariat; but to remedy these evils is one of the objects of my repeated remonstrances to the Portuguese Government in regard to their finances, and other measures.

‘It appears now that the favorite measure of the Portuguese ministers, viz., a loan in England, is abandoned; and recourse is to be had to the sale of the lands of the Crown and of the Church, rather than to enforce the adoption of the only measures which can relieve the finances.

‘I have already had before me a proposition for the sale or rather transfer, to the creditors of the Junta de Viveres, of the lands of the Crown; but these were the uncultivated lands in Alentejo; and I pointed out to Government the great improbability which existed, that any body would take these lands in payment of their claims; and the injury they would do to the public credit by rendering such a scheme public, if it were not likely to be successful.

‘My opinion is, that there is nobody in Portugal possessed of capital, who entertains or who ought to entertain such an opinion of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, as to lay out his money in the purchase of the lands of the Crown. The loss of a battle, not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would expose his estate to confiscation; or at all events to ruin; by a fresh incursion of the enemy; and even if any man can believe that Portugal is secure against the incursion of the enemy; and his estate and person against

the violence, exactions, and fraud of the enemy, he is not, during the existence of the war, even according to the Conde de Funchal's notion, exempt from those evils from his own countrymen and their allies.

‘There could be no objection to trying the experiment of offering some of the estates of the Crown for sale ; and it will be seen whether I have or not formed a correct judgment on this subject. I think it more than probable that the holders of small farms under the Crown have the means, and would purchase at the full value, the fee simple of their several farms ; but I should think the produce from this resource would not be very large. If the Prince Regent of Portugal consents, however, the experiment of the sale of the Crown lands, in large parcels as well as in small, to the landholders, might be tried.

‘Although, if this measure succeeds, it is probable that it will keep back some specie which would find its way into the British military chest, I do not recommend that payment for these purchases should be taken in paper exclusively. I do not think that any measure which can be adopted will have the effect of raising the exchangeable value of the Portuguese paper money, as long as the British Commissary at Lisbon continues to pay in paper money the drafts made upon him by the Commissary General at Head Quarters, making an allowance for the discount.

‘The receiver of the paper, who resides possibly in a distant province of Portugal, is interested in exchanging it for money at any rate ; because he cannot pass it in the country, the law on this subject not being executed, excepting in the large towns.

‘In regard to the sale of the lands belonging to convents and the Church, I earnestly recommend that it should not be attempted. First, The same objection exists as to the sale of the Crown lands, viz., the want of purchasers. Secondly, nothing would render the measure palatable to the Church ; and it might be expected that the influence of the Church would be exerted against the allies, instead of operating, as it has done hitherto, most powerfully in their favor. Thirdly, the measure is useless, if the sale of the Crown lands should succeed ; and it certainly will not succeed if the other should not. At the same time the attempt

will alienate the good wishes of a numerous and very powerful party in Spain, as well as in Portugal. Fourthly, it must be observed, that if the measure should be successful, and should be *honestly* carried into execution, it will entail a considerable burthen on the finances, viz., 5 per cent. on the purchase money, for the ecclesiastical owners of the estate; which the sale of the Crown lands will not.

‘The best mode of obtaining for the state, eventually, the benefit of the estates of the Church, would be to prevent the monasteries and nunneries from receiving novices; and in the course of time the Pope might be brought to consent to the sale of these estates, for the benefit of the state; or the state might assume the possession of them, the ecclesiastical corporation which held them being extinct.

‘I am however of opinion, that it is not disadvantageous to Portugal and Spain, that large portions of the land should be in the hands of the Church. The bishops and monks are the only proprietors who live on their estates, and spend the revenues of them among those by whose labors those revenues have been produced; and till the habits of the great landed proprietors on this subject shall change, the transfer of the property of land from the Church to laymen will be a misfortune to those countries.

‘I propose to send Mr. Stuart a copy of this dispatch.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Villa Toro, 18th October, 1812.

‘The 20th\* regiment had been ordered to march with the other troops, and I expected that they had marched before I received your letter expressing a wish that they should return into Portugal, and I have now posted them in the Light division in Beckwith’s brigade.

‘If you wish to send any other regiment instead of them, I can have no objection, excepting the —th regiment, which cannot be in a state fit for service, or at all complete. Indeed, it would appear to be necessary to relieve the 20th regiment, as they have no mules for the carriage of officers’

\* Portuguese.

baggage, of ammunition, or provisions; and the whole of the concern falls upon our departments, so that the 20th regiment must be either supplied with mules, or relieved.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’*

#### MEMORANDUM

*To Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne, for the attack of the Enemy's second line.*

‘ Villa Toro, 18th October, 1812.

‘ 1. The enemy's second line is to be attacked this afternoon at half past four.

‘ 2. The mine under the church of San Roman is to be exploded at that hour; and Colonel Brown will immediately order an officer and 20 men of the troops under his command to rush forward, and establish themselves on the breach which the mine shall have made. An officer and 50 men will be in readiness to support these.

‘ 3. Colonel Brown will have the effects of the mine well reconnoitred; and if he should find that it is practicable to enter the second line after his troops shall have been established on the emplacement of the church, he shall order them to do so; and establish them within the second line, communicating by his left with the troops which shall attack the second line from the piles of shot.

‘ 4. If Colonel Brown should find that he cannot enter the second line, he will keep a fire on it from the emplacement of the church.

‘ 5. Six ladders of 18 feet long must be sent to Colonel Brown.

‘ 6. The troops of the 6th division, cantoned in Burgos, must be under arms to support the attack upon the second line, if it should be necessary.

‘ 7. When the mine shall explode at half past four, a camp color will be displayed on the hill to the west of the castle; which is to be the signal for the attack on the other parts of the line.

‘ At four o'clock, the parallel along the parapet of the 1st line must be fully occupied.

‘ 8. When the signal shall be made, an officer and 20

men, who must previously be placed in the sap leading to the palisade in front of the gate of the second line, are to rush forward and drive the enemy from behind that palisade; and follow them into the covert way.

‘ 9. The sap must be immediately reoccupied by an officer and 30 men, who are to protect the rear and right flank of the detachment which shall have entered the covert way.

‘ 10. At the same time, an officer and 40 men, 18 of them carrying ladders, must rush forward from the left breach in the first line to the shot piles, and thence to the line in front of the shot piles, where they will descend the ditch, which they shall pass, at the places where the palisades have been destroyed by our shot. They are then to scale the line at that point.

‘ 11. An officer and 50 men are to be in readiness at the trench in the first line, to rush forward to the shot piles as soon as the first party which shall have gone there shall have advanced from thence. These troops are to support the storming party; and are to move on from the cover of the shot piles as soon as they shall find the head of the storming party established on the parapet of the second line. These men are to carry with them three ladders.

‘ 12. Fifty men must be in readiness to move up to the shot piles, as soon as the 50 ordered in paragraph 11 shall have moved forward to the escalade. These are likewise to carry three ladders.

‘ 13. As soon as the party shall have succeeded in the escalade, they are to turn to their left, and communicate with those who shall storm the breach in the second line.

‘ 14. As soon as the party shall have escaladed the line, the 30 men ordered into the sap are to endeavor to force the gate of the second line; and if they should succeed, to communicate by their left with the party which shall escalade.

‘ 15. Three hundred and fifty men of the relief for the trenches this evening must go down under the command of a field officer, so as to be in the trenches at three in the afternoon. As soon as they shall arrive, the whole of the covering party now in the trenches, which shall be on the left, are to go down to the right; and the left of the trenches and horn work shall be occupied by the relieving party.

‘ 16. When the signal shall be made that the mine is sprung, an officer and 20 men are to rush forward from the advanced trench to storm the breach.

‘ 17. Fifty men are to be in readiness to follow these, and are to move out as soon as the head of the 1st detachment shall have ascended the breach.

‘ 18. One hundred men are to be in readiness in the advanced trench to support the storming party in the breach. But they are not to leave the trench till the storming party shall be established on the breach; and then only in case support should be wanted.

‘ 19. When the storming party shall enter the breach, they must turn along the parapet to the left, and drive the enemy from the stockade which he has there established.

‘ 20. The troops formed in the parallel along the parapet of the first line, and in the trenches under the horn work, must keep up a fire during the storm on the enemy’s third line and the castle, so as to keep down the fire of the enemy.

‘ 21. Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne will convey these orders to the field officer in the trenches; and he will see that they are carried into execution according to the intentions of the Commander of the Forces on the right. Lieut. Colonel Sturgeon will convey these orders to the field officer commanding the relief for the trenches ordered by the 15th paragraph, to be there at three o’clock; and he will see that all the arrangements ordered are made, and that the intentions of the Commander of the Forces are carried into execution on the left.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Toro, 18th October, 1812.

‘ The great inconvenience which I have experienced in the attack on the castle of Burgos, in consequence of the want of musket ammunition, and the probability which exists that our operations will continue to be carried on at a distance from our former magazines, have induced me to review the state of the ordnance establishments with this army, and to suggest to your Lordship an augmentation of them.

‘ This army has never had with it an equipment of ordnance at all consistent with its numbers, even though the

establishment should be calculated for the British troops only. But besides the British troops, there are nearly equal numbers of Portuguese troops in each division of which the army is composed; and in the campaign of 1810, and the commencement of 1811, we had a considerable number of Portuguese guns, (nine brigades of six guns each) and a large body of Portuguese artillery with the army. But the financial difficulties of the Portuguese Government, and the irregularity of their system, have caused the destruction of nearly all the animals attached to draw these guns; and the equipment failed first in the quantity of ammunition necessary to be brought into the field to be useful, and afterwards in the draft for the guns themselves; and the service of one brigade after another has been discontinued, till at last there has been no Portuguese ordnance with this part of the army in this campaign, and only one brigade with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill.

‘ In the mean time, the British ordnance has not been proportionally increased; and your Lordship will find, that in the battle of Salamanca, the French army had more than twice the number of pieces of ordnance that we had.

‘ We have since that battle been joined, and are in co-operation with various bodies of Spanish troops; which are in some cases, if not in all, very inadequately supplied with ordnance; and as your Lordship is aware, the Spanish finances are by no means in a state to form such an equipment of ordnance as even their armies would require. The dependence of the allied armies in the Peninsula, therefore, must be almost exclusively on the British artillery; which, as I have above informed your Lordship, is not adequate to the numbers of the British army alone.

‘ I have, in the course of this year, brought under the consideration of the Secretary of State different scales for the establishment of the ordnance with this army, in proportion as I have found it absolutely necessary, and in my power to increase the number of the pieces of cannon with the army. The first, of the 16th of April, was calculated for five brigades of 9 or long 6 pounders, and four troops of horse artillery.

‘ I then submitted to your Lordship on the 18th of August the scale for an establishment of seven brigades of

9 or long 6 pounders, and four troops of horse artillery; and of one brigade of heavy ordnance to attend the army.

‘ I have since ordered to the army one brigade of 9 pounders from Cadiz, which will make the number with the army eight brigades of 9 or long 6 pounders; and my firm conviction is, that we ought to have ten brigades of 9 or long 6 pounders, four troops of horse artillery, and one brigade of heavy ordnance; this would make ninety pieces.

‘ I enclose the scale of establishment of horses, &c., required for these guns and their ammunition, &c.

‘ The musket ammunition of the army is carried upon mules; and a sufficient number is attached to each division to carry the ammunition which is required for the ordinary consumption of the British troops in the division. There is, besides, a large quantity carried on mules in the reserve of the artillery, to supply extraordinary demands. Besides this supply for the British troops, the Portuguese troops have a proportion of mules attached to each regiment to carry the supply of ammunition which they require.

‘ There were established in different situations on the frontiers of Portugal depôts of musket and gun ammunition equal in amount to the quantity carried by the mules with the troops; so that any extraordinary consumption could be supplied at any moment without difficulty or inconvenience.

‘ It is obvious, however, that in consequence of the removal of our operations to a greater distance from the Portuguese frontier, this resource will not answer; and notwithstanding the pains which I have taken to induce the Generals of the Spanish army, and the Commanding officers of the Portuguese regiments, to take measures to supply the wants of their own troops, it is very obvious that they will, in the end, fall upon our resources. It is necessary, therefore, to provide for the carriage of a large supply of musket, as well as of gun ammunition, to be near the army; and I have the honor to enclose a scale of an ordnance establishment required for this purpose.

‘ Since I have had the honor of commanding His Majesty’s troops in the Peninsula, I have never made any demand upon the Government, but have always considered it my duty to do the best I could with the means placed at my disposal; being certain that the Government were desirous

of making them as large as circumstances would permit. As the same desire still exists in the ordnance, as well as other departments, I should wait till Government should deem it expedient to increase our means of this description; but finding those at my disposal to be very inadequate to the numbers even of the British army, and by no means sufficient in a view to the circumstances in which we are placed, I think it proper to bring the whole subject under your view.

‘ I beg leave to mention that we have at Lisbon the quantity of ordnance required to complete this equipment, excepting the iron guns, the whole of which, I informed your Lordship on the 10th June, that I had sent to Gibraltar to be put in a state of repair for the Sicilian army.

‘ I find that there was a mistake in the reports of practice, on which was founded my demand of 24 pounders, in my letter of the 18th of August; and I should wish to have iron 18 pounders of 37 cwt., 8 feet long, instead of 24 pounders of 30 cwt., and 6½ feet long.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 11th to the 17th October, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	—	1	27	—	28
Wounded . .	4	3	66	—	73
Missing . . .	—	—	—	—	—

#### MEMORANDUM

*For General Pack, for the Blockade of Burgos.*

‘ Villa Toro, 20th October, 1812.

‘ 1. While the enemy shall be in force in front of the army, Brig. General Pack will take charge of the blockade

of Burgos, keeping possession of the ground which has been acquired during the siege. He will have under his command, besides his own brigade, the 24th and 58th regiments, Colonel Brown's battalion of caçadores, the 11th, 53rd, and 61st regiments, and the Spanish battalions of Asturias and Guadalaxara, which are in the town of Burgos.

‘ 2. The guns, howitzers, and ammunition now in the trenches, are to be brought down this night, for which purpose a working party of 200 men must be ordered for this evening at 5 P.M.

‘ 3. Orders will be sent to Colonel Robe regarding the disposal of the artillery and ammunition.

‘ 4. Orders will likewise be sent for the 11th, 53rd, and 61st regiments to go round and occupy the bivouac lately occupied by the brigade of Guards.

‘ 5. Brig. General Pack, and all the troops under his command, will be in readiness to march at a moment's notice, with the exception of 500 men, in their due proportions of English and Portuguese troops, to relieve the trenches at the hour of the next relief, and Colonel Brown's battalion of caçadores, and the two battalions of Spanish infantry. The officer who shall take General Pack his orders will show him the road he is to march.

‘ 6. When General Pack shall move, he is to give charge of the blockade to Colonel Brown, who will concert his measures with Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne to preserve all the ground gained.

‘ 7. General Pack will settle with the Commandant of the Spanish troops, to take some of the duties in the town, now taken by the caçadores.

‘ 8. All the avenues from the town to the castle should be barricaded.

‘ 9. One of the French guns and an howitzer might be left in the right hand battery, in order to give the enemy a shot occasionally, and to check sorties. An officer and artillerymen of the reserve must remain for this purpose.

‘ 10. The Engineer officer must load the mines in the horn work, and these mines must be sprung, if by any accident it should be necessary to withdraw from the trenches.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

## MEMORANDUM

*For Colonel Robe, for the removal of guns.*

‘ Villa Toro, 20th October, 1812.

‘ 1. The guns and howitzers now in the batteries are to be moved down this night, with the exception of a French gun and howitzer, to be left in the right hand battery, to give the enemy a shot occasionally, and to check *sorties*.

‘ 2. Those howitzers which are serviceable, with their ammunition, must be sent to Riobena.

‘ 3. The 18 pounder guns, with their ammunition, and the unserviceable howitzers, are to be sent as soon as they shall be brought down, through Quintana-dueñas as far as the neighbourhood of Villalon. They are there to halt, 200 yards short of the village, where they will not be seen from the Castle of Burgos.

‘ 4. The reserve ammunition of the field train should be sent this evening to the same place ; and to-morrow morning before daylight it should march by Tardajoz to Frandovinez.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Brigadier General Pack.*

‘ Riobena, 21st October, 1812.

‘ MY DEAR PACK,

Half past 1 P.M.

‘ I am sorry to say that I am afraid that I shall be obliged to give up our position here, in consequence of the intelligence which I have received from General Hill of the movements of the enemy in the South ; and unless I should receive a contradiction of the intelligence, I propose to march this night.

‘ As soon as you shall receive this letter you should send off the baggage of the troops with you by Quintana-dueñas and Villalon to Frandovinez. If I should go I shall send you word ; and in that case you will march when the moon shall rise, and will go into the town, entering it by the side of the trenches, of which you will keep possession, as well as of the trenches, till 5 o'clock in the morning. You will then march with the troops under your command by the high road of Valladolid to Frandovinez.

‘ The troops in the trenches should evacuate the horn work first. They should then evacuate the other part of the trenches, and they should proceed along this side of the river to Villalon, where they will cross and join you. Your brigade, the Spanish infantry and Colonel Brown’s battalion should be across the bridge before the trenches are evacuated, leaving of the latter only the sentries necessary to prevent the enemy from coming out of the castle.

‘ At a particular moment to be fixed, shortly before 5 o’clock, at which the last of the trenches are to be evacuated, the mines in the horn work must be exploded by an officer, who must be mounted and ride away.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Pack.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Let the troops belonging to the 1st division, excepting those in the trenches, join the division as it shall pass Gamonal, and let those of the 6th division, excepting Colonel Brown’s battalion, do the same.’

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fria, 21st October, 1812.

‘ I have received your several letters of the 17th and 18th instant. The enemy moved forward on the 18th, and have since collected in my front in very large numbers. They advanced yesterday evening with three divisions of infantry and a considerable body of cavalry, probably with the object of reconnoitring the position which we occupy; but upon my moving down some troops to attack them, they retired in some haste to the ground about Fresno.

‘ I am inclined to believe that the whole of the troops of the armies of Portugal and of the North which are disposable have been collected for this operation; but they do not appear disposed to make any serious attack upon us.

‘ By the letters which I have received from the South, it seems evident that Soult, contrary to my expectations, is about to move on Madrid with the whole of the troops in Valencia and Murcia; and as the weather, which has been so very bad in this part of the country, has not been so to the south, the fords of the Tagus are unfortunately all passable. I have besides learnt that General Ballesteros, who was

ordered to take up a position at Alcaraz, has not moved from Granada. Under these circumstances, if I do not in the course of this evening receive any accounts from Sir R. Hill which should induce me to believe that the enemy are not marching upon the Tagus, I propose to raise the siege of Burgos, and withdraw across the Arlanzon.

‘ I shall not, therefore, want the guns which you were so kind as to send to Reynosa; and I forward by this opportunity orders to Captain Pack to return with the equipments under his charge to Santander.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir Home Popham.*

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Frandovinez, 22nd October, 1812. 11 A.M.

‘ I have received your letters of the 19th, one P.M.

‘ Our affairs in this quarter stand thus:—On the 18th in the afternoon we stormed the breach in the second line of the castle, and at the same time, escalated it; and a mine sprung at the same moment with good effect.

‘ Unfortunately we could not support the storm sufficiently in time, and our troops were beat off. We lost above 100 men in killed and wounded. The Guards and Hanoverians behaved remarkably well.

‘ On the same day the enemy moved forward, and attacked our outposts in strength, and the two armies have been opposite to each other from the 18th till last night. They made a great reconnaissance with three divisions and some cavalry on the evening of the 20th, in which some of them were very roughly handled by the Chasseurs Britanniques; and I made a movement with our left, under Sir E. Paget, which induced them to move back rather more quickly than they had advanced. Unluckily it was too dark to take any advantage of their error or our movement.

‘ The two armies continued opposite to each other all day yesterday; and having received your letter of the 17th in the morning I determined to raise the siege last night, and to move towards you. This I have effected, and the troops are now on their march, and we shall be this day at Celada del Camino.

‘ Let me hear from you constantly. If their movement on your side is decided upon Cuenca, I conceive that those in my front will go to Lerma or Aranda de Duero, leaving the army of the North behind. I am certain that the army of Portugal will not follow us if left alone.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD,

‘ Cabezón, 26th October, 1812.

‘ I have been so much occupied by the movements and operations of the army since the 18th instant, that I have not been able to write to your Lordship. The operations of the siege of the Castle of Burgos continued nearly in the state in which they were when I addressed your Lordship on the 11th instant, until the 18th. Having at that time received a supply of musket ammunition from Santander, and having, while waiting for that necessary article, completed a mine under the church of San Roman, which stood in an outwork of the second line, I determined that the breach which we had effected in the second line should be stormed that evening, at the moment this mine should explode ; and that at the same time the line should be attacked by escalade.

‘ The mine succeeded, and Lieut. Colonel Brown lodged a party of the 9th caçadores and a detachment of Spanish troops of the regiment of Asturias in the outwork. A detachment of the King’s German Legion under Major Wurmb carried the breach, and a detachment of the Guards succeeded in escalading the line ; but the enemy brought such a fire upon these two last detachments from the 3rd line and the body of the castle itself, and they were attacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed.

‘ It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the Guards and German Legion upon this occasion ; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, those troops would have maintained them.

Some of the men stormed even the third line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line; and I had the satisfaction of seeing, that if I could breach the wall of the castle, we should carry the place.

‘ Sir Home Popham had succeeded in an experiment which he had tried for the removal of guns from Santander for the siege of Santoña; and knowing our wants of ordnance and stores, and that our battering guns and carriages had been destroyed by the enemy’s fire, he sent two 24 pounders and stores from Santander, and I intended, as soon as they should arrive, to endeavor to breach the wall of the castle.

‘ In the mean time, another mine was commenced under the second line from the church of San Roman, of which we remained in possession.

‘ The enemy had on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry and six squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca, to reconnoitre our outpost at Monasterio. They attacked the piquet at the bridge in front of the town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the infantry of the Brunswick Legion. In this affair Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely; and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance.

‘ I had long had reports of the enemy’s intention to advance for the relief of the Castle of Burgos with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the North which was disposable; and they did advance in considerable force against the post of Monasterio, on the evening of the 18th. Lieut. Liznelsky, of the Brunswick Legion, who commanded a piquet in S<sup>a</sup> Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy; and he was taken with his piquet. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which command the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire, on the morning of the 19th, to the Burgos side of the town.

‘ I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared, by the enemy’s movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavoring to raise it; and placed the allied army on the heights, having their

right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Riobena and Mijaradas, and the left at Soto Palacios. The enemy's army likewise assembled in the neighbourhood of Monasterio.

‘ They moved forward on the evening of the 20th with about 10,000 men, to drive in our outposts from Quintana-palla and Olmos. The former withdrew by order ; but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, I requested Lieut. General Sir Edward Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divisions upon the enemy's right flank ; which movement having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio ; and our posts were replaced in Quintana-palla.

‘ On the morning of the 21st, I received a letter from Sir Rowland Hill of the 17th, in which he acquainted me with the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army.

‘ The castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th instant, and General Ballesteros, although he had entered Granada on the 17th September, had not assumed the position in La Mancha which he had been ordered to assume by the Spanish Government, at my suggestion.

‘ The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount to not less than 70,000 men, a very large proportion of which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom.

‘ I had desired Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage, and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making. I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 21st, and moved the whole army back towards the Duero.

‘ I felt severely the sacrifice I was obliged to make. Your Lordship is well aware that I never was very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered that success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period.

If the attack on the first line, made on the 22nd or the 29th, had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were very limited; but it appeared to me that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain.

‘ I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops during the siege of Burgos, particularly with the brigade of Guards. During the latter part of the siege, the weather was very unfavorable, and the troops suffered much from the rain. The officers at the head of the Artillery and Engineer departments, Lieut. Colonel Robe, and Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne, and Lieut. Colonel Dickson, who commands the reserve artillery, rendered me every assistance, and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them. By their activity we carried off every thing in the course of one night, excepting the three 18 pounders destroyed by the enemy’s fire, and the eight pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy on the night of the 19th ultimo, in the storm of the horn work, not having cattle to move them.

‘ The enemy were not aware of our movements, and did not follow us till late on the 22nd, when 10,000 men encamped on this side of Burgos.

‘ The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with the light cavalry at Estepar and Buniel. We continued our march the following day; the right of the army to Torquemada, the left to Cordovilla, at which places we crossed the Pisuerga.

‘ The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear guard consisted of the two light battalions of the King’s German Legion, under Colonel Halkett, and of Major General Anson’s brigade of cavalry; and Major General Bock’s brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo, to give them support; the whole under the command of Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon; and the party of guerrillas heretofore commanded by the late Marquinez, in the hills on the left of our rear guard.

‘ Major General Anson’s brigade charged twice, with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy were detained above three hours by the troops under Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village.

‘ The rear guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the guerrillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear guard of Major General Anson’s brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss; and Lieut. Colonel Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

‘ The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by Major General Bock’s and Major General Anson’s brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully; and our rear guard was hard pressed. The enemy made three charges on the two light battalions of the King’s German Legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of Colonel Halkett, who commanded them.

‘ The exertions and conduct of Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, and of the officers and Staff attached to him, throughout this day, were highly meritorious; and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull’s troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves.

‘ The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Dueñas, and left at Villa-muriel; and the 1st batt. 1st Guards joined us from Coruña. I halted there on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa-muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of Major General Oswald, in the absence of Lieut. General Leith, on account of indisposition.

‘ I had directed the 3rd battalion of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over

the Carrion at that place; but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieut. Colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa-muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed Major General Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the 5th division. The bridge of Villa-muriel was destroyed, but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of cavalry and infantry. I made Major General Pringle and Brig. General Barnes attack these troops, under the orders of Major General Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day, from which we suffered a good deal; and Major General Don Miguel Alava was unfortunately wounded while carrying on the Spanish infantry in the pursuit of the enemy.

‘ I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabezon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuerga.

‘ The enemy appear to be moving in this direction from Dueñas. I propose to halt here to-morrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 18th to the 21st of October, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	4	3	89	—	96
Wounded . .	10	4	160	—	174
Missing . . .	—	—	4	—	4

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cabezon, 27th October, 1812, 9 P.M.

‘ I have received your letters to the 26th. It is not necessary that I should now enter into an account of our retreat. We halted the day before yesterday at Dueñas, and this day at this place; but the enemy are infinitely superior to us in cavalry, and from what I saw to-day, very superior in infantry. We must retire, therefore, and the Duero is no barrier for us. If we go, and we cannot hold our ground beyond the Duero, your situation will become delicate. We certainly cannot stand against the numbers at present opposed to us in any situation, and it appears to me, therefore, to be necessary that you, as well as we, should retire. The only doubt which I entertain is respecting the road which you should take, and that doubt originates in the insufficiency of this army to stop the army opposed to it a sufficient length of time to enable you to reach the Adaja.

‘ I propose to remain on the Pisuerga to-morrow, if I can, and as long as I can upon the Duero, and then to retire by Arevalo. God knows whether I shall be able to remain on either river, and if I cannot, your retreat should be by the valley of the Tagus; if I can, we should join as proposed by former letters. If I can remain on the Pisuerga to-morrow, I shall cross the Duero on the 29th, and I think it probable that I shall be able to prevent the enemy from crossing in full force till the 1st, in which case I shall arrive at Arevalo on the 3rd.

‘ You will not receive this letter till the 29th: you will arrive at the Escorial probably on the 31st, at Villa Castin on the 2nd, and at Arevalo on the 4th. If you should find it necessary to retreat sooner, so much the better, as this arrangement, which is much more likely to fail on my side than on yours, will be more easily accomplished.

‘ If I should not be able to hold my ground as long as I expect, either on the Pisuerga or the Duero, I shall apprise you of it at the first moment, and shall suggest your line of retreat; but this will be difficult, as you have a large body of cavalry opposed to you, and your march, as proposed, at least as far as Villa Castin, would have been secure, whereas that by Talavera, &c., will not till you shall cross the Tagus.

‘ Do not order the bridge at Almaraz to be taken up, or destroyed, till you shall be certain that you will not require it.

‘ In respect to the Spaniards, let Don Carlos’ division, Morillo’s and Penne Villemur’s, retire with you; desire Generals Elio, Bassecourt, and Villa Campa, to join General Ballesteros by the bridge of Toledo, if you should have left that entire, or by that of Talavera, or that of Arzobispo if you should not; and desire the Empecinado to go to his old ground about Guadalaxara. Tell them all that we shall soon be able to set matters on their legs again, but that it is impossible for the British army to resist the armies of the North; the Centre; of Soult; and that of Portugal; and part of that of Suchet; in co-operation at the same moment.

‘ I send to Major Hartmann to desire that he will destroy the stores, &c., at Madrid. I shall let you know the result of every day’s proceedings, and my expectations for the next.’

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I do not reply to your letter of the . The Jarama appears to me to be the most advantageous line, although liable to be turned both on the right and left.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cabezon, 28th October, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 26th, I have had an opportunity of seeing the enemy’s whole army, as they placed themselves opposite to us on the Pisuerga yesterday. They are certainly in very great strength. The army of Portugal have received a reinforcement of 10,000 men (including cavalry) from France; and I have reason to believe that there are two divisions of infantry now with this army, belonging to the army of the North. The cavalry of the army of the North is certainly with the army of Portugal, and they have at least 5000 good cavalry.

‘ I do not think that I am sufficiently strong to contend with this army thus reinforced. I have here only four weak divisions of British and Portuguese troops, and three very weak brigades of cavalry.

‘ There are with this army 12,000 Spanish troops of the

army of Galicia, including about 600 cavalry, and the cavalry under Don Julian Sanchez.

‘ I was sorry to observe, however, in the affair of the 25th, that although the Spanish soldiers showed no want of spirit or of disposition to engage with the enemy, they were totally unable to move upon them with the regularity and order of a disciplined body, by which alone success can be hoped for in any contest with the French.

‘ We must depend upon ourselves, therefore ; and the difference of numbers, from what I saw yesterday, is much against us.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to desire Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, and to join me, if possible, on the Adaja. It is absolutely necessary that I should cross the Duero ; and if the enemy should follow me with his whole force, which is probable, I cannot expect to be able to maintain myself, and I shall be obliged to retire towards the Tormes. In this case Lieut. General Sir R. Hill would be exposed to the evil which I raised the siege of Burgos to avoid, thinking it possible he might be obliged to retire, and be attacked by a superior army in front, and by another in his rear. This misfortune would be more certain if any accident should unfortunately happen to the troops under my command.

‘ By accounts from Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to the 26th instant, I find that the enemy had approached the Tagus with their left, and had moved their right upon Cuença. He does not state the force they have with them, but I should imagine not less than 50,000 men ; and, as far as I can judge, there are not less than 40,000 now opposed to this army. Both armies are infinitely superior to ours in cavalry and artillery, as well as in total numbers.

‘ Lieut. General Sir R. Hill has with him about as many Spanish troops as there are with this army, but I believe they are equally unused to order and discipline.

‘ Under these circumstances, I acknowledge that I have no expectations that I shall be able to maintain myself very forward in Castille, if the enemy should be able to keep this large body collected.

‘ Your Lordship will recollect that I have always been of opinion that, as far as the allied British and Portuguese army

was concerned, the discontinuance of the blockade of Cadiz and the evacuation of Andalusia, would be misfortunes, however important as political events. The reason is, that in consequence of those events, these armies are opposed to larger bodies of the enemy than they were before, at the same time that they do not receive proportionate assistance from the Spanish troops, owing to the state in which these troops are found.

‘ If General Ballesteros had moved into La Mancha, as he was desired, I do not believe the enemy could have ventured upon the march towards the Tagus, nor do I believe they would have attempted to interrupt the siege of Burgos ; an operation which I have reason to believe was ordered by the King from Valencia, and is connected with his movement towards the Tagus. If they had moved towards the Tagus, they must have detached to observe and check Ballesteros, and their force against Sir R. Hill would have been diminished, and I might have drawn reinforcements from him. It is fortunate that I was induced to raise the siege of Burgos, and to retire to the Duero, upon learning the state of affairs on the Tagus, as it is obvious that my force is far inferior in numbers and composition to that of the enemy ; and the result of a battle, fought to save the siege, might have been very doubtful.

‘ No event of importance has occurred since I addressed your Lordship on the 26th. The enemy formed their cavalry in the plain on our front yesterday ; they have cannonaded different parts of our line, without doing us any injury, excepting that Lieut. Colonel Robe, of the Royal Artillery, was wounded severely, but not dangerously, yesterday.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Boecillo, 29th October, 1812.

Half past 5 p.m.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ We crossed the Duero this day, having destroyed all the bridges on the lower Pisuerga. The enemy are in march towards Tordesillas, where I destroyed the bridge last night. That of Toro will have been destroyed this day, I hope.

‘ I am anxious to hear from you, after the receipt of mine of the 27th.

‘ I propose to place myself to-morrow in front of Tordesillas, to prevent the enemy from coming over the Duero there.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Boecillo, 29th October, 1812.

‘ You will be anxious to receive an answer to your letter of the 22nd September, on the subject of sending us guineas. If the guineas should come, you may depend upon it that they shall be applied strictly, as the law directs; viz., in the payment of the ordinaries of the service; that is, the pay of the officers and troops. It will be a relief to us to receive the money to be so applied; almost as great as it would to receive an equal sum in silver, to be applied to any service.

‘ In regard to the rate at which they must be paid to the troops, I rather believe that they ought to be paid as one pound one shilling; and let the troops dispose of them as they please. It would be rather curious to pay the troops in dollars at four shillings and sixpence, which are worth five shillings and sixpence, and afterwards to pay them guineas at one pound, because they are supposed not to exchange for more in Portugal or Spain. However, I will consider of this point before the guineas arrive.

‘ We crossed the Duero this day; having destroyed all the bridges on the Pisuerga.

‘ The enemy are marching on Tordesillas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 30th October, 1812. 10 P.M.

‘ The enemy are collected at and about Tordesillas, and last night obtained the bridge of that place by the misconduct, I believe, of the Brunswick corps. The army are formed in front of the enemy, and I hope that the latter cannot pass the Duero till you shall be near me.

‘ Let me know particularly how you get on ; whether you are followed closely, by whom, and by what numbers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Rueda, 31st October, 1812.

‘ Sir Charles Stuart will show you my letter of this day and the accompanying dispatches, and you will see what a scrape we have been in, and how well we have got out of it. I say we have got out of it, because the enemy show no inclination to force the passage of the Duero. I have the army posted on the heights opposite the bridge of Tordesillas, of which they have possession. The bridge of Toro is destroyed, and I hope that of Zamora; and at all events they cannot cross at either before Hill and I shall join, when they will probably feel no inclination to cross.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 10th of October, I mention that I have no intention to deprive the Portuguese army of the 35,000 dollars. I will take them in payment, and lend them again, in order to insure the Government sending up another sum to repay me.

‘ The 3rd Cavalry keep up Hill's communication with Elvas, as the Guides do mine. But Hill will of course order them off the communication as soon as he shall join me.

‘ I am sorry to find that your wound is not healing as it ought. You must have patience. Poor Alava's was in a bad way this morning. Bleeding came on, and Gunning was not to be found; he soon stopped it, however, and he is now doing well.

‘ The Government will certainly depute you to invest Sir Charles Stuart with the order of the Bath. A person receiving a deputation cannot depute another.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I rather think the enemy are gone into cantonments. They are very few in my front; 5000 are gone towards Toro, and the greater number towards Valladolid.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Rueda, 31st October, 1812.

‘ The dispatches which I send you will show you in what manner I have been occupied for the last fortnight, and will account for my not writing to you.

‘ I think my junction with Hill on the Adaja is now quite certain; and that I have got clear, in a handsome manner, of the worst scrape I ever was in. Caffarelli’s troops are certainly here; and the enemy have at least 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. I have not 20,000 British and Portuguese. Amongst the British are all the foreign troops in the army; and I have not 1500 English cavalry; and only 24 pieces of artillery. I was shocked when I saw how the Spaniards fought on the 25th; and when I saw the whole of the enemy’s army, it was very clear to me that they ought to eat us up. I detained them two days on the Carrion, three on the Pisuerga, and they do not appear inclined to pass the Ducro at all. Hill will be at Arevalo on the 3rd or 4th.

‘ From your account of the duty on corn, I think we ought not to pay it on the corn imported by our Commissariat, or purchased from an importer.

‘ I have referred your letter of the 22nd to the Commissary General, in regard to the transfer of your corn to the Portuguese Commissariat. He appeared to think there would be difficulty in arranging the matter in the mode you propose. But I will inquire further.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Rueda, 31st October, 1812.

‘ The enemy crossed the Carrion on the 26th and 27th, and formed their army on the heights near Cigales on the last of those days, opposite our position on the left of the Pisuerga, and their advanced guard, about two miles in front of their main body, and half that distance from Cabezon.

‘ On the 28th they extended their right, and endeavored to force the bridges of Simancas and Valladolid; the former

of which was defended by Colonel Halkett, with his brigade of the 7th division, and the latter by the Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie, with the remainder of the 7th division. At length Colonel Halkett, being hard pressed, blew up the bridge. He at the same time detached the Brunswick light infantry regiment to Tordesillas, towards which quarter the enemy detached troops on the evening of the 28th.

‘As soon as I found that this was the case, I thought it proper to break up from the Pisuerga, and to cross the Duero; which object was effected without difficulty on the 29th instant by the bridges of Puente de Duero and Tudela.

‘The bridge of Tordesillas was destroyed on the enemy’s approach to that town on the evening of the 28th; and I had sent orders to the regiment of Brunswick Oels to take post on its ruins in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from repairing the bridge. I had the mortification, however, of learning, on the night of the 29th, that this regiment had been obliged to abandon its post; and as I had seen the enemy’s whole army in march towards Tordesillas on that evening, it was obvious that no time was to be lost.

‘I therefore marched the army at an early hour yesterday morning to their left, and posted the troops on the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, immediately opposite and near the bridge of Tordesillas. We found the bridge nearly repaired on our arrival; but the enemy have made no attempt to pass it; and they have now no large assembly of troops in this neighbourhood.

‘I learn that some of them marched last night towards Valladolid, and others towards Toro. I have destroyed the bridge at Toro; and I understand that it cannot be repaired for some days; and it is obvious that the enemy cannot prevent the junction of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill’s corps with mine; and it is probable that when that shall be effected they will not be anxious to cross the Duero.

‘I have received letters from Lieut. General Hill to the 29th. The Tagus was every where fordable, and the enemy had passed a small body of troops over at Fuentidueña. Sir Rowland Hill collected his troops on the Jarama, thinking that that river afforded the most favorable line for defence.

‘ He was likely to receive my orders to move upon Arevalo on the 29th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the movements of the Army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., from the 22nd to the 29th October, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	4	14	109	74	127
Wounded .	45	35	442	65	522
Missing . . .	8	12	223	59	243

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Rueda, 31st October, 1812.

‘ You will see that the ———— regiment got us into a bad scrape, from which, however, we have extricated ourselves; and I consider my junction with Hill now to be secure. I assure you, that considering the numbers of the enemy, (among whom is Caffarelli’s infantry, as well as his cavalry,) the state of the Spanish troops, the great proportion of foreign troops in the divisions which I have with me, and their general weakness, and the weakness of our cavalry, I think I have escaped from the worst military situation I was ever in.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 1st, I have to mention, that, under Lord Liverpool’s orders, I do recommend foreign officers (Portuguese and Spanish) for the medal. But I do not think it ought to be conferred on the ————.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 1st Nov., 1812.

‘ I did not write to you last night, as I had nothing particular to tell you.

‘ The enemy are very quiet in our front.

‘ They have sent a division, or possibly two, to Toro, where they are repairing the bridge which we destroyed. This will take time, as the span of the arch is more than 50 feet. It took more than six days last summer; some of their troops have gone towards Valladolid, but I have not heard of their appearing on the upper Duero. I have not yet heard from you since you received my letter of the 27th, which I know had passed Madrid.

‘ Have you given the orders about taking up the bridge at Almaraz? That should be done now, particularly if you have passed the Escorial.

‘ Send an officer into the valley of the Tagus, to observe the enemy’s movements in that quarter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Commodore Sir Home Popham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Rueda, 1st Nov., 1812.

‘ I received last night your letters of the 24th and 26th, and I am very sorry that you see cause to be dissatisfied with the Governor of Santander, and with General Mendizabal. I have nothing to say to any Spanish officer, and it is impossible for me to apply a remedy to the inconveniences of which you complain. I shall mention them however to General Castaños.

‘ It will be unfortunate if Mendizabal should not have moved for the attack of Santoña, according to the orders which General Castaños assured me had been given to him. We have all the disposable force of the army of the North in our front, indeed altogether more than I can manage; and there never would have been so good an opportunity for an attack, as the present moment affords.

‘ The Spaniards, however, have acted as they chose them-

selves ever since I have known them ; and I have learnt to bear with patience evils and disappointments for which there is no remedy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Commodore*

*Sir Home Popham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Rueda, 1st Nov., 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Secretary of State ; and I beg you to lay such parts of them as you may think proper before the Spanish Government, for their information. I beg you also to take that opportunity of expressing to them the grateful sense I entertain for the cordiality with which his Excellency General Castaños and the officers under him have co-operated with me.

‘ The Spanish troops have invariably manifested a disposition to engage with the enemy ; and in an affair of the cavalry on the 19th ultimo, the Spanish cavalry under the Conde de Fiquelmont were very successful, and destroyed many of the enemy, and took many horses and prisoners. The infantry likewise, in the affair of Villa-muriel, on the 25th, manifested a disposition to engage with the enemy.

‘ The truth, however, ought to be known to the Government ; and I must say that the army of Galicia is not in the state of discipline in which they ought to be before they are brought to a contest with the enemy ; or which could gain for them either the confidence of their allies or of themselves.

‘ In the affair at Villa-muriel, they could neither advance or retreat in order. Their movements were made *à la débâdade*, and if I had not ordered a movement on the enemy’s flank by the British troops, not only the enemy would not have been driven across the Carrion, but they would have carried the heights above Villa-muriel, on which the Spanish troops were posted.

‘ It may be depended upon, that order and discipline alone can insure any solid success against the enemy with whom we are engaged.

‘ I had an opportunity of seeing the enemy’s whole army on the 27th October on their march across the plains to

Cigales, and it appeared to me to consist of 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, with an immense train of artillery. To oppose these troops, I have not more than 20,000 British and Portuguese troops; and there were 12,000 men, including 600 cavalry, in the army of Galicia. It is obvious, however, that, in their present state of discipline, I cannot reckon upon these troops in a field of battle.

‘I should have been obliged to continue my retreat therefore; and my communication with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, and his retreat, would have been cut off.

‘Under these circumstances, I thought it proper to order that General to retire from Madrid upon Arevalo, there to join with me, sending the troops under General Elio, Generals Bassecourt and Villa Campa, and General Freyre, to join General Ballesteros.

‘I beg you to explain to the Spanish Government, that Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, and the allies on the Tagus, are as much inferior in force to the enemy opposed to them as I am to the enemy opposed to me, the enemy having brought all their forces to bear upon the centre of Spain, with the exception, I conclude, of a part of Suchet’s army left in Valencia. I imagined that they would adopt this plan when I wrote to you from Valladolid on the 9th of September; and it is very unfortunate that General Ballesteros did not take the position at Alcaraz which he was ordered to take by the Minister at War, in consequence of my suggestion. If he had, the enemy could not have moved against General Hill; and I might have drawn a reinforcement from his army to this, still keeping possession of Madrid.

‘Under present circumstances, I think it not improbable that I may not be able to retain much of Castille. But it may be depended upon, that I will do every thing in my power.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Rueda, 1st Nov , 1812.

‘ You will see, by the dispatches forwarded on this occasion, that we have been in a difficult situation. I had no notion that the enemy could have been so much reinforced, particularly in cavalry, or that the army of the North could come so far down this way. I expected something better also from the army of Galicia ; but they are really in such a state, that it is not possible to expect any thing from them. Under these circumstances we have made a handsome retreat ; but it was quite impossible to leave Hill at Madrid any longer.

‘ I shall attend to what you say about Palmella and Camac.

‘ The plans for raising brigades and for supplying the armies are nonsense.

‘ I am very much afraid that the little experience which the country have had of the Government of the Cortes, has done that body no good. They are very unpopular every where, and in my opinion deservedly so. Nothing can be more cruel, absurd, or impolitic, than their decrees respecting the persons who have served the enemy. In fact, it deprives the state of some of the ablest and most honest of its servants, and submits to an inquiry the conduct of persons who have rendered the most important services of a secret and therefore an invidious nature.

It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking and talking of any other subject but Spain. How it is to end God knows !

‘ Buonaparte was at Moscow the 19th of September. The Emperor of Russia deceived Lord Cathcart and the people of Petersburg, and pretended that the battle of Mojaisk was in his favor, and, strange to say, the truth was not known at Petersburg on the 10th, although Buonaparte was at Moscow and Moscow burnt on the 14th ; a courier being usually only two days and a half on the road. The French in our front have two reports, one that the Russians

are making peace; the other that Buonaparte is marching to Petersburg.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ I think you had better not show my letter to Lord Bathurst of the 28th to the Spanish Government. The substance of it is in my dispatch to you of this date.’

*To His Excellency Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Rueda, 1st Nov., 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received an answer, which I enclose, from Sir R. Kennedy, in regard to the proposition contained in your letter of the 22nd October, respecting the transfer of grain consumed, and the mode of settling the account, from which you will observe that Sir R. Kennedy consents to what you propose.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 2nd Nov., 1812. 8 A.M.

‘ I received last night, after I wrote to you, your letters of the 31st at noon. All remains quiet in my front; and unless I should hear from you in the course of the day that you are pressed, I shall not march to-morrow.

‘ I think that you had better not direct your march upon Arevalo; but from Villa Castin on Blasco Sancho, where there is a good passage over the Adaja: thence you can go to Fontiveros.

‘ If the head of your column has gone to Arevalo, it does not signify, and the tail can go as above pointed out.

‘ Let me hear the disposition of your march.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 3rd Nov., 1812.

‘ I have just received your letter of yesterday, at 5 P.M., and I conclude that, in consequence of mine of yesterday

morning, the rear of your corps, at least, will have marched upon Blasco Sancho.

‘ We are all quiet on this side. The enemy have repaired the bridges of Toro and Tordesillas, but have shown no inclination to pass either. It is reported that Caffarelli’s two divisions have returned to the north; but of that I have no certainty. If it be so, I conclude that the preparations to cross the river are made to be taken advantage of when the troops of the armies of the Centre and of the South approach us.

‘ Under these circumstances, you become the guide of our movements, at least for the present. Unless you should be pressed by the enemy, I recommend you to halt a day upon the Adaja at Blasco Sancho or Arevalo, keeping your cavalry well out upon the road towards Villa Castin, to give time for stragglers, baggage, &c., to come up; and give me timely notice of any movement towards you, or in the valley of the Tagus.

‘ If you should be pressed by the enemy, you will move upon Fontiveros, giving me the earliest intelligence of the circumstances which induce you to move. If you should move from the Adaja, take care that all our stores and people (including my hounds at Arevalo) move off.

‘ Send me all the intelligence you get from Madrid or the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Conde de Villariego.*

‘ CONDE DE VILLARIEZO,

‘ Rueda, 3rd Nov., 1812.

‘ I have just now had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 1st instant from Avila.

‘ It gave me the greatest concern to be under the necessity of collecting the allied army in Old Castille, the result of which measure was the evacuation of Madrid. The fact was, that after I had made every effort in my power to obtain possession of the castle of Burgos, but in vain, I found myself attacked by the army of Portugal, reinforced by 12,000 men, and the army of the North, the two together

consisting of 40,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry; to which force I had not sufficient troops to oppose myself.

‘ It was then necessary to draw reinforcements from Lieut. General Sir R. Hill; and General Ballesteros not having at this moment arrived in La Mancha, it was impossible to leave Lieut. General Sir R. Hill upon the Tagus with a reduced force without incurring the risk of losing his army as well as the capital. It was necessary therefore that the whole force should move.

‘ In answer to your Excellency’s letter, I recommend that you and the civil authorities of New Castille should cross the Tormes; and that you should let me know in what town you will place yourself, that I may take the earliest opportunity of apprizing you of any change of circumstances. The enemy in my front are stronger than the troops under my command; while those opposed to General Sir R. Hill are much stronger than he is. It is possible that, notwithstanding the advantage which we now enjoy of being joined, we may not have it in our power to strike an important blow against either, before they likewise will be in communication, and will co-operate, on account of the local circumstances of their situation. This being the case, it may be necessary for us to fall back still farther; and you and the civil authorities might be exposed in Avila.

‘ At the same time I beg you to understand that every thing that is practicable shall be done to preclude the necessity of any further retrograde movement.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to me any intelligence you may receive of the enemy’s proceedings at Madrid, and of the force collected there, &c.; and particularly whether any force is detached towards General Ballesteros in La Mancha.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Conde de Villariego.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Rueda, 3rd Nov., 1812.

‘ I take the opportunity of the return of the messenger (Myers) to Coruña, to inform you that the army have con-

tinued in the position in which I placed them on the 30th October, and the enemy have made no attempt to pass the Duero.

‘ The bridge of Tordesillas is repaired, and they are employed in the repair of that of Toro. Their troops are extended along the Duero, from the latter place to Valladolid.

‘ In the meantime, the troops under Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill will arrive this day and to-morrow on the Adaja. The General received my orders to break up from his position on the Jarama on the 29th, and he intended to carry them into execution on the morning of the 30th. He had intended to destroy the Puente Larga, but the mine failed ; and the enemy having collected a large body of troops between the bridge and Aranjuez, they immediately attacked our post on the bridge, but were repulsed, with considerable loss, by the 2nd batt. of the 47th regiment and a detachment of the 95th, under the command of Colonel Skerrett. I have not received the returns of our loss on this occasion ; but I understand it is about 40 men. No officer was touched. Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill speaks in high terms of the conduct of the troops.

‘ These circumstances delayed the march from the right of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill’s position till the evening of the 30th ; and he has since continued it, without being at all molested by the enemy.

‘ The building called La China in the Retiro, and all the guns, stores, &c., which that work contained, which had not been carried away, were destroyed before the troops were withdrawn from Madrid.

‘ The Spanish divisions of Don Carlos de España, and Conde de Penne Villemur, are with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill.

‘ I had recommended that the detachments of the 2nd and 3rd armies, under General Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecourt, and Freyre, should cross the Tagus at Toledo, or Talavera, or Arzobispo, and should join General Ballesteros ; but I am not certain that this recommendation has been attended to.

‘ I have not yet heard that General Ballesteros has entered La Mancha.

‘ A small body of the enemy’s troops were at Val de Moro

on the 31st, and entered Madrid at ten o'clock on the morning of the 1st instant.

‘ By a letter from General M’Kenzie to Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, dated at Alicante on the 23rd October, it appears that the enemy had kept but a small force in the kingdom of Valencia, under General Harispe, who was extended from Caudete to Alcira upon the Jucar; the works of the city of Valencia being dismantled and destroyed, and the city itself abandoned by the French troops and their adherents.

‘ From the tenor of General M’Kenzie’s letter, I judge that he proposes to attack the force under General Harispe; and he has already pushed forward his posts to Alcoy and Concentayna.

‘ I have no accounts upon which I can rely that Marshal Suchet has accompanied the King’s march into the centre of Spain with any large portion of his army; but it is so reported, and the letter above referred to, from General M’Kenzie, tends to confirm the report. The advanced posts of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill have seen the regiment of Cuirassiers which belong to the army of Aragon.

‘ I have accounts from the North, stating that Longa has taken a convoy, escorted by 300 men, near Vitoria.

‘ I learn likewise that the post at Santoña is much distressed for provisions; and I hope that Sir Home Popham may have been able to make his attack upon that place.

‘ These events will probably oblige General Caffarelli to withdraw his troops from our front.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Rueda, 3rd Nov., 1812.

‘ The messenger Myers arrived here yesterday morning early, with your letters of the 13th ultimo.

‘ I think it will be very desirable that Sir John Murray should be sent to Alicante, to command the troops on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, in case Lord William Bentinck should not arrive to assume the command of them himself.

‘ I think it will be advisable that you should alter your dispatch, No. 60, of the 12th October; omitting the last paragraph; as it will not be convenient to apply the guineas solely to the payment of the troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Rueda, 3rd Nov., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 5th and 7th October, for which I am much obliged to you. I shall act as you recommend regarding the settlement of my affairs.

‘ I beg to return you my best thanks for your kindness to my sister, respecting whose comfort I am indeed much interested.

‘ You will see in my dispatch to Lord Bathurst how we stand. I do not know how the French can contrive to keep together the force which they have brought against us; but at all events as we have got together they cannot do us much harm, and sooner or later they must separate, and we then shall resume again the upper hand.

‘ At all events, although the evacuation of Madrid is a material deterioration of the campaign, its effects on the contest in the Peninsula are still most important.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. the Judge Advocate General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Rueda, 4th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial, of which the late Major General Le Marchant was president, on the trial of Lieut. ———, of the Royal Waggon Train, upon which I request you to take the pleasure of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

‘ There is an irregularity, in point of form, in the proceedings of this Court Martial, to which I beg to draw your attention. The proceedings had been closed, and the sentence agreed to, and copied fair, but had not been signed by Major General Le Marchant when he was killed. When I was informed of this circumstance, I wrote the enclosed

letter to Lieut. Colonel Dalbiac, the next senior officer of the Court Martial, directing him to sign the proceedings in presence of the members of the Court. Owing to the situation of the army, the Court could not then be conveniently assembled ; and Lieut. Colonel Dalbiac being sick, I have now ordered that its proceedings might be signed by Major Gordon, the next in seniority to Lieut. Colonel Dalbiac.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

*the Judge Advocate General.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 5th Nov., 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ Lord Charles FitzRoy delivered me your letter of half-past two P.M. at ten last night. I am doubtful whether, in consequence of my letter of the 3rd by Churchill, which you must have received shortly after Lord Charles left you, you will have halted or marched. If you should have halted this day, I conclude that you will march to-morrow.

‘ I sent the 5th division of infantry, and General Ponsonby’s brigade of cavalry, to Alacjos this morning, the enemy having appeared in that quarter from Toro ; and I propose to move to-morrow to La Nava del Rey. If your troops at Arevalo should have marched, or having halted this day should march to-morrow upon Madrigal, or Fuente el Sol, we shall be tolerably well connected.

‘ I shall write to you as soon as I shall know what you have done this day.

‘ I do not think it clear that the enemy is following you in force. I conceive the four regiments and two battalions to have been sent only to see what you were doing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Rueda, 5th Nov., 1812. 12 at noon.

‘ I received, about two hours ago, your letter of two this morning. I think you had better make a movement to-morrow morning, and place your troops behind the Tra-

bancos river, behind Flores de Avila. I propose to place this army behind the same river at Castrejon, Carpio, &c.

‘ Do not allow the enemy to come too near you with a small advanced guard. Move upon them immediately, and make them keep at a proper distance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Rueda, 5th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 11th of September, regarding the claims of Mr. ———, as late ——— of the ———, which I have referred to Marshal Sir William Beresford for his consideration, and I enclose an extract of his answer.

‘ Mr. ——— left the army without leave, as well as I recollect, in the month of August, 1809; and I beg leave to remind your Lordship that an officer or soldier guilty of that offence, in all services, forfeits all arrears of pay which might be due to him. But, supposing your Lordship should be inclined to treat Mr. ——— with favor, and to allow him to receive his arrears prior to his absence without leave, I should imagine that you would not extend your favor so far as to give him pay after the period at which he quitted.

‘ Mr. ——— can have no claim, under the regulation, to the bâton and forage money issued to the army in September, 1809, having previously gone away from it.

‘ I should wish to see Mr. ———’s appointment to command at Almeida, or at Alcantara. There was a senior officer at Almeida, when he was there, as far as I have any knowledge; and I know that if he ever commanded at Alcantara, it was a fault rather than a service for which he ought to be rewarded. He had no order to command there.

‘ If your Lordship desires it, I will give my warrant for the issue of the whole, or of any part of Mr. ———’s demand; but if I were to exercise my own judgment on this demand, and to be responsible for my decision, I would not issue my warrant for the payment of any part of the demand.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

*Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,                      ‘ Castrejon, 6th Nov., 1812. 12 at noon.

‘ I have just arrived here, and received, about an hour ago, your letter dispatched at nine last night. I am going to take my quarters at Torrecilla de la Orden, about three miles in the rear.

‘ I propose to march in the morning early to Pitiegua, so as to cover the road from Toro to Salamanca. The enemy were moving in strength towards Toro last night, and if they have passed there in force, they are behind our left flank; but I think they are not in force at Toro yet.

‘ I think you had better march at an early hour, and pass Peñaranda, and encamp either at Nava de Sotro-val, and along that river, or at Coca, Tordillos. and Peñarandilla, farther in the rear, as you may think proper.

‘ As you are before me, I think you had better not cross the Tormes to-morrow, if you can avoid it without suffering inconvenience; but if it should be inconvenient, or you are likely to suffer from waiting, you had better cross the Tormes at Alba.

‘ Have you any account of the enemy moving in the valley of the Tagus? or whether the King has stopped at Madrid? or what force has followed you? It appears last night nothing but cavalry.

‘ You, of course, send orders to Don Carlos.

‘ Order the Royal Infantry, and any other troops or departments belonging to this part of the army, to cross the Tormes, at Alba, to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,                      ‘ Pitiegua, 7th Nov., 1812. 2 P.M.

‘ Fremantle\* has delivered me your letter of this morning.

‘ The enemy did not move after us at all yesterday, but

\* Now Colonel Fremantle, C.B., K.C.T.S., commanding the Coldstream Guards.

ordered 10,000 rations for this day at Rueda. I have not yet heard that any have moved from Toro.

‘ I shall take up the position in front of Salamanca, however, to-morrow, and you will do well to march in the morning upon Alba de Tormes.

‘ I wish that the 3rd, 4th, Light, and Don Carlos’s divisions of infantry, and General Alten’s brigade of cavalry, should join this part of the army as soon as may be expedient. They will have but a short march to-morrow to Alba de Tormes, and might move on as far as Calvarrasa de Arriba, or the woods thereabouts, to which place I will send them further orders.

‘ You might canton the 2nd, and General Hamilton’s and Morillo’s divisions in Alba de Tormes, keeping the Light cavalry out in front; and Slade’s brigade in the rear of the town. Occupy the castle of Alba with 200 men, which I understand commands the bridge effectually. Have the neighbourhood of Alba examined, and see whether there are any fords, which must of course be closely watched.

‘ I do not know whether the ford of Huerta is now practicable; if there should be little water in the river it certainly is, as the bottom is good. I know there is another good ford at Encinas de Abaxo, and I shall be obliged to you if you will have them both examined early to-morrow, and let me have the report of them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ An officer is just arrived from Alicante. He says the force which arrived from Valencia is stated to be 45,000. About 20,000 are following you. The King went into Madrid the 3rd instant, and it was supposed was to remain there. There were no troops moving in the valley of the Tagus. General W. Clinton, who now commands in Alicante, tells me on the 29th, that Suchet is near him with 20,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry. There cannot be many of his army here.

‘ P.S. Nov. 8, 12 *at noon*.—If you should not have received and acted upon the original of this letter, you might move the 3rd, 4th, Light, and Don Carlos’s divisions,

and General Alten's cavalry, upon Salamanca to-morrow morning early, instead of Calvarrasa this afternoon.

'I have not heard of the enemy's movement to his right; if so, it must be to join with the army of Portugal.'

*To the Commissioners of the Transport Office.*

'GENTLEMEN,

'Pitiegua, 7th Nov., 1812.

'Captain Haly, of the 53rd regiment, who was taken prisoner at the commencement of the campaign, having been left by the enemy on the 30th July at Valladolid, on his parole not to serve until exchanged, I request that you will carry his exchange into effect, by sending any French officer of his rank, who may be a prisoner in England, to France in exchange for him.

'I likewise beg that you will send to France Mons. Belvere, *Directeur des services réunis de l'Armée Française*, who is now on his parole at Dartmoor. He was taken prisoner in April, 1811, and was promised his liberty by General Castaños; but by some accident or other he was sent to England, and it was not recollected that he had been promised leave to return to his country.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Commissioners  
of the Transport Office.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Pitiegua, 7th Nov., 1812.

'I received last night your letter of the 31st. I am glad to see that the Portuguese finances, particularly the customs, are in so flourishing a condition.

'I recommend to you to buy more corn; if not wanted for the consumption of the army, we can sell it in the market, and the amount can be lodged in the military chest.

'You will see the news in my dispatch.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

'MY DEAR LORD,

'Pitiegua, 7th Nov., 1812.

'I have received your letter of the 12th October, regarding General Nugent.

‘ It is scarcely necessary to consider what we shall do with our army after the French withdraw from Spain ; as that event is not at present very probable, unless Buonaparte should be so pressed in the North as to be induced to weaken his force. We have at present in operation against us, at least all the troops which were in the Andalusias, and the armies of the Centre and North, besides that of Portugal, without any effective addition to our force, excepting the little garrison of Cadiz.

‘ My opinion is, however, that if we should get the French out of Spain, and the war should continue, we should carry on our operations on the southern frontier of France. I think so because we should have the hearty co-operation, and probably the direction of a Spanish and of a Portuguese army, besides our own ; and our means would be much greater than they would be on any other scene, would be applicable at a much earlier period, and would, moreover, be applied on the most vulnerable part of France.

‘ In regard to all schemes in Italy and the North of Europe, founded on this army ; First, I would observe that you must reckon that six months would elapse, after you should decide on the measure and should issue your orders in Downing Street, before the army would be fit to engage in an operation in the new scene :

‘ Secondly, it would be but a small army, incapable of acting alone ; at the same time that it would not be easy to connect it with any other :

‘ Thirdly, it must not be expected that any of the Powers in the North of Europe would give us the direction and management of their concerns, as we now have of those of the Portuguese, at least, if not of the Spaniards. The Powers of the North would willingly avail themselves of the bravery of our troops ; they would share in our riches, partake of the plenty in our camps, which our good arrangements and money should procure for us ; but they would share with us nothing but their distresses. Believe me, that you could not keep a British army long in a state of efficiency under such circumstances.

‘ As for Italy, I have never seen any ground on which I could venture even to think of a military operation in that country. However, as I said before, unless I can beat Soult

and the armies of Portugal and of the North united, we have no chance at present of getting the French out of Spain. I think Buonaparte will at last give up Spain ; but that is a different question, not worth discussing now.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I see that Ballesteros and the Cortes are fighting, instead of the former moving into La Mancha as he was ordered.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

Pitiegua, 8th Nov., 1812.

‘ The enemy repaired the bridge at Toro at a much earlier period than I expected, and by their possession of that bridge, and of that of Tordesillas, would have had an easy mode of collecting a large force behind our left flank, if I had attempted to effect my junction with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill on the Adaja, with a view to any operation against the enemy’s force advancing from Madrid. On the other hand, a considerable body of the enemy made their appearance in the Guadarrama pass, and arrived at Villa Castin on the 4th ; and if I had moved Sir Rowland Hill along the Adaja to join with this army in its position in front of Tordesillas, the enemy would have had the shortest line to the Tormes by Fontiveros, if they had preferred to march in that direction, to following the march of Sir Rowland Hill’s troops.

‘ The junction in front of Tordesillas would besides have answered no purpose. We had no means of passing the Duero, and it was very clear that the enemy would not attempt to pass as long as we remained in our position. I therefore desired Sir Rowland Hill to continue his march by Fontiveros upon Alba de Tormes ; and as soon as I found that he was sufficiently forward, I broke up (yesterday morning) from the position, which I had held in front of Tordesillas since the 30th of last month ; and I am in march towards the heights of San Christoval, in front of Salamanca.

‘ The enemy has not pressed at all upon the rear of the troops under Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill ; nor have those on the Duero followed the march of the troops under

my command. I conclude that the two corps will unite, which in consequence of the situation of the Duero I could not prevent.

‘The two corps of this army, particularly that which has been in the north, are in want of rest. They have been in the field, and almost constantly marching since the month of January last; their clothes and equipments are much worn, and a short period in cantonments would be very useful to them. The cavalry likewise are weak in numbers, and the horses rather low in condition. I should wish therefore to be able to canton the troops for a short time, and I should prefer the cantonments on the Tormes to those further in the rear.

‘I do not know exactly what the force of the enemy is. The army of Portugal have about 36,000 men, of which 4000 are cavalry. As far as I can learn, they received in September and October reinforcements, amounting to 14,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry, and I account for the army being only 36,000 men, by allowing for the sickness of the conscripts. The army of the North have 10,000 men, of which 1200 are cavalry.

‘I have received several reports that General Caffarelli had returned to the north with the troops under his command, but none on which I can rely. A person who brought me a letter from Sir Home Popham, and passed through Torquemada, saw 3000 infantry on their march towards Burgos on the 4th, but he says that no other troops had passed or were expected.

‘It is difficult to judge of the exact extent of Soult’s force. It is reported that the enemy brought from Valencia to the Tagus from 40,000 to 45,000 men; and I should consider that to be rather below the number, which the armies of Andalusia and the Centre could bring into the field, without any of the troops of the army of Aragon and Valencia. Soult is particularly strong in good cavalry, and there are several regiments of cavalry in the army of the Centre.

‘I am inclined to believe that none of the troops, excepting probably some cavalry of the army of Aragon and Valencia, have moved to the Tagus.

‘It will still remain to be seen what number of troops can be brought to operate against our position; as, unless

Madrid should be again abandoned to its fate by the King, arrangements must be made to resist the attacks which it must be expected that the Spanish troops under General Elio and guerrillas will make on that city, even though General Ballesteros should not move forward in La Mancha. I propose, therefore, to wait at present on the Tormes till I shall ascertain more exactly the extent of the enemy's force; and if they should move forward I will either bring the contest to a crisis in the position of San Christoval, or fall back to the Agueda, according to what I shall consider at the time to be best for the cause.

‘ General Ballesteros was still at Granada on the 20th October, and it was reported had no intention of moving.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major General W. Clinton, who has come to Alicante to take the command, dated the 29th of October, from which I observe that but few, if any, of Suchet's troops have moved forward to the Tagus.

‘ I do not understand why it is necessary for Major General Clinton himself to have possession of the castle of Alicante in case he should move forward, excepting it is that he suspects the Governor of treachery, and he thinks that in case of misfortune his retreat would not be secure.

‘ I enclose likewise the copy of my letter to Major General Mackenzie\*, to which that of Major General Clinton is a reply.

‘ I understand that the King entered Madrid on the 3rd instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Salamanca, 9th Nov., 1812. 2 A.M.

‘ By the reports of 5 in the afternoon which I have received from Lieut. Bobers, of the 1st Hussars, it appears that the enemy are moving in force on the fords of Huerta and Encinas, and I believe the troops are Soult's. I have not heard of any movement from the Duero in any quarter.

‘ I think that you will do well to move in the morning to

\* See page 497.

your left, to Machacon, with the 2nd division, excepting one British brigade, leaving Hamilton's division and that brigade at Alba. Take Slade's brigade, and the Spanish troops and Portuguese cavalry with you, leaving Long's brigade looking out in front of Alba. Have a good garrison in the castle of Alba. You should not load the mine of the bridge, because we must keep a Commandant with the garrison. If the enemy should attempt to cross either of the fords of Huerta, fall upon the first who cross.

' I order my troops to remain at Calvarrasa de Arriba in the morning, till I shall see how matters turn.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' Salamanca, 9th Nov., 1812.'

$\frac{1}{4}$  before 6 P.M.

' MY DEAR HILL,

' I am just come in from the front; the enemy have two divisions of infantry and some squadrons of cavalry at Pitiegua and Cabeza Velloso, which came from Toro yesterday, and I saw a body of infantry at Morisco, Babila-fuente, Huerta, (one battalion) San-Morales; the total force of which I could not tell; but, from the baggage of Babila-fuente, I should suppose them to be a division. There were six squadrons of cavalry skirmishing with Pack's brigade at Aldea Lengua, and there might have been four more squadrons between that and Babila-fuente.

' All reports agree that the fords are not now practicable. Indeed there is a considerable increase of water in the river, and the best proof that they are not practicable is, that the people of the country have their cattle grazing on the left bank. I am certain that if the fords were practicable, the enemy would pass the river, rather than attack us on the heights of San Christoval; as it is, I am doubtful. And as we have not on our position, or near to it, as many troops as we require, I propose to move the troops now at Calvarrasa de Arriba into Salamanca early to-morrow morning.

' If the fords are not practicable, you might move the 2nd division, &c., into Calvarrasa de Arriba and de Abaxo, Pelabravo, Machacon, or back upon Alba de Tormes, observing the fords with piquets.

‘ I have never been at Alba, and shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what garrison ought to be in the castle. I should think 200 men. If the river falls, so as to be fordable by all descriptions of troops, all I shall wish is to put in a Spanish garrison, to prevent the enemy from using the bridge in case of an action, as they did before. As long as their movements are uncertain, it would be expedient to have a garrison of a better description. If you think it necessary to occupy the town of Alba, to prevent the enemy from crossing the bridge, what number should there be ?

‘ I have just received your letter of 4 P.M. You may depend upon it that the river is not fordable for troops, otherwise the cattle would not have been left on the banks ; and all the peasants I saw of Huerta say it is not so, and not likely to become so. However, it is easy to have it marked this night, and you will know whether it will rise or fall before morning. But, as the thing is doubtful, I shall move to Salamanca, in the morning, only the Light and Don Carlos’s divisions and General Alten’s cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Salamanca, 9th Nov., 1812.

Half-past 9 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ I have just received your letter of half-past 6 P.M. If the enemy can pass the Tormes at too many fords, and in too great force for you, your troops and those at Alba (excepting the garrison) must fall back on the heights of Arapiles, taking care to keep the village of Calvarrasa de Arriba on your right, as you retire ; and to occupy that village, and the height behind the Convent, or Ermita de N<sup>a</sup>. S<sup>a</sup>. de la Peña, and giving me the earliest intelligence of this movement, as I must collect the whole of the army on the same ground. Have this ground reconnoitred. I acknowledge, however, that I am not aware of the necessity for this movement in the existing state of the river, which is represented to be scarcely fordable for cavalry, and not for infantry or artillery. How is the bridge of the Tormes then to be forced, having the castle on

one side, and a body of infantry on commanding ground on the other ?

‘ The consequence of blowing up the bridge under these circumstances would be the loss of the garrison in the castle, which would lose heart upon seeing all communication with them cut off ; and nothing would be gained as to defence, if I am correct in the notion, that between the castle and infantry on the left bank, the bridge cannot be carried, the river not being fordable for infantry.

‘ The destruction of a bridge is a measure of great importance, in reference not only to the enemy’s operations, but our own. I am not quite certain that if you were to lodge the powder in the mine, with the intention of exploding it only at the last moment, and that you should defend the left of the bridge, as I am convinced it would be defended, the enemy would not explode the mine for you, in order to be certain at least of your garrison in the castle.

‘ Upon the whole, I am convinced that your situation depends upon the state of the fords and the use the enemy can make of them. If they are as I believe them to be, the enemy may make a desperate attack upon Alba de Tormes and the bridge, but must be defeated in that object ; and they are liable to be attacked on this side.

‘ If the fords are practicable easily for cavalry and artillery, and at all for infantry, and are numerous, you must retire, as I told you above, if the enemy should attempt to pass in force, leaving the garrison in the castle.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Salamanca, 10th Nov., 1812.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

Half-past 4 P.M.

‘ I am very sorry that I did not meet you at Alba, and still more so, that I did not see the large force which Colonel Gordon tells me was collected in front of the town. However, the post is a very good one, and held by good, determined troops ; and it is my opinion that the enemy can do them no harm. Indeed, I should doubt their attacking them, and I think they are come there to try the fords. By all accounts,

these are not practicable for troops. When I call a ford practicable for troops, I do not mean to say that a single horseman cannot get over; but that cavalry, infantry, and artillery cannot. The river has certainly fallen since yesterday evening; but I believe no infantry soldier can pass now, even if a cavalry soldier can; and small piquets guarding the fords, and charging resolutely the first men who pass, or firing upon them, if they are piquets of infantry, will effectually prevent the passage of the fords.

‘ I wish that General D’Urban had mentioned where, and at what hour he passed yesterday. the 9th, as the river rose considerably in the afternoon, and is higher now than it was yesterday morning. I understand that it has not fallen since morning.

‘ If the fords above the town are practicable, and those below not; or if the former are more practicable than those below, it would be expedient to move General Slade’s, and General D’Urban’s, and Penne Villemur’s cavalry to the nearest woods to join Hamilton’s position, keeping piquets on the fords as far as Huerta. The first people who pass must be vigorously attacked.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I beg you will send some musket ammunition to Alba de Tormes, for Major General Howard’s brigade.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Salamanca, 10th Nov., 1812.

10 min. before 8 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ I have just received your letter of 6 P.M. It is my opinion that the enemy cannot take the town of Alba; and that it ought to be maintained as long as the force now in it, reasonably supported, can maintain it; if the fords do not become in a state that the enemy’s infantry and artillery can pass them, and their cavalry in many places with ease.

‘ I gave General Hamilton no instructions. He told me that you had instructed him to maintain his post, of which I entirely approved.

‘ Recollect that I must have timely notice of all that passes

at Alba; otherwise the troops on the Arapiles will be in a worse situation than those now at Alba.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ If you will refer to my instructions, you will see, that although the town of Alba should be evacuated, it is, in my opinion, not necessary to retire from the Tormes.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,                      ‘ Salamanca, 11th Nov., 1812. 6. P.M.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I have given to a Spanish officer for you; which officer commands the detachment which I have prevailed upon General Castaños to send to garrison the castle of Alba.

‘ You might as well have all the arrangements made for his reception this night. You might also have the mine prepared and loaded. I expect that the officer and detachment will be at Calvarrasa de Abaxo this night; and you should immediately send him to his station.

‘ If you should withdraw from the Tormes, and from Alba before the Spanish garrison arrives, I believe, that upon the whole, it will be best to withdraw the English and Portuguese garrison from the castle, blowing up the bridge at the same time that you evacuate the town; as I fear that we could not expect our soldiers to march through the country as the Spaniards would. If, however, the Spanish garrison should arrive before you withdraw from the Tormes under your instructions, they must occupy the castle.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I am still inclined to believe that the fords are not practicable for infantry and artillery, and some not for cavalry; although some are, certainly.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Salamanca, 11th Nov., 1812.

‘ The bearer of this letter is Major Josef de Miranda, of the

Spanish service, who goes in command of 300 men, who are eventually to form the garrison of the castle of Alba de Tormes.

‘ It will be necessary to increase the quantity of provisions in the castle to ten days for 300, instead of for 200 men ; and to leave there 50,000 rounds of musket ammunition, instead of 25,000 rounds.

‘ As it is determined to hold the town, if possible, as long as we can remain upon the Tormes at all, I think it would be desirable to put this gentleman in charge of his post with his garrison as soon as he shall arrive with his troops ; and measures must be taken to feed them daily, as long as you remain on the river, in order to keep up the stock of provisions.

‘ You will give him instructions to maintain himself in his post as long as the army shall remain in this neighbourhood ; if possible, for the full extent of the ten days for which provisions shall be left for him.

‘ If any misfortune should happen, or the army should be obliged to quit this part of the country, he is then to evacuate his post, and to march with the troops under his command either towards the Sierra, and thence into Portugal, or towards Miranda de Douro, and thence into Portugal, or any other road that he may think proper.

‘ When you shall get the Spanish garrison within the castle, I think you might complete the mine in the bridge, and explode it when the town shall be evacuated by our troops, that is to say, if possible, when you should be under the necessity of retiring from the Tormes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ Salamanca, 11th Nov., 1812.

Half-past 9 P.M.

· MY DEAR HILL,

· I have received your letter of 6 P.M. I do not think the enemy will attempt to pass in the existing state of the river. However, the 3rd and 4th divisions are still at Calvarrasa

de Abaxo, at your command, if you should require their assistance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. The report from the deserters this day is, that every thing is moving to the enemy’s left.’

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Salamanca, 11th Nov., 1812.

‘ I beg you to lay the papers enclosed in the accompanying letter from Major General Peacocke before the Portuguese Government; and that you will be so good as to let them know that the prisoner therein alluded to shall be placed at their disposal, if they wish to have him tried by the civil laws of the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Dom Miguel Forjaz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Salamanca, 14th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th instant, in which you have enclosed one written by order of the Governors of the Kingdom to the Conde de Funchal, regarding a new mode of finding funds for paying the subsidy to Portugal, upon which their Excellencies desire to have my opinion.

‘ No arrangement could be so satisfactory to me as one which should relieve the military chest of the British army from the burthen of its payments to His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon, to enable him to perform His Majesty’s engagements to the Portuguese Government; but I acknowledge that I do not conceive that the scheme proposed would answer the end in view.

‘ First; any scheme of this description must interfere with the supplies of money for the military chest of the British army of the Peninsula; and I do not believe His Majesty’s Government would be disposed to listen to such a scheme, unless it should appear that under the existing system the performance of His Majesty’s engagements had been neglected.

‘ Secondly ; I assert that the performance of His Majesty’s engagements has not been neglected. I will prove that in money and in kind the Portuguese Government have to this day received more than the subsidy ; every thing else is in arrear. The pay of the officers and soldiers of the army, and of the transport service, are in arrear, for five months the former ; for a year the latter ; debts are due to all classes and descriptions of persons, excepting to the Portuguese Government alone, to whom I assert that not only nothing is due, but that the subsidy is overpaid.

‘ In point of fact, a loan of money is never received from any quarter that a proportion of it is not given to His Majesty’s Minister for the use of the Portuguese Government ; and very lately I borrowed a sum of money at Madrid (under a very inconvenient engagement which I preferred, to repay it in a month,) and gave the greater part of it to relieve the distresses of the Portuguese troops in the field which had been neglected by the Government, notwithstanding that large sums had been paid in subsidy. This money has only now been repaid into the chest of the British army. I wish that the Portuguese Government had performed their engagements, and had given to the cause a well equipped army of 30,000 men, in return for the subsidy which they have received from His Majesty.

‘ Thirdly ; It does not appear to me that the Government have at all weighed or digested the scheme for the payment of the subsidy in London, the details of which they appear to consider very easy to arrange ; and they have left them to the Conde de Funchal. I would beg leave just to point out to them that the difference between the market price and the mint price of bullion in England is now, if I am not misinformed, about 25 per cent. ; and they would lose in the receipt of the subsidy such a proportion of that sum as the rate at which they now receive the dollar approaches to the mint price of bullion. If they now receive the dollar at 4*s.* 6*d.* sterling they would lose the whole 25 per cent. on the subsidy ; or one quarter of its amount ; if they now receive the dollar at 5*s.* the loss would be about 15 per cent.

‘ Fourthly ; I have reason to believe that the scheme is impracticable without taking so much specie out of the mili-

tary chest of the British army, as must be attended by the consequence of recalling the army.

‘ I have never been made sensible of the inconveniences, excepting to myself personally, of the mode of paying the subsidy now in practice, which have been so frequently complained of. Notwithstanding the existing prosperity and credit of Great Britain, great difficulty is experienced in procuring specie for a large foreign expenditure ; and the greatest inconvenience has been felt in His Majesty’s dominions from the efforts which have been made in this manner in the cause of the Peninsula. In order to overcome these difficulties, and to obviate some of the inconveniences attending the realization of His Majesty’s aid to the powers of the Peninsula, it was proposed, and the Portuguese Government were distinctly informed, when the increased subsidy was granted, that a part should be given in kind. That is to say, that those articles of military equipment and stores which the Portuguese Government required, and which could be purchased in England at a cheaper rate than in Portugal, should be supplied at the rate of their cost ; and that provisions should be supplied in the same manner from the stores of the army. The reason for making this arrangement was, that the former might be purchased in England without an expenditure of specie ; and the latter in the Peninsula by bills on His Majesty’s treasury, with a condition that they should not be negotiated in the Peninsula.

‘ It might have been expected from the allies of Great Britain that they would cheerfully adopt and carry into execution an arrangement which His Majesty had a right to dictate as the condition on which he would grant any aid ; but instead of that, the Portuguese Government have never ceased to complain that they do not receive as much money as they wish, totally forgetting that they have received more in money and money’s worth than His Majesty has ever consented to grant them ; and instead of assisting, as they ought, they have rejected, or have rendered nugatory, every proposition which has been made to them to facilitate the means of increasing the specie in the military chest of the army.

‘ Your Excellency is mistaken in supposing that the

£100,000 estimated as the amount of the pay of the British officers in the Portuguese service is exclusively for their British pay; it is for their Portuguese pay; and I cannot recommend to His Majesty's Government that any increase of subsidy should be granted to the Portuguese Government on any ground.

' If the Government will be in earnest in respect to the finances, they have ample means at their command to cover the deficit for the military expenses; and they will be enabled to relieve the poorer description of people from many burthensome and oppressive, though unproductive taxes. I do not consider the scheme, however, of selling quit-rents, &c., belonging to individuals by grants from the Crown for their lives or others, in order to raise a loan to be employed in the liquidation of paper money, to be one of the legitimate means in the power of the Government to ameliorate their finances; even though an attempt should be made to conceal the manifest arbitrary injustice and attack upon private property of this scheme, under the cloak of a purchase from the owner by the grant of an *apolice*.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*'

' WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

' MY DEAR HILL,

' Salamanca, 15th Nov., 1812.

' I have been out all the morning, and have only now received your letter of twelve at noon. You must have the motions of the corps which has marched up the river well observed; and it might be expedient, if the enemy should not cross the Tormes in the night, to remove the 4th division to the edge of the wood near the top of the hill, (and on the right of the road looking to Alba,) at day-light in the morning, in order to be in readiness to protect General Hamilton's eventual evacuation of Alba de Tormes, and his withdrawing from the river. The 4th division will in this position not be much farther from you than they are at present.

' I saw the *chevalets* at Huerta. I do not believe they are to be used to construct a bridge; nor have I seen or heard of any collection of force at any point, such as the enemy must have in order to pass the river. I cannot ob-

serve any reduction of force at any point. All the troops mentioned by the Conde de Penne Villemur, in his letter to you, are those of the 5th and 8th divisions of the army of Portugal, and are in front of Pack's brigade at Aldea Lengua.

'The French have evacuated Madrid (on the 7th). I do not yet know where the troops have gone.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To General Giron.*

à Aldehuela de la Boveda,  
ce 16 Nov., 1812.

'MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

'Le Général Comte de Belveder m'a fait savoir que l'ennemi était en avant de lui; et je l'ai prié de marcher demain matin à quatre heures au lieu de sept heures; et j'ai fait des arrangemens pour avoir de la cavalerie à son arrière garde demain. L'ennemi s'est aussi montré en force sur la route de Matilla; mais nous ferons notre marche demain avec facilité.

'Je vous prie de faire mes complimens au Général.

'Agréez, &c.

'*General Giron.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.*

'MY DEAR PAGET,

'Head Quarters, 19th Nov., 1812.

'I did not hear of your misfortune till more than an hour after it had occurred, nor was I certain of it till the enemy attacked our rear guard, and the firing had continued for some time, and I found you were not on the field; and you will judge of my concern by the sense which I hope you feel I entertain of the cordial assistance which I received from you during the short time that you have been with us.

'I cannot account for your misfortune, excepting that you were alone, and could not see the approach of the enemy's cavalry.

'That which must now be done is to endeavor to obtain your exchange. I have no French General Officer in the Peninsula; but I beg you to make it known to the King, and to the Duke of Dalmatia, that I will engage that any General Officer they will name shall be sent from England to France in exchange for you. If you should find that

there is any prospect of your being exchanged, I recommend to you to endeavor to prevail upon the King not to send you to France. It is not necessary to enter into the reason for giving you this advice. If the King, or the Duke of Dalmatia will not name an officer to be exchanged for you, the sooner you are sent to France the better.

‘ I send you some money—200*l*. I will take care of your friend Marlay. You cannot conceive how much I regret your loss. This is the second time that I have been deprived of your assistance, at an early period after you had joined us, and I am almost afraid to wish to have you again; but God knows with what pleasure I shall hear of your being liberated, and shall see you with us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.*

‘ Let me know your wishes on any subject, and they shall be carried into execution.’

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov., 1812.

‘ The troops under the command of Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill crossed the Tormes at Alba on the 8th instant, and those under my command took the position on the heights of San Christoval de la Cuesta on the same day; Brigadier General Pack’s brigade occupying Aldea Lengua, and Brigadier General Bradford’s Cabrerizos, on our right, and the British cavalry covering our front. I had desired Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill to occupy the town and castle of Alba with Major General Howard’s brigade of the 2nd division, leaving Lieut. General Hamilton’s Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes to support those troops, while the 2nd division was posted in the neighbourhood of the fords of Encinas and Huerta, and the 3rd and 4th divisions remained at Calvarrasa de Arriba in reserve.

‘ On the 9th, the enemy drove in the piquets of Major General Long’s brigade of cavalry in front of Alba; and Major General Long was obliged to withdraw his troops through Alba on the morning of the 10th. In the course of

the day, the enemy's whole army approached our positions on the Tormes; and they attacked the troops in Alba with 20 pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry. They made no impression on them, however, and withdrew the cannon and the greatest part of the troops in the night, and this attack was never renewed.

‘ I enclose Lieut. General Hamilton's \* report to Sir Row-

*\* To Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Alba de Tormes, 11th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have the honor to report the steps I have taken to carry into effect your instructions for the defence of this place, which, I am happy to say, have obliged the enemy to withdraw the greatest part of the force opposed to us; and I feel almost confident we shall be able to retain our position as long as you may deem expedient.

‘ I yesterday garrisoned and provisioned the castle, and by the exertions of Captain Goldfinch of the engineers, it is put into as good a state as circumstances will admit; he is continuing strengthening it. Captain Goldfinch has been of great assistance to me.

‘ I have appropriated to each regiment a district of this town, and the commanding officer has barricaded the streets and buildings in a very judicious manner. Brigadier Da Costa and Campbell's brigades are in our position on the left bank of the Tormes. Brigadier Campbell reports his having caused the enemy some loss, in their attempt to pass a ford near his position.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Tulloh has made so good an arrangement of his two brigades of guns, that, united with the position of the two brigades of infantry on the left bank of the Tormes, I consider my flanks secure.

‘ Early yesterday morning Major General Long, commanding the cavalry in front, reported that the enemy were advancing in great force; I was therefore induced to retire the cavalry.

‘ About ten o'clock the enemy appeared on the heights in considerable force of cavalry, and a few infantry, covering, as I conceived, a reconnaissance of several officers of rank. About two o'clock the enemy's force was increased to fifteen squadrons, and six thousand infantry, and twenty guns, including six six-inch howitzers, which immediately commenced firing, and continued until it was dark. The enemy's light troops advanced close to the walls we had hastily thrown up; but from the cool and steady conduct of the 50th regt., Col. Stewart; 71st regt., Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan; the 92nd, Col. Cameron (General Howard's brigade), the enemy dared not attempt the town.

‘ About eight o'clock in the evening, I was repeatedly informed that the enemy's infantry was considerably increasing, which induced me to order three battalions of Brigadier Da Costa's brigade into town, leaving his other battalion for the protection of the fords. The enemy during the night withdrew their artillery, and I have left a small force of cavalry and infantry, who kept up a smart fire. I have to regret the loss of a considerable number of men, but which I trust you will not deem great, when you consider the heavy and incessant fire of artillery for so many hours. The loss of the Portuguese was while on duty this morning, and I have real pleasure in reporting their steady and animated conduct.

land Hill of the transactions at Alba, which were highly creditable to the troops employed. From the 10th to the 14th, the time was passed in various reconnaissances, as well of the fords of the Tormes, as of the position which the troops under my command occupied, on the right of that river in front of Salamanca; and, on the 11th, the enemy crossed that river in force at the fords near Encinas, about two leagues above Alba.

‘ I immediately broke up from San Christoval, and ordered the troops towards the Arapiles; and as soon as I had ascertained the direction of the enemy’s march from the fords, I moved with the 2nd division of infantry, and all the cavalry I could collect, to attack them, leaving Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill with the 4th and Lieut. General Hamilton’s divisions in front of Alba, to protect this movement, and the 3rd division in reserve on the Arapiles, to secure the possession of that position.

‘ I feel much indebted to Major General Howard, who rendered me every possible assistance, as also to every officer and soldier of his excellent brigade, for their steady, zealous, and soldier-like conduct.

‘ To Captain Pinto Saavedra, my Assistant Adjutant General; to Captain Watson, Royal dragoons, Assistant Quarter Master General; and to Captain Bunbury, my aid de camp, I consider myself obliged, for their prompt execution of my orders.

‘ I enclose a return of the killed and wounded, and trust we shall not have many more casualties.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ JOHN HAMILTON, Lieut. General.

*Return of Killed and Wounded of the Army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the defence of Alba de Tormes, on the 10th and 11th November, 1812.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . . .	—	—	21	—	21
Wounded . . .	3	4	85	—	92
Missing . . .	—	—	—	—	—

‘The enemy, however, was already too strong, and too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked; and I confined myself to a cannonade of their cavalry, under cover of which I reconnoitred their position.

‘In the evening I withdrew all the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, leaving a small Spanish garrison in the castle, with directions to evacuate it, if they should find that the enemy retired, and having destroyed the bridge.

‘In the course of the night and following morning I moved the greatest part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed Lieut. General Sir Edward Paget with the 1st division of infantry on the right at Aldea Tejada, in order to secure that passage for the troops over the Zurguen, in case the movements of the enemy on our right flank should render it necessary for me to make choice either of giving up my communication with Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca.

‘On the morning of the 15th, I found the enemy fortifying their position at Mozarbes, which they had taken up the night before, at the same time that they were moving bodies of cavalry and infantry towards their own left, and to our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. It was obvious that it was the enemy’s intention to act upon our communications; and as they were too strong, and too strongly posted for me to think of attacking them, I determined to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore put the army in march in three columns, and crossed the Zurguen, and then passed the enemy’s left flank, and encamped that night on the Valmuza. We continued our march successively on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and this day, when part of the army crossed the Agueda, and the whole will cross that river tomorrow, and canton between the Agueda and Coa.

‘The enemy followed our movement on the 16th with a large body, probably the whole of the cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry; but they did not attempt to press upon our rear. They took advantage of the ground to cannonade our rear guard, consisting of the light division, under Major General Alten, on the 17th, on its passage of the Huebra at San Muñoz, and occasioned some loss.

‘The troops have suffered considerably from the severity of the weather: which, since the 13th, has been worse than I

have ever known at this season of the year. The soldiers, as usual, straggled from their regiments in search of plunder, and I am apprehensive that some may have fallen into the enemy's hands.

‘ I am sorry to add, that we have had the misfortune to lose Lieut. General Sir Edward Paget, who was taken prisoner on the 17th. He commanded the centre column, and the fall of rain having greatly injured the roads, and swelled the rivulets, there was an interval between the 5th and 7th divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode alone to the rear to discover the cause of this interval, and as the road passed through a wood, either a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had got upon the road, or he missed the road, and fell into their hands in the wood. I understand that Sir Edward was not wounded, but I cannot sufficiently regret the loss of his assistance at this moment.

‘ In my dispatch of the 7th instant, I communicated to your Lordship my opinion of the strength of the enemy as far as I could judge of it from the reports I had received, and from what I had seen. I have since learnt that General Caffarelli, with the army of the North, certainly remained joined with the army of Portugal. King Joseph left Madrid on the 4th instant, and arrived at Peñaranda on the 8th, leaving at Madrid the civil authorities of his Government, and a small garrison. These authorities and troops evacuated Madrid on the 7th, and marched for Castille; and Colonel Don Juan Palecca took possession of that city.

‘ Your Lordship will have seen General Ballesteros' letter of the 24th October to the Regency, from which you will observe that he disobeyed the orders of the Government given to him at my suggestion, to march his troops into La Mancha, and hang upon the enemy's left flank, because the Regency and Cortes had offered me the chief command of the Spanish armies.

‘ General Virues, who succeeded to the command upon General Ballesteros being removed, had not advanced farther than Jaen, when I last heard from that quarter on the 8th instant.

‘ The whole of the enemy's disposable force in Spain was therefore upon the Tormes in the middle of this month, and they were certainly not less than 80,000 men, but more pro-

bably 90,000. Of these, 10,000 were cavalry; and as the army of Portugal alone had 100 pieces of cannon, it is probable that they had not less in all than 200 pieces.

‘ I had 52,000 British and Portuguese troops, of which, 4000 were British cavalry, on the Tormes, and from 12,000 to 16,000 Spaniards; and, although I should have felt no hesitation in trying the issue of a general action on ground which I should have selected, I did not deem it expedient to risk the cause on the result of an attack of the enemy in a position which they had selected and strengthened.

‘ I entertained hopes that I should have been able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Tormes, in which case, they must have attacked me in the position of San Christoval, or must have retired, leaving us in possession of the line of the Tormes. I considered either to be likely to be attended by so many advantages to the cause, that I deemed it expedient to delay my march from the Tormes till the enemy should be actually established on the left of that river; and if the weather had been more favorable, we should have made the movement without inconvenience or loss.

‘ It is difficult to form a judgment of the enemy’s intentions at present. They have not pushed any troops beyond the Yeltes, and very few beyond the Huebra. But it is obvious, and a general sense is said to prevail among the French officers, that until they can get the better of the allied army, it is useless to attempt the conquest and settlement of Spain; and as far as I can form a judgment from one of Marshal Soult’s letters to the King in cipher, which was intercepted, and fell into my hands some time ago, it was his opinion, and he urged that Portugal should be made the seat of the war.

‘ The result of the campaign, however, though not so favorable as I at one moment expected, or as it would have been, if I could have succeeded in the attack of the Castle of Burgos, or if General Ballesteros had made the movement into La Mancha which was suggested, is still so favorable, that this operation appears out of the question.

‘ The strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz being in our possession, and Almeida being re-established, it is not easy for the enemy to penetrate by either of the great entrances into Portugal; and although the two former of

these places (particularly the first-mentioned) are neither in the state of defence nor garrisoned as I should wish to see them, having deprived the enemy of their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, at Madrid, at Salamanca, and Valladolid, it does not appear possible that these places should be attacked.

‘I conclude, therefore, that for the present they will canton their army in Old Castille, and in the valley of the Tagus, and will wait for the arrival of fresh reinforcements and means from France.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘MY LORD, Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov., 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose the return of the killed wounded, and missing, from that part of the army which was under my immediate command, on its march from Burgos, from the 22nd to the 29th of October \*. The difficulty of making up this return accurately has occasioned the delay in transmitting it.

‘I have the honor also to enclose the return of killed, wounded, and missing, to this date.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Earl Bathurst.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the operations of the Army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., from the 15th to the 19th of November, inclusive.*

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	5	2	43	15	50
Wounded . .	6	7	126	9	139
Missing . . .	1	3	174	58	178

\* Placed at page 531, after Dispatch.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Ciudad Rodrigo, 20th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th. I have never known a Knight of the Bath made that he was not knighted and invested with the Order by some person authorized for that purpose by the Crown; but upon this point I may be mistaken, and you should inquire from England without loss of time.

‘ Although you may have the insignia, and may be appointed a Knight of the Bath, nobody can knight you or invest you with the insignia that is not duly authorized, nor can a person authorized depute another.

‘ I have not received the authority, which I should think would have been sent to Beresford, as he is at Lisbon. If the messenger brought you the insignia, it is just possible that the same messenger may be now on the road with the authority to me to invest you; and if it should be so, or if I should receive the authority by any channel, I will apprise you of it, and will appoint time and place to meet you for the performance of the ceremony.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Hon. Berkeley Paget.*’

‘ MY DEAR BERKELEY,

‘ Ciudad Rodrigo, 20th Nov., 1812.

‘ I am sorry again to have to apprise you of your brother’s misfortune at a period almost as early after he had joined us as I had upon a former occasion. He was taken prisoner by the enemy, unhurt, as I am informed, on the 17th instant.

‘ I acknowledge that I cannot exactly account for the mode in which he was taken. He commanded the centre column of the army on its march from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Hill the right; the Spaniards were on the left. The country was woody but open, and the cavalry was ordered to march between the two columns of British infantry.

‘ The roads were very bad, and the rivulets much swelled, and there was some delay in the march of the centre column

in the morning ; and the right crossed the Huebra before the head of the centre reached that river. The cavalry had been encamped near the right, and followed their movements, and the enemy's cavalry were consequently on the flank and rear of the centre when the head of the centre column reached the Huebra.

‘ Some squadrons of Portuguese dragoons had been thrown out to keep the communication with the centre, which they did very insufficiently ; and as soon as I saw the mistake, I ordered up Sir William Erskine's division of cavalry to protect the march of the centre column ; and the last time I saw your brother I requested him to halt the 7th division on a height about a mile from the Huebra, till the Light division, which was the rear guard, should come up.

‘ I had come up from the rear to the head of the 5th division at this time, which immediately preceded the 7th, and when I passed the latter, there certainly was no interval in the column.

‘ The badness of the roads and the swelling of the rivulets had however afterwards occasioned an interval, and your brother, with his usual anxiety, rode alone to ascertain the cause of it, having sent Marlay with information to the Light division, that they would find the 7th halted and cavalry at hand to give them assistance. On his way to the 7th division he was taken, either on the road, or in the wood through which it passed.

‘ From the account of a French officer to one of ours on that afternoon across the Huebra, I am inclined to believe that his want of sight was the immediate cause of his being taken. He said that a non-commissioned officer had knocked off his hat, but had not hurt him, and that he then surrendered himself. As he was remarkably well mounted, there is no doubt that he might have got away, either before receiving this blow, if he had been able to see the enemy, or afterwards if he had been able to see his way. But his want of sight is a terrible disadvantage. The interval between the 5th and 7th divisions could not have been more than half a mile, and the French could not have been on or near the road more than 5 minutes.

‘ I need not tell you how much I am annoyed by this misfortune.

‘ I have desired him to tell King Joseph and Soult that I will engage that any person they shall name shall be sent to France in exchange for him. I have recommended him to go to France, if he should find that neither is disposed to name a person to be sent in exchange for him, as I think it probable that his chance of exchange will in that case be better there; he will live more comfortably than in Spain, and will be more in the way of hearing and receiving assistance from his friends. I have sent him money and his clothes, and some stores, &c. &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *To the Hon. Berkeley Paget.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To —, Esq., late Lieutenant, —th Dragoons.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Ciudad Rodrigo, 21st Nov., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th October.

‘ You are much mistaken if you suppose that any thing which occurred to you in this country was occasioned by any feeling of irritation on my part, or any thing but a desire to uphold the discipline and subordination of the army.

‘ I was very sorry that you fell the victim of great and persevering indiscretion and misapplication of very good talents; and I am happy to find that you are sensible of your error, and desirous of beginning your career again with a determination to avoid the conduct in future which has occasioned your misfortunes.

‘ It is quite impossible that you can be restored to your rank in the service; and I wish you would consider well, whether, at your time of life, with your talents and your prospects in other professions, it is worth your while to serve as a volunteer in a regiment of dragoons, in order eventually to be appointed a Cornet, thence to continue to rise as an officer. At all events, it will be necessary that you should have the permission of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to serve even as a volunteer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ — — —.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To José Clementi.*

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 22nd Nov., 1812.

‘In regard to the Capitañ Mor of Zibreira, I beg that you will tell him that he has been guilty of the greatest crime of which any individual in modern times can be guilty; viz., he has aided the French in invading his native country, in which they committed horrors till then unheard of; it is not surprising, therefore, that his countrymen and the Government should be much displeased with him, and that I should experience the greatest difficulty in persuading them to pardon him.

‘I can undertake this difficult task upon only one condition, and that is, that the Capitañ Mor shall render some important services to his Country and her cause. I know that he is a person trusted and employed by the enemy; and if he will give me early and accurate intelligence of all that comes to his knowledge, and by these means serve his country, I will endeavor to obtain his pardon, and to restore him to the bosom of his country; otherwise he must not expect that I shall attempt it.

‘You will find out the mode of transmitting me his letter, and state what the messenger should be paid, which I will invariably pay.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*José Clementi.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

#### MEMORANDUM.

*Orders for Captain Todd and Lieutenant Piper.*

‘Ciudad Rodrigo, 22nd Nov., 1812.

‘Captain Todd has been ordered to take up the bridge at Almaraz, and to carry to Badajos or Elvas that part of it for which he has conveyance, and to destroy that part for which he has not conveyance. It is concluded that he has obeyed these orders, but he has not reported.

‘If he has not obeyed the above-mentioned orders, he is to obey them forthwith. If he has obeyed them he must report.

‘Lieut. Piper was first ordered to take up the pontoon bridge, and to proceed with it to Salamanca as soon as Captain Todd’s bridge should be ready.

‘He was then ordered by Lieut. Head\*, on the 6th instant, to halt on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, whenever he should reach that road. He was then ordered on the 12th instant, by an Officer of Guides, to proceed directly to Badajoz, if the order should find him south of the Tagus; or directly to Castello Branco, if the order should meet him on the north side of the Tagus.

‘There has been no report from him since the 31st of last month, when Captain Todd’s bridge was not ready, and he had not of course received the order of the 6th instant. This order is now sent to him by the south of the Tagus, and if he has not already moved from the Tagus, he is to move upon the receipt hereof, and to take the bridge by Badajoz to Elvas.

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Ciudad Rodrigo, 22nd Nov., 1812.

‘I enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Secretary of State, of which I request you to communicate such parts as you may think proper to the Spanish Government.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Ciudad Rodrigo, 22nd Nov., 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from the Secretary of State, from which I understand that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent approves of my acceptance of the command of the Spanish armies.

‘I request you therefore to signify this approbation to the Spanish Government, and to request them to signify to me their pleasure respecting the period at which I shall take upon myself the command.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

\* Now Sir Francis Head, Bart., Governor of Upper Canada.



order clothing to be sent to Alcacer do Sal, for General Downie's effective strength of trained soldiers, whenever he shall signify to me their numbers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Ciudad Rodrigo, 23rd Nov., 1812.

‘ I received by the last post your letter of the 27th of October. When one army is so inferior in numbers to another as ours is to the French army now assembled in Castille, its operations must depend in a great degree upon those of its opponent. It is impossible therefore for me at this period to point out what line I shall follow. The enemy having abandoned Madrid, and having given up all their communications with the north, solely with a view to collect a still larger force against us, there is no diversion which would answer at present to effect an alteration in our relative numbers, even if I could depend upon the Spaniards to do any thing. But I am quite in despair about them. The only man among them who ever did any thing (Ballesteros) is gone; and I am apprehensive that it will be quite impossible to employ him again. But even he never did more than give employment for a short period to one or at most two divisions of the enemy's army. Then there is another circumstance which must be attended to, and that is the situation of our own army. It has been actively employed since the beginning of last January, and requires rest. The horses of the cavalry and artillery in particular require both that and good food and care during the winter; and the discipline of the infantry requires to be attended to as is usual in all armies after so long a campaign, and one of so much activity.

‘ I believe that the enemy require repose as much if not more than we do; and that their immense numbers are rather embarrassing to them in a country already exhausted. But I am not quite certain that they do not propose to penetrate into Portugal this winter. I hope the enterprise will end fatally to them; but our troops will suffer a good deal if they are to have a winter campaign, and if the

weather should continue as severe as it has been since the 15th of this month.

‘I believe that I have underrated rather than overrated the enemy’s force. They say themselves at Salamanca that they have 90,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry; and their demand for provisions from the country is 140,000 rations daily. I think they have 90,000 men altogether, including from 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry. The morning state will show what we have.

‘It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength of the enemy’s armies. The disposition of the Spaniards to exaggerate their own advantages induces the best intentioned among them to deceive; and no individual will ever allow that the French have more men than he has seen himself. The numbers of the army now in Castille have been stated to me at 15,000, and at almost every number from 15,000 to 90,000. I have never found myself mistaken in my estimate of the numbers of the enemy, when I relied upon the returns, making a reasonable abatement for losses during the period elapsed since their date. The only occasion on which I have been seriously mistaken was at Burgos, when I relied upon the reports of the country; and was induced to believe that Sir H. Popham’s operations would continue to give employment to Caffarelli. But I afterwards found that the army of Portugal had been very largely reinforced in cavalry as well as in infantry, to a larger amount even than I stated in my dispatch to Lord Bathurst, as it was 31 battalions instead of 23, as I stated, and the 130th regiment. There were besides two divisions of infantry, and from 1000 to 1400 cavalry of the army of the north; and most certainly when I saw the whole drawn out near Cigales, they were not less than 45,000 men, of which 5000 are cavalry. Soult has six divisions of infantry, and sixteen regiments of cavalry. The gross numbers of his army last April were 65,000. He has since sustained no great loss excepting the garrison of Badajoz, 5000 men. But I strike off from his gross strength, for losses, sickness, and men on his strength who were employed principally in the siege of Cadiz, 25,000 or 30,000, including the garrison of Badajoz; and I believe his army consists of 35,000 men, of which from 4000 to 5000 are cavalry. The army of

the King, when it quitted Madrid in August, was from 20,000 to 22,000 men, including *Juramentados*, and an Italian division belonging to Suchet's army, under General Palombini, and the 16th regiment, likewise belonging to Suchet. Supposing the King to have lost by desertion, or to have sent away, all the *Juramentados*, and that the troops belonging to Suchet's army were left in Valencia, there will still remain the French troops of the King's guard, 5000 men, about 3500 more French and German infantry (I know the numbers of the regiments), which belong to the army of the Centre, and from 2000 to 3000 good French cavalry. I believe all this put together will amount to 90,000 men.

‘What are our prospects against this army? At present none certainly. In the spring, as soon as the green forage shall appear, I shall be able to take the field with a very large British and Portuguese force, probably larger than we have yet produced, and more efficient I hope in cavalry and artillery. I have sent the army of Galicia home; and I hope advantage will be taken of the winter to do something with them; but unless some changes are effected I shall certainly be disappointed. There are besides, applicable to the *guerre* in Castille, the Spanish army lately under the command of Ballesteros, and the troops under the command of Elio.

‘If I should find that the French remain quiet during the winter, I propose to go to Cadiz for a short time, to endeavor to put matters upon a better footing, at least as far as regards the armies of Galicia, and that lately under the command of Ballesteros, which must be brought forward in co-operation with us. It will likewise be necessary to apprize the Government of the inconvenience and danger of the system on which they have been acting in the provinces which have been freed from the enemy; and of the inefficiency of all the persons selected for public trusts; and of the inconvenience of loading the resources of the provinces with the maintenance of such people. It is useless to trouble your Lordship with a detail of these facts; but I can only say that, if I cannot by the exercise of fair influence in concert with my brother produce some alteration, it is quite hopeless to continue the contest in the Peninsula with the

view of obliging the French to evacuate it by force of arms. After this detail of facts, your Lordship will see that it is very useless to trouble you with my opinion of what ought to be done after the French shall leave the Peninsula, more particularly as I have already communicated that opinion to Lord Bathurst.

‘From what I see in the newspapers I am much afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the mean time the allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and Sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners, and they have taken and destroyed or have themselves the use of the enemy’s arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines before Cadiz, &c.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3000 pieces of cannon. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.

‘We should have retained still greater advantages I think, and should have remained in possession of Castille and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October, or if Ballesteros had moved upon Alcaraz as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement.

‘The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid the 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions, who had been with myself always before; and I brought with me that were good the 1st division, and they were inexperienced. In fact the troops ought to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the first trial on the 22nd of September, and if they had we had means sufficient to take the place. They did not take the line because ————, the field officer who

commanded, did that which is too common in our army. He paid no attention to his orders, notwithstanding the pains I took in writing them, and in reading and explaining them to him twice over. He made none of the dispositions ordered; and instead of regulating the attack as he ought, he rushed on as if he had been the leader of a forlorn hope, and fell, together with many of those who went with him. He had my instructions in his pocket; and as the French got possession of his body, and were made acquainted with the plan, the attack could never be repeated. When he fell, nobody having received orders what to do, nobody could give any to the troops. I was in the trenches, however, and ordered them to withdraw. Our time and ammunition were then expended, and our guns destroyed in taking this line; than which at former sieges we had taken many stronger by assault.

‘I see that a disposition already exists to blame the Government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The Government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and at Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them.

‘The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such excellent roads, &c., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon 50 or 60 mules more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity. I could not find means of moving even one gun from Madrid. ——— is a gentleman who piques himself upon his overcoming all difficulties. He knows the length of time it took to find transport even for about one hundred barrels of powder and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket ammunition which he sent us. As for the two guns which he endeavored to send, I was obliged to send our own cattle to draw them; and we felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements of the army.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To His Excellency Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 25th Nov., 1812. ’

‘ I have the honor to inform you that His Majesty’s Government have sent from England a certain sum of money in guineas for the payment of His Majesty’s troops, which guineas I propose should be issued to the troops at their current value in England, viz., each at the rate of one pound one shilling sterling.

‘ Dollars are now issued to the troops each at the rate of four shillings and sixpence sterling, which is the Mint price in England; and the guinea will therefore, in reference to dollars, be worth four dollars and four-sixths of a dollar.

‘ The dollar has been stated by an edict of the Portuguese Government to be worth 800 reis metal; and the guinea, by the same rule, ought to be worth 3733 reis metal.

‘ I have so frequently failed in the applications which I have had occasion to make to the Portuguese Government for their interposition for the relief or convenience of His Majesty’s service, that I hesitate in requesting you to apply to the Government to issue a decree fixing this value as that of the guinea in reference to the Portuguese currency; but it is so desirable that there should be no misunderstanding on this subject that I venture to solicit you to request the Portuguese Government to fix the current rate of the guinea in Portugal at 3733 reis metal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 25th Nov., 1812.

‘ The greater part of the enemy’s force, which had crossed the Tormes, have retired across that river, and it is reported have directed their march towards the Duero; and it is reported that the King is gone to fix his quarters at Valladolid, and that those of Marshal Soult are to be at Salamanca.

‘ A part of the troops which had moved to the Huebra returned towards Salamanca, and others which had advanced

to Tamames returned to the Tormes and towards the Escorial by Los Santos. The road to the Puerto de Baños passes by that place, and it is reported that the enemy are about to march that way. But I have no reason for giving credit to this report.

‘ I must admit, however, that I have lately received but little intelligence from the country. The decree of the Cortes, which required every person to justify his conduct who had remained in the country occupied by the enemy, has obliged many who were heretofore instrumental in acquiring and transmitting intelligence, to fly from their homes, lest they should be punished by the enemy; and I have not yet had time to establish fresh channels of communication.

‘ The army are cantoned on both banks of the Upper Agueda, and between the Agueda and Coa; and I propose to extend the cantonments still further when I shall be certain of the enemy’s destination.

‘ Many men who were missing have returned to their regiments; but I am sorry to say that several who had straggled from their regiments, and strayed behind, have died from the extreme severity of the weather and the want of food which they experienced, all the villages having been plundered by the soldiers in hospitals who first passed, and abandoned by the inhabitants.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst. -*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 25th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th October, enclosing one from Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, of the 3rd October, in regard to an arrangement which had been made between the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, for the supply of the troops of the latter with provisions and forage from the Royal magazines in Spain, upon which you are desirous of having my opinion.

‘ It is very difficult to understand from Sir Charles Stuart’s letter precisely what was intended by the arrangement, excepting that the Portuguese Government should

have a plausible excuse for not sending money to provide for the supply of their troops in Spain ; as I observe that Sir Charles Stuart includes meat in the arrangement.

‘ The fact is, that there are no Royal magazines in Spain, and the crown possesses no cattle whatever.

‘ The crown of Spain does possess certain estates in different parts of the country, and has a right to the tenth of the produce of certain other estates ; and when I entered Spain in the month of June last, I agreed with the Spanish authorities that the rent of these estates and the dues to the Crown should be received in kind, and should be handed over to the British Commissariat, at the current price of the day, in such proportions as were not required by the Spanish armies.

‘ We did receive some supplies under this arrangement during the campaign, and the Portuguese army likewise ; and the account is now in a train of settlement ; and the value of what was received will be payable to the Spanish Government.

‘ It will probably be difficult to distinguish what was received by the Portuguese troops from the estates of the crown of Spain, from what was delivered to them from other sources, and to be accounted for as subsidy ; and it may not be possible to allow what they have received from the crown of Spain to be carried to account against the supposed debt of the Spanish to the Portuguese Government.

‘ I say supposed debt, because in point of fact, since the year 1810 inclusively, the burthen and expense of feeding all Spanish detachments which have passed through Portugal, have fallen upon the British Commissariat. I believe therefore that if there exists any account or any debt from one Government to the other, the Portuguese Government is the debtor.

‘ At all events, as the supplies, received from the estates of the crown of Spain, by the Portuguese departments, probably first passed through the British Commissariat, it will be reasonable that if the British Commissariat should be obliged to pay for them, their value should be carried against the British subsidy to Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*  
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*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 26th Nov., 1812.

‘ I enclose some good news. From all accounts I judge that the enemy are not moving by Baños, but are crossing the Torines, and I have commenced the movements of my troops, and I have desired the Quarter Master General to write to you to recommend that you should commence yours, in order to take up your cantonments in the province of Coria, through the Pass of Perales.

‘ I have desired the officer to return to Alcantara with the bridge, and you will send him your orders to lay it; if you should like to use it, you must give him a day’s notice of your wanting it.

‘ The Alagon and Tietar are good barriers for your front, but you should observe well what passes on the north side of the Puerto de Baños. I believe there is only one bridge on the Alagon at Monte Hermoso.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I believe the 9th Light dragoons should be sent towards Elvas, and probably the Portuguese dragoons likewise, but I shall hear from you on this subject.’

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 26th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th instant.

‘ If Captain Mackenzie is unable to perform the duty with which he is charged, another officer shall be appointed to perform it. I shall make inquiry on the subject.

‘ I never yet applied to the Portuguese Government to make any arrangement to facilitate the transaction of business by the departments of this army, that they did not create difficulties.

‘ In regard to the duties on corn, the facts are just these. The Commissary purchases corn with his bills upon the Treasury, with the condition that the bills shall not be negotiated at Lisbon. He can continue this practice, and can insist on the condition, if the duties on the corn are remitted. If they are to be paid, he must either give some money from

the chest, or he must allow a part of the bills to be discounted at Lisbon, otherwise the seller of the corn has it not in his power to pay the duties.

‘ There is another reason also why I wish that the people of the corn market at Lisbon should have nothing to say to our concerns. Experience has taught me to entertain the worst opinion of every description of Portuguese *employés*, and I think it desirable that those in the corn market should not have that knowledge which the payment of these duties would give them of the state of our stores. It is my opinion, as it is that of the Commissary General, that the possession of this knowledge would very materially affect prices in our dealings with the importers of corn, from time to time.

‘ This last reason may be imaginary, but the first is conclusive; and if the Government do not agree to give up the duties, I must refer the subject to His Majesty’s Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Freneda, 27th Nov., 1812. 10 P.M.

‘ I was about to write to you last night, to tell you that I had ordered the troops to their cantonments, and to request you to come over here for a day, on your way to Lisbon. I find, however, that I am too late.

‘ We cannot take the field in this part of the country till the end of April, or beginning of May. We may be obliged to take it earlier to the southward. However, I hope that when we shall take the field, it will be in great strength and condition.

‘ There are various cavalry arrangements upon which I wished to speak to you. But I must now talk them over with Elley, whom I shall send for to come here for a few days.

‘ I shall write to Admiral Martin to give you a passage. Wishing you a pleasant voyage, and the early re-establishment of your health; and that I may soon have the benefit of your assistance again,

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir S. Cotton, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.



cellency, keep themselves out of the reach of the enemy's enterprizes during the winter.

‘ It is impossible for me, at this distance, to point out to your Excellency more than a general principle for your operations. On a future occasion I shall have the honor of writing to you more fully.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I have written to General Elío\*, which I request your Excellency to peruse, and beg you to forward, with a copy of this letter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Duque del Parque.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Adjutant General of the Forces.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 27th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving a letter from Colonel Darling of the 22nd October, enclosing one from Major —— of the ——nd regiment, referring to a prior conversation on the wants of the 2nd batt. ——nd regiment of officers, and requiring that the Captains of the ——nd regiment belonging to the 2nd battalion, and doing duty with the 1st battalion in this country, should be ordered to join the 2nd battalion in England.

‘ Major —— forgot to mention, either in the letter or the conversation, that according to the return of the 24th October, there are two Captains, —— —— and —— ——, belonging to the 1st batt. ——nd regiment, doing duty with the 2nd battalion. There were 8 Captains, including Captains —— and ——, belonging to the 2nd battalion, 12 Lieutenants, and 4 Ensigns, doing duty with the 1st batt. ——nd regiment, according to the last returns.

‘ There are not *too many* Officers doing duty with any regiment in this army; but of all regiments, from what I have seen lately of the state of its discipline, I should consider the ——nd least able to spare any officers; and I would therefore beg leave to suggest that His Majesty's regulation in regard to the relief of the officers of a battalion on service should be enforced in regard to the officers of the 2nd batt. ——nd regiment, serving with the 1st battalion in this coun-

\* Missing from the drafts of the Duke of Wellington's papers.

try, before Captains —— and —— are allowed to depart from the 1st battalion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adjutant General  
of the Forces.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Officers Commanding Divisions and Brigades.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Freneda, 28th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c., which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions of Brigades.

‘ But besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

‘ It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops had such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.

‘ We must look therefore for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some cause besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

‘ I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the Officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the Service, and by the orders of this army.

‘ I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the Officers of the army; and I am quite certain that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

‘ Unfortunately the inexperience of the Officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments; for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions; and the regulation of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

‘ These are the points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The Commanding Officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavor to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a

sense of their situation and authority ; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they well know that their officers and their non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

‘ The Commanding Officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real inspection of the soldiers’ arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article and of the soldiers’ necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily.

‘ In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our army.

‘ The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked ; and it would soon be found that if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

‘ You will of course give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching, and the division should march 10 or 12 miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division should be dry.

‘ But I repeat that the great object of the attention of the General and Field Officers must be to get the Captains and Subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To Officers commanding  
Divisions and Brigades.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General le Baron Maucune.*

‘ au Quartier Général,  
ce 29 Nov., 1812.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Je viens d’avoir l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 25 ; et je vous suis bien obligé des bontés que vous avez eues pour le Général Paget.

‘ J’envoie mon aide de camp, Colonel Gordon, pour recevoir les lettres que vous voulez m’envoyer ; et je vous prie de me faire savoir la somme d’argent que vous avez avancé au Général Paget, afin que je prenne des mesures pour vous la rendre.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Général  
Baron Maucune.*

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have desired the Commissary General to send to Coruña 5000 suits of clothing for the use of the corps of Spanish troops under General Porlier ; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will provide a ship for the conveyance of this equipment to that port.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Vives, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 30th Nov., 1812.

‘ I have sent to Don Carlos de España a warrant for the sum of \_\_\_\_\_, being for the pay of the officers and troops under the command of Don Carlos de España

and yourself, for the month of August, and another warrant for the sum of \_\_\_\_\_, being for the pay of the officers of the division of Don Carlos, and belonging to the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, for the month of September.

‘ I have sent this last in order to enable the officers to equip themselves as they ought to be.

‘ I have continued to advance this money, notwithstanding that I have no scruple in declaring that I am by no means satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, particularly in respect to the mode of performing the duties which they have been called upon to perform, in escorting prisoners, &c.

‘ I hope that such transactions will not occur again; and that when I shall have an opportunity of reviewing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I propose to do at an early period, I shall find all the troops in a good state of discipline, and their arms, accoutrements, and clothing in good order.

‘ It is my opinion that the whole of Don Carlos’s division ought now to be in the garrison and suburbs of Ciudad Rodrigo; that there should be ten rounds of ammunition for each piece of ordnance in the outworks; that there should be an officer and 20 men in each of them every night; and an in-line piquet in the fort of 200 men every day, in readiness to move to any point which may be threatened.

‘ The officers on guard in the outworks must have orders to hold their posts to the last extremity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Vives.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Freneda, 30th Nov., 1812.

‘ I did not receive your letter of the 28th till last night. The fact is, that by some means or other, the precaution which I had taken in the summer, to provide for the army 35,000 rations of hay at Espeja, was defeated; and I am sorry to say that this occurs so frequently, owing to the mode in which we are in the habit of allowing our soldiers, bät-men, and followers to go on, that it does require notice and serious attention. Possibly, nay, probably, the mischief was done before the Guards went to Espeja; as I have generally

observed that they do less of this kind of mischief, and are more regular in all their duties and in every respect than the other troops.

‘ The utter contempt of the authority of a Portuguese guard is one of the evils of which I complain. It is not in the nature of the Portuguese to oppose any thing in the shape of an Englishman; yet Portuguese, and even Portuguese militia, must be used on these services. British officers would think it rather extraordinary if British soldiers were scattered all over the country as guards over hay stacks or magazines. Indeed, if they were, I doubt their doing their duty as it ought to be done.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Commissioners of the Transport Office.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Freneda, 30th Nov., 1812.

‘ Being desirous of effecting the exchange of Major Jose Joaquim Talaya, of the Portuguese Engineers, who was taken by the enemy at Campo Mayor, and permitted to return to Portugal on his parole, I shall be much obliged to you if you will send a French officer of his rank to France in exchange for him, and transmit to me the cartel, in order that I may forward it to Major Talaya, and authorize him to serve again.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Commissioners*

*of the Transport Office.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 30th Nov., 1812.

‘ Some white breeches cloth, which was sent from England for the use of the 45th regiment, and was afterwards sold at Lisbon, as it was not required for the soldiers, having been seized by the officers of the Portuguese customs, I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay before the Government my request that this cloth should be released, on the amount of the established duties on English goods being paid into the Custom House.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Freneda, 1st December, 1812. 9 A.M.

‘ I have received yours of the 29th this morning. I have no objection to your giving furloughs to the Portuguese soldiers in the 6th division, in moderate numbers at a time, and in their turn. But it must be understood and positively stated, that if any man does not return to his time, none will be allowed to go in future.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Freneda, 1st December, 1812.

‘ Fremantle delivered to me last night the letters which you had received in regard to the enemy’s movements towards the Puerto de Baños.

‘ I do not exactly understand their movements on the Upper Tormes. It appears to me that they have taken up their cantonments in the province of Avila, and that their advanced guard is on this side of the Tormes; and that the troops of the advanced guard are those of whose movements we hear so frequently.

‘ I do not think they will come down to Plasencia. If they do, it will probably be in large force, and the movement must be connected with those of the troops about Salamanca. I do not think, therefore, that you will be disturbed in your cantonments, particularly as you will be well covered by the Alagon.

‘ But if you should find the enemy collect in too large force for you on the Estremadura side of Baños, and it should be necessary for you to retire, you must retire upon Castello Branco.

‘ It will be necessary, in that case, to direct the officer at the bridge of Alcantara to march away with the bridge to Marvañ, and to direct all the boats, &c., to be taken up on the river.

‘ I shall be obliged to you to send to the officer at the bridge, and see what assistance he requires either to lay it, or to take it up, or to remove it; and have that assistance

given to him by the nearest troops, and by your commissariat.

‘ I hear there is a band of robbers between Truxillo and Merida, who are playing the devil. If you have sent Penne Villemur across the Tagus, desire him to destroy these people.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 1st December, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning (dated 31st Nov.) I have received a letter of yesterday, at 11 o'clock, from Blanckley, from Monforte, who says that the enemy are moving every thing from Bejar and elsewhere, towards the Puerto de Congosto and Avila. I am inclined to believe this.

‘ I have another letter of the 29th, at 4 in the evening, from a clergyman at Batuceas, near Alverca, who says the enemy were moving on Plasencia. Blanckley was, however, so certain of the truth of his intelligence, that he was about to go towards Baños and Bejar himself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Peacocks.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 1st December, 1812.

‘ It has been stated to me that the horses of the Life Guards have landed at Lisbon in very bad condition ; and I have been informed that the men have come unprovided with currycombs or brushes.

‘ As these articles are essentially necessary on service in this country, in which it has been found that attention to the cleanliness of the horse's coat tends essentially to the preservation of his health and condition, I beg you will desire the Commanding Officers of the two regiments of Life Guards to take immediate measures to have the soldiers supplied with currycombs and brushes ; and that I rely upon

them to make every exertion in their power to restore the condition of their horses.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 1st December, 1812.

‘ Notwithstanding that Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton has been serving with the army, his wound is still open, and it is necessary that he should return to England. I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will give him a passage in a man-of-war.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 1st December, 1812.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 27th November. Very great inconvenience is felt at head quarters from Senhor Sodré's absence, and if he is to go to Brazils, somebody must be employed here to perform the duty which he has performed hitherto.

‘ I can have no objection to his going to Brazils if he thinks such a voyage will be of advantage to him. But I beg that it may be clearly understood by him, by the Local Government, and by the Prince, that Senhor Sodré is not deputed by me in any manner ; and that he is not charged even with a message from me.

‘ I do not understand why the 200,000 dollars were not paid to the Portuguese Government in dollars as I ordered. I ordered a second 100,000 to be given in November, and Mr. Kennedy tells me that he likewise ordered the 200,000 for October to be paid in immediately. I propose to try to give 200,000 in November.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,                      ‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 9 A.M.

‘ I received in the night a letter from Blanckley, dated Monforte, at ten P.M., the 30th of November, in which he confirms the report communicated to you in my letter of yesterday afternoon; and he says that the whole of the enemy's force has passed the Tornes, and moved towards Arevalo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,                      ‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th November, and although there are other points on which I have to write to you, and on which I have proposed to write this day, I shall not delay to answer that letter immediately. The way in which I have always considered your situation in the army, was as Marshal of the Portuguese army, and of course next in command to myself, as long as I should be in a situation to exercise any command at all.

‘ An officer has been from time to time appointed second in command to this army, upon whom it was the intention of the King's Ministers that the command of the allied army should devolve, in case any circumstance should deprive me of the command of the army.

‘ I imagined that it had been explained to, and understood by, the Portuguese Government, when you were sent to command the Portuguese army, that the officer appointed to command the British army was to command both; and I was not aware, till there was a discussion with the Regency upon this point, I believe in the beginning of 1811, that this point had not been explained, and that I commanded the allied army as Marshal General. This point not having been explained, it follows of course either that the British General officer, second in command, must, in the event of my being deprived of the command, be made Marshal General; or the awkwardness must occur to which you refer,

in regard to your own situation ; or you must take the command of the allied army, and not the General officer sent out by Government specially for the purpose of taking the command, in case circumstances should deprive me of it.

‘ I have always felt the inutility and inconvenience of the office of second in command. It has a great and high sounding title, without duties or responsibility of any description ; at the same time that it gives pretensions, the assertion of which are, and I believe you know I found them in one instance to be, very inconvenient. Every officer in an army should have some duty to perform, for which he is responsible ; and I understand a General officer commanding a division or larger body of troops to be in this situation. The second in command has none that any body can define ; excepting to give opinions for which he is in no manner responsible, and which I have found one at least most ready to relinquish, when he found that they were not liked in England.

‘ Having made known these sentiments to Lord Bathurst, Sir Edward Paget was lately sent out with the explanation that he was coming as a Lieut. General in this army, but that Government looked to his succeeding to the command, in case circumstances should deprive me of it ; so the matter would stand in respect to any General officer who should now be sent out to fill his situation. In regard to your own situation in the army, what I have always felt was, that you had too many duties of a general nature to perform, and it was necessary to refer to you too often, to charge you with the details of command ; and excepting on the occasion on which I requested you to take the command in the Alentejo in 1811, (which Hill had held,) during his absence, I have not desired you to take upon you such details.

‘ The convenience of the service might however lead to a different decision, and I have always felt that you were ready to take upon you any duty which might be imposed upon you whenever it should be necessary. From the contents of this letter you will observe that the conversation between us to which you refer, as having passed immediately previous to the battle of Salamanca, related on my part to the situation of the next in British rank to me, solely in the event of any circumstance depriving me of the command ;

as I never entertained a doubt, particularly after the decision of the Commander in Chief, in which I entirely concurred, that you took your rank next to me in the allied army as Marshal.

‘ I shall send your letters to the Secretary of State by this post, though I wish some parts of both were altered.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’*

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir William Beresford, in relation to his rank in the allied army, to which I beg to draw your attention.

‘ The Commander in Chief having decided, upon reference to him in the year 1809, that officers in the service of His Majesty and the Prince Regent of Portugal should rank with each other according to the dates of their several commissions ; there is no doubt whatever that Marshal Sir William Beresford, holding the rank of a Marshal, ranks next me in the allied army. I hold the rank of Marshal General in the allied army.

‘ His Majesty’s Government have thought proper from time to time to appoint a General officer to be second in command to the British army, senior in rank in the British service to Sir William Beresford, on which officer it has been the intention of His Majesty’s Government that the command of the allied army should devolve, in case any circumstance should deprive me of the command.

‘ It does not appear, however, that any explanation in regard to command has ever been had with the Portuguese Government, in order to remove the awkwardness which Marshal Sir William Beresford notices ; and in point of fact I command the allied army now as Marshal General of the Portuguese army. In case circumstances should deprive me of the command, therefore, either the second in command of the British army must be made Marshal General likewise, or Marshal Beresford must quit the army at a moment when his absence might be interpreted to his disadvantage ; or he must assume the command of the allied army and not the

officer selected by His Majesty's Government as the person on whom they wish it should devolve.

'In case Government should think proper to send any General officer out to replace Lieut. General Sir Edward Paget, it is desirable they should advert to the circumstances affecting his situation, stated by Marshal Sir William Beresford.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Earl Bathurst.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To the Hon. Berkeley Paget.*

'MY DEAR BERKELEY,

'Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

'I enclose two letters from your poor brother. I have not received that one which he says he wrote to me from Matilla; nor has he received one which I wrote to him and sent to him with £200. The latter was sent to the outposts of Soult's army, whereas he was with the army of Portugal.

'He is gone towards France, and you must try to get him exchanged. As he does not acknowledge the receipt of it, I conclude that he has not got the first money we sent him on the day after he was taken. He will be badly off therefore with his twenty four doubloons, unless you take some measures to supply him in France.

'It is just possible that the French officer will send the money after him.

'There is a letter from him for Lord Uxbridge, which will go to England by this mail.

'Believe me, &c.

'*The Hon. Berkeley Paget.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To General Vives, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.*

'SIR,

'Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

'I have received a complaint from Major Napier of the 43rd regiment, stating that a soldier of the artillery of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo stabbed with a knife in the belly a soldier of the 43rd regiment, on the 29th of last month. The soldier guilty of this offence is known to the Major of the artillery of the garrison, having been pointed out to him by Major Napier; and as offences of this nature have been committed too frequently lately, I request that the offence

of this soldier may be investigated in the most solemn manner, and that he may be punished according to law, if he should be found to deserve punishment.

‘ I am concerned to have to mention to you that Major Napier complains that the Major of the artillery, instead of doing every thing in his power, as was his duty, to discover and bring this offender to punishment, did every thing in his power to elude the discovery of the offender, and to screen him. If this be true, it is not astonishing that offences of this description are frequent.

‘ But if it be true, the Major of the artillery is highly criminal; and I beg that he may be put in arrest, and may be brought to trial “ for having omitted to do every thing in his power to discover a soldier of the artillery of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 29th November, who had stabbed a soldier of the 43rd regiment in the belly.”

‘ Major Napier shall attend to give evidence before the Court which will be appointed to try the Major of the artillery, at any time and place which shall be named.

‘ I beg to refer your Excellency to the letter which I wrote to Don Carlos de España, on the 28th of May, when I consented to advance the pay of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, from the military chest of this army; and by which you will see that it depended upon the attention to discipline of the officers and troops; and that no person was to receive pay who should not be actually doing duty.

‘ The Major of artillery cannot be supposed to be performing his duty when he is in arrest; and I request that your Excellency will retain in your hands the sum of 3000 reals set down in the estimate for his pay for two months, until I shall be made acquainted with the result of his trial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Fives.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Don Carlos de España.*

‘ SIR.

‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘ I am concerned to inform you that the commanding officer of the 14th light dragoons has informed me that Lieut. Mannel Pastor of the *cazadores de Castilla* cut down a dragoon of the 14th regiment at San Felices el Grande

with his sword, on the 28th November; this dragoon having done nothing to offend him.

‘As circumstances of this kind have occurred very frequently lately, I beg that this officer may be put in arrest, and brought to trial.

‘Your Excellency will recollect that when I consented to advance the pay of the troops under your command from the military chest of the army, it was on condition that the troops should be disciplined, and kept as soldiers ought to be; and likewise that no person should receive pay who did not perform his duty.

‘I leave your Excellency to decide how far the troops under your command can be called disciplined.

‘It is certain, however, that when Lieut. Manuel Pastor shall be in arrest, he cannot be supposed to be performing his duty; and therefore I request that the sum of 900 reals, being the amount of his pay for two months, for which you have a warrant in your possession, may be detained in your hands, till I shall be made acquainted with the result of the investigation into his conduct.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General

‘WELLINGTON.

*Don Carlos de España.*

*To Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘MY DEAR ADMIRAL,

‘Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘It is probable that Government may be desirous of sending more men and horses to this country, and I am anxious that the whole should arrive before the spring equinoctial gales. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send back the horse ships and transports, &c., as soon as the horses and men they shall have brought may be disembarked; of course unless you should have received directions from the Admiralty for the disposal of them in a different manner.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘ I have received a long letter from Sir Robert Kennedy, with which I will not trouble you, respecting the effect of an order which you have lately given Mr. Pipon, to give Mr. Sampayo bills upon the Treasury in exchange for certain Commissary paper in his possession, at the rate of exchange of the day. I am concerned that you did not write to me on this subject, as Sir R. Kennedy complains that the conduct of Mr. Pipon in this instance is directly in disobedience of his orders, given with a view to the amelioration of our finances, which effect they had already in some degree produced. It is better that upon all these occasions we should incur the inconvenience of a little delay, and allow matters to go through their regular channel.

‘ I acknowledge that my opinion of Mr. Sampayo is a little shaken by this transaction. I consider the purchasers of our Commissariat bills and debts as the worst enemies we have in the Peninsula; and there is no person in the Peninsula who knows so well as Mr. Sampayo that I entertain this opinion. I suspected, unjustly, that he purchased our debts incurred on the expedition to Oporto, in the year 1809, and he knows that I ordered the then Commissary General, Mr. Murray, to pay him the last of all our creditors. He afterwards convinced me that he had been a contractor under Mr. Rawlins, and I ordered that he might be paid immediately; but I explained to him, and he perfectly understood, the mischief he would have done us as a purchaser of our debts.

‘ Mr. Sampayo is employed as our broker, and he has besides had contracts for the supply of various sums of money on private bargains. Surely if he had money he should have put it in the chest, and should not have speculated in our debts. But then he says he sold corn for these securities. That is just as bad. The securities were never intended to be transferable; and they are our worst enemies, and the worst enemies of the Portuguese Government also, who at all aid in making them so.

‘ I am not astonished at the determination of the Commissary General no longer to employ Mr. Sampayo as a

broker, if he does not clear himself of the charge of speculating in our debts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Will you send the enclosed letter to Madeira by the first opportunity ?’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘ I beg leave to recommend to your protection the family of the late Major Wurmb, of the King’s German Legion, who fell at the siege of Burgos. I understand that they are very numerous, and totally unprovided for.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘ I enclose, to be laid before the Commander in Chief, a letter from Major General Walker relative to the loss of his baggage on the day subsequent to the capture of Badajoz.

‘ I am so fully aware of the outrages committed by the troops at the time, and of the very unfortunate situation in which the Major General was placed by the plunder of every thing he was possessed of, at a moment when he was rendered incapable of attending to his own concerns by the severity of his wounds, that I am induced strongly to recommend the case to his Royal Highness’s favorable notice, although it is evidently not customary to grant compensation for losses to be attributed solely to the irregularities of the soldiers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

‘ Although I have not yet any intelligence upon which I can rely of the exact position of the enemy’s armies, I am

certain that the whole have crossed the Tormes, with the exception of very small posts in front of Salamanca; and I have ordered the whole of the allied army into cantonments, those under Sir Rowland Hill in the province of Coria, and the remainder in the province of Beira, on the Douro and Mondego, with the exception of the Light division and Lieut. General Alten's brigade of cavalry, which remain on the Agueda. The whole of the troops will be supplied throughout the winter without difficulty; and are in situations in which they can receive the clothing and other equipments which they require.

'The last accounts from General Elio state his intention of being in Alicante on the 9th ultimo. Some detachments of his army were in Madrid. The Duque del Parque, who now commands the troops lately under the command of General Ballesteros, was on the 22nd at Villa Neuva de los Infantes.

'The army of Galicia have crossed the Duero, and have moved into Galicia; and the troops under Don Carlos de España have gone into the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and those under the Conde de Penne Villemur and General Morillo have crossed the Tagus at Alcantara into Lower Estremadura.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Earl Bathurst.*'

'WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

'MY DEAR LORD,

'Freneda, 2nd Dec., 1812.

'You will see by my dispatch how I have disposed of the army. I am quite convinced that I have adopted the only measure which will set us to rights, and I hope in a short time to hear of great improvements.

'I propose to take the field with the largest body I can get together as early in the spring as the green forage will be on the ground. I shall be obliged to you therefore if you will take measures that all the horses, reinforcements, recruits, ordnance, &c., which you prepare to send to the army, may sail from England by the 1st of February.

'I propose to go to Cadiz as soon as I shall be quite certain that the French are settled for the winter, and in what shape. I have much to arrange with the Spanish Govern-

ment. I shall not be long absent from hence, and indeed not many days absent from some of the posts of the army.

‘ I write to Admiral Martin not to detain any transports or horse ships one moment after they shall have disembarked those men or horses which they shall have brought.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’ ]

‘ WELLINGTON.

] *To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 3rd Dec., 1812. ]

‘ I enclose the copy of my last dispatches. I am certain that the French have all retired across the Tormes, but I do not yet know to what positions, as I can get but little intelligence. I propose, however, to set out for Cadiz in a few days, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will have *tiros* placed for me at Fuente Cantos, one half way between Fuente Cantos and Seville, and one at Seville.

‘ Send a messenger to meet me on the road by Badajoz and Valencia de Alcantara, to let me know whether I shall find the *tiros*; and where.

‘ I shall write to the Minister at War to-morrow, and shall send you a copy of the letter.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ I shall take my own carriage.’

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Freneda, 4th Dec., 1812.

‘ You will see from the Quarter Master General’s paper how the troops will be distributed in cantonments, where I propose that, if possible, they should remain during the winter. If I am not disturbed beforehand, it is my wish to assemble the army and to move forward as early in April as there will be green forage; that is to say, if we should be strong enough to move forward at all. I therefore wish that the recruits, convalescents, and every thing which the troops require, should be with their regiments by the middle of March. I shall be glad if you will make arrangements accordingly.

‘ It is best, indeed, that every thing should be sent to the regiments as soon as possible; but I mention the middle of March as the period at which every thing ought to be complete.

‘ You will see that I have sent D’Urban’s cavalry into Tras os Montes, with which disposition he appears well satisfied. Campbell’s and Diggens’s will go into the Alentejo. I have not seen M’Grigor since I received your letter, but I will speak to him respecting Mr. Burrows, whose assistance you wish to have.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’*

*To Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 4th Dec., 1812.

‘ In consequence of the excessive number of men of the —nd regiment absent from their regiment on the march of the 15th and 16th Nov., and of the reports which I had received of the habitual want of discipline of the —nd regiment, I gave orders that the Commanding Officer of that regiment should be put in arrest, with the intention of bringing him to trial before a General Court Martial for gross neglect of duty, in having allowed the officers commanding companies so far to neglect theirs, as to allow so many men to quit the ranks of their companies on the march.

‘ I have since found, by a correspondence which Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole has put into my hands, that this officer was Colonel —; and although I am of opinion that the reasons alleged in that correspondence by Colonel — afford no justification whatever for his conduct, or for the neglect of the officers of the regiment, but that, on the contrary, Colonel —’s letters prove that the officers of the —nd regiment were guilty of a further neglect of duty, of which I was not aware till I read the letters. viz., that the soldiers of the —nd did not cook on the evening of the 14th November, I am disposed to release Colonel — from his arrest.

‘ I desire that he may be released, because I am in hopes that the circular letter which I addressed to the General

Officers commanding divisions on the 28th November, will have its due weight on the mind of Colonel ———, and of the officers under his command in particular, and on the army in general; and that Colonel ——— and the officers under his command will see that officers commanding and doing duty in regiments have important duties to perform in their cantonments, in their camps, and on marches, besides the regular attendance at parades; and that they will hereafter perform those duties, and prevent the recurrence of the evils, of which, in the —nd regiment in particular, I have too much reason to complain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*the Earl of Dalhousie.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Robert Kennedy, Commissary General.*

‘ Freneda, 4th Dec., 1812.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

Half-past 9 A.M.

‘ I have perused Mr. ———’s report regarding the great coats and tents. I consider what he says to be very unsatisfactory regarding both these objects. If articles of public store arrive to the charge of a particular commissary in bad order—from wet, for instance—it is quite a novel doctrine to say that he has performed his duty by putting them in a place where they could receive no injury; and that the injury they received was on the road, before they came to his hands. Surely it is the duty of a Commissary in charge of stores to endeavor at least to preserve them for the public service; and if they have received injury from wet on the road to have them dried. In this case of the tents and great coats, head quarters were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and the state of these stores ought to have been reported. There were at Ciudad Rodrigo, at the same time, hundreds of convalescents; and an application from Mr. ——— to the Commandant would have got him all the assistance he wished for. This is a very bad business altogether.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Mr. ——— to deliver to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo ten of the tents which are there; and, at all events, let us have those remaining dried and properly taken care of in the stores.

‘ I observe that Mr. Bissett is still in Portugal. It is necessary that he should obey the orders of the Secretary of State, and go to Gibraltar.

‘ I ordered, in the month of May last, that tin camp-kettles should be provided for the troops ; and I know that orders were given that they should be made at Lisbon and at Oporto. I believe they were made ; and, as well as I can recollect, Mr. Dalrymple told me at Burgos that there were a considerable number at St. Joaõ da Pesqueira. There are none in the return of stores you gave me the other day, excepting about 1000 at Lisbon, Coimbra, and Valada. Indeed, the whole concern of our Quarter Master General’s stores requires amendment ; as is obvious from Mr. ———’s having on the 19th returned 15,000 great coats at Ciudad Rodrigo, whereas only 10,000 had been ordered there, and he had really only 9500.

‘ It is very desirable that this concern should be put upon a proper footing, and that I should get regular periodical returns of what is in store at each place, made out alphabetically, and specifying whether for the Portuguese, Spanish, or British army.

‘ I observe, by the returns, that there are in the stores at Lisbon, bayonet belts for infantry, 45,150 ; gun slings, 45,112 ; pouch belts, 45,143 ; pouches, 45,148. I should wish to know whether these stores were sent out for the Spanish, Portuguese, or British army ; whether they are made of buff or black leather. At all events, I should wish that ten thousand of each should be brought round to Oporto, or Figueira, as soon as possible ; and that the buff, if there should be any in store, should be brought round in preference to the others.

‘ Pray let me know what orders you have given for bringing the clothing up to the several regiments of the 1st division from Lamego ; Colonel Stirling’s brigade from Lamego ; the 7th division from Figueira ; the 3rd and 4th divisions from Abrantes ; General Anson’s and General Ponsonby’s brigades from Figueira ; General Alten’s brigade, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Robert Kennedy,*  
*Commissary General.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Don Josef de Carvajal, Minister at War, Cadiz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 4th Dec., 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 18th November, in which you have enclosed the copy of the decree of the Cortes, by which I have been appointed to command in chief the Spanish armies; and I beg leave again to express my acknowledgments for the confidence which has thus been reposed in me; and the Cortes and Government may rest assured that I will omit nothing which depends upon me to forward the just cause of the Spanish nation.

‘ Your Excellency and the Government have a right to expect from me an accurate representation of facts as they shall appear to me; and you may depend upon it that I will perform this duty.

‘ I am concerned to have to inform you that the discipline of the Spanish armies is in the very lowest state; and their efficiency is, consequently, much deteriorated. Neither officers nor troops having been paid for months, nay, some for years, it cannot be expected that the troops should be in very good order, or that there should exist much subordination in the service.

‘ But circumstances have come to my knowledge, and under my view, lately, which show that the evil has taken deep root; and that it requires a stronger remedy than the mere removal of the causes, viz., want of pay, clothing, and necessaries, which have originally occasioned it. Not only are your armies undisciplined and inefficient, and both officers and soldiers insubordinate from want of pay, provisions, clothing, and necessaries, and the consequent endurance of misery for a long period of time, but the habits of indiscipline and insubordination are such, that even those corps which have been well clothed and regularly paid by my directions, and have, to my knowledge, seldom, if ever, felt any privations for more than a year, are in as bad a state, and as little to be depended upon as soldiers, as the others. The desertion is immense, even from the troops last adverted to. I can assure your Excellency, that the officers of the army in general (with some exceptions of officers, General and on the Staff, as well as attached to

regiments) take but little pains to apply a remedy to these evils; and, upon the whole, I am sorry to acknowledge to your Excellency, that I consider that I have undertaken a task of which the result is as little promising as that which was ever undertaken by any individual.

‘I certainly was not aware, till very lately, of the real state of the Spanish army, or I should have hesitated before I should have charged myself with such an Herculean labor as its command; but having accepted the command, I will not relinquish the task because it is laborious and the success unpromising; but will exercise it as long as I shall possess the confidence of the authorities who have conferred it upon me. It will be necessary, however, that the Government should arm me with powers to enable me to perform this task. It is my opinion,

‘First; that officers should be promoted, and should be appointed to commands, solely at my recommendation.

‘Secondly; that I should have the power of dismissing from the service those whom I should think deserving such punishment.

‘Thirdly; that those resources of the State which are applicable to the payment, or equipment, or supply of the troops, should be applied in such manner as I might recommend.

‘Fourthly; in order to enable me to perform my duties, it will be necessary that the Chief of the Staff, and such limited number of the Staff Officers of the army as may be thought necessary, should be sent to my head quarters; and that the Government should direct that all military reports of all descriptions should be sent to me; and I shall, of course, make my reports to your Excellency.

‘The division of the Spanish territory into districts, and the appointment of an army to each district, was a wise arrangement; and I should propose that it should continue. But it must be observed, that it is a most expensive and burthensome arrangement to the public.

‘For instance, Castille and Estremadura are the territory of the 5th army; and, besides Captain General Castaños, who is most usefully and deservedly employed, there is a Captain General with a large staff in Estremadura, and a Captain General with a large staff in Castille. There are

not in the former province as many troops as will form the garrison of Badajoz ; nor in the latter as many as will form the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ The large staff in Castille is not only useless, but destructive of the resources by which troops could be maintained.

‘ Then in the same manner the 2nd and 3rd armies do not, altogether, compose two divisions, and yet they have attached to them all the staff, military as well as civil, of two complete armies.

‘ The 7th army in like manner is composed almost entirely of bands of guerrillas ; and the only corps that I know of in Spain that at all approach in numbers to the size of armies are the 4th and 6th.

‘ I would propose to your Excellency that the Captain General Castaños should continue, as he is at present, the Captain General of the 5th, 6th, and 7th armies, with the staff attached belonging to one only of those armies, viz., the 6th, and that all the rest, of every description, civil as well as military, should be recalled by the Government, excepting only such officers as General Castaños should think proper to retain for the performance of the duties in the provinces of Castille and Estremadura.

‘ An arrangement of the same description ought to be applied to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th armies ; but I should wish to defer to make any proposition regarding these armies till I shall have seen more of the detail of their state.

‘ I should wish also to defer to a future opportunity, to draw your attention to the alterations which the existing state of the country requires should be made in the powers of the Captain General of the provinces, and the Intendants respectively.

‘ We must not conceal from ourselves that there is but little authority of any description whatever in the provinces which have been occupied by the enemy ; and even that little depends on the exercise of military power. It is vain to expect that a gentleman called an Intendant will exercise the power to realize the resources of the country for the state, or even for the military, without the assistance of a military force ; which military force, in the existing state of the army, will destroy more than its efforts would produce,

even supposing that the military chief should be at all times disposed and ready to assist in supporting the civil authority of the Intendant.

‘ I am aware that it is wrong in principle to invest military men with civil powers; but when the country is in danger that must be adopted which will tend most directly to save it: when the enemy is in the country that must be done which tends most directly to drive him out, whatever may be the constitutional principles which may be invaded by those measures. I throw this out at present for your consideration, reserving myself to a future time to make a distinct proposition on this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Josef de Carvajal,*  
*Minister at War.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 4th Dec., 1812.

‘ I enclose the draft of my letter to the Minister at War. There is nothing new.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 4th Dec., 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Sir R. Kennedy, in regard to the difficulties in the construction of a *jetée* on the Tagus at Junqueira.

‘ The object in constructing this *jetée* is to facilitate and expedite the landing of provisions and stores; in which object it would appear that the Portuguese Government are interested, if they are at all interested in facilitating the defence of the country.

‘ It is a military object; and I have always understood and have known, that private property of all descriptions, corn, trees, horses, cattle, carts, houses, &c., have been seized by embargo, when required for military purposes, generally without payment; but whether with or without payment, every thing has been seized that is required by the Portuguese army, without consulting the inclination of the owner.

‘ Probably the Government are of opinion that the same rule ought not in reason to be required to be applied to the wants of a foreign army, however necessary the assistance of that foreign army to the defence of the country, and although that foreign army are willing to pay for what is required. However, as I differ in opinion with the Government upon this subject, I request that, if the refusal to force Senhor Caldas to supply the wood required, for payment, is persisted in, you will bring this case under the consideration of His Majesty’s Government. I shall certainly bring it under the consideration of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To S. Hunter, Esq., Deputy Paymaster General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 6th Dec., 1812.

‘ Dr. M<sup>c</sup>Grigor has represented to me the great inconvenience felt by the Officers of the Medical Staff, in consequence of their being unable to receive their pay at the several hospital stations at which they are employed, even at the late periods at which the Staff pay, paid from the ordinaries of the army, is issued to the army at large, there being at those hospital stations no branch of the pay department. It has, therefore, appeared to me to be expedient to direct that the Purveyor General of the hospital shall give in an estimate every two months of the Staff pay due to the whole medical department attached to this army wherever stationed, with the exception of that part of it at Cadiz; and that a warrant shall be made out in the name of the Purveyor General to enable him to receive the Staff pay of the whole department for whom he will have estimated; for which sum he will give his receipt in triplicate.

‘ He will then issue their pay to the several officers entitled to receive it, taking their receipts in triplicate, which he will forward to the office at Lisbon, when his receipt will be returned.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *S. Hunter, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To His Royal Highness the Duke of York.*

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 6th Dec., 1812.

‘According to your Royal Highness’s former directions, I have given directions that the privates of the 24th regiment, and of the 2nd batt. 38th regiment, should be transferred to the 1st battalions of those regiments respectively, and that the skeletons of those two battalions should be sent to England.

‘I have directed that the effectives of the Queen’s regiment, the 24th, 30th, 44th, 53rd, and 58th, should be transferred into four companies of each of those battalions, and that the officers and non-commissioned officers of those companies from which the privates have been transferred should be sent home. I have formed the four companies of the Queen’s and the four companies of the 53rd into a battalion; the four companies of the 24th and the four companies of the 58th into another; and the four companies of the 30th and the four companies of the 44th into another.

‘I enclose a copy of the orders which I have issued upon this subject, from which your Royal Highness will see the detail of the arrangement.

‘My reason for adopting this arrangement is, that I have for the service in this country the whole number of men of which these provisional battalions will be composed, all of whom are seasoned to the service and climate. Experience has shown that they could not be replaced by three times their numbers brought from England, or any other part of the world. However, if your Royal Highness disapproves of the arrangement, it will be easy to break up these battalions, and to send the officers and men home, upon receiving your Royal Highness’s orders to that effect.

‘If your Royal Highness should approve of the arrangement, I should wish to extend its principle to the 51st and 68th regiments, and to send home the officers and non-commissioned officers of four companies of each of those regiments. I should wish, however, as those are light regiments, still to keep them as separate battalions, each consisting of six companies, in this country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Royal Highness  
the Duke of York.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Freneda, 6th Dec., 1812.

‘ I enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by Lieut. Colonel Jackson\*, who is now doing the duty of Assistant Quarter Master General with Lieut. General Sir Rowland Hill’s detachment. He is called from that duty to perform that of a mounted officer with a battalion of Guards.

‘ I have always been in the habit of considering the wish of one of their Royal Highnesses respecting their regiment as a law, and have acted accordingly, when it has not militated with His Majesty’s regulations. I beg you, however, to represent to the Commander in Chief that Lieut. General Sir R. Hill has informed me that he shall feel the greatest inconvenience from the want of the assistance of Lieut. Colonel Jackson, and I certainly do not know where I shall find an officer qualified to replace him in that situation. It might not be difficult to find one to replace him as a mounted officer with the Coldstream Guards.

‘ I have frequently mentioned to you the great inconvenience which I felt from the constant change of officers in charge of every important department, or filling every situation of rank or responsibility with this army. No man can be aware of the extent of this inconvenience who has not got this great machine to keep in order and to direct; and together with the British army, the Spanish and Portuguese concerns, the labor which these constant changes occasion is also of the most distressing description. No sooner is an arrangement made, the order given, and the whole in a train of execution, than a gentleman comes out who has probably but little knowledge of the practical part of his duty in any country, and none whatever in this most difficult of all scenes of military operation. Nobody in the British army ever reads a regulation or an order as if it were to be a guide for his conduct, or in any other manner than as an amusing novel; and the consequence is, that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into execution (and in this country the poverty of its resources renders them all complicated), every gentleman proceeds according to his fancy; and then, when it is found that the arrangement

\* Major General Sir Richard Jackson, K.C.B.

fails (as it must fail if the order is not strictly obeyed), they come upon me to set matters to rights, and thus my labor is increased ten fold.

‘ The officers on the Staff of the British army are effectives in regiments; and considering that it is most important to every army to have good and efficient Staff officers, I do not know that the Colonels of regiments have any right to interfere to prevent the appointment of officers to the Staff from their regiments, or to occasion by their influence the relinquishment of their offices on the Staff when they think proper. If they have this power of interference it is one which may very materially affect the public interests, and it ought not to be exercised lightly or with caprice. At the same time I admit the necessity of keeping regiments well officered, but I should wish to know who is more interested in keeping regiments well officered than the officer who commands the army?

‘ Believe me, &c,

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Freneda, 6th Dec., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd. The charges against Captain —— are so serious, that I cannot allow him to go unpunished, unless he should give in his resignation to quit the service forthwith. I have ordered him in arrest.

‘ I am very much afraid that I cannot give Major MacGregor the Majority of the Veteran Battalion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 8th Dec., 1812. 4 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 7th. I was in hopes I had put your troops in a plentiful country. I knew that part of it had supplied the consumption of Marmont's army last year, from July to December, and that in this year they had not a single soldier near them. I likewise recollected the fertility of the same country in the year 1809, and I knew that there was plenty of barley, at least about Zarza, in this year.

‘ However, all that I can say is, that I placed the army in cantonments for its convenience, and in order that the horses might recover their condition, and the men their discipline, and it is nearly a matter of indifference to me where they are cantoned.

‘ If the province of Coria and Plasencia cannot supply even the straw wanted for your infantry, and the few cavalry which I suppose you must keep with you, you must then go elsewhere ; and when I shall learn this is decidedly the case, I will point out the place for your cantonments.

‘ If the 13th dragoons and General Slade’s brigade cannot be supplied where they are, they had better cross the Tagus at Alcantara, and stay either in Estremadura south of the Tagus, or cross the frontier and go to Portalegre. If they cannot live there, they must go to Lisbon. But some exertion must be made by the officers of the cavalry to prevent the waste of forage wherever they go.

‘ I have got three divisions of infantry, and three brigades of cavalry, with their artillery, well cantoned and supplied in the valley of the Mondego, which is neither of half the extent or fertility, or so well peopled, as the valleys of the Tietar and the Alagon, nor is there one town of 40 houses in the whole extent of it. But I must do the General Officers of the cavalry the justice to say that they are desirous of overcoming, and not of making difficulties.

‘ I do not agree with the Conde de Penne Villemur that Soult’s troops have not gone to Oropesa. They have certainly gone there and to Arzobispo, and are about to look for food south of the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Freneda, 9th Dec., 1812.

‘ I am glad to find from your letter of the 3rd that the arrangements of D’Urban’s cavalry, and the cantonments of the army in general, will have been satisfactory.

‘ I did not move the 20th regiment, as I wished to be in some strength hereabouts, and meant it should wait till re-

lieved. But I have now desired that it may move as soon as the weather shall be a little settled.

‘ I do not see why the 22nd should remain at Merida.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ P.S. It would probably be best, under existing circumstances, not to put a regiment of militia in Almeida, but to keep the three disposable for the garrisons in Alentejo.

‘ I thought of a regiment of the line for Almeida, to save calling out the Militia. And if we can carry the war forward again, as I hope we may, we might then put the militia regiment in Almeida.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 9th Dec., 1812. 4 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 8th. When I wrote to you to retire, if necessary, upon Castello Branco, it was in the notion that the enemy might be too strong for you in your front. I had no idea that the provinces of Coria and Plasencia would not feed your troops; if I had entertained such an idea, I should not have directed them for relief on Lower Beira. They should have crossed the Tagus at Alcantara, and gone from thence into Estremadura and the Alentejo.

‘ I am not astonished at Major Tulloh's being unable to get his carriages into Idanha à Nova. Let him go immediately with the Portuguese artillery wherever he pleases.

‘ As for the British artillery, it may remain where you please, in any place where the horses and men can be fed. In regard to forage, officers are much mistaken if they suppose that any town in the Peninsula, however large, will furnish forage for a large number of animals for a length of time. The horses of a brigade of cavalry, or even of a brigade of artillery, must be separated by 20 or 30 in each village. They should be cantoned with the infantry, and by this mode all would get good stabling and forage, even in a country which it might be supposed would produce none.

‘ However, I should prefer that the horses should go even to Lisbon, than that I should be disappointed in my hopes of having the cavalry in good order early in the campaign.

‘ I imagine you are mistaken in supposing the bridge at Alcantara not to be ready. There is a letter from the officer in charge of it, of the 4th instant, in which he says, that it was then ready to be laid down. It would require only 12 hours to lay it down when you should give orders for it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*  
*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Freneda, 9th Dec., 1812. 10 A.M.

‘ have received your letter of the 6th, and I entertain no doubt whatever that you have done and will do every thing in your power for the good of your division.

‘ If matters turn out only tolerably well during the winter, I hope to be able to take the field very early with a very large army ; and I am very anxious that you should be back at an early period. As business requires your absence, the sooner you go the better, and come back as soon as you can. In regard to your going to the Mediterranean, I confess that I do not think the service on that side of the Peninsula is very promising at present.

‘ I had a letter yesterday from your brother, and I saw one from Lord W. Bentinck to Sir H. Wellesley. Your brother was so much inferior in strength to Suchet, particularly in cavalry, that he had not been able to take the field. Lord William states his intention to send 5000 men, British, Italian, and Sicilian, to the coast of Spain, and to come himself to take the command. This will make his numerical force equal to Suchet’s in Valencia, as it is stated by your brother ; but not equal to what is stated in the returns which I have. In those returns however, Poles are included, who probably have been drawn away for the war in the north.

‘ But still, supposing the numbers nearly equal, the want of cavalry is a great drawback. I would therefore recommend this scene to you, rather than that on the eastern coast. When you go, as Pakenham will be relieved from the charge of the 3rd division, I propose to send him to take care of yours till you return.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ When you wish to go, make an official application for leave, stating how long you wish to stay.’

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 9th Dec., 1812.

‘ Just to show you what a Portuguese complaint is, I enclose one which I received from the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal against Mr. — of the Commissariat, whom I ordered into close arrest for his conduct; and an officer went over from hence to inquire into the circumstances preparatory to Mr. —’s trial.

‘ As soon as the Juiz de Fora found that the matter was to be seriously noticed, he wrote the enclosed letter of the 7th instant; and in the mean time I understand that he has been constantly living with Mr. —, and the officer of whom he complained.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Since writing the above, I find that the Juiz de Fora has given Mr. — a certificate of his good conduct, and stating his wish, and that of the inhabitants, that he should return to Sabugal.’

*To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 9th Dec., 1812.

‘ I beg to submit to your Lordship’s consideration the application of Ensign — of the —th regiment, to receive the pension granted to Ensigns for the loss of a limb, although at the period when he received the wound which rendered amputation necessary, he had not a commission, but was serving as a volunteer in the —th regiment, and is therefore by the regulation not entitled to the allowance which has lately been granted to officers in his situation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.  
the Secretary at War.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 9th Dec., 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of field equipment required for the use of the army under my command ; and I beg that your Lordship may be pleased to cause the different articles to be sent to Lisbon as soon as may be possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 9th Dec., 1812.

‘ Nothing has occurred since I addressed you on the 2nd instant. Some of Marshal Soult’s troops arrived in the valley of the Tagus on the 3rd inst.

‘ The Spanish troops were still at Madrid in the end of last month.

‘ By a letter from Major General W. Clinton from Alicante, of the 8th November, I learn that he had not thought his force sufficiently strong to attack Marshal Suchet ; and he was still at Alicante.

‘ Accounts from the north of Spain state, that General Caffarelli had returned with the troops, which I informed your Lordship in my letter of the 7th ultimo had been seen passing Torquemada on the 4th of November. It is reported that he has since gone to France with the division of the Imperial Guard, which still remained in Spain under his command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Freneda, 10th Dec., 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 6th, and I am glad that you concur in the disposition of D’Urban’s cavalry. Campbell is gone into the Alentejo, and I yesterday desired Hill to send Major Tulloh’s artillery to Elvas and Estremoz ; where he proposed it should be sent.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the American news. If Buonaparte has any money he will send out a fleet if he is wise. But he has no money.

‘ I am glad that your ideas and mine agree about your military situation.

‘ It is certain that Government have always thought it necessary to have an officer here, selected by them to succeed to the command, in case I should be deprived of it; and there are some of the Government so partial to old practice and precedent, that they do not like a departure from either, in not calling this officer *second in command*. This officer might have been very useful in the days of councils of war, &c.; it may look well in a newspaper to see that such a general officer is “second in command.” But there is nobody in a modern army who must not see that there is no duty for the second in command to perform, and that this office is useless. It is at the same time inconvenient, as it gives the holder pretensions which cannot be gratified except at the public inconvenience.

‘ I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to Government on this subject, with yours.

‘ I do not know, and indeed I do not believe, that Government have any distinct idea upon this subject; but I happen to know that they did not consider — — as second in command at the battle of Salamanca.

‘ Matters being quiet here, and having put every thing in train for the re-equipment of the army, I am about to go to Cadiz to see what I can do there, and what is the real situation of affairs.

‘ I propose to get into fortune’s way if I should be able to assemble an army sufficiently strong; and we may make a lucky hit in the commencement of next campaign. But it is obvious that we cannot expect to save the Peninsula by military efforts, unless we can bring forward the Spaniards in some shape or other; and I want to see how far I can venture to go, in putting the Spanish army in a state to do something. In your life you never saw any thing so bad as the Galicians. Yet they are the finest body of men and best movers I have ever seen.

‘ God knows the prospect of success from this journey of mine is not bright; but still it is best to try something.

‘ The 20th regiment will march as soon as the weather is a little settled.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Marshal

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Freneda, 10th Dec., 1812. 6 P.M.

‘I have received yours of 6 P.M. yesterday evening. I doubt the French having arrived at Truxillo in time for the Alcalde at Brozas to hear of this event on the 8th in the evening. If they have gone there, it can be only a small detachment.

‘I propose going to Cadiz, and as you will command the troops in this quarter in my absence, which will last about three weeks, it is desirable that I should see you.

‘I leave this on the morning of the 12th, and shall be at Moraleja that afternoon, where I shall be happy to meet you on that day.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General  
Sir R. Hill, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘If you mean to dine at Moraleja, you had better bring your things, as I shall have nothing with me.’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Freneda, 10th Dec., 1812.

‘I enclose a letter which General Alava has received regarding the conduct of an officer of the Commissariat, who was in charge of cattle passing at Payo, and is said to belong to the 2nd division of the army.

‘You will see that his name is said to be Stourk, but Sir R. Kennedy does not know of any person of that name in the department. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inquire what person of the Commissariat passed lately at Payo with cattle to the 2nd division of infantry; and send to Payo to have him identified, and let him be put in close arrest, and let me know his name, that I may have charges brought against him without loss of time.

‘The officer of the staff corps referred to is I believe Lieut. Read, who was lately sent from hence to survey the course of the Tietar.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General  
Sir R. Hill, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 10th Dec., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th, and I will speak to Mr. Kennedy respecting Mr. Sampayo’s concern. I have always entertained the best opinion of Mr. Sampayo, and have given my consent to several arrangements proposed by him, solely because I relied implicitly on his integrity.

‘ I may be wrong in my notions respecting the circulation of our Commissariat bills; but I have been at least consistent in entertaining them. From what I mentioned in my letter of the 2nd, you will observe that I entertained them in the first year I was in the Peninsula. You will find them again in my letter of the 22nd of April last, regarding the payment of a debt to Messrs. Alcock and Co., on account of some bills which they had purchased; and I am now quite certain that if our debts and the Commissariat bills had never been purchased by the *sharks* at Lisbon, our finances would now have been in a much better state; at the same time that the people of the country, those who have really supplied us with something for our money, would have received more value for their commodities than they have received.

‘ There is no person better acquainted with these opinions, whether true or false, than Mr. Sampayo; and it is not astonishing that I should have been shaken by his having had any concern in such transactions. However, I am willing to believe he did what he thought was right and proper, more particularly as he says that Mr. — knew that he acted as he did; and I shall speak to the Commissary General, and will endeavor to remove any bad impression he may have received on the same subject. I must observe, however, *en passant* that Mr. — has shown himself in this instance again to be so stupid as to be quite unfit for the situation in which he is placed.

‘ I am sorry that the bills on the Treasury having been exchanged for the Commissariat bills, and, the transaction being closed, you did not allow it to remain as it was.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral G. Martin.*

‘ MY DEAR ADMIRAL,

‘ Freneda, 10th Dec. 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th, for which I am much obliged to you. Government appear to be at last making a serious effort to get the better of the American navy, which might as well have been made before.

‘ If Buonaparte is wise, and has money, he will send out a large fleet. He has no money, however, and he must have found before now that a fleet cannot be equipped and maintained, as he maintains his armies, by requisitions on the unfortunate country which is made the seat of war.

‘ Colonel Gordon, the Quarter Master General, has requested me to apply to you to facilitate his return to England in a ship of war.’

‘ I must mention to you that I have received very particular directions from Government, not to apply for a passage in a man of war for any officer whose return is not occasioned by the public service. That is to say, that Government is not to be put to the expense of an officer’s passage in a ship of war, unless the public service should have rendered his return necessary.

‘ Whenever an occasion of this kind occurs, I shall apply to you officially, stating the cause of the return of the officer to England, and you will grant the passage or not, according to the convenience of the service, for which the public will defray the expense.

‘ But many officers have occasion to go for other reasons besides those caused by the public service; and they are anxious to go in a ship of war. It may be in your power to facilitate their being gratified in this respect, either by recommending them to the Captain who may be going or otherwise, and if it is, I shall be much obliged to you. If it is not, they must go by the packet, as the Government will not defray the expense of these passages. I shall always apply for these as I now do for that of Colonel Gordon, apprizing them at the same time, as I have him, that it is very probable that you may not have it in your power to gratify their wishes.

‘ I mention this because I find that Admiral Berkeley is in a scrape for not attending to the distinction between officers going home on the public service, and officers going home on

their private concerns; on an occasion, however, in which the distinction was quite clear.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral G. Martin.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812. }

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter of enclosures which have been received from General Le Cor, complaining of the conduct of Lieut. Colonel —, of the Portuguese artillery, and other officers, in regard to taking forage at Idanha à Nova, in consequence of which I have given the order, of which the enclosed is a copy, to have those officers put in arrest.

‘ I enclose, likewise, the copy of the crime charged against Lieut. Colonel —; and I request you to give directions that he may be brought to trial for this neglect of duty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*’

*To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812. 11 A.M.

‘ I enclose letters which I have received regarding the conduct of Lieut. Colonel —’s and Captain —’s artillery, and the —th light dragoons, at Idanha à Nova, in regard to forage. This conduct occasions the difficulty in cantoning the troops in any country during the two or three months of the winter. Three brigades of artillery and a regiment of cavalry get together in one place; and in one day they destroy four times the quantity of forage for which they give receipts.

‘ I have ordered a General Court Martial to be assembled in the 2nd division of infantry, before which I request that the commanding officer of the —th light dragoons, and Captain — may be brought, on charges of which the enclosed are copies; and I beg that the Adjutant General attached to the 2nd division may prosecute them.

‘ The complainants at Idanha à Nova must be called to give their evidence before this Court Martial.

‘ I likewise enclose the charge against Lieut. Colonel —, which I request may be sent to him by the staff officer attached to General Hamilton’s division.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir R. Hill, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812. Noon.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th. The General Order of the 4th instant was not intended to refer to you. The Quarter Master General mentioned to me what you had done at Celorico, and I approved of it.

‘ The commanding officers of regiments are naturally jealous of the general hospitals; and they were in the habit of sending orders occasionally to the men of their regiments in hospital, and occasionally to the commandants at the hospital stations, to send particular men to join their regiments. General Officers adopted the same practice; and, in consequence, nobody was responsible either for the march of the men from the hospitals at the proper period of their recovery, or for the conduct of the soldiers on their march to join their regiments. The orders were therefore given that nobody was to interfere with men in hospitals excepting the Commandant.

‘ It is impossible in drawing up a General Order to foresee every case which ought to be excepted from its general provisions; and the case of the passage of a division to the rear, by an hospital station still left in front, is not provided for. However, the General Officer commanding a division would, as you did, communicate with the officer commanding the hospital station, and take away with him only those men of whose departure the Commandant should approve.

‘ But after you had passed, orders were sent to Major Cimitiere by General Officers of all ranks and descriptions, as well as by commanding officers of regiments, and adjutants, and even serjeant majors, and not only to Major Cimitiere, but to the officers in charge of the sick and convalescents under his command, and in some instances even to the sick themselves. This is the irregularity to which I referred in the General Order.

‘ The fact is, however, that I ought to have given an

order that the convalescents should join their divisions as they passed Celorico. But it is impossible to think of every thing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General H. Clinton.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Don Josef de Carrvajal, Minister at War.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Don Estevan Mexia, the Intendant of the province of Castille, in which you will observe a relation of the practical evils resulting from the appointment of a Captain General and Staff to this province.

‘ The Intendant of the army (there being no army) has seized the grain and money which the Civil Intendant of the province had destined for the consumption of the troops in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and has applied these articles, I conclude, for the support of the staff of the army of Castille established at Freixo. I hear the *Lanceros* have seized and sold another portion, which they had been appointed to escort to the garrison.

‘ I enclose the copy of the answer which I have written to Don Estevan Mexia regarding the supplies received by the army under my command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Josef de Carrvajal,*  
*Minister at War.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Don Estevan Mexia.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th instant, which I have forwarded to the Minister at War, to be laid before the Spanish Government.

‘ The allied British and Portuguese army under my command has, generally speaking, been subsisted from its magazines since it crossed the Agueda. If it has received any supplies from the country of Argañan, I conclude they have been paid for; and I do not suppose it is intended that the allied British and Portuguese army shall not enjoy the resources which the country affords, paying for the same.

‘ In regard to the assistance you demand for the garrison

of Ciudad Rodrigo, I answer that I will give no assistance in provisions to the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo or to any Spanish troops while in Spain, being quite convinced that the country is well able to supply the wants of all requiring supplies, if the abuses are remedied to which you adverted in your letter. The remedy does not rest with me.

‘ In answer to that part of your letter in which you require payment for the supplies received from you on the part of the Government by the British army in the course of the campaign, it is only necessary that the account of the amount of those supplies should be settled in order to be paid for, either to you or to the Government, according to my promise made to you at the commencement of the campaign.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Estevan Mexia.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812.

‘ I propose to leave this place to-morrow morning, and to sleep at Moraleja; on the 13th at Alcantara; 14th at Valencia de Alcantara; 15th at Badajoz; 16th at Fuente Cantos; 17th at Seville; 18th at Cadiz.

‘ Possibly you may find it convenient to meet us at Seville, as we shall have many matters to talk over. I have no notion of any thing likely to interrupt this proposed route, but I shall dispatch a courier to you if there should be any thing. I enclose the draft of a letter to the Minister at War with its enclosures. I bring nobody with me excepting Alava and Lord Fitzroy Somerset.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812.

‘ I set out for Cadiz to-morrow, and I shall be at Moraleja the 12th, Alcantara the 13th, Valencia de Alcantara 14th, Badajoz 15th, Fuente Cantos 16th, Seville 17th, Cadiz 18th.

‘ I shall be very much obliged if you will send any letters that may come from England, or that you may have occa-

sion to write to me, by a messenger direct to Badajoz with directions to follow me from thence by the high road of Seville to Cadiz.

‘ I propose to return here after staying a few days at Cadiz, by the same road.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have directed Sir R. Kennedy to give the Portuguese Government 200,000 dollars in the course of December.’

*To Viscount Palmerston, Secretary at War.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 11th Dec., 1812.

‘ I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the case of Paymaster —, of the —th foot, about whom I had the honor of writing to you on the 18th of August last.

‘ Having been directed by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to cause Mr. — to settle his outstanding accounts, I desired Lieut. Colonel — to place him in arrest, and order him forthwith to comply with His Royal Highness's commands; but finding that the Paymaster delayed doing so on the plea that the papers which related to the accounts in question were in England, I subsequently gave directions to his commanding officer to prefer charges against him, to which I received the enclosed answer from Lieut. Colonel —; by which it appears that he is not in possession of the documents necessary to enable him to draw up the charge.

‘ I am, therefore, under the necessity of bringing the subject under your Lordship's consideration; and I beg to be favored with your commands as to the mode of proceeding with Mr. —.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.  
the Secretary at War.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Moraleja, 13th Dec. 1812.

‘ As I have learnt from Hill that the passage through Estremadura is not quite safe, I have written the enclosed

letter to General Victoria, in order to have the 3rd regiment of cavalry placed on the road. I shall be obliged to you if you will have measures adopted for their supply in Estremadura. I shall do what I can for them as I pass Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ I was detained at Payo yesterday by the swelling of a river, by which I have lost a day; and I shall not be at Badajoz till the 16th.’

*To General Victoria.*

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ à Moraleja, ce 13 Dec., 1812.

‘ Je suis sur ma route pour aller à Seville et Cadiz, et je compte passer par Badajoz le 16. Comme on me dit qu’il y a plusieurs voleurs en Estremadure et en la Sierra Morena, je vous prie, aussitôt que vous recevrez cette lettre, de faire marcher le 3<sup>me</sup> régiment de dragons par les marches régulières à Fuente Cantos, où ils attendront nouvel ordre que je leur donnerai. Si tout le régiment n’est pas rassemblé à Elvas, vous aurez la bonté de faire marcher la partie du régiment qui sera à Elvas, et les détachemens suivront. Je prévien le Marquis del Palacio pour qu’il n’y ait pas de difficulté pour le passage du pont de Badajoz.

‘ Vous aurez soin de pourvoir à la nourriture des hommes et des chevaux, pendant qu’ils seront en Estremadure.

‘ Je vous prie de faire passer une copie de cette lettre au Maréchal Conde de Trancoso.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *General Victoria.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Elio.*

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ à Moraleja, ce 13 Dec., 1812.

‘ J’ai reçu votre lettre du 27 Novembre.

‘ Je vous ai écrit en triplicata par la voie du Duque del Parque; et je vous renvoie à cette lettre pour la connaissance de mes sentimens sur l’état des affaires.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *General Elio.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Moraleja, 13th Dec., 1812.

‘ I write just to let you know that I was detained yesterday at Payo by the swelling of a rivulet in the Puerto de Perales; and if the rain continues, I must expect to be detained again. I cannot now arrive at Seville till the 18th, nor at Cadiz till the 19th.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.’*

*To Colonel De Lancey.*

‘ MY DEAR DE LANCEY,

‘ Moraleja, 14th Dec., 1812.

‘ I have settled with Sir R. Hill that he shall remain at Coria as long as the weather continues as it has been lately; and he will go to Guinaldo, if the rivers should become fordable. He wishes you to come to him. The remainder of the Staff is to remain at head quarters.

‘ I omitted to mention to you, that General Alten had reported that a battalion of British infantry could be accommodated at Guinaldo, and furnished with bread at the rate of four reals a ration. Inform the Commissary General of this circumstance; and if he thinks this price will suit him, let one of the battalions of the Light division which are badly cantoned at Nave d’Aver and Fuentes, go to Guinaldo when the weather shall clear.

‘ I shall be very anxious to learn what has been done in the distribution of the great coats from Celorico; and of the blankets, when they arrive there. The 51st regiment appeared to me to be much in want of great coats, and should be supplied immediately, if they have them not of their own. The Commissary General omitted to state how many he had delivered to each regiment in the Light division. This must be accurately reported to the Secretary at War, in order that the expense may be charged against the regimental great coat funds.

‘ I enclose an order, which I beg you to give to the Adjutant General to be circulated. I missed my road on the 12th from Ligiosa, and went to Guinaldo instead of Puente de Villa. We were detained that night at Payo, by the

swelling of a rivulet, and did not arrive here till yesterday. But the lumbago is not worse.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel De Lancey.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Alburquerque, 18th Dec., 1812.

‘ Lord Fitzroy Somerset has given me your letter of the 10th, but I do not exactly understand the arrangement which you propose. You say that the Commissariat departments and contractors might be allowed to receive and keep in their service all those persons “who are not actually deserters, who did not belong to the troops of the line.”

‘ From the subsequent part of the letter, I imagine that you mean to prevent the departments from taking into their service, excepting as clerks or persons of trust and confidence, any who are liable to be called to serve in the line under the recruiting laws. Let me know whether the last or the first is your intention.

‘ I have been three days longer on my journey than I intended, owing to the fall of rain, which has swelled all the torrents, and I am now detained here by the swelling of the Gevora. I hope, however, to get to Badajoz this evening.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’*

*To Colonel De Lancey.*

‘ MY DEAR DE LANCEY, ‘ Alburquerque, 19th Dec., 1812.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 16th. I enclose a General Order, which will provide for the great coats. The distribution might have been better, but it must answer, as it is made.

‘ We have been detained here two days by the swelling of the Gevora and neighbouring streams, having been before delayed and put out of the way by others. However, I hope the delay will not be inconvenient to the public service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel De Lancey.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Forward the enclosed to Goodman to be published.’

*To Captain —.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Alburquerque, 19th Dec., 1812.

‘ When I appointed you to take charge of the prisoners of war at Lisbon, I was in hopes that you would perform your duty, and that I should receive no more such complaints as the enclosed. I now desire that you will go to the place where the prisoners of war are confined, and see that a remedy is applied to the complaints of the writers of the enclosed; and that you will send me, without loss of time, directed to head quarters, a certificate from these same officers, that you have done your duty by them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain —.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Those officers, who it appears are deserters, must be kept separate from the prisoners and treated with proper attention.’

*To Mrs. —.*

‘ MADAM,

‘ Alburquerque, 19th Dec., 1812.

‘ I received only yesterday your letter of the 10th, and I assure you that I feel no inclination to act harshly by Captain —. I must inform you, however, that under a recent regulation it is impossible for the commanding officer of the —th to make, or for me to forward, a recommendation that Captain — might be permitted to exchange; and without such recommendation it is not probable that the exchange should be allowed. I do not see what can be done, therefore, excepting that Captain — should give in his resignation, or take his trial before a General Court Martial.

‘ I am much concerned that you are in a situation to be distressed by these circumstances, but I am quite unaware in what manner it is possible for Captain — to avoid quitting the service or standing his trial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mrs. —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘ I arrived here only this day, having been detained on the road by the swelling of the rivers.

‘I am by no means satisfied with either Captain —, whom I have not seen, but who is gone to Merida to destroy the bridge without orders that I know of; or with Captain —, who appears to me quite incapable of executing such a trust as that of the charge of the works of this place.

‘I beg therefore that both may be relieved from hence without loss of time, and that you will send here an officer on whose judgment and discretion you can rely to execute the trust reposed in him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel

*Sir R. Fletcher, Bart.’*

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Piper, Royal Engineers.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘I beg that upon the receipt of this letter you will send to Lisbon for a return of the number of pontoons, with carriages, &c., complete, of the different sizes, now at that place.

‘I likewise request you will ascertain the size of the copper pontoons, taken from Badajoz, now at Elvas; and that you will make yourself acquainted with the number of them which have carriages fit for service, and balks and tressels.

‘You will likewise ascertain whether they can travel upon the carriages of the tin pontoons now at Elvas; and whether the balks, tressels, and anchors of those pontoons will answer for the copper pontoons taken from Badajoz. You will be prepared to report to me on all these points on my return to this place in ten days from this time.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Piper, R. E.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘I do not know what you have done or what has been determined respecting your Riband. I am inclined to believe that it is not necessary for you to be invested, and that this form is imposed only upon us military men.

‘However, if you are to be invested, and I should be authorized to invest you, and if circumstances should enable

me to go to Lisbon, I have no objection to go there on my return, which I expect will be about the .

‘ But observe that I am anxious not to go to Lisbon, excepting for this object. If I am to go to Lisbon, I wish you would order six horses or mules for my carriage to Estremoz. One relay of the Prince’s saddle horses might be at Monte Mor ó Novo, one at Vendas Novas, and one at Pegões. I shall leave the carriage at Monte Mor ó Novo, to go across to Abrantes. Alava and Lord Fitzroy Somerset are with me, and we shall want six horses for ourselves and servants, and two for our baggage at each stage.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ If I should go to Lisbon to invest you, you must order a feast and a ball, and invite the whole town to assist at the ceremony.

‘ I arrived here only this day, having been *en voyage par terre et par mer* ; and detained two entire days at Alburquerque. I find that the English messenger Williams has passed by.’

*To His Royal Highness the Duke of York.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘ When I saw Sir R. Hill lately, under whose command the 31st and 66th regiments have been, he mentioned to me, that he thought it would be advisable to extend to those battalions the arrangement which had been carried into execution in respect to other battalions of this army, formed into provisional battalions ; that is to say, that four or six companies of each should be sent to England.

‘ I am unwilling to adopt this arrangement till I shall learn your Royal Highness’s sentiments regarding that already submitted to you ; and I shall be much obliged to you, if you will let me know whether your Royal Highness approves of its being extended to the 31st and 66th regiments.

‘ I am of opinion that it would be advantageous to send home four companies of each of the 51st and 68th regiments ; keeping them, however, still as separate battalions, as they are Light, and I request your Royal Highness will

let me know whether this arrangement meets with your approbation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness  
the Duke of York.*

WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘ I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship that 10,000 great coats for the use of the British army should be sent to Lisbon without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘ Admiral Berkeley has sent me a message respecting his pay being stopped on account of his having ordered a passage to England for the late General Craufurd, in a gun vessel, in the commencement of the year 1811. I had received orders some time before, not to apply for a passage for any officer who was not returning to England on the public service, and as General Craufurd not only did not go on the public service, but contrary to my inclination, though with my consent, I did not apply for a passage for him at the expense of the public.

‘ I perfectly recollect, however, that nearly about the same time, many General and other officers were returning to England; and the Admiral had allowed them to go in a troop or store ship then about to return. I also recollect to have requested him to facilitate to Major General Craufurd the means of returning to England in a ship of war, meaning that he should allow him to go in that vessel. Major General Craufurd had, however, delayed his passage till after that vessel had sailed; and when he did determine to go, and waited upon the Admiral with my letter, it is not improbable that the Admiral understood that I applied for a passage for the General at the public expense; whereas I only intended to apply that his return to England might be facilitated in a ship of war in the same manner as the

return of others was at that time about to be facilitated, without any expense to the public.

‘ Under these circumstances, I trust that your Lordship may think it proper to recommend that the Admiral may receive his pay, which has been stopped.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Melville.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Torrens.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘ I enclose some letters which I have received from Dr. McGrigor, regarding certain promotions made by the Medical Board. I entirely agree with Dr. McGrigor in opinion, that it is no encouragement to those who are performing their duty with the army in this country to see, that when by their merits and exertions they have attracted the notice of their immediate superiors, and of the officers under whose command they are serving, and have been recommended for promotion, others have been preferred to them who have quitted the arduous service on which these have remained, probably to solicit from the Medical Board the promotion which these have been found to deserve by their exertions. The officers promoted by the Medical Board (one of them Mr. Higgins I know is) are meritorious; but neither deserve promotion equally with either Dr. Tyce or Mr. Guthrie.

‘ I have frequently made you acquainted with my sense of the inconvenience felt by the constant change of the officers employed in every branch of the service in this country. One of the principal causes of these changes is the practice of going to England to apply for promotion which ought to be acquired by service here; and I acknowledge that I do not see the utility of my forwarding the recommendations of the heads of departments of those officers whom they deem deserving of promotion, if to these recommendations are to be preferred the claims and applications of those who quit the service here, to go home to make them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 20th Dec., 1812.

‘ I arrived here this day on my way to Cadiz, having been detained many days on the road by the swelling of the rivers. I propose to be at the head quarters at Freneda early in January.

‘ I heard last night from the head quarters at Freneda of the 17th, and from Sir Rowland Hill’s quarters at Coria of the 18th. Nothing particular had occurred since I quitted that part of the country, and there has been no alteration in the situation of affairs since I addressed your Lordship on the 9th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Earl Bathurst.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Seville, 23rd Dec., 1812. 6 A.M.

‘ I received your letter by Williams, the messenger, and the duplicate of it by a Portuguese messenger on the road between Badajoz and this place; and you may depend upon my going to Lisbon for the purpose of investing you with the Bath, unless I should receive intelligence which should render it necessary for me to return immediately to head quarters, in which case I shall apprise you, and you had better come to me.

‘ I shall be at Cadiz to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir Charles Stuart, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

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